APR 27 1971

ORBIS

quarterly journal of world affairs

Volume XIV Fall 1970 Number 3

Public Protest, Political Leadership and Diplomatic Strategy — *James N. Rosenau*

"People's War": Vision vs. Reality — *Hammond Rolph*

The Soviet Union in the Middle East — *Alvin J. Cottrell*

Limiting Factors in a Reconsideration of U.S. China Policies — *Harry G. Gelber*

For an End to the Hundred Years War — *René Albrecht-Carrié*

The Fall of De Gaulle — *William G. Andrews*

Gaullism After De Gaulle — *Charles A. Micaud*

International Conferencing and the Summit: Macro-Analysis of Presidential Participation — *Elmer Plischke*

The Iraqi Revolution: A Case Study of Army Rule — *Phebe Ann Marr*

Cuba and the Communist System: The Politics of a Communist Independent, 1967-1969 — *Daniel Tretiak*

Reviews — *Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, Lothar Metzl, Linda Rose, Nicholas Balabkins*

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS, a quarterly journal of world affairs
published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

EDITOR: William R. Kintner
MANAGING EDITOR: Robert C. Herber
ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
ASSISTANT EDITOR: Margaret M. Capotrio
CIRCULATION MANAGER: Marsha Palitz

EDITOR EMERITUS: Robert Strausz-Hupé

EDITORIAL BOARD: James E. Dougherty, Morton A. Kaplan, Hans Kohn, Lawrence B. Krause, Norman D. Palmer, Stefan T. Possony, Frank N. Trager, Arthur P. Whitaker.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD: Loren C. Eiseley, Covey T. Oliver, Sidney I. Ploss, Froelich G. Rainey, J. K. Zawodny.
EDITORIAL RESEARCH STAFF: Nicholas D. Constan, Jr., Wayne H. Ferris, Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, Karl P. Sauvant, Harvey Sicherman, Gerald T. West.
SECRETARIAL STAFF: Betty Armstrong, Barbara Maser, Marcia Rose.

The Editors welcome articles that examine problems in international relations. Articles should be submitted in the original, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if the author desires to have his manuscript returned. Articles should conform to ORBIS style and format; text and footnotes should be double-spaced, and the latter placed at the end of the article. Address editorial communications and manuscripts to the Managing Editor.

Books, monographs and pamphlets for review or listing should be sent to the Managing Editor. Address correspondence relating to advertising to the Assistant Editor and communications relating to subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager.

ORBIS is indexed by *Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Current Contents, Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences* and *ABC Pol Sci.* Abstracts of ORBIS articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life,* both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts,* published in Paris by the International Political Science Association.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute or the Editors of ORBIS.

Copyright © 1971 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Delaware nonprofit corporation.

Out-of-print issues of ORBIS, volumes I-V, are available in reprint editions from the Kraus Reprint Corporation, 16 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017, at $90.00 for the five volumes, clothbound; $80.00, paperbound; and $16.00 a volume, paperbound. Individual issues and complete volumes from Volume VI on are obtainable by writing to the Circulation Manager; please note, however, that Volume VI, No. 4, Volume VIII, No. 4, Volume X, No. 2 and Volume XI, No. 4 are now out of print. Prices for complete volumes are at the yearly subscription rate of $6.00; individual copies are $2.00. Reprints of articles published in ORBIS, as long as they are available, are 25 cents each.

ORBIS is published four times a year, February, May, August, and November, by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Editorial and business address: 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Subscription rates: one year, $6.00; two years, $11.00; three years, $16.00. Single copy, $2.00. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa. and at additional mailing offices.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME XIV FALL 1970 NUMBER 3

Reflections on the Quarter 543

Public Protest, Political Leadership and Diplomatic Strategy . . . . . *James N. Rosenau* 557

"People's War": Vision vs. Reality . . . . . *Hammond Rolph* 572

The Soviet Union in the Middle East . . . . . *Alvin J. Cottrell* 588

Limiting Factors in a Reconsideration of U.S. China Policies . . . . . *Harry G. Gelber* 599

For an End to the Hundred Years War . . . *René Albrecht-Carrié* 627

The Fall of De Gaulle . . . . . *William G. Andrews* 642

Gaullism After De Gaulle . . . . . *Charles A. Micaud* 657

International Conferencing and the Summit: Macro-Analysis of Presidential Participation . . *Elmer Plischke* 673

The Iraqi Revolution: A Case Study of Army Rule . . . . . *Phebe Ann Marr* 714

Cuba and the Communist System: The Politics of a Communist Independent, 1967-1969 . . . *Daniel Tretiak* 740

Reviews:

The Prospects for European Integration . . *Diane K. Pfaltzgraff* 765

Communist Political Terror: A Behaviorist Interpretation . . . . . *Lothar Metzl* 769

Jerusalem and the Arab-Israeli Conflict . . . . *Linda Rose* 773

The Course of West German-Israeli Relations . . . . . *Nicholas Balabkins* 776

Books Received 781

Contributors to this Issue 793

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

An International Research and Study Center, Founded in 1950, with Headquarters in Munich, Germany

In addition to books and monographs, the Institute regularly publishes the following periodicals devoted to all aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policy:

BULLETIN ..... $12.00 per year
(in English, 12 issues per year)

STUDIES ON THE SOVIET UNION ..... $12.00 per year
(in English, 4 issues per year)

ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA UNIÓN SOVIÉTICA $ 1.00 per year
(in Spanish, 4 issues per year)

MAJALLAH ..... $ 1.00 per year
(in Arabic, 3 issues per year)

REVIEW OF SOVIET MEDICAL SCIENCES $ 4.00 per year
(in English, 2 issues per year)

DERGI ..... $ 1.00 per year
(in Turkish, 4 issues per year)

PROBLÈMES SOVIÉTIQUES ..... $ 2.00 per year
(in French, 2 issues per year)

SOWJETSTUDIEN ..... $ 2.00 per year
(in German, 2 issues per year)

ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
(in English, 40 issues per year) ..... $10.00 per year
(in Russian, 40 issues per year) ..... $10.00 per year
(in Spanish, 20 issues per year) ..... $ 5.00 per year

SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA ..... $ 5.00 per year
(in Russian, 5 issues per year)

For information, subscriptions, samples:

Munich Office • Mannhardtstrasse 6 • 8 Munich 22, Germany

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Columbia University Press

Alliance Politics

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT

"This brilliantly subtle and realistic study throws penetrating light on the way that governments, nominally united in friendship and alliance, can misperceive each other and each other's problems. It is an important, original and authoritative work."—*Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.* $5.95

The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967

DAVID A. KAY

"In what must be one of the least noted revolutions in modern international affairs, 33 new nations entered the UN between 1960 and 1967. Here Kay offers an outstanding appraisal of the immediate consequences . . . one of those infrequent scholarly monographs which should appeal to laymen as well as specialists."—*Library Journal.* $10.00

Appearance and Reality in International Relations

GRANT HUGO

This book attempts to analyze some of the ideas commonly employed by governments in the conduct of international relations. Mr. Hugo insists that the only real difference between one decision and another is to be discerned in its concrete results rather than in its antecedents or the merits of the motives that prompted it. $5.95

The Security of China

ARTHUR HUCK

What are the conditions under which the present Communist rulers of China would feel their country was secure? How do they differ from previous republican and imperial ideas of China's security? Is China really a "paper tiger" militarily and economically?

This book answers these and other currently vital questions about China's role in the world power struggle. $4.95 cloth $1.95 paper

Communist China and Latin America, 1959-1967

CECIL JOHNSON

Analyzes the major effort made by the Chinese, especially during the years 1959-1967, to try to become a major force on the Latin American scene. The Maoist theory of "people's war" is systematically analyzed and compared with the strategy articulated by Regis Debray, Che Guevara, and Fidel Castro. The Sino-Cuban ideological and political controversy is also examined in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the global struggle with the United States.
Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University. $9.95

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Address for orders: 136 So. Broadway, Irvington, N.Y. 10533.
In Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 3458 Redpath St., Montreal 109.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REFERENCE WORKS

Subject Catalogue of
THE ROYAL COMMONWEALTH SOCIETY, London

All aspects of the culture and development of those countries which are now or have been part of the Commonwealth are covered by the *Subject Catalogue of The Royal Commonwealth Society*. The Society's Library, since its foundation in 1868, has expanded its collection to an estimated 400,000 books, pamphlets, official publications and periodicals, in subject areas that include literature and the arts, as well as geographical, political, historical and economic aspects. The key is the extensive card catalogue, arranged by geographical areas and sub-divided by subjects. Within these headings, the order is chronological.

Estimated 146,000 cards reproduced in 7 volumes

***Prepublication price*: $490.00; *after April* 30, 1971: $615.00**

Catalog of the FOREIGN RELATIONS Library
The Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., New York

The collection, approximately 55,000 volumes, consists of the following: documents of international organizations, including those of such organizations as the Council of Europe, the European Communities, the International Court, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Nordic Council, and many others, all fully catalogued; government documents, especially United States, including treaties and hearings involving the conduct of international relations; books and pamphlets, both trade and institutional, in all western European languages. The catalog is in dictionary form—author, subject and title (on a limited basis).

Estimated 153,000 cards reproduced in 9 volumes ***Price*: $590.00**

10% additional charge on orders outside the U.S.

Descriptive material on these titles and a complete catalog of publications are available on request.

G. K. HALL & CO. 70 Lincoln Street, Boston, Mass. 02111

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reflections on the Quarter

Whither Chile?

NO event since Fidel Castro came to power has so dramatized the change in Latin America's political climate over the intervening decade as the assumption of the Chilean presidency by an avowed Marxist, Salvador Allende Gossens. Elected by the Chilean Congress, into which the presidential contest had been thrown when none of the three candidates in the September 1970 election had obtained the majority required (Allende's percentage was 36.3), the new Chief Executive has been pursuing radical policies that are unsettling to many Chileans and foreigners alike, though not to his partisans.

Particularly concerned over Allende's declared intention to turn Chile into a socialist state are neighboring Argentina and Brazil, and, farther north, the United States; they fear an extension of his ideology to other South American nations. That, indeed, has already happened in Bolivia and Peru, both of which have been encouraged to move further leftward by his assumption of power. Others similarly affected, though more subtly, are Ecuador and Venezuela. If Allende continues to employ the clever tactics that worked so well during his first months as President, his influence is likely to extend far beyond the few countries mentioned. The contrast he offers to bombastic, threatening, extremist Castro is likely to exercise a narcotic effect upon many *latinos* who hold beliefs akin to those of Castro, but who have refrained from translating them into practical terms for fear of being identified with the now generally unadmired Cuban dictator and ultimately discredited. Allende, in short, seems destined to play the continental role that Castro, because of his excessive revolutionary zeal, was unable to perform successfully.

To be sure, Castro has welcomed Allende's victory. Diverging from his old policy of recognizing as "true revolutionaries" only those who fight for power with gun in hand, and seeming at the same time to be embracing the despised Soviet "revisionist" line of "peaceful coexistence," Castro has accepted Allende as a member in good standing of the revolutionary fraternity. Allende, on his part, was extremely prompt to renew diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba, without so much as informing (much less consulting with) the Organization of American States, which he was obliged to do since Chile voted in January 1962 with a majority of American states to break relations with Havana and join the economic blockade against Cuba.

It is a measure of the Chilean leader's astuteness, however, that he postponed an invitation to Castro to visit Chile until after the April 1971 municipal elections,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which will be a test of his and his government's popularity. (Nothing less than 50 per cent of the municipal vote will suffice for popular endorsement, in the reckoning of Luis Corvalán, Secretary General of the Communist Party, which formed a major element of the Unidad Popular coalition that supported Allende's candidacy and also figures large in the Allende Government.) This is not the way Castro would probably have behaved under the same circumstances: he would have told Allende to visit Cuba without regard for the implications.

Allende has been a frequent visitor to Cuba since the 1959 revolution and has long admired Castro. How he reconciles his admiration for the fiery Cuban dictator—which would seem to indicate ideological affinities between them—with the continuation of democratic procedures in Chile, is a question as yet unanswered. The apparent dichotomy suggests, however, the possibility that Allende can turn out to be the Janus Castro was in the beginning—with the difference that, in his early months of office at least, he is practicing, *after* taking power, the democratic role Castro adopted beforehand. He may well be biding his time before doing away with the opposition by one means or another—assuming he can first neutralize or undermine the armed forces.

The Soviet government has expressed gratification with the Allende victory, and has renewed diplomatic and trade relations with Chile, as have also China and other communist states. Moscow sees Allende as a Marxist in the orthodox mold—except for his aberrant admiration of Castro—who is pursuing "sensible" policies that are likely to turn Chile into a full-fledged socialist state. More than that, Allende is the supreme justification of the wisdom of the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" as contrasted with Cuba's "path of armed revolution." From Moscow's perspective, the Allende victory provides encouragement to other pro-Soviet forces in Latin America to try to duplicate his feat, while at the same time showing Castro that he could do worse than buy that policy himself. Indeed, since Allende, Castro seems to have initiated a dual policy of "peaceful coexistence" *and* "armed revolution" toward the rest of Latin America.

Although it is highly unlikely that the Chilean-Soviet relationship has yet advanced to the point where Moscow has begun building a naval base at Valparaíso, as has been rumored, such a project—or at least closer Soviet-Chilean military ties—cannot be excluded as a possibility in the future. The necessary acquiescence of Chile's armed forces, which hitherto have been American-oriented, would have to be obtained. But reports from Santiago indicate that the armed forces are perturbed by the U.S. government's refusal to permit the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* to visit Chile, upon Allende's invitation, after he had met with Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations. They appear to consider this a rebuff to them as well as the President. According to the usually reliable *New York Times* corres-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pondent in Santiago, Juan de Onís, cancellation of the visit "has raised doubts in the [Chilean] armed forces over future relations with the United States military." If this is truly their feeling, no news about Chile could be graver: her military constitutes the only real bulwark against the revolutionary forces represented by Allende.

Allende has gone forward with his electoral program to socialize Chile's basic industries and financial system. He has sent to Congress a constitutional amendment providing for the nationalization of, and compensation for, the huge copper mines partly owned by the U.S. firms, Kennecott and Anaconda. The nitrate, iron, coal and iodine mining industries have been, or soon will be, nationalized. Equally or even more radical is nationalization of banking and finance, highlighted by the takeover—allegedly motivated by political enmity, at least in part—of the Banco Edwards, long owned by one of Chile's oldest families. Only a few domestic banks and financial institutions have thus far been affected, Allende has carefully pointed out. The fate of their foreign-owned counterparts—which include the Bank of America, the First National City Bank, and the Banco de Londres y Sud America—will be "negotiated."

Among the regime's most radical proposals is that calling for replacement of the bicameral Congress, in which the opposing Christian Democratic and National parties hold a majority, by a unicameral Popular Assembly elected by voters who would include, for the first time, eighteen-year-olds and illiterates. This could be the initial step in establishing a "people's democracy," featuring a Soviet-type legislative body which gives "representation" to the "people" but no power to legislate or act as a check upon the other branches of government. One of the Popular Assembly's functions would be to name Supreme Court justices, the intention being to remove at once those who have made the Court an organ of "bourgeois justice."

One of Allende's disturbing moves has been his gradual silencing of press opposition. The celebrated example is his official intervention in *El Mercurio,* Chile's largest and most influential daily, owned by his mortal foes, the Edwards family, on the ground that its account books were not in order; under extreme pressure, editor and publisher Agustín Edwards fled into exile and his workers promptly formed a "cooperative"—a government-inspired device—and took over. Generally, as the Christian Democrats have charged, Allende has been gradually overwhelming the opposition press by granting all sorts of assistance and favors to the leftist media—television, for example, is practically a government monopoly—and denying facilities to those who oppose him. He has carefully avoided, so far, Castro's mistake of forcibly closing down opposition press organs. On the other hand, he imitates Castro, in the months after the latter seized power, in complaining bitterly of the "lack of objectivity" of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign press, which he has indicated he might act against.

Either to show his evenhandedness, or to take his opponents off guard and continue building his image as a genuine democrat, Allende had the *carabineros* detain several members of the extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) who had committed acts of terror, and then warned in sharp language that he would thenceforth bring to bear the whole repressive apparatus of the state against any group that flouted the law and committed acts of political violence. He was careful to add later, however, that the guilty MIR youngsters were *buenos muchachos* —"good boys"—who meant no harm; this can be interpreted as an attempt to allay doubts expressed publicly by the MIR and other far-left groups about Allende's intentions to go forward to a socialist society. Furthermore, he took equal care not to prosecute the Indians in southern Chile who went beyond the agrarian reform law in seizing land for themselves from owners as yet unexpropriated or not in line for expropriation.

The Christian Democrats, whose votes in Congress gave the presidency to Allende, have since had cause to fear the direction he is setting for Chile. Several of its senators recently denounced a conspiratorial plan which, they claimed, had the support of prominent Allende lieutenants, to stage an armed insurrection and install communism. (The accusers did not say whether the authors of the alleged plan intended to retain Allende as President.) Other Christian Democratic leaders have charged that Communist Party members are steadily infiltrating the government. Although the Communist Party is one of the two senior partners, along with Allende's Socialist Party, in the victorious Unidad Popular coalition, by agreement it has occupied only a handful of top governmental posts in order to maintain a "low profile." This is another expression of Allende's policy of relative moderation, in a calculated effort to avoid Castro's tactical errors and preclude or blunt foreign criticism of him as a "communist." Yet it should not be forgotten that his Socialist Party is well to the left of its Communist partner and has consistently advocated more militant policies; it is difficult to see how the entrance of more Communists into the government will further radicalize it. Welcoming them could, however, represent a closer orientation toward the Soviets in Chilean foreign policy.

Allende's chief worry is neither foreign opinion nor middle- and upper-class reaction to his policies, but the armed forces. He can afford to ignore the United States, for example, even though he is at pains not to show unfriendliness toward Washington—as he demonstrated when he invited the *Enterprise* to visit in answer to charges that he was permitting the establishment of a Soviet base at Valparaíso. Chile is receiving little U.S. aid, and American companies and banks can probably be "bought off" with adequate compensation for their properties and other "carrots." At the same time, because

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he is in need of foreign capital and desirous of stopping the outflow of capital from Chile, he wants to assure international money markets that he is not violently anti-American like Castro. He is not unaware of rising opposition from the middle and upper classes who, together with an undetermined number of members of the working class and the peasantry, gave the combined opposition nearly two-thirds of the presidential vote last September; but if his economic policies turn out to have benefited most Chileans, and they vote accordingly in April, he will have free rein to continue them whether or not the Christian Democrats and Nacionalistas keep on criticizing him. The real question remains, what will the armed forces do?

They are certainly cognizant that, ultimately, Allende's socialist program must lead to their elimination as they are presently constituted, or at least their neutralization. Just as Rómulo Betancourt realized that his only hope of carrying out his program as President of Venezuela was to allay the military's suspicions of him, so must Allende do likewise—with the difference that he promulgates a wholly socialist program whereas Betancourt's was only mildly leftist. Understanding this from the start, Allende has ratified in office the service chiefs who had been appointed by his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, and has thus far showed no sign of "exiling" them or moving his own military supporters into key posts. Further, he utilizes every opportunity—as when the MIR terrorists were apprehended—to praise the armed forces for their "patriotic attitude," and to express confidence that they will continue in that attitude. In interviews with the foreign press, in particular, he usually emphasizes that conviction. The armed forces, then, have no better booster than the President of Chile, and it would be only natural if, as a result, they reciprocated by maintaining, on the surface at any rate, an ever stronger loyalty to him.

Perhaps in the case of the junior officers and the rank and file, that loyalty will prove more than skin deep, especially if Allende is able to supplement his pro-military propaganda with material rewards for them and their families. But the senior officers, and other more mature members of the armed forces, fear that the eventual consequence of Allende's policies may be to challenge their loyalty to him and cause them to wonder whether that is synonymous with loyalty to nation. As they look next door to Peru and Bolivia, where the military themselves are in charge of what seem to be "safe" social reform programs, they must wonder also whether the destinies of Chile would not be better off in their hands. There can be little doubt that, unless they can be brainwashed by Allende, they will be determined to avoid the fate of the Cuban army after Castro took power.

Since a substantial element—perhaps a majority—of the members of Unidad Popular probably would like to mete out that fate to the Chilean military, and replace it with a "revolutionary" or "peo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ple's" militia—which is what the MIR and other extremists are advocating publicly—it is not unlikely that the leaders of Chile's armed forces are discussing or planning measures to forestall such an eventuality. They must be aware that appeasement of them is a tactic to gain time.

If that is the case, the April municipal elections may prove to be a decisive turning point. Should Unidad Popular poll 50 per cent of the vote, "Then we would be in a position to hit the enemy harder, and we would be able not only to accelerate economic and social transformations but to bring about the institutional changes in our program for the Congress and the judiciary," according to Corvalán, the Communist chieftain. Among the institutional changes could be the substitution of the armed forces by a "people's army." But if Unidad Popular obtains the same 36 per cent it did in the election last September, "or just a little bit more, this would be seen here and abroad as a failure for us, and the track would become heavy for us," confesses Corvalán, using racehorse jargon. It would definitely encourage the doubtful or anti-Allende elements within the armed forces, and the country generally, to take measures to halt or slow down the drive toward socialism.

Short of an outright coup like the one in Peru some thirty months ago, however, it is doubtful whether the military and/or the moderates in Chilean society will be able to reverse fundamentally the trend that Allende and his Unidad Popular have set in motion. Chile is likely to experience profound changes whether Allende remains in power or is displaced by the military *à la* Peru. The real question is whether she will move with great rapidity to a position akin to Cuba's—that is, become a communist state dominated by a one-party dictatorship—or toward the Scandinavian model of a social democracy, permitting a multiplicity of parties and leaving the door open to peaceful transfers of power to nonsocialists.

The Polish Workers' Rebellion

ON December 14, 1970, Polish workers in the northern port city of Gdansk marched on Communist Party headquarters to demonstrate against sharp, government-enacted price increases for food, fuel and clothing and to register their opposition to a new wage incentive system scheduled to take effect in January. The protest, peaceful and orderly at its start, broke into a full-scale riot shortly after the demonstrators reached party headquarters. A major battle ensued between workers and militiamen, and the headquarters was heavily damaged. The inability of the militia to restore order prompted authorities to call in armed forces, including tank support.

News of the events in Gdansk sped quickly to all parts of Poland, causing chain-reaction demonstrations. Several reached riot proportions, most notably in the cities of Gdynia, Slupsk, Sopot and Szczecin. For five days the conflagration

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

raged, surpassing in violence the student demonstrations of 1968 and even the Poznan riots of 1956. When order had finally been re-established, official reports indicated some twenty dead and hundreds injured, many seriously. Unofficial observers suggested that the toll was considerably higher.

The most important and immediate political outcome was the "resignation" of Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Communist Party, ostensibly for reasons of health. The timing of his departure (one day after the rioting had ended) and the simultaneous departure of four of his cohorts on the twelve-man Politburo left no doubt that a purge had been effected.

A hue of irony colored this denouement, for Gomulka had been swept into power on the crest of the 1956 wave of riots in Poznan, also sparked by economic discontent. Furthermore, in November his prestige had reached a notable high as a result of the treaty signed by Polish and West German representatives during a visit to Warsaw by Chancellor Brandt. In this agreement the two countries formally affirmed the inviolability of the German-Polish frontier at the Oder-Neisse line, as set by the Potsdam Conference of 1945, and renounced all future claims on the other's territory.

The riots that toppled Gomulka resulted from major policy measures designed to reform the stagnating economy. The wage incentive plan to which the workers in Gdansk had objected was aimed at substantially increasing worker productivity, plant efficiency and quality production by introducing and institutionalizing certain aspects of market economy into the Polish system. Thus Gomulka's attempt to cure the economy, ailing after more than two decades of communist rule, was ironically a principal cause of his ouster.

The government had begun to entertain proposals for a new economic model as early as 1964. But fear of the new, ideological attachment to the old, and the realization by well-established vested interests that a new system might damage their position had made it impossible to implement necessary changes. In 1970 prices and wages continued to be determined more by executive fiat than by supply-demand relationships; efficiency in production was still hindered by excessive centralization in decision-making.

Such a system cannot compete with Western economies. Trade with the Western world is a necessity to compensate for goods in short supply in Poland, but most Polish manufacturers cannot match the output of their Western counterparts, and on the eve of the riots Poland had only food and raw materials or scarce hard currency to offer in trade. The trade of even these items posed concomitant hardships: agricultural production, always hampered by the structure of the economic system, had suffered poor harvests from adverse climatic conditions, and paying for needed imports with hard currency required, over the long run, a favorable balance of trade which Poland had not enjoyed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The leadership's procrastination in implementing reform had further diminished the country's economic performance. In a speech delivered one week prior to the outbreak of the riots, Politburo member Boleslaw Jaszczuk admitted that the rate of national income growth had decreased significantly since 1955 in spite of the infusion of large capital investments into the economy. Imbalances in supply-demand relationships necessitated the price increases, applying to two-thirds of the Polish market, which the Gomulka regime effected in mid-December.

The timing of the increases—preceding the Christmas holidays and when food, fuel and clothing were in poor supply—surprised many observers. One explanation hypothesized that the Soviets had pressured for the change to test the possible reaction to similar price increases contemplated for the Soviet Union in 1971. Another explanation held that pressure for the pre-Christmas edict had come from conservative political forces within the Polish Communist Party, led by General Mieczyslaw Moczar, in an attempt to embarrass the Gomulka regime. Still others believed that the Gomulka group had railroaded the increases through to override more orthodox party elements who had been resisting change and thus set the stage for sweeping economic reforms to follow in 1971.

The Gomulka leadership must have considered the step carefully, and no doubt believed in the wisdom of the decision. Opposition forces may have pressed for the increases, but it seems probable that the leaders could have postponed them until a later date if they had deemed this course of action preferable. The regime's failure to gauge the outcome correctly testifies to the volatile nature of the communist political system and the lack of communication between party and populace.

One factor that may have contributed to the protest demonstrations was an increase in freedom given to Polish workers in 1970. This indulgence granted by the government was part of an effort to prod middle-level Communist Party bureaucrats toward the implementation of a new economic model. The bureaucrats, lacking technical expertise, had feared system changes that would reduce their usefulness and had steadfastly resisted reforms. The leadership apparently thought that pressure from below, from the workers, in addition to that already being exerted from above, might squeeze them into compliance. Workers were encouraged, tacitly or otherwise, to confront management directly with grievances. Union leaders were instructed to adopt a tougher stance vis-à-vis management. The workers also began to acquire a stronger voice in union affairs. Meanwhile, the Polish press and other media began to publicize Polish problems with new freedom and candor. All these events may have prepared the way for the workers' decision to make known their opposition to regime policies.

The subsequent power struggle was won by Edward Gierek, who succeeded Gomulka as Secretary of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Communist Party. While it is too early to evaluate the new leadership, most observers agree that initial signs point to a less orthodox, less dogmatic regime. Gierek, a member of the Politburo since 1959, entered office with a reputation as a pragmatist, largely because of his close ties with the technocrats in the party. His efforts to bring modernization and reform to the Katowice region, of which he was party head, had gained him distinction as an expert on industrial and economic problems. It seems likely that he will address himself to finding a cure for the ailing economy. A number of high-level appointees who have followed him into power are also thought to be adherents of a more liberal line.

Although "anarchists," "enemies of Poland" and "hooligans" have been blamed for the riots, the new regime has recognized that they stemmed from legitimate grievances and has undertaken measures designed to remedy the more stressful aspects of the situation. To this end Gierek has requested the cooperation of all elements in society —nonparty as well as party, nonbelievers as well as believers. Immediate measures included a two-year price freeze on food and the appropriation of seven billion zlotys to be distributed among large families, retired people and low-income groups to offset the price increases. Meetings to launch the latter program were called in a hundred representative factories between party members, trade union representatives, plan administrators and workers' groups. Gierek also announced the government's intention to consult more frequently with the working class and the intelligentsia, and declared that the national economic plan would be subject to a re-examination.

As the new year began, broad public discussion was initiated in preparation for an approaching session of the Central Committee. On January 10 a party-designed "consumers' charter" was officially approved by the Council of Ministers. The charter pledged that prices of nonseasonal goods would be held constant for two years and that prices of industrial goods would be subject to reduction in response to increased production and lowered production costs. It also declared that manufacturers, rather than the central authorities in Warsaw, would henceforth initially set prices, and that consumer research would be undertaken on a broad scale.

Such measures alone, however, will not be sufficient to resolve Poland's economic problems. In the final analysis, genuine reform can only be brought about through changes in the ingrained attitudes and habits responsible for the irrational, inefficient economic-political system that has existed for more than two decades.

The economic bureaucracy, its usefulness limited in the projected new system, cannot be expected willingly to collaborate in its own demise. Even from the workers cooperation is uncertain, for the December riots suggest that the working class will not readily acquiesce in the enactment of a new program, even one supposedly intended to redound to its benefit. Memories of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the regime's undelivered promises are vivid in the minds of most citizens. It is to be expected that the retraining process required under the new system will engender further worker resistance; retraining might also result in unemployment for many. Finally, from the workers' perspective, the new plan might be regarded as merely another gambit to increase output without compensating gains in salary and fringe benefits.

Economic discontent has been a contributing factor in all the major postwar outbreaks of violence in Eastern Europe (East Germany, 1953; Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968; Poland, 1956, 1968 and 1970). Thus far, such riotous incidents have been confined within the borders of the respective countries. But the possibility remains that an eruption of violence in one country may spread across borders to other East European states. This prospect is undoubtedly understood as much in Moscow as it is in Eastern Europe, for Soviet control of the entire area is ultimately at stake. The Soviets' overwhelming military power and their will to use it were amply demonstrated in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. But it is questionable whether they could simultaneously put down three "Czechoslovakias" (e.g., Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia) without risk to their own position.

Hence, the dilemma. Continued procrastination with respect to the economic malaise in Eastern Europe can only further magnify the problems for the Soviet Union by increasing the probability of violence against the political system it has prescribed for the communist bloc. However, efforts to engineer requisite reform in the communist countries carry the same danger. As in Poland, violence may arise from anxiety over the anticipated changes because of their potentially adverse effect on at least some portions of the society.

The Middle East: Negotiations and Beyond

BY February 1971 the exchange of messages among Israel, Egypt and Jordan through UN mediator Gunnar Jarring had approached a critical point, staved off by a thirty-day renewal of the cease-fire. On March 7, the formal cease-fire agreement expired when Egypt refused to join Israel in extending it. The circumstances of the cease-fire are of crucial importance in consideration of a negotiated settlement of hostilities. The original Middle East cease-fire after the 1967 war was abrogated by the late President Nasser's "war of attrition," which apparently aimed at making the cost of Israeli occupation along Suez too expensive to bear. In retrospect, by the spring of 1969 the Israelis had frustrated the war of attrition through their air force; the Nasser regime had few military or political prospects until the Soviet Union intervened with anti-aircraft missilery.

The United States appears to have concluded that the USSR would cooperate in avoiding situations likely to lead to superpower

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confrontation. In this interpretation excessive Israeli retaliation, rather than any change in Moscow's policy, forced Soviet intervention in "defense" of the Egyptian regime. Therefore, when the Israeli Air Force, in a remarkable display of concentrated bombing, eliminated all SAM sites along the canal zone, Soviet intervention on a grander scale seemed inevitable. But what if the USSR, in direct conflict with Israel, began to wear the Israelis down? Could the United States then avoid the dreaded confrontation?

The peace initiative of Secretary of State Rogers was designed to lessen the likelihood of Soviet intervention by halting the war of attrition. The United States guaranteed the Israelis that no "improvements" (SAM sites) would be installed, while promising the Egyptians that no U.S. jets would be sent to Israel. The hope was that both Washington and Moscow would thus be given the opportunity to "de-escalate" their commitments to proxies and begin the difficult process of negotiating peace.

In the apparent belief that the USSR and Egypt would not violate the accords, the United States refrained from intelligence gathering until the Israelis charged violations and refused to enter the negotiations. To Washington's astonishment, photographs taken by U.S. reconnaissance missions portrayed an elaborate and sophisticated SAM missile system under construction by the Egyptians, obviously with Soviet assistance. In response to U.S. inquiries, Moscow insisted that *it* had not been a "party" to the cease-fire. After diplomatic protests produced no results, the United States agreed to supply Israel with new jets and equipment.

The Rogers peace initiative thus had mixed results. The Arab eastern front was greatly weakened because of the Jordanian civil war which erupted as a consequence of the guerrillas' refusal to recognize the cease-fire. The United States can claim some credit for the preservation of King Hussein by its assembly of fleet and force during the conflict. Nonetheless, on the Suez Canal front the Soviets have accomplished—through the very intervention the Rogers initiative was supposed to prevent—an improved military array to resume the war of attrition.

As for the negotiations, the plans of the respective parties are now on the table. The fundamental difference between the Israeli and Egyptian and Jordanian positions is simple. The Israelis see the purpose of the negotiation as delineating "agreed and secure borders." The map of those borders and a peace treaty recognizing them comprise the substance of the talks. The Arabs view the negotiation as a means to obtain Israeli withdrawal to the borders of 1967, with "agreement" upon those boundaries influenced by a settlement of the refugee problem. It is difficult to anticipate any useful exchange of proposals on this basis.

Meanwhile, the threat of a renewal of hostilities has been brandished by the Arabs to pressure the United States into convincing Israel

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the need to modify her position. This influence is aided immeasurably by the Rogers peace proposals of December 1969, which envisage essentially the 1967 borders as the final "secure and agreed" boundaries, backed by Four-Power or UN guarantees. In effect, the Egyptians have been trying to obtain a public U.S. commitment to press the Rogers Plan upon the Israelis—or the war of attrition will be resumed, with Israel facing a reinforced SAM system and aircraft piloted by Russians.

Washington postponed such a confrontation temporarily through securing a one-month extension of the cease-fire. Having promised the Israelis *not* to insist upon the Rogers proposals in the negotiations, Secretary Rogers declared to the Egyptians that his proposals still represent official and active U.S. policy on the settlement. Meanwhile, President Sadat of Egypt coupled his renewal of the cease-fire arrangement with a demand for "tangible" progress from the negotiations; that is, a withdrawal timetable, presumably arranged by U.S. pressure on Israel.

The United States is now in a peculiar position. If it does not exert extreme pressure upon Israel to agree to the Rogers Plan, the war of attrition may resume. If it does exercise whatever leverage it has over Israel, it will have violated its pledge to that beleaguered state. This default would be seen as the direct result of the threat, real or implied, of Soviet military intervention.

Washington has thus arrived at a crucial turning point in its Middle East policy. If it presses the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territories, Israel must in return be offered an extraordinary security guarantee, perhaps a formal treaty, since the Israelis are unlikely to trust to international arrangements, remembering that they failed so badly in 1967; Four-Power assurances have little meaning if two of these powers are open antagonists. In short, the unstable geographic situation of 1967 would have to be "stabilized" by open American commitment to a border. This form of settlement can only aid the Soviet position, for it makes the United States chiefly responsible for maintaining circumstances odious to Israel, and, pending a refugee settlement, odious to the Arabs.

The alternative, not to insist upon the Rogers Plan but to pressure both sides into "talking out a settlement," is also a risky proposition, primarily because the Soviet Union, through its intervention, and the UAR, through the cease-fire violations, threaten war if their proposals are not substantially accepted. The only real pressure the United States can exert upon the Arabs consists of arms for Israel. The Soviets, having "produced" the UAR for the peace talks, remain attached to the Arab position on the eventual settlement, with emphasis on clearance of the Suez Canal as an immediate gesture.

Therefore, the choice appears to lie between a "peace" entirely inimical to Israel, and brought about patently through threat of Soviet military intervention, or a resumption of war with prospects

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of more direct Soviet military intervention and confrontation.

There is perhaps a third route that avoids these pitfalls. Since Moscow, for geopolitical reasons, is interested in reopening the Suez Canal, the Egyptian settlement may be separated from the future of Jordan's boundaries. The Jordanian question, which includes the status of Jerusalem, is much more emotionally charged. The Soviet peace plan envisaged a partial Israeli withdrawal from the canal as "a first step." General Dayan is rumored to favor something similar. Now President Sadat has proposed a reopening of the canal with partial Israeli withdrawal. Under this arrangement, the question might become one of military tenability for the Israelis, should the Egyptians renege on free passage or transfer their army to the other side of the canal. In addition, King Hussein would suffer a hard political blow, for his ostensibly "pro-Western" policy would have yielded him nothing, while those supported by Moscow would have regained some territory, *even without a peace treaty.*

The USSR, on its part, pursues a policy attended by considerable risk. Should the war of attrition resume, there is no guarantee that Soviet intervention will either sustain the war or keep the Israelis from a general and desperate military endeavor. Until the cease-fire violations of August 1970, the Soviet intervention had been carried out under cover of the balance of terror. If it takes on major and menacing characteristics, the United States and the other Western states will have great public support for stern countermeasures. An open Soviet "threat," heretofore omitted, would signify a challenge the United States could not afford to avoid.

Governments act upon both capabilities and assumptions of intentions. The cease-fire violations should have exploded the logic that the Middle East conflict precludes either Soviet chicanery or direct Soviet intervention. That this intervention in its present size can threaten the Israelis with a successful war of attrition is unproved. It cannot be presumed that the Soviets would intervene massively should that war falter, although the consequences of having their bluff called could be ruinous to Moscow's prestige in the Middle East.

What appears sure, however, is that Moscow is not interested in a peaceful settlement short of its consolidation of power in Egypt and along the canal. There is no indication, given the problem of "secure and recognized" borders, that the settlement Moscow envisages involves any less danger to Israel. To prevent the balance of power shifting further toward the Soviet Union and its "client states," a greater and more explicit commitment may be required of the United States. The U.S. interest lies in the reduction of Soviet influence in Egypt. Against misgivings that the strengthening of Israel will lead to the USSR's even greater commitment to its Arab "clients," it is difficult to conceive that the destruction or weakening of Israel will contribute to a diminution of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet influence in the Middle East. Hence Washington, at this stage, has no choice but to prevent a further deterioration in the prevailing balance of forces.

Essentially, the United States can follow one of three courses of action designed to diminish Soviet influence: (1) Return the Israelis to the insecure borders of 1967, guarantee the security of these borders, and by doing so in the face of a Soviet-sustained threat of a renewed war of attrition, liquidate its own political position, in the hope that Moscow will reduce its commitment to Egypt. (2) Call the Soviet-Egyptian bluff by refusing to force the Israelis into an unnegotiated map, thereby trusting the outcome to Israeli skill and Moscow's fear of heavy intervention and direct confrontation. Or (3) separate the Egyptian and Jordanian positions by pressuring the Israelis into a withdrawal from the canal, in the expectation that the Soviets will not place their forces in the Sinai or intervene to assure that the territory on the eastern front seized by Israel in the Six-Day War is returned to Jordan.

The Rogers peace initiative and its assumptions lead directly to road one; President Nixon's speech of July 1, 1970, stressing American determination to meet threats and challenges, suggests road two. The third road is a compromise born of desperation. These choices and their ramifications will go far to determine the future of the Middle East and the American position there. They also provide a major test case of great-power maneuvers under conditions of nuclear parity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC PROTEST, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

by James N. Rosenau

IT is now commonplace to observe that we live in a time of challenge, tumult and change. New social and political developments in the United States are unfolding at such a rapid rate that the present appears to have little connection to the past and represents more a weekly or monthly phenomenon than an annual or quadrennial one. But a few years ago the rank and file of labor normally ratified the contracts negotiated by their leaders, students usually abided by the decisions of college faculties and university administrators, voters ordinarily nominated the primary candidates offered by party hierarchies, blacks typically acquiesced to the low status accorded them by whites, boys characteristically accepted the obligation to serve in the armed forces, tenants habitually paid their rents. Such givens of the recent past are today's uncertainties. What used to be extreme political attitudes are now conventional bargaining positions, what were once stable groups are now hostile factions, and what once constituted administrative routines are now contested issues.

These transformations in American life have accompanied, perhaps even caused, profound changes in the conduct of public affairs. Tumultuous agitation appears to have replaced calm argumentation, and the politics of accommodation seems to have given way to the politics of confrontation. The level of challenge and the intensity of demand appear to escalate with each landmark event. Remember the lunch counter sit-ins of the 1950's? Or the teach-ins of the mid-1960's? How remote in time and puny in scale they seem from the perspective of 1970. And how even more distant seem the traditional practices of citizenship. Practices that were once private have been replaced, or at least overshadowed, by practices that are quite public. Where one once confined the expression of political preferences to the loneliness of the voting booth or the privacy of a letter to a congressman, now one also openly proclaims judgments by turning on car headlights or joining a demonstration.

The main themes of the explanations usually offered for these

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changes are as familiar as the changes themselves. The ties that have bound Americans together in a national community, it is argued, have been disintegrating as a cumulative result of the blacks' quest for equality, a war in Southeast Asia that has proven terribly expensive and morally dubious, and mounting evidence that the fruits of an industrial civilization can be polluted to the point of being poisonous. Long-standing goals are no longer unifying, and cherished symbols are no longer satisfying. Individuals and groups are fearful for their safety and frustrated by their inability to improve their condition. Thus private demands have intensified and feelings of community have atrophied, giving rise to a crisis of authority in every sphere of American life. The privatization of interests and the polarization of conflicts have, in turn, led the citizenry into the streets to defend their needs and proclaim their wants. Baffled and desperate, they no longer regard the traditional practices of citizenship as adequate and feel that preferences must be publicly as well as privately communicated to government. With the broad ties of national community being replaced by the narrow bonds of similar age, skin color or job, groups are emphasizing what divides them rather than what unites them. As a result, the argument concludes, confrontation is replacing accommodation as a means of resolving conflict.

II

While some aspects of this pessimistic explanation certainly seem accurate, a more positive interpretation of the tumult in public affairs is equally plausible. Blacks are pressing, Viet Nam has had profound moral and social repercussions, and the quality of the environment has deteriorated; but to conclude that these realities have led to a breakdown of community and the emergence of a politics of confrontation is to make an unjustified leap in social analysis. Such may well be the case. Societies do collapse and none is entirely free from disintegration. There is a real possibility that future generations may look back on the 1960's as the beginning of the end of a united United States. Nevertheless, it takes no more of a leap to derive a very different interpretation of the new forms of citizenship. If this interpretation is valid, and if the nation's leadership at all levels acts upon its implications, it offers an opportunity to reverse whatever disintegrative processes may be at work and to rebuild the ties of national community.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This more positive explanation is essentially simple. It is that *subjective political competence*—the sense an individual has about his ability to affect public affairs—has risen so sharply in the United States during the last decade or so that the practices and pleasures of citizenship now enjoy a legitimacy never known before. What we are witnessing, this interpretation would stress, is not a crisis of authority but the emergence of a belief that authority can be shared; not a privatization of interests but a widening of public concerns; not a rising frustration over ineffectiveness in public affairs but a growing conviction that effectiveness is possible. To turn on headlights or join a demonstration is to be persuaded that others will take note, that some will care, and that a few will be influenced. Such open affirmations, this explanation continues, are founded on the belief that, because of their openness, officials cannot ignore them and therefore the messages that are being communicated will be received and considered. The consequence may be confrontation, but the intent is communication and the source is feelings of competence.

It must be stressed that we are not referring to the activities of radical ideologues committed to the use of violence. Some of the tumult in public affairs is undoubtedly due to the actions of such individuals and groups and the responses they evoke from agents of law enforcement. Doubtless, too, a degree of the tumult stems from the radicalization of some nonideological groups who, being impressed by the capacity of those who resort to violence to arrest public attention, have convinced themselves that *their* ends justify emulation of the means used by the ideologues. Yet it is a serious error to view the current vibrancy of public affairs as simply the work of radicals who are ready to resort to highly visible and extreme methods of protest. The number of citizens communicating their preferences through private letters to officials and through public affirmations is much too great, and the range of issues on which preferences are communicated is much too wide, to make it possible to consider the increase in subjective political competence as confined to an emboldened radical movement. From 1958 through 1968, for example, the average weekly number of communications received by the letters-to-the-editor department of the *New York Times* more than tripled—whereas the circulation of that newspaper hardly increased at all over the same period. Similar patterns have been reported for mail received by the White House, members of Congress, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other newspapers.[1] Furthermore, an analysis of these communications revealed that the sharp increases in volume were not limited to one level of public affairs; the flow of mail increased on national and international as well as local issues.

If these findings about private communications are viewed in conjunction with the evidence of increased public activity on the part of citizens, it seems clear that the turbulence of public affairs is not sustained by radical groups but by a large and growing segment of the population, a segment that believes neither in violence nor in passivity and is thus prepared to be vocal and visible. This open and nonviolent participation in public affairs on the part of millions of citizens is what the foregoing emphasis on a growing subjective political competence seeks to explain.

III

But why should subjective political competence in the United States have undergone a sharp rise in the 1960's? A satisfactory answer to this question is necessary if this rise is to be interpreted as a prime source of the growing tumult in public affairs. In the absence of such an answer it would be reasonable to view the tumult as evidence of a privatization rather than a politicization of citizens, of despair over rather than confidence in the individual's ability to affect public affairs.

The greatly increased subjective political competence can be attributed to a multiplicity of factors, some originating in the early postwar years but all converging in the 1960's. First and foremost, there is the substantial and persistent rise in the educational level of the society. More and more people are getting a college education—from 36 per cent of the 1939 high school class to 54 per cent of the 1968 class—and increasing numbers of citizens are thus acquiring the analytic skills with which to comprehend public affairs, the intellectual skills with which to articulate their opinions, and the organizational skills with which to bring the pressure of their opinions to bear on officials. Second, and hardly less important, television has brought public affairs into the home, and all the mass media of communication, despite their faults, have done an ever better job of portraying

[1]Most of the data are reported in James N. Rosenau, *The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy: A Theory of Growth and Some New Evidence* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1968), pp. 22-47. Although not yet reported, the data for 1967 and 1968 have been collected and analyzed, and these show a continuation of the trend toward increased citizen involvement in public affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the latent dimensions and complexities of local, national and international political processes.

In short, to a large extent subjective political competence has risen sharply because objective political competence has undergone a significant increase. People feel more competent because in fact they are more skilled in the techniques of citizenship. Of all the revolutions in the world today, the one that is creating informed, analytic and articulate citizens may prove to have the most profound consequences.

But a third factor must be noted. Objective realities and subjective feelings do not always coincide. To note that the public is more skilled in the techniques of citizenship is not to explain why they have exercised these skills. Public affairs must seem sufficiently receptive to the opinions of citizens for people to feel politically competent, and in this respect the last decade or so was pervaded with events that further stimulated and sustained the growth rate of subjective political competence. Two events stand out in particular. One was the series of boycotts, sit-ins, marches and other techniques of open, nonviolent protest undertaken by the civil rights movement in the 1950's and early 1960's. These protests produced results: not always immediate results and frequently not fully satisfying results, but results nevertheless. Lunch counters were desegregated and so were public transportation facilities. Discriminatory practices in employment were reduced in some respects. Schools were integrated, or at least opened to some blacks. For perhaps the first time in American history, wide-scale civic action produced visible cooperative responses on the part of governmental officials and community leaders.

The key here is the visibility of the response, the unmistakable connection between the protest action and the altered policy on the part of those toward whom the action was directed. For it is this connection that gives subjective reality to objective competence. Citizens not only acted but saw evidence that the messages communicated by their actions were being considered. In 1964 the visibility of this responsiveness in hundreds of local situations achieved national proportions when agitation on behalf of equal voting procedures coincided with Congress' passage of the Civil Rights Act. How could subjective political competence do other than rise sharply? Government, it seemed clear, was listening and heeding. The citizens' messages were being re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ceived and they were being acted upon—never sufficiently, perhaps, but at least considered.

The second historical stimulus to increased subjective political competence was not strung out over several years, but its visibility was no less clear and its responsiveness to the protests of citizens no less dramatic. Lyndon Johnson's decision not to run for reelection in 1968 was widely interpreted as a reaction to the protests against Viet Nam, protests which culminated in the successful journey of many citizens to New Hampshire to work against his candidacy in that state's presidential primary. The years between 1964 and 1968 were lean in terms of visible government responses to citizen demands, but the outcome of the New Hampshire primary and the subsequent decision to end the bombing of North Viet Nam more than revived the sense of political competence that may have lagged after 1964. Citizens everywhere, Republicans and Democrats alike, could not fail to see the lesson: if a President can be toppled, then no political goal seems beyond reach so long as open, strenuous and persistent efforts to communicate opinions to government are undertaken.

IV

This is not to equate high subjective political competence with the conviction that policy should be made in the streets. Most citizens who follow the course of public affairs are not so naive as to expect their messages to be the ones that form the basis of governmental decisions. The democratic ethos that has evolved over decades in the United States may once have been simplistic, but it now incorporates an appreciation of the fact that officials are subjected to conflicting demands and that they must necessarily reach compromises among them. The ethos also allows symbolic acts as well as policy content to serve as indications of official responsiveness and, in so doing, makes it possible for citizens to view consideration of their communications to government as virtually equivalent to public action on their behalf. Indeed, the myth of such an equivalence reinforces the sophistication of the citizenry. It is easier to appreciate the political realities of conflicting demands if one accepts as a symbolic reward the knowledge that one's messages to government are received and considered. Thus, high subjective competence need not be founded on the conviction that public policy is a direct response to public opinion. Those socialized into the American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political culture are likely to feel politically effective as long as officials indicate that the people's communications have reached their mark and are being considered.

To be sure, a high degree of subjective political competence cannot be maintained indefinitely by symbolic rewards alone. These must be supplemented periodically with policy innovations that reflect the demands being made. Yet, as indicated by the number of years between the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the Johnson decision of 1968, symbolic rewards can sustain high subjective competence for long periods of time without concurrent tangible policy rewards. Rather than allowing the absence of a Viet Nam policy reversal to depress their subjective political competence and turn them away from public affairs during the 1964-1968 period, the citizenry became more active than ever and, through participation in teach-ins, moratoria, and a variety of other protests, evidenced an unshakable confidence that eventually their messages about the need for de-escalation in Viet Nam would receive consideration in Washington. Fortified by the earlier successes of the civil rights movement and perhaps encouraged by the symbolic rewards inherent in the fact that President Johnson was known to read and attach great importance to public opinion polls, active citizens were able to sustain their belief in their political competence and continue to assert their demands for a change in Viet Nam policy even though that policy was moving in exactly the opposite direction throughout 1965, 1966 and 1967.

If the civil rights experience allowed the citizenry to subsist on symbolic rewards alone under these adverse circumstances, surely Johnson's decision to retire from politics in 1968 ensures that subjective political competence will be high in the years ahead. As long as political leaders provide symbolic rewards, which above all means that they must appear ready to acknowledge the messages being directed to them, the danger of a severe decline in the American people's subjective political competence seems remote. Stated differently, the chances that increasing segments of the population will become increasingly frustrated—and that public affairs will thus become more violent as well as more turbulent—are likely to grow only if the nation's leadership fails to provide symbolic assurances that the messages from all segments of the citizenry are being received and considered.

Our conclusion that subjective political competence is sus-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tained as much by a sense of participation as by a feeling of effectiveness is, of course, largely impressionistic. There is little evidence either to support or negate this interpretation which is so crucial to the ensuing analysis. All we can go on is a variety of clues suggesting that active citizens accept the democratic ethos and are more concerned about being heard than about being heeded. One such clue is implicit in the diligence with which legislators answer every letter they receive. This long-standing practice is founded not only on the belief that responsiveness is part of their obligations as elected representatives; it stems also from a realization that constituents derive satisfaction from knowing that their communications are received and that thought is devoted to answering them. The fact that the thought is contained on an electronic tape which automatically reproduces the answer is not known to discourage the letter-writing habits of active citizens.

Another clue to the dynamics of subjective political competence is the absence of rigidly ideological groups in American politics. This suggests a widespread readiness to live with compromise and to presume that if one's message is heard at least some part of it will enter into the processes of compromise. Other, even more impressionistic clues consist of many quotations from active citizens depicting a greater attachment to the processes than to the outcomes of policymaking. Praise for the organizers of the Viet Nam moratoria in 1969, for instance, focused on their ability to stimulate participation on the part of hundreds of thousands of citizens rather than on their limited success in producing attitude change on the part of a few government officials.

Perhaps the most vivid indication of the depth and resilience of subjective political competence is provided by the spurt of citizenship activity that followed the decision to send U.S. troops into Cambodia and the Kent State tragedy of May 1970. Although disorder and violence on campuses commanded the headlines in the immediate aftermath of these events, a closer reading of accounts of the vocal minority's activities reveals that the predominant reaction to the unexpected and apparently escalatory turn in Indochina was not one of malaise and disorder. Rather the vocal minority was galvanized into creative, peaceful and vigorous forms of political action. Faced with a major setback to their aspirations for Southeast Asia, they reacted not with aimless despair, but with intense activity which plainly rested on the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conviction that it was possible to bring about a reversal of policy and to prevent future decisions of this kind. What stood out were not the few "crazies" who fomented riots and fire-bombed buildings, but the many citizens who turned to "leafleting," to calling on members of Congress, and to a host of other constructive efforts to mobilize support for their aspirations. The Cambodian decision and the Kent State tragedy may have, at least temporarily, politicized the university and polarized the society, but they also lay bare a remarkable commitment to the democratic process.

V

If our interpretation of the dynamics of subjective political competence is correct, and if it is also the case that increasing education is likely to increase the number of citizens who seek a sense of creative involvement in public affairs in the years ahead, then the implications for the nation's leadership are many. Most notably, those who occupy top positions must be ready to devote more energy to the tasks of providing symbolic rewards. Such a readiness requires substantial attitude change on the part of those leaders who find the new turbulence in public affairs distasteful and who are thus inclined to regard the open proclamation of beliefs as an illegitimate technique. Those who hold such an attitude will fail to realize that the protesters are actually expressing commitment to the system and that they may be more accurately viewed, not as a rowdy minority who seeks to have policy made in the streets, but as dedicated citizens trying to communicate with their leadership. Only if he views marches, sit-ins and other forms of protest as messages will the present-day leader be attitudinally ready to shoulder the burden of providing symbolic rewards. Open protests can be answered as readily as letters to Congress. The messages conveyed by marches are less complex than those contained in letters, so that creative responses to them need not be elaborate. Like the message itself, the symbolic reward need not even be verbal. A wave from a window or an appearance in a receiving line can serve as an acknowledgment that the marchers' message has been received and is under consideration. Situations differ, but a way can always be found to keep the channels of communication open to protesters.

The following comments that two Presidents, each faced with protest marches around the White House, made at press confer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ences illustrate the difference between viewing protests as messages to be answered and as threats to policy:

> I saw the ladies myself [through the window]. I recognized why they were here. There were a great number of them. It was in the rain. I understood what they were trying to say and, therefore, I considered that their message was received.
>
> *John F. Kennedy*[2]

> . . . I understand that there has been and continues to be opposition to the war in Vietnam on the campuses and also in the nation. As far as this kind of activity is concerned, we expect it. However, under no circumstances will I be affected whatever by it.
>
> *Richard M. Nixon*[3]

It could be objected that this comparison is unfair to President Nixon, that he could not follow the Kennedy approach because the Women Strike for Peace protest was a general one and Kennedy did not have to consider diplomatic implications in acknowledging it. The moratorium of November 1969, on the other hand, confronted Nixon with a protest that had wide international implications. It had come to be defined as part of the Viet Nam situation and thus Nixon's remarks were addressed as much—if not more—to the leadership in Hanoi as to the American public. Even though the relationship between domestic communication and international bargaining is undoubtedly close, however, the President need not have been so unqualified in expressing his readiness to put external necessities ahead of internal demands. Without endangering his domestic support and, we argue below, without any loss in international prestige and possibly with some diplomatic gain, he could have welcomed the moratorium marchers to Washington and indicated concern for their physical comfort and welfare. To acknowledge the presence of protesters is not to agree with them or to undermine the ability to pursue policies from which they dissent. To express a concern for their welfare is not to qualify the assertion that there can be no compromise in foreign policy. On the contrary, the provision of such symbolic rewards can be used as an occasion to reassert the importance of foreign policy goals.

As of November 1969, however, President Nixon did not view domestic dissent as compatible with diplomatic strength. During

[2]In response to a question about the utility of a Women Strike for Peace demonstration, quoted in the *New York Times,* January 16, 1962, p. 18.

[3]In response to a question about a planned student moratorium against the Viet Nam war, quoted in the *New York Times,* September 27, 1969, p. 14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the 1969 moratorium he not only passed up a number of opportunities to indicate receipt of the marchers' message, but almost seemed to go out of his way to affront them. He anticipated their rally in Washington by giving a speech that designated them as a minority and that called for support from the "silent majority." He let it be known that he was watching a televised football game while the marchers were circling the White House. He allowed the police to park the protesters' buses in a ring around the White House, thus blocking his view of the march.

How easy it would have been—and how little it would have cost politically—for the President to have ordered one or two of the buses moved so that he could see the line of march from his office window. Such a gesture would have had great consequence in terms of subjective political competence. It would have been widely publicized and would have told all citizens, supporters as well as opponents of Viet Nam policy, that citizens' messages were received and considered at the highest level of government. The order to move the buses could even have been accompanied by a press release stating that the sight of the marchers filing by compelled the President to reconsider the costs and sacrifices incurred in Viet Nam. The issuing of such a statement—which surely would not have had to be contrived—would have kept the lines of communication to the vocal minority open, an outcome no less desirable than the support of the silent majority. The vocal minority comprises the articulate, informed and involved members of the society, and maintaining their commitment to nonviolent participation in public affairs is in the long run of considerable value to any President.

Notwithstanding his reaction to the 1969 moratorium, six months later Nixon himself amply illustrated that domestic communication need not be—indeed, could not be—sacrificed to the requirements of foreign policy. His response to the upheaval that followed the Cambodian decision and the Kent State tragedy included the provision of a variety of symbolic rewards even as he remained firm with respect to policy in Southeast Asia. Faced with a revulsion against his policy that threatened to tear the society apart, he found that the vocal minority could not be studiously ignored, that symbolic rewards had to be provided if the aroused passions were to be contained and a modicum of support for his foreign policies maintained. So, instead of allowing the buses to seal him off from the march on Washington that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

followed the Cambodian decision, he instructed his aides to mingle with the protesters, arranged for the editors of college newspapers to convene in the White House pressroom for briefings, journeyed at daybreak to the Lincoln Memorial to "rap" with students gathered there, and appointed a distinguished university president as a temporary adviser through whom the academic community could communicate with him. The President buttressed these symbolic rewards with statements that he shared the protesters' aspirations and that American troops would be removed from Cambodia in six weeks. These varied actions did not placate the vocal minority, but taken together they served to reinforce its commitment to organized, nonviolent political activity as a means of evoking a response from government.

VI

Is this a counsel of subterfuge and an argument for political manipulation? In calling for greater attention to the dispensation of symbolic rewards at the presidential and other leadership levels, are we urging that leaders deceive the public, exploit its fears, and falsely raise its hopes? Is it a violation of the democratic ethos for leaders to indicate consideration of a message when all or most of it is likely to be rejected? Our answer to these questions is an emphatic "No!" It is a gross misunderstanding of the function of symbolic rewards to view their use as manipulation or deception. The messages delivered through open protests are in fact received and considered by the officials toward whom they are directed. Officials do not have to approve of a policy alternative in order to consider it. For it to enter their deliberations it is only necessary that the message attract their attention, and surely this is what happens when officials become aware of the presence of the protesters. Surely President Nixon's involvement in a televised football game on the day of the 1969 moratorium was not so complete that he was oblivious to the message being delivered a few hundred yards away. Surely he was conscious of the message and thus inevitably he considered it.

To provide symbolic rewards in response to the demands communicated by citizens is to acknowledge, not distort, political reality, even if the reality being acknowledged is mostly a formal one. It can readily be argued that, for the democratic ethos to be meaningful in a large and complex society, form is as crucial as substance; that making it possible for citizens to feel creatively

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

involved in the political process is more important than trying to perform the impossible task of meeting all their policy demands. Only a few can govern in such a society, but their governance will almost certainly violate the democratic ethos if the many who are governed lack a sense of political competence.

This is not to deny that officials could use symbolic rewards to exploit unsuspecting publics. Acknowledging the receipt of a message can easily be made to imply agreement with its contents and the possibility of thus misleading the public is an ever-present danger. The existence of such a danger, however, does not negate the fact that it is the responsibility of leaders to provide symbolic rewards that build and sustain the citizenry's sense of political efficacy. It could even be argued that the best way to guard against exploitative politicians is to promote greater subjective political competence in the ranks of the public. A citizenry genuinely confident of its ability to affect the course of events will not long tolerate deceptive and manipulative leaders.

VII

Just as the maintenance of subjective political competence through appropriate symbolic rewards makes for good domestic politics, so does it make for good international politics. To acknowledge receipt of the messages delivered through protests is to tell the entire world—openly and unambiguously—that an underlying consensus on the form of public affairs prevails in the United States, that Americans still agree to disagree, and that, consequently, turbulence over the content of public affairs is not a symptom of weakness. Taking open and direct notice of the messages of protesters at home, in other words, conveys the message abroad that the national political system remains intact and as viable as ever. Admittedly, such a posture in foreign policy will not immediately convince an adversary to enter negotiations and conclude a diplomatic settlement of disputes. Time will be required before he comes to appreciate that America's internal turbulence is a sign of her vitality. It may take repeated instances in which the presence and legitimacy of protesters is acknowledged by officials before he is persuaded that the officials are politically capable of adhering to their foreign policy goals and must be bargained with accordingly. Gradually, however, he will accept the possibility that he has misread the nature of the turbulence and that a basic consensus prevails.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The relevance of this reasoning to the Viet Nam situation is self-evident. Hanoi has apparently proceeded on the belief that the turbulence of public affairs in the United States reflected an absence of consensus and a divisiveness that would compel Washington to capitulate and withdraw from Viet Nam. To a large extent Washington has shared this perception, thus leading President Nixon to call on the silent majority for support and to withhold symbolic rewards from the vocal minority. Yet, in emphasizing that a majority supports his policy, the President perpetuates the notion of divisiveness and allows Hanoi to believe in the existence of fluctuations of support which can lead to a reversal of policy. To cast support in majority-minority terms is to concede the possibility that it can dwindle and that a new balance of opinion can emerge. If the President's bargaining strategy in Viet Nam demonstrated the existence of an underlying consensus on form that embraces the vocal minority as well as the silent majority, Hanoi would find it more difficult to perceive that time was on its side.

VIII

But, it might be asked, suppose the protesters reject the symbolic rewards? Suppose they discourteously prevent the President or other leaders from even making a gesture indicating receipt of their message? Suppose they resort to violence or otherwise indicate that they no longer agree to disagree? Would not such behavior at home gravely weaken the attempts to bargain with stubborn adversaries abroad and, consequently, are not the diplomatic stakes too great to justify the risk of acknowledging the messages of protest groups? Is it not safer to stress that the active citizens are a minority that can be ignored?

The answer to these questions depends on whether or not one accepts the central thesis developed here. If we are right in judging that subjective political competence and symbolic rewards are important to sustain commitment, then there are no risks—and possibly substantial gains—in acknowledging the messages submitted through open protests. If, as I believe, the vast majority of the vocal minority are satisfied to know that the messages are received and considered at the highest levels of government, then they will neither act discourteously nor tolerate the violence radical groups may seek to foster. More often than not, the radical groups will try to turn the protests initiated by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nonradical groups in discourteous and violent directions. If the preceding analysis is correct, however, such efforts can be made to fail more effectively through a skillful use of symbolic rewards that reject the radical and acknowledge the nonradical messages than through a refusal to allocate any rewards on the grounds that a differentiation between the two groups is impossible.

If, on the other hand, one rejects the thesis and evidence presented here and conceives of the citizenry as unwilling to settle for the knowledge that their messages have been received and considered, one would have to conclude that discourtesy, violence and diplomatic setback will follow from a reliance on symbolic rewards. In that case, however, the American system is in deep trouble and the technique of gaining diplomatic advantage by pitting the silent majority against the vocal minority is also bound to fail. For if the growing subjective political competence of the public means it will increasingly insist that demands be heeded as well as heard, the present turbulence of public affairs signals the society's future collapse rather than its emerging maturity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"PEOPLE'S WAR": VISION VS. REALITY

by Hammond Rolph

WHEN Lin Piao, now formally anointed as Mao Tse-tung's heir and successor, published his famous article in September 1965, entitled "Long Live the Victory of People's War!,"[1] world attention was focused on the threat of Maoist revolutionary warfare as a major factor in future international politics. In some quarters this singular treatise was looked upon as a clarion call for revolution in the emerging nations and a bible for practitioners of the politics of violence in the Third World.[2] At the same time there was considerable disagreement among students of Chinese affairs and specialists in revolutionary movements about what Peking's crown prince was trying to convey and about the true importance of the "people's war" thesis in world affairs.[3]

While Lin's essay said nothing essentially new about the theory, strategy and tactics of "people's war," it was a systematic reformulation of Mao's revolutionary war theories, as well as a significant recapitulation of Chinese communist revolutionary experience. Whatever its main thrust, it remains a convenient springboard for discussing the applicability of Maoist revolutionary doctrine to the world's vast "rural" areas which the Chinese Defense Minister envisioned in raging rebellion against the developed "urban" zones. Even if not intended as a precise "blueprint" for the application of Maoist theory and Chinese experience to Viet Nam and the future requirements of other revolutionary movements, it included this rather sweeping statement: "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war has been proved by the long practice of the Chinese revolution to be in accord with the objective laws of such wars and to be invincible. It has not only been valid for China; it is a great

[1]English text released by Hsinhua (New China News Agency), September 2, 1965.

[2]For example, see Samuel B. Griffith, *Peking and People's Wars* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 3-48; also *The Economist,* August 20, 1966, pp. 709-710.

[3]Some of this discussion can be found in Ralph L. Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrines," *Asian Survey,* April 1968, pp. 239-262; Jay Tao, "Mao's World Outlook," *ibid.,* May 1968, pp. 416-432; and David P. Mozingo and Thomas W. Robinson, *Lin Piao on "People's War": China Takes a Second Look at Vietnam* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM 4814-PR, November 1965).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contribution to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world. . . ."

How valid is this hypothesis today in terms of its general applicability to basic conditions in the Third World, events of the last several years, and future prospects inside and outside China? The Chinese media continue to proclaim that "people's war" is the "magic weapon to defeat imperialism, revisionism and reaction" and that such wars are "victoriously developing" in Asia, Africa and Latin America in accordance with Mao's "brilliant" laws.[4] Thus we may legitimately ask: Is there any substance in all this? In the perspective of the five years since the Lin article appeared, some answers to this question are possible.

I

It should be kept in mind that the term "guerrilla warfare" is too narrow to encompass Mao's concepts of revolutionary action. Although important and dramatic, guerrilla activity is but one aspect of a process whose essence is political. The critical ingredients of the doctrine are the primacy of political objectives and psychological tactics, profound confidence in politically mobilized and indoctrinated masses, faith in the supremacy of human will over weapons in war, and a conviction that a protracted war of attrition will move revolutionaries from weakness to strength and on to ultimate victory.

There are important factors in the Third World which give a degree of theoretical substance to Peking's orotund claims about the "universality" of its revolutionary doctrine. Certain basic conditions, particularly in Asia, create vulnerabilities that must be recognized. Primarily, the internal weaknesses of the new states—political, social and military—make them relatively attractive targets for revolutionary insurgents. (They would be excellent targets for conventional aggression as well, but any such Chinese action is doubtful, especially in view of the presence of U.S. military power in Asia.) Within many of the new states population diversity, racial antagonism and acute social cleavages arising from the modernization process produce centrifugal tendencies which could be exploited by insurgent movements. A political culture that tends to inhibit the national integrative

[4]E.g., Peking, Hsinhua International Service, May 15, 1969. Numerous other major articles appear from time to time in the Chinese press on the "unprecedentedly excellent" revolutionary situation around the world, particularly emphasizing "people's wars" in Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and India.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

efforts of incumbent governments renders rural areas of these countries susceptible to the agitational and organizational techniques of the modern revolutionist. Furthermore, the physical geography of the underdeveloped world lends itself far better to guerrilla operations than to the effective deployment of the incumbent's security forces.

Why, then, when it is obvious that these conditions prevail in so much of Asia, Africa and Latin America, are there so few successful revolutionary wars of the Maoist variety? Why has Mao's "prairie fire" metaphor not taken on reality? Where are the "storm centers of world revolution" that Lin Piao so dramatically visualized?

In order to gauge the success or failure of Peking's universalist mission, we must consider the elements in the Chinese communist revolutionary process, for these are basic to the model that Mao places before the Third World. This is best done by pointing out the stages in the process, since sequential precision is here of great consequence. The Chinese communists claim that the careful development of each stage in a true Marxist-Leninist manner ensured them success in China and can do the same for others. At every stage, they assert, they carefully analyzed the "objective situation" and then proceeded on the correct path, always rejecting adventurous and romantic policies that might have led to disaster and developing a general line of theory and action from which they never deviated. (In view of the tumultuous and devastating "campaigns" and "surges" that have characterized Mao's twenty-year rule in China—the Great Leap, the People's Communes, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution —it is tempting to dismiss such self-assured statements, but it would be unwise to do so, for the theoretical framework remains, and the history of actual Maoist practice before 1949 lends much support to the model.)

These stages in the revolutionary process are rather clearly discernible and can be briefly described.[5] The first step is the fashioning of a reliable tool—a hardened, united, tested communist party. After the party has been organizationally consolidated and has developed its political themes, a move to broaden its base of political support is made through the creation of a national united front, a key feature of successful communist-led

[5]They are discussed in depth in Robert Scalapino, editor, *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (second edition; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 18-24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

movements in the so-called national-democratic phase of revolution in the nonindustrialized countries.[6] When conditions are ripe, the party converts itself and its allies from political to "armed struggle"—the stage of "people's war"—which means not the abandonment of politics but merely an advance to a level of struggle where the final decision will be reached by military means. Following the rules of guerrilla warfare, this armed struggle is carried out in the rural areas by a peasant army, and is rooted in the Maoist principle of moving gradually from a position of weakness to one of strength.

As secure rural bases are developed, and as sufficient territory is consolidated under revolutionary control, an embryo rebel administration unfolds, and there is a gradual transformation of the guerrilla army into something resembling a conventional military force, which will intensify operations in accordance with Mao's three-stage theory of the evolution of "people's war."[7] As more contested areas are "liberated," it becomes possible to envelop the enemy's urban strongholds and ultimately to take them. With victory comes the final phase, establishment of the "people's government." It marks the end of the "national-democratic" stage of the revolution and the beginning of the "people's democracy" which, under the exclusive leadership of the party, will lead the country to socialism and at last to communism.

There are certain conditions that must exist, however, if this paradigm is to be applicable anywhere outside China, much less universally. In many areas the Chinese pattern is either not appropriate or would have to be trimmed to allow for serious deviations and variations. The Chinese themselves have been the first to recognize that their revolutionary experience grew out of historical circumstances in their own country which were in many ways unique, and despite the showy bombast of the recent period, they probably still accept the reality of this limiting factor. The question is, what and where are the revolutionary conditions likely to initiate a "people's war" in which the Maoist model would be the general framework for development?

II

The qualifications for a "people's war" devised from the

[6]The development of this instrumentality to the highest degree by the Vietnamese communists is analyzed in P. J. Honey, "The National United Front in Vietnam," *Studies in Comparative Communism,* January 1969, pp. 69-95.

[7]Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," in *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 210-219.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese formula are as follows: (1) The cause must be a powerful one and must spring from indigenous sources. In his article Lin Piao clearly recognizes these requirements and their necessary linkage. He acknowledges that each people must make its own revolution and that insurgency cannot be successfully exported. Unless revolution arises from native political and social conditions, it will fail.

Furthermore, the catalyst of revolutionary upsurge must be strong enough to split the population, with the majority either sympathetic to the insurgents or neutral. The cause may be real or largely artificial, acute or dormant. If it is both genuine and acute, the chances for success are so much the better. However, we have seen in South Viet Nam the great skill of the Viet Cong cadres in generating ostensible support for an issue of little genuine concern to the rural populace (reunification) and activating grievances that long lay dormant (rural social reform).[8]

One of the most potent causes energizing the revolutions carried on by the Chinese communists and Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh was a combination of nationalism, anti-colonialism and opposition to Western imperialist domination. Today these burning issues have lost some of their impact in Asia, at least in Marxist revolutionary terms. Aside from the struggle in Viet Nam, the communists have been unable to capitalize on nationalist passions lingering from the colonial era. Actually, nationalism in Southeast Asia tends to work against Peking, as the political and social problems of the resident Chinese minorities amply demonstrate. In parts of Africa, nationalism as a revolutionary issue exists to some degree, but in that locale forces other than the Chinese brand of communism seem to be profiting from it.

Despite the facile rhetoric of nationalism and anti-colonialism and the easy assumptions by many observers of their paramountcy in the Third World, these factors would appear not to occupy the pinnacles of the mind and heart they once did. Issues of economic development, material well being, a fairer distribution of wealth, and a better life in general are beginning to compete with the old ideas of nationalism in popular imagination as well as elite concern. If this is so, would such issues support a revolutionary cause? Perhaps, but how will the

[8]For a detailed study of these techniques, see Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), especially Chapters 5, 7, 20. Earlier Viet Minh operations at the grass roots level are well documented in Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism* (New York: Praeger, 1964), especially Part III.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese example provide a spark? Communist China has undeniably made material progress since 1949, but Mao has compromised the prestige of his regime's early years by such fiascoes and aberrations as the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution to the point where the attractiveness of his model can be seriously questioned. Populations in the new states seem increasingly likely to judge either conservative or revolutionary regimes by the material benefits they produce. Evidence supports the view that those developing nations which have achieved considerable material progress without revolutionary violence are becoming more appealing than Maoist China as models to others, e.g., Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan.

It might be interjected that the Viet Cong movement is a deviation from the Maoist model in several important respects, and that lack of a truly powerful cause is a factor weighing against its success. If nationalism were an overriding issue and if reunification of North and South were a consuming passion among the South Vietnamese, it is likely that Ho Chi Minh would have won his war well before the Americans intervened in it on a large scale. The publicly stated program of the NLF and its new provisional government differs little from the objectives expressed in the Constitution of the Republic of Viet Nam, and widespread cynicism and indifference are the apparent popular response to both. In the absence of a compelling issue around which to unite the people, the Viet Cong have resorted to terrorism on an ever-widening scale, achieving a considerable part of their rural popular support or acquiescence through isolation of the peasants from the government by intimidation. In the special circumstances that have prevailed in South Viet Nam since 1954, it can be strongly argued that the Viet Cong have capitalized on chaos more than on issues.

(2) A second condition for the full applicability of Maoist doctrine is solid organization and unity of purpose in the communist party of the country, coupled with the emergence of a dynamic leader of this "vanguard" at precisely the right time. This is the way events developed in revolutionary China and Indochina in the 1930's and 1940's, but do we see this kind of powerful "vanguard" party and leadership in Asia today, outside China and Viet Nam? Hardly. For example, communism in Burma is hopelessly split after twenty years of independence *cum* civil strife, and its most effective wing, the BCP (White Flags),

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has been devastated by a fatuous Maoist attempt to export the Cultural Revolution to Burma. The Communist Party of Thailand has never sunk real roots within the country or in Thai society and consists largely of a collection of sycophantic expatriates in China who dutifully mouth pro-Mao slogans on call. Even its role in the small-scale communist insurgencies in several areas of Thailand is unclear. In Laos, the Pathet Lao would amount to little without the stiffening of North Vietnamese political cadres and military forces, while the real threat to Cambodia is not internal, but rather the presence of North Vietnamese armed forces on its soil. The Communist Party of Indonesia, which was progressing well along a semi-Maoist road until October 1965, now lies in ruins, amid the bitter mutual recriminations of Peking and Moscow over what went wrong.

Indian communism presents a picture of splintering par excellence. The two parties which have competed since 1964 have now in effect become three, as an extremist group from the pro-Peking CPI (M) has broken off from the parent body in response to Mao's promulgation of an "armed struggle" line for India.[9] Attempts to carry out armed uprisings in states whose coalition governments are headed by the CPI (M) have been largely unsuccessful and have been denounced by the CPI (M) leaders as "infantile adventurism," although extremist influence in West Bengal villages is apparently on the increase.[10] Peking continues to encourage Indian peasant uprisings, but concedes "temporary" setbacks, partially due to "the absence of a Party which is armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism and its highest development in the present era, Mao Tse-tung Thought, which is closely linked with the masses, which does not fear self-criticism and which has mastered the Marxist-Leninist style of work."[11]

(3) Another requirement for revolutionary success is a weak opponent, or at least one so beset by various other problems that his capacity to meet an insurgent threat is seriously limited. Since the insurgents are themselves feeble in physical strength

[9]Bhabani Sen Gupta, "A Maoist Line for India," *The China Quarterly*, January-March 1968, pp. 3-16.

[10]M. P. Narayana Pillai, "The Thin Red Line," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 9, 1969, pp. 59-62; Dilip Mukerjee, "Worried Partners," *ibid.*, April 3, 1969, pp. 27-28; and Harald Munthe-Kaas, "Green and Red Revolutions," *ibid.*, March 19, 1970, pp. 21-24.

[11]"People of India Embark on the Road of Armed Struggle," *Peking Review*, May 16, 1969, pp. 18-19. The quote is allegedly from an Indian communist "revolutionary" source.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vis-à-vis the incumbent in the initial stages, a slack, incompetent or preoccupied government becomes an asset to them.

This condition does exist in much of the Third World. However, it is probably subsiding as an asset to the communists as the governments of the new nations take hold and begin to make some progress toward solving their problems. Furthermore, in some vulnerable areas, such as South Viet Nam, weak incumbents are backed by massive outside power. Governments of many political shades are becoming more alert to the possibilities of insurgency. One of the richest ironies of the recent abortive Maoist uprisings in the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal was the swiftness with which the CPI (M) state ministries terminated these episodes.

(4) Physical features of the area must not be overlooked. It is much better for the insurgents if the country resembles the China Mao Tse-tung describes in some of his elementary geography lessons: very large, relatively landlocked, with difficult terrain, a primitive economy and communication system, and a large population, widely and rather evenly dispersed. These geographic and demographic criteria exist in a number of new states, but none has the nice balance of all of them that China has. Many countries in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America have relatively small populations with considerable urban concentration, and many are accessible by sea. Despite the widespread notion that Viet Nam is ideal for guerrilla warfare, its physical features are actually far from matching the Maoist model.

(5) A final requisite is outside support and sanctuary for the insurgents. Unless the incumbent simply collapses suddenly (as Batista did in Cuba), these are essential, especially as the guerrilla war moves into the later, more conventional stages. Lin Piao has stated clearly that "people's war" is essentially a "do it yourself" operation. While support from communist states will be forthcoming, he says, the insurgents must rely mainly on their own strength. Nevertheless, it is obvious in Viet Nam that while Hanoi furnishes the manpower, the communists would be patently incapable of carrying on the present kind of war without vast amounts of material aid from China and the Soviet Union.

China's commitments to revolutionary movements are in no sense open-ended. Peking may be prepared to provide support in training, weapons, supplies and money, but only within the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

limits of what the Chinese leaders consider feasible in light of their assessments of the "objective situation" and their interests. Contiguity, or at least proximity, of rebel areas to the source of outside support is often critical in determining logistical practicability—obviously so in the case of sanctuary. Therefore, while "people's war" has been effectively supported by China on its periphery in Southeast Asia, the prospects for rendering such aid on the broader stage of the Third World are much less favorable. Peking harbors an assortment of expatriates dedicated to the overthrow of their respective governments, but their functions seem to be more ornamental than operational. (Despite the warm embrace of deposed Prince Sihanouk, it remains to be seen how substantial support of him will be.) In view of the low level of Chinese risk-taking in the past, any dramatic escalation in the assistance Peking gives to insurgent movements is unlikely. Mao seems to want revolutionary victory "on the cheap."[12]

III

Before passing on from the prerequisites for success in applying Mao's doctrine, it would be well to mention the twin factors of luck and fortuitous outside events. A careful look at Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionary history leads to the conclusion that among many other assets the communists had an almost incredible amount of good fortune. The intrusion of dramatic external events changed the situation markedly in favor of Mao and Ho and their movements.

After the Long March, the prospects of the Chinese communists could only be described as bleak. However, the intensification of Japanese pressure on China gave them an issue that helped greatly to revive their flagging fortunes, and subsequently the outright Japanese invasion of China caused a surge of nationalism and an unprecedented degree of social mobilization in North China which the communists exploited to the fullest. The concurrent disintegration of the Nationalist armies and administration under the full impact of the Japanese military machine afforded Mao a priceless opportunity. In 1945 the sudden Japanese collapse while the reconstructed Nationalist armies were far to the south and southwest, coupled with the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, provided the communists with the chance to

[12]According to Narayana Pillai, *op. cit.*, Peking's material contribution to an abortive Kerala uprising in November 1968 was £ 50 and a large supply of "big character" posters of Mao's quotations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

control most of the northern half of the country. World War II was also the dramatic outside event which first brought Ho Chi Minh to power in Viet Nam, and it is debatable whether his final victory against the French would have been possible without the arrival of Mao's armies on the Indochina border. There is no comparable combination of events foreseeable today. It is tantalizing to speculate whether the Peking leadership ever puts aside its blinkers of Mao-thought long enough to recognize these factors in recent history.

IV

An assessment of the current operational status of Maoist revolutionary war belies Peking's endless boasting that "the situation is excellent." The pattern prescribed by Mao is hardly discernible in the tapestry of violence and revolutionary movement in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, despite the coverage given these areas by Chinese media. Peking's diplomatic and economic infiltration of Tanzania and Chinese support for anti-Portuguese and anti-Pretoria guerrillas are facts to be reckoned with in Africa, but there has been nothing resembling the development in stages of "people's war" as occurred in China and Viet Nam. Especially has there been no evidence in the Arab, African or Latin American world of the crucial first stage: the building of an effective and hardened communist party to guide a revolution in the Maoist manner.

The friendly but alert posture of the Tanzanian government toward Peking tends to deflect any Maoist attempts to make the essentially bourgeois regime in Dar-es-Salaam a target, and it appears that the Portuguese and South African police have effectively prevented the establishment of any genuine communist organization in their territories. It might be argued by some of his critics that Julius Nyerere plays the role of an African Sukarno, Sihanouk or Souphanouvong, but there is no PKI or Lao Dong in either Tanzania or the white territories to exploit this situation.

Prospects for Maoism are hardly brighter in Latin America and the Middle East. If the paragon of guerrilla leadership in Latin America is still "Che" Guevara, then so much the worse for the revolution, at least in Maoist terms, for this ineffectual romantic did almost everything wrong according to the "people's war" book published in Peking. It strains credulity to accept the idea

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that Arab guerrillas and commandos fighting Israel derive their inspiration from a Chinese oracle.

There is only one truly serious insurgency underway—that in Indochina. It has been assuredly inspired by the Maoist model but deviates from it in several important respects. Both the Viet Cong's war and operations in Laos are directed by Hanoi with considerable independence and with little concern for some of Mao's maxims or the niceties of the protracted Chinese timetable. By Maoist standards, the great TET offensive of 1968 was an "adventurist" heresy; the Viet Cong's proclivity for repeatedly attacking enemy positions when results do not warrant the heavy losses is a violation of one of Mao's cardinal rules of guerrilla warfare; and the vast panoply of Viet Cong terrorism does not fit Mao's concepts of how to make a "patriotic" united front work most efficiently. The lower-level insurgency in Thailand is difficult to classify, but it shows some signs of having gone into the stage of armed violence prematurely, before completion of adequate political preparations. In Burma, Indonesia and India the actions of both the local rebels and their Chinese mentors have shown little but ineptitude, producing many martyrs but no victories.

It is questionable whether the Chinese will accept the idea of serious deviations from the Maoist model which might bring greater success to foreign revolutionary movements. Their theoretical writings have made much of the "creative application" of Marxism-Leninism to local conditions, and Hanoi has doubly emphasized its "unique" contributions to the "rich treasury" of Marxism-Leninism and liberation war theory.[13] Peking may have to be more flexible, but the implied criticism of the Viet Cong's operations in the Lin Piao article and the repeated emphasis on "protracted war" in Chinese statements since TET indicate that Mao and his colleagues look upon aberrations with a jaundiced eye. Rigidity in Maoist thinking may therefore be a factor in Chinese inability to spark the "prairie fire," yet one should not attribute to the Chinese a total lack of realism in these matters. Behind their barrage of exhortations they may not be overly optimistic about their short-run chances for promoting liberation wars. They undoubtedly recognize that conditions vary from

[13]E.g., in speeches by North Vietnamese generals Nguyen Chi Thanh and Nguyen Van Vinh to the Fourth COSVN Congress in April 1966, quoted in Hammond Rolph, "Viet Cong Documents on the War (II)," *Communist Affairs,* November-December 1967, pp. 22-28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

country to country. And who can say with assurance that they are wrong in implying that the Viet Cong might have done better with different methods?

One major impediment to Maoist hopes for the spread of "people's war" is the Soviet Union. The USSR's posture, both on its borders with China and in its diplomacy on China's southern periphery, exerts an inhibiting influence on Chinese revolutionary designs abroad. Moscow's great buildup of tension and military force on China's northern borders certainly has a deterrent effect; what is not so dramatically evident is Soviet activity in South and Southeast Asia aimed at countering Peking's policies. Despite continuing lip-service to the idea of "national liberation wars," Moscow has actively supported insurgency only in Viet Nam (and even there for partially anti-Chinese reasons). Soviet diplomacy designed to strengthen relations with the governments of India, Pakistan, Burma, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore has been accompanied by repeated denunciations of "adventurist" Maoist revolutionary war policies. One Soviet academician states that Mao, in his "world city-world village" concept, is supplanting the contradiction between the proletariat and bourgeoisie with the contradiction between metropolitan areas and ex-colonial areas, and accuses him of subordinating the international working class movement to the liberation war movement.[14] Maoism's direct clash with Soviet interests in the Third World drew this expression from another Soviet scholar:

> . . . one cannot dismiss . . . the harmful influence of the Mao Tse-tung group. It devotes active efforts (effectively operating on parallel lines with the imperialists) toward weakening the vanguard liberated countries' links with the USSR and the brotherly socialist states. The Maoists incite ultranationalism and even racist inclinations, and capitalize on the weaknesses and backward aspects of the national liberation movement, and foment and intensify them. . . .[15]

Peking's reaction to Soviet policy has been predictably bitter. It rejects Moscow's charges of "adventurism" and in turn has characterized Soviet actions as betrayal of the revolutionary forces in Asia for the purpose of "encircling" and isolating the Chinese People's Republic. Peking has charged that Moscow, "In collabo-

[14]A. Ryumantsev, "Maoism and the Anti-Marxist Essence of Its Philosophy," *Kommunist,* January 1969.

[15]K. Brutents, "On Revolutionary Democracy," *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya* (*World Economy and International Relations*), No. 4, 1968, p. 29; quoted in *Mizan,* September-October 1968, p. 182.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ration with renegades and scabs in this region . . . vigorously propagates the 'parliamentary road' in order to sabotage the people's revolutionary movement. It even supplies weapons to certain reactionary groups, helping them massacre the people's revolutionary armed fighters who are valiantly engaged in fierce battles. . . ."[16]

V

When all external considerations have been weighed, the essential question that remains is the direction the Chinese regime will take, and this element is necessarily more speculative than any of the others. In the last five years, China has been through a purgatory of internal convulsion and external policy failure, out of which are coming changes whose outlines we can only dimly see. It might not be off the mark to suggest that Peking itself does not see the road ahead too clearly, and that many of the absurdly didactic and perverse things it says about world revolution are an attempt to camouflage this uncertainty.

First of all, the aged father of revolutionary war concepts is in a sanctified twilight, and despite his official bestowal of the mantle of succession on Lin Piao, a struggle for place and power within the hierarchy may be underway. The philosophy and style of the future leadership will have an important bearing on "people's war." If Mao's ideas emerge victorious, through Lin or someone else, there may be a renewed emphasis on the export of revolution. Should supremacy go to the so-called moderates and pragmatists (who may be mislabeled in some cases), it would be difficult to predict their influence on China's course, but it would seem that a greater concentration on the country's internal development problems might ensue. We must also consider the myth of global veneration of Mao and the role it plays in legitimizing Maoism and Mao's chosen successor, Lin Piao, in the Chinese political system. In the contest with the Soviet Union, the "people's war" doctrine serves to strengthen the image of both men as saviors of the nation and the only true revolutionaries.[17]

Moreover, China's further development of nuclear weapons systems may have an effect on the "guerrilla mentality" that pervades Chinese strategic views as well as the thought of Mao Tse-

[16]Peking, Hsinhua, March 14, 1969.

[17]This theme was strongly implied in a joint editorial of *Jen-min Jih-pao, Hung Chi* and *Chieh Fang Chun Pao* on April 22, 1970, on the occasion of the Lenin Centennial.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tung. Although Peking has said that its nuclear weapons are "a great encouragement to revolutionary peoples everywhere," the net result of Chinese nuclear development might be a shift of strategy and foreign policy into other than revolutionary channels. Peking's "people's war" talk in recent years has not been exclusively aimed at encouraging revolution in the outside world; much of it has been an expression of doctrine for the defense of China against attack by the "imperialist" American enemy. It is now also touted as the answer to the armed threat from the Soviet "revisionists." Without sufficient nuclear weapons, and with its conventional armed forces chronically unbalanced, busy with domestic chores and insufficiently modernized to meet a determined attack, Peking loudly advertises a protracted Chinese "people's war" as the trump card in the defensive arsenal. In this sense, the specter of an exhausting guerrilla war has been used as a deterrent to perceived threats of direct American or Soviet military attack. To some degree revolutionary war in Southeast Asia may similarly be considered as a forward defense of the southern borders, in that it is directed not only against indigenous governments but also against U.S. military bases and Soviet diplomatic "plots" in the area. Nevertheless, possession of a larger nuclear arsenal may well lead to a de-emphasis of the guerrilla deterrent and might open avenues for the projection of Chinese power and influence which will be more attractive to Peking than the indifferently successful promotion of revolutionary war.

It is clear that the Chinese communists, despite their bellicose words, have been compelled by reality to modest deeds. This caution has not been entirely due to the circumstance that the international strategic power balance weighs so heavily against them; since 1965 Peking has come to realize that the United States has been learning something in Viet Nam about coping with the "people's war" strategy, even if the Americans have devised no means of gaining a military victory in that conflict. While it might be argued that the Chinese can draw any conclusions they wish from the Viet Nam war,[18] the fact remains that orthodox Maoist doctrine does not provide for endlessly protracted stalemates. There has always been a wide gap between Peking's aspirational and operational foreign policies—the former typified by Lin Piao's 1965 speech and the unceasing publication

[18] J. D. B. Miller, "Lessons from Vietnam," *Australian Outlook,* April 1969, p. 75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of inspirational messages from Mao to "revolutionary peoples" in every corner of the globe, the latter demonstrated by the relatively restrained measures China actually takes toward realization of these grandiose concepts. Although guerrilla wars may become increasingly prominent in future world politics, Mao Tse-tung's influence on them is likely to decline.

Benjamin Schwartz has commented that Chinese foreign relations are pursued on two levels: one dominated by Mao's "higher" visions, the other operating within the normal nation-state framework.[19] Should Peking choose to emphasize a more normal pursuit of political advantage within the structure of the modern international system, China will have to be much more careful than it has been in the last decade in handling diplomatic problems, particularly those related to the new states of Asia and Africa. Obviously "liberation war" and the "glorious thought" of Mao Tse-tung can be exported only at the expense of the present leaders in these states, with whom Peking might wish in the future to maintain profitably smooth relations. While it stretches the imagination to suppose that the Chinese will take a cue from recent Soviet successes in catering to these leaders, or that a revival of the relatively enlightened "Bandung era" of Chinese diplomacy might occur, there have been some signs that Peking is beginning to consider more normal relations with states which have been in Maoist "outer darkness" for years. The Chairman himself has gone out of his way to be pleasant to noncommunist diplomats in the capital,[20] and most of the Chinese ambassadors called home when the Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution totally controlled the Foreign Ministry have returned to their posts. Resumption of talks with the United States in Warsaw in early 1970 seemed to reflect a changing mood in China's international relations, while some increased interest in UN membership appears to reinforce this trend.

Yet temptation to be less cautious still entices the Peking communists, particularly in areas near home, where Chinese power has traditionally been either paramount or strongly felt. The areas where there are threatening manifestations of Mao's "people's war" strategy—Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, northeast India—are those where Peking's muscle can be most effectively used. Although nuclear armament may change

[19]Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Maoist Image of World Order," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XXI, No. 1, 1967, p. 101.
[20]Peking, Hsinhua, May 1, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the direction of China's strategic thinking, it is not impossible that a nuclear umbrella could give Peking greater confidence in promoting revolutionary war on the periphery. Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez and the looming reduction of the American commitment to the security of Southeast Asia might be interpreted by the Chinese as giving them more leeway in pursuance of one of their major objectives: a belt of states essentially dependent on Peking for all foreign policy initiatives. Furthermore, Peking's break with Moscow and its claim to leadership of world revolution put great pressure on Mao and his colleagues to do something to hasten the movement of history toward the goal of a new society.

In the final analysis, the future of Maoist revolutionary strategy will depend largely on the direction and intensity of the impulses that guide Chinese affairs and the country's outlook. No one can predict with confidence that the objective erosion of the validity of Mao's *weltanschauung* by the facts of international life will diminish its impact on the thrust of Chinese society. Much hinges on whether the nation's great energies will be focused on self-development or whether Communist China will hold to a messianic mood and continue to claim a universalist mission to establish a new order. If China would come to terms internally with the requirements of a modern technological civilization, its participation in the life of the international community could be refreshingly positive. Mao apparently does not object to modernization and development per se, so long as China can avoid having to pay the price in proliferation of bureaucracies, "technocratic" challenges to ideological purity, and dilution of general revolutionary zeal. His successors may break through this stultifying impasse, but if the Chairman views the Soviet Union as an example of what can happen in fifty years of development, some of his apprehension is understandable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by Alvin J. Cottrell

MORE than twenty years have passed since Winston Churchill described the Soviet Union as a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." In the intervening time—especially in the last decade—Sovietologists grew progressively confident that they had unraveled a good part of the mystery. From the post-Stalin thaw and the actions of Stalin's heirs, some experts drew a picture of the USSR in which a group of mediocre leaders was confronted, with growing helplessness, by acute problems at home and proliferating challenges abroad. While Western observers differed in their analyses of Soviet domestic trends, their verdicts regarding Soviet external behavior became nearly unanimous. They suggested that the new Soviet leadership had jettisoned revolutionary zeal and expansionist aims in favor of personal survival and national viability. Except for its efforts to catch up with the United States in the strategic race, the Soviet Union was becoming a status-quo power.

This image significantly shaped Western policies and continues to cling stubbornly to current policy perceptions. It was jolted, but not damaged badly, by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. That surprise move suggested that the Soviet Union was still capable of acting quickly and decisively, contrary to notions regarding a divided and confused leadership in the Kremlin. Nonetheless, it was argued, the action was in favor of the status quo, at least from Moscow's vantage point.

The image has suffered grievously, however, under Soviet behavior in the Middle East. It is worth recalling the prevailing view among Sovietologists following the abject defeat of the Soviet Union's Arab clients in the Six-Day War of 1967. In simplified terms, this held that in the Middle East Khrushchev's successors might well have ridden a camel not of their choosing. Walter Laqueur, for example, in his excellent book, *The Struggle for the Middle East,* writes:

> The Arab defeat in 1967 . . . adversely affected Soviet prestige. The re-equipment of the Arab armies became necessary, regardless of cost, and has thus involved Soviet prestige even more than in the past. Yet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

another Arab defeat by Israel must appear well-nigh intolerable in Soviet eyes, but since it has no full control over the armies of the UAR and Syria, and since its capacity to intervene in a war is probably still limited, the Soviet position is not without hazards.[1]

After the disaster, the experts thought, the Soviets would surely abandon the track; they would write off their investments and perhaps, putting the best face on defeat, try to transform themselves into the major peacemakers in the Middle East.

This prognosis has proven sadly wrong, as evidenced by the mounting Soviet interest and power in the area. But criticism of past judgments begs the central question: What *are* Soviet motivations in the Middle East?

I

Ideology provides little clue to Soviet motivations. Particularly in the Middle East, the Soviets have cynically abandoned ideological purity for a willingness to cooperate with traditional and "reactionary" rulers and regimes—kings, sheikhs and emirs—as well as with revolutionary forces. The fate of local communist parties apparently has not weighed heavily in the Kremlin's tactical decisions. If ideology still shapes Soviet Middle East policy, it is probably the old Marxist-Leninist prescription that revolutionary power prevails where weakness and internal dissatisfaction abound.

In short, whether or not supported by ideology, Soviet policy in the Middle East seems to be animated by the tried-and-true rule of international competition: expand where the opportunity is ripe. In line with this rule, Soviet expectations probably range between minimum and maximum goals. Clearly, the minimum objective is to bring about the burial of historic Western influence in the area. The Kremlin has taken long strides toward this goal over the last five years by establishing a military-political presence in the Middle East and east of Suez. The maximum goal, equally clear, is Soviet domination of the region—a strategic position which would provide a springboard for the spread of Soviet influence into adjacent countries of Asia and Africa. The larger ambition suffered severely from the closure of the Suez Canal in the 1967 war. Professor Bernard Lewis of the University of London, writing about the effects on the Soviets of the closing of the canal, observes that

[1]Walter Laqueur, *The Struggle for the Middle East* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 148.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet power was advanced in the Mediterranean but almost entirely halted in the South of Suez . . . in the countries bordering the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. . . . with the Suez Canal and Aden at its disposal, the Soviet Navy would soon have established supremacy in the Red Sea, and the regimes on both shores would have been due for realignment or replacement.[2]

The easy blending of ideology and expansionist appetite is described in a report of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, entitled *The Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal:*

The defensive-offensive dichotomy has little relevance in the discussion of Soviet policy. Their policy would better be described as imperialism in the conventional, traditional sense of the word, though sometimes in the guise of social revolution. There are two essential components to the growth of empire—appetite and a sense of mission. The Soviets have both. The defense of the imperial frontier requires a *cordon sanitaire,* which in turn requires a further *cordon sanitaire.* This process is capable of indefinite extension.[3]

The principal pawns of Soviet strategy in the Middle East have been the "revolutionary Arabs." As Laqueur points out, Soviet tactical predilections have always favored quantity over quality. For example, "What in the last resort prevented a rapprochement between Moscow and Jerusalem was not anti-Semitism, but the simple fact that Israel was small. Size has always been of great significance in shaping Soviet attitudes toward other countries; more than once this has been the source of political mistakes."[4]

At the time of the Arab defeat in June 1967, and prior to direct Soviet intervention in Egypt, the mistake seemed clear. However, the shift in the Middle East balance brought about by the direct Soviet involvement may not only redress the mistake but prove the soundness of the Kremlin's course. To be sure, this still holds obstacles and risks. The costs of rearming Egypt and of supporting Soviet activities in the area have been high, and the burden will become heavier if the conflict is protracted.

The risks relate in good measure to the abiding weakness of the Egyptian regime. Until the massive Soviet involvement in Egypt, Nasser had been growing domestically weaker at the same time that the continuing flow of Soviet arms shipments was placing greater military strength in his hands. This combination of

[2]Bernard Lewis, "The Great Powers, the Arabs and the Israelis," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1969, p. 645.

[3](Washington: Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Special Report Series, No. 8, February 1969), pp. 9-10.

[4]Laqueur, *op. cit.,* p. 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

internal weakness and military strength leads to dangerous unpredictability, and Soviet apprehensions in this regard no doubt weighed heavily in the Kremlin's decision to accede to Nasser's request for large-scale Soviet assistance. Particularly, the Soviets faced the prospect that if Nasser were overthrown they would probably have to deal with a new military leadership, which would feel compelled to resort to more militant policies in order to eclipse Nasser's image and establish its own. Through their massive intervention, they not only rescued Nasser from almost certain internal defeat after the 1967 debacle but managed to put themselves in a position to influence Egypt's policies more directly.

The question for the Soviets is where they go from here. With Nasser dead, they are even more deeply involved in the affairs of Egypt because of the vacuum his passing created. How will the new leadership be sustained in the eyes of the Egyptian people and the Arab world? Even had Nasser lived, the strengthening of his military posture alone would have been unlikely to serve as more than a temporary palliative to his radical Arab followers. Perhaps Nasser himself wished to escape the constrictions of his earlier pan-Arabism and tailor policy more prudently to purely Egyptian interests. His followers at home would have wished to see more tangible benefits flowing from Egypt's refurbished military position, either in the form of a military victory over the Israelis or in a peace settlement clearly favoring Egyptian interests. If these assumptions were true in Nasser's case, they are likely to be even more valid now, when less charismatic successors are under compulsion to demonstrate a worthiness to inherit Nasser's mantle of power. This desire to register progress by at least recovering territory lost in the June 1967 war—while undoubtedly inspired by Moscow's great interest in opening the Suez Canal—is almost certainly behind Egyptian President Sadat's proposal for a pullback by Israel to allow clearing operations to begin in the canal. This would satisfy the Egyptian government's interest in regaining full control of Suez. It would also meet the USSR's objective of reopening the canal in order to gain greater mobility for its Black Sea-Mediterranean naval forces to penetrate the Persian Gulf-Red Sea-Indian Ocean area.

II

How far are the Soviets willing to press in the Middle East? While "crisis management" in the broadest sense may have been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the immediate motive behind massive Soviet intervention, the Kremlin's aspirations clearly range beyond the mere imperative of protecting investments. Opportunities are beckoning, and there will undoubtedly be growing pressures, not only from Arab clients but within the Kremlin itself, for translating Soviet military muscle into demonstrable political gain.

Moscow has paid relatively few political penalties for its intrusion in the Middle East, even with respect to Western opinion. There has been intensive coverage in Western publications of the growing Soviet role. Yet if one reads the many articles and commentaries carefully, it becomes clear that despite detailed accounts of arms and other military assistance, including pilots who have been supplied to Egypt, the Soviets have emerged for the most part undamaged in the eyes of the world. One reason is that Soviet intervention has come at a time when opinion in the West, particularly in the United States, has been shifting perceptibly against Israel. Influential official and commercial circles in the United States have lately been inclining (if often tacitly) toward the view that American political and economic interests in the Arab world are endangered not so much by the Soviet presence as by U.S. support of Israel. Soviet intervention has only tended to exacerbate the American policy dilemma of how far to go in support of Israel, and to swell the ranks of those who argue in favor of Washington's complete disengagement from Tel Aviv.

In light both of opportunities and the prospect of mild opposition from the United States and the West, the Soviets may now be tempted to maximize their gains. Certainly in the absence of a peace settlement they will be hard put to maintain a position of merely protecting the interior of Egypt from Israeli attack and adopting a "defensive" posture along the canal. As has been suggested, Nasser's successors will require something more substantial than a Soviet presence and military hardware to preserve their and Egypt's prestige in the Arab world—especially in the event that peace negotiations following the cease-fire agreement fail to restore the occupied territories. In the words of former Under Secretary of State George Ball,

> The Soviet Union has almost as many "advisors" in the Arab world as the United States had in South Vietnam when President Kennedy was shot, and—as we should have learned from our own experience—the progress from "advisors" to participation in "defensive" missions to carrying the brunt of the offense is an easy slide for a great power.... Certainly there is nothing in postwar Soviet history to suggest that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

once their forces were engaged, the Russians would tractably withdraw when victory had been won.[5]

Whatever the future may hold, one fact is clear: the Soviets have already managed to alter the military balance decisively against Israel. The great public debate that has raged in the United States over the sale of aircraft to the Israelis is of little consequence. In real terms the marginal addition of aircraft has long ceased to be the answer to Israel's emerging predicament. The Soviet leadership can look with relative equanimity on the prospect that the United States will meet Israel's request for another 100 to 150 planes. They would not make much, if any, difference in the long run, because the Soviets could overcome them by attrition—notwithstanding the qualitative superiority of Israel's air force, as evidenced by reliable reports that Israeli pilots bested Soviet pilots in air combat prior to the cease-fire along the canal.

The aircraft would help in dealing with Syria, which has a large air force, but vis-à-vis Egypt there are weightier reasons why additional airpower alone will not solve Israel's military-strategic problem. Israeli defense has been based largely on the offensive concept of "aerial pre-emption." This concept, central to deterrence, has been seriously compromised by Soviet air defenses in Egypt. By establishing a barrier against Israeli aerial penetration—one which would at the least impose intolerable attrition upon her small air force—the Soviets have, in fact, neutralized Israel's "defense."

The United States might respond to Soviet-Egyptian joint action by openly guaranteeing Israel's original borders. But this would be a development entirely favorable to the Soviet objective of further undermining U.S. relations with the Arab world. In general, Moscow could hope to benefit from supporting an action of sufficient threat to force the United States to take a clear stand for Israel but stopping short of triggering a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Apparently the Soviets feel free to offer nearly unlimited support to the Egyptians without great concern that a confrontation with the United States will result.

At the moment, the Kremlin probably views the cease-fire agreement as an opportunity to achieve its goal of reopening the canal without the use of force. The Suez will be one of the principal issues in the forthcoming negotiations. In pursuing this

[5] *New York Times Magazine,* June 28, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

objective at the peace tables, however, the Soviets may face some hard bargaining from their own Arab clients. Egyptian leaders are well aware of Soviet interest in having the canal reopened, and they are likely—as Nasser certainly would have done—to play this card as a trump against Moscow to make sure there will be no settlement short of a substantial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

Soviet and Egyptian interests may not be identical, but the reopening of the Suez Canal is at least one objective upon which they can agree. The Soviets, having succeeded in altering the balance against Israel, might now seek to open the canal through military support of an Egyptian crossing. For example, they could give the necessary support and air cover to establish a "beachhead" twenty-five to thirty miles in depth along the east bank. There are those who believe the United States would respond militarily to such a gambit, but it is doubtful that the Soviets would take this prospect seriously, let alone that they would be deterred thereby. They have good reason to believe the United States would take pains to avoid any military involvement, especially in response to action that is limited to the occupied territories. Moreover, they could probably count on world opinion favoring, or at least greeting passively, an Egyptian move ostensibly restricted to the partial recapture of conquered territory.

III

While world attention is focused on the Arab-Israeli dispute, it is too often forgotten that the Soviets have made substantial gains in Turkey and Iran, two of the most important countries in the Middle East generally regarded as Western clients. Preoccupied observers of the Arab-Israeli conflict often fail to notice that Turkey and Iran rate a high priority in Soviet policy. Their respective détentes with the USSR have been due in part to American foreign policy decisions as well as to a combination of skillful Soviet diplomacy and military strength. Since 1964, when President Johnson in a bluntly-worded note warned Turkey against intervening in Cyprus, U.S.-Turkish relations have steadily worsened. The Soviets have capitalized on this development by taking a stand on the Cyprus issue favorable to the Turkish position, to the annoyance of the large Cypriot Communist Party.

Similarly, Iran's relations with the United States have undergone considerable deterioration since the India-Pakistan conflict of 1965, when Washington cut off aid to the Shah's friend, Presi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dent Ayub of Pakistan, and refused to permit the Shah to assist Pakistan with military equipment provided under CENTO. The Soviets have since concluded with Iran a $110,000,000 arms deal, as well as an important commercial agreement under which Iran has received over $100 million in credit and contracted to pay for Soviet construction of a gas pipeline with deliveries of Iranian natural gas.

In scoring these diplomatic and commercial successes, the Soviets profited from the strains between Ankara and Tehran and the United States. At the same time, however, Soviet military power, made manifest in a permanent naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean and an increasing presence in the Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea area, has had a persuasive influence. The haunting impression has been created in Turkey and Iran that the Soviet Union—the nation both have feared for so long—will eventually become the dominant power in the Middle East. Both countries have sought to take out insurance against this prospect, which is made increasingly plausible by present trends in the Middle East. Both fear, with much justification, that the Soviets will control, either directly or through clients, waterways vital to their interests: Turkey, the Dardanelles; and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

A major objective of the Soviets in Europe in the past two decades has been to bring about the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in NATO. In the Mediterranean their aim has been somewhat analogous, to cause withdrawal or neutralization of the American Sixth Fleet. Since 1956, Moscow has frequently warned Washington that it considered intolerable American hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean, an area close to Soviet borders. More recently, Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev bluntly demanded the United States' withdrawal.

Brezhnev's demand has been backed up by growing Soviet naval and military power. The Soviet naval presence has already degraded the principal value of the Sixth Fleet—its psycho-political impact—and it seems clear that the changing military equation has influenced the political-military outlook of nations from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. The ability of the Sixth Fleet to show the flag in Mediterranean ports has been greatly reduced: perhaps only in Greece and Italy would the United States still merit anything approaching a warm reception, while the Soviets are welcome in many other ports, e.g., Latakia, Mers-el-Kebir, Alex-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

andria and Casablanca.[6] Relations with Turkey have so deteriorated that the last visit of the Sixth Fleet to Izmir provoked leftist demonstrations and uncovered evidence of a plot by Turkish leftists to murder at least one U.S. seaman. A report of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services questioned whether future visits would be beneficial.[7]

There has recently been much controversy in the United States over the new U.S.-Spanish agreement, signed on August 6, 1970 in Washington, covering American air and naval bases in Spain. But if the United States were, at this time, to be forced to withdraw from the Rota Naval Base near Cadiz, the blow to American influence, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, would be incalculable. Even though many of Rota's uses might be transferred elsewhere, U.S. withdrawal from that base at this critical juncture in Mediterranean and Middle Eastern affairs would signal to most countries in the area the eventual abandonment of the Mediterranean by the Sixth Fleet and its transformation into a *mare Sovietica.*

The issue points up the dangerous myopia of those in the Senate who have broadened their objections to the U.S. commitment in Viet Nam into an attack on American commitments or arrangements elsewhere in the world. A reasonable case can be made for the proposition that our involvement in Viet Nam is of questionable value, strategically and politically, to the United States. No such argument can be advanced realistically, at this point in history, with regard to American and Western interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Even a prolonged debate over whether the agreement with Spain should be an executive agreement or a treaty could have had a debilitating effect on U.S. policy if it cast doubt on the United States' willingness to remain in the Mediterranean. That would have encouraged Soviet policymakers to push even harder in pursuit of their goals.

The USSR's penetration of Syria is an alarming development. Approximately 1,000 Soviet military advisers are in that country, and Moscow's uninhibited support of every Syrian position has been credited by qualified analysts as a major factor in triggering the 1967 war. Yet perhaps even more notable successes have

[6]Hanson W. Baldwin, *Strategy for Tomorrow* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 168-169.

[7]Report by Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services Following a Visit to Spain, Italy, Libya, Turkey and Iran, January 2-17, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), pp. 5709-5710.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been achieved in Iraq, where the Soviets have stationed upwards of 700 military advisers in the only "nontraditional" state in the Persian Gulf, i.e., the only state not willing to accept the status quo. The Soviets could tip the balance of military power in the Gulf just as they have done in the eastern Mediterranean. Should Iraq reassert its claim to Kuwait, as it did in 1961—assuming, as we must, that the British will not now intervene as they then did—there would be nothing to prevent the Soviets from reversing the power relationship that now favors Iran over Iraq. Given their recent successes in Tehran, the choice would be a painful one for Kremlin leaders, but there is little doubt that in a confrontation between revolutionary Arabs and traditional rulers in the Middle East, especially the Shah of Iran, the Soviets would support the Arabs.

Turkey and Iran are excellent mirrors of the changing balance in the Middle East. Both countries are clearly apprehensive over future power relationships in the area. They have good reason for their concern. Already the Soviets have achieved, in large measure, their minimum objective of ending Western hegemony. They are now moving with considerable momentum toward their maximum goal—domination. There are those who argue optimistically that the Soviets will be no more able to dominate and control the Middle East than were Britain or France for many years, or, over the past quarter-century, the United States. Others would have us cease to oppose the Soviets in the Middle East, on the assumption that they will become entangled there in their own Viet Nam. Certainly the closer relationship resulting from the increasing Soviet military commitment has led to an exacerbation of strained relations.

John Valdeleur, writing in the London *Daily Telegraph* on February 8, 1969, when the Soviet presence was much less conspicuous, observed about Egypt:

> Russian instructors and technicians have been actively training the Army and Air Force down to battalion and squadron levels. The morale of the Air Force is reported to be "patchy" and there are complaints in both Services of "Russians breathing down the necks" of commanding officers, although the actual number of Russian advisers attached to the defence forces has, in recent months, been considerably reduced and is now thought to be less than 1,500. Army officers say that the *new* Russian equipment has the advantage of having instructions written in English (rather than Russian) and some of the weapons are easier to handle than the ones they lost. They admit, too, with reluctance, that the Russians are excellent teachers. None the less, the Egyptians con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sider them as hard task-masters and resent the fact that they no longer have the opportunity to enjoy long weekends among the bright lights of Cairo and Alexandria. The towns of the Canal Zone have been evacuated and soldiers and airmen dislike this deserted urban area almost as much as they hate sandy desert stations.

More recently, as the Soviet military presence has deepened, the chafing has increased. David Hirst of the *Manchester Guardian* wrote on August 22, 1970:

> . . . the Soviet Union knows that if any section of Egyptian society, through direct contact, has come to resent the Russian presence, it is the army. In Syria, officers are known to talk of the ugly Russians. The Egyptians may not have gone that far, but stories of friction are plentiful, and Russians seeking postings elsewhere are not unheard of.

IV

Suppositions of future complications for the Soviets in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world may turn out to be valid. The problems arising from their military presence have become more obvious since Nasser's death, if only because they may now have to maintain it for a longer time than they had hoped. No doubt they will eventually have a "past" in the Middle East, which will work to their detriment as it did in the case of Britain and France. But given the tenacity with which the Soviets have held conquered territories, perhaps the United States would be well advised not to allow them unchallenged opportunity. Whatever aims Moscow has in Egypt, they most certainly are not confined to the eastern Mediterranean alone but involve long-standing Soviet objectives in the Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean region.[8]

President Nasser's death will require considerable Soviet effort in restructuring and sorting out the internal political situation in Egypt, but it will not necessarily decelerate the long, steady advance of Soviet power throughout the Middle East and into the Indian Ocean.

[8]T. B. Millar, "Soviet Policies South and East of Suez," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1970, p. 71.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIMITING FACTORS IN A RECONSIDERATION OF U.S. CHINA POLICIES*

by Harry G. Gelber

WITH the decline of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, China is entering a new phase in her relations with the outside world. The isolation which was one facet of that convulsion has been qualified or diminished. Trade and economic relations, badly disrupted during the 1967-1968 period, are being restored. There are signs of debate in Peking about the usefulness of a situation in which the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) is on terms of bitter hostility with both superpowers simultaneously.

At the same time, United States policies toward China have become more flexible. In part, this is due to the general dissatisfaction with past U.S. policies in Asia, disenchantment with Viet Nam, and impatience with the difficulties of global responsibility. More important, perhaps, have been the consequences of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the prospect of a larger international role for Japan, and the increasing need, as time goes by, to establish better ways of doing business with the government of the most populous nation in the world. Washington has made a series of diplomatic and strategic gestures toward Peking. Its rhetoric has become more conciliatory. But no far-reaching accommodation has been suggested.

It seems worth asking what, in general terms, the limitations on a Sino-American rapprochement are. The proposition advanced in this article is that (apart from U.S. domestic political concerns which are not examined here) they derive principally from two kinds of uncertainty and the subordination of China policy, in at least two major respects, to other aspects of U.S. foreign relations. The uncertainties, which could be resolved in time but loom large at the start of the 1970's, concern the co-

*An earlier draft of this article was presented to the Conference on the Foreign Policy of Communist China, held in Puerto Rico, January 4-8, 1970. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the sponsors of the conference, the Subcommittee on Chinese Government and Politics of the Social Sciences Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, New York; the members of the conference for their comments; and the Harvard Center for International Affairs, where much of the research on the topic was done.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hesion, character and general outlook of the government of the CPR and the structure and aims of its foreign policy. The more permanent factors are that China policy is from Washington's point of view largely secondary to policies toward Japan and the Soviet Union.

I

The first problem concerns the leadership in Peking, and the succession to Mao. For the time being, the Chairman appears to remain supreme both as a symbol and as a real political force in any situation in which he wishes to be decisive. The results of the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969 confirmed the Mao-Lin line. The twenty-five-man Politbureau and its five-man Standing Committee, as they emerged from that congress, were in the hands of those personally loyal to Mao and Maoism. But in 1970 the pattern appeared to be changing. There are signs that the jockeying for position among top leaders is continuing and that, though Mao's leadership is probably not under challenge, the extent of his ascendancy is being questioned.[1]

[1]The evidence is, as usual, fragmentary and inconclusive. But at a reception given by Chou En-lai on the eve of China's national day, on September 30, 1970, a toast was offered to unity "under the leadership of the Party Central Committee with Chairman Mao as its leader and Vice-Chairman Lin as its deputy leader. . . ." (Hsinhua dispatch, September 30, 1970.) The same phrase was used in a joint editorial in *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*), *Hongqi* (*Red Flag*) and *Jiefangjun Bao* (*Liberation Army Daily*) on October 1, 1970. The editorial went on to say that "The Chinese Communist Party is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese People." This stress upon the party and its Central Committee constitutes a startling departure from the previous adulation of Mao himself.

There are other signs of difficulty. As late as the end of September, at a reception given by Mao for the Vice Premier of North Viet Nam, Chou and Kang Sheng were listed as members of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau. (*Peking Review*, September 30, 1970, pp. 3-4.) During the national day celebrations of October 1, in the list of those present on the Tien An Men rostrum, both men were designated merely as members of the Central Committee. At a reception given that evening by Chou as Prime Minister, Kang Sheng was again listed as a member of the Standing Committee. (*Peking Review*, October 9, 1970, pp. 6-7, 13.) Another member of the Standing Committee, Chen Po-ta, was not listed as being present during the national day celebrations at all. Three weeks later, for the twentieth anniversary of China's entry into the Korean war, both Chou and Kang were again listed as members of the Standing Committee. (*Peking Review*, October 30, 1970, p. 7.)

These matters are not accidental. The relegation, or attempted relegation, of Chou and Kang to the ranks of the Politbureau would tend to increase or confirm the personal prominence of Mao and Lin vis-à-vis all other members of that larger body. It would also further the anti-hierarchical trend to which Mao appears to attach such importance. The apparent resistance of the two men therefore has a direct bearing upon Mao's own position, the heritage of the Cultural Revolution and the principles upon which the party is to be rebuilt. On the other hand, both Chen and Kang were closely associated with the driving forces behind the Cultural Revolution. The decline in their fortunes (if that is, indeed, what has happened) might, therefore, be a further signal, and one sanctioned by Mao, of the decline of the Cultural Revolution's forces in Peking.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mao's designated successor, Lin Piao, seems in doubtful health. It is even more doubtful whether he commands the kind of firm, nationwide support a successor to Mao should have. The evidence so far permits no forecasts about how the succession problem will be dealt with. And if the shape of China's leading group during the next few years is unknown, it follows, a fortiori, that the machinery by which policy differences will be adjusted cannot be known and the emerging policy preferences cannot be predicted.

Similar arguments apply to the elites of the second echelon, those of the governmental apparatus, the party and the army. Here, too, the composition and outlook of the next generation is largely a matter for speculation. The Cultural Revolution, conceived in part as an attack upon entrenched bureaucracies, has succeeded in leaving the party and the governmental apparatus in great disarray. The rebuilding of both, and especially of the party, has proceeded with caution, Mao evidently fearing that they might once more congeal into bureaucratic elitism.[2] One of the problems of the leadership may be the discrepancy between official statements about the obligation of other groups, including the army, to accept the primacy of the party, and the absence of a party apparatus to which the others could, even if they would, accord primacy.

In this situation the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has assumed a role of particular importance. It was the army, under Lin's leadership, on which Mao largely relied in controlling the Cultural Revolution. In the process, the army has greatly increased its power and influence at every level. Army men control the majority of the provincial revolutionary committees

[2]The lack of progress in rebuilding the party is apparent in the Communiqué of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), August 23 to September 6, 1970 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970). It is also likely to be one reason for the delay in calling the promised Fourth National Congress, for if there existed a strong party machine which could organize the congress, there would be fewer reasons for postponement. Many of the comments on the problems of party rebuilding stress the complex and protracted nature of the undertaking, the need for close links with the masses (read: avoid bureaucracy), the need to combat factionalism and careerism (proving the persistence of these evils), and the need to find room both for young people who have graduated through the Cultural Revolution and persons who sincerely repent of their former errors. Cf. a joint editorial in *People's Daily, Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily* of July 1, 1970, on the forty-ninth anniversary of the founding of the CCP (*Peking Review,* July 3, 1970, pp. 10-11). Also see *Peking Review,* August 14, 1970, pp. 9-12, and a *Hupeh Daily* editorial on August 7, 1970 on rebuilding the Communist Youth League (CYL).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

throughout the CPR. A majority of members of the Politbureau are connected with the PLA.[3] The weakening of the governmental and party structures increased the importance of the army as the most powerful nationwide body enjoying administrative cohesion and reasonably effective lines of command. In addition it retains its primary responsibility for national defense, a vital role during the last few years when armed conflict, at first with the United States and, in 1969-1970, with the Soviet Union, seemed a real possibility.

Yet the mere fact of the PLA's prominence does not point to any clear-cut political or even strategic conclusions. The PLA's involvement in government at every level has brought its members more into practical politics and probably has made them more sensitive to political criteria and imperatives. The multiplicity of the army's roles, ranging from involvement in factional quarrels on local revolutionary committees to high politics and strategy, seems more likely to lead to a reflection, within the military, of the debates and disputes of national politics than to a monolithic or even coherent army view of national affairs. There is little evidence to suppose either that the army, as a body, is in conflict with Mao or Maoism, or that differences on political or ideological matters in China often occur along straightforward PLA versus non-PLA lines.

It seems clear that during the Ninth Party Congress the provincial military leaders consolidated their influence. They fended off the claims of the cultural revolutionaries on the one hand, and the pressures of the Peking centralizers on the other. It is not apparent that the situation has changed substantially since then. One other reason for the postponement of the Fourth National Congress may be the fear of other groups, including the party, that the army's control at the local level would enable it to select the delegates to such a congress so as to lead to still greater PLA ascendancy.

This local control may, however, strengthen local commanders not merely against Peking politicians but against the PLA's own high command, the more so since the latter does not appear to be united on the key political questions of the day. Important differences remain on the emphasis to be given to ideological training in the army, and the role of man as against equipment and

[3]Ralph Powell has suggested, "The party may control the gun but only because the generals control the party." "The Party, the Government and the Gun," *Asian Survey*, June 1970, p. 471.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

technology.[4] No unanimity exists on the role the army should play within the state,[5] or even on such major issues as the relevance of people's war[6] and future relations with the Soviet Union.[7] There is also the matter of control. Mao and Lin hold the posts of Chairman and Vice Chairman not only of the party but of the Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee. In view of the evidence that significant differences, including ideological differences, remain between Lin and some other senior commanders,[8] the assumption by Mao and Lin, toward the end of 1970, of the additional titles of "Supreme Commander and Deputy Supreme Commander of the whole country and of the whole army" may reflect not so much the completeness of their control as a wish to strengthen it.

These questions of personnel, policy and structure are intimately connected with ideological concerns. On this, there seem to be two sets of disputes which, though logically incompatible, overlap in practice. The first is about the content or interpretation of ideological principles, or how they should be applied in particular situations. The second is whether the ideology is relevant at all to the real concerns of China. This involves the whole conflict between administrative and ideological

[4]The emphasis on ideological and morale factors, and the unity of the army and the people, are persistent themes. In the words of Mao, "Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive." See the joint editorial of *People's Daily, Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily* on August 1, 1970, commemorating the forty-third anniversary of the founding of the PLA (*Peking Review,* August 7, 1970, pp. 6-7, 23); also Hsinhua dispatch, October 21, 1970, and a series of local broadcasts, e.g., Nanch'ang Radio, July 31, 1969, Sining Radio, October 19, 1970, and Lanchow Radio, October 11, 1970.

[5]There is an obvious discrepancy between the emphasis by party leaders and national editorials on the role of the revolutionary masses, the party and the Central Committee, and such remarks as that by Shensi Radio in October 1970, that "the army constitutes the principal component part of the political power of the state. Establishing and consolidating political power is determined by the fundamental nature of our army."

[6]This involves a long-standing difference of opinion between officers who, like Lin, graduated through the war against the Kuomintang, and other, often more junior, officers who are more impressed with the value of modern technology. These differences might become more acute as and when China acquires more advanced weapons.

[7]This point is further discussed below.

[8]This emerges clearly enough if one compares, for example, the joint editorial of August 1, 1970 (see footnote 4); the address, on the same occasion, of the Chief of Staff and Central Committee member, Huang Yung-sheng (*Peking Review,* August 7, 1970, pp. 9-10); an article about the PLA in *Peking Review,* August 14, 1970, pp. 13-16, and Lin Piao's address on October 1, 1970 (Hsinhua dispatch of the same date). Huang conspicuously omits any mention of the "four good" company movement which is stressed elsewhere and with which Lin is particularly associated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authority and Mao's attempt to maintain or restore the fusion between the two. One of his crucial dilemmas in steering the Cultural Revolution has been precisely the fact that its conflicts "could not be reconciled, harmonized or resolved on the basis of the ideology, because the applicability of this ideology was itself the central issue in the dispute."[9] In effect, whereas Maoism and the CCP were vitally important integrative factors in making possible China's progress during the last thirty years, this progress has produced a functional differentiation in the party and the nation at large which is subversive of the central coordinating position of the ideology. The growing pluralism of institutions and interests, partly the result of economic progress, but also encouraged by such elemental forces as population growth, has proved hard to dovetail with the continuation of centralized governmental and ideological authority. Moreover, the very centrality of Mao's thought has associated it with past policy failures—not to mention the civic disruption of the Cultural Revolution—and has therefore in some ways weakened its authority.

Yet it is not easy to see how China's major problems, ranging from national defense to economic progress, can be solved without the restoration of a central ideology or some functional substitute for it. The ideology has been used to legitimize the regime, lay down the principles of national life, define common purposes and priorities, and determine the thrust of the educational system. "In the Chinese Communist political community, an ideology in the form of the thought of Mao Tse-tung played an extraordinarily important role in setting the general orientation, in bringing about integration of the various functional groups . . . and in enlisting commitment."[10] Neither generalized pragmatism nor a central bureaucracy can fulfill these roles.

Compared with the cohesion and comprehensiveness of the ideology, pragmatism is likely to seem partial and fragmented. Though some of its results are satisfying in detail, in sum it lacks coherence, balance and intellectual attraction, let alone popular appeal or the power to mobilize. As for bureaucracy, its task would be easier if, for example, the Peking government controlled a

[9]See Professor Tang Tsou's illuminating chapter, "Revolution, Reintegration and Crisis in Communist China: A Framework for Analysis," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, editors, *China in Crisis, Volume 1: China's Heritage and the Communist Political System* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 277-364. The quotation is from p. 345. See also Chalmers Johnson, "The Two Chinese Revolutions," *The China Quarterly,* April-June 1969.

[10]Tsou, *op. cit.,* p. 291.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sophisticated nationwide electronic communications and data-handling network, or if the process of modernization was being massively assisted from abroad. But neither pragmatism nor bureaucracy is likely to replace the energizing function of a broadly accepted ideology, not only as the motor of self-sustained modernization but as the basis for maintaining an operationally effective national unity against local or sectional interests.[11] Institutional restoration itself is taking place within a framework of revolutionary morality,[12] while the anti-bureaucratic elements of the Cultural Revolution have been used explicitly to try to fuse the party and the masses. And China's leaders keep insisting that ideological consolidation is linked with national unity and unity is the precondition of success at home or abroad.[13]

It may be objected that ideology plays a disruptive rather than a unifying role, that there might be some nonideological functional substitute for it or that, even if an ideology is needed, it might be something other than Mao Tse-tung Thought. The first objection points out that Maoism has led to debate and factional dispute. Far from unifying China, it has proved disruptive. But this argument to some extent misinterprets the role of ideology in a revolutionary situation. For all its acerbity, ideological dispute can, by a process of fruitful tension, produce greater strength, unity and enthusiasm against outsiders rather than weakness. Theological disputation among the various segments of Oliver Cromwell's army was certainly more bitter than among his royalist opponents. Similar statements might be made about Jacobins and Bolsheviks. In the CCP, the effectiveness of unified thinking in the past was usually based on prior debate within the leadership. In none of these cases did dispute necessarily produce weakness toward the outside world.

In favor of the second objection one might urge that once ideology is seen to be irrelevant to practical problems, a functional substitute for it might be found in, for example, emphasis upon

[11]If there is to be a central ideology at all, it must necessarily be based on Peking and therefore combine claims to intellectual dominance with compulsions for the maintenance of central authority.

[12]As was predictable and was predicted. See Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," *The China Quarterly,* April-June 1969, pp. 63-91.

[13]Among the most explicit of such statements is Lin Piao's appeal for support of Mao's leadership in 1966: "Our country . . . must have unified thinking. . . . But if a nation of seven hundred million people does not have unified thinking then it will just be like a sheet of scattered sand." (*Red Flag,* No. 11, 1966, p. 21.) More recently, a similar plea for unity runs through the Communiqué of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee, *op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese nationalism or fear of foreign threats. Even in a dispute about the relevance of ideology, however, it is by definition ideology which is central to the debate. Neither nationalism nor fear of foreign threats is competitive with Mao Tse-tung Thought. The Maoist leadership has itself made use of foreign threats to compel domestic unity and the acceptance of comparatively unpopular measures; and nationalism is part of the very canon of Maoism. It is hard to imagine a non-Maoist nationalism in present-day China.

The third objection raises the question of an alternative ideology. Though theoretically possible, it is unrealistic now. No alternative to Mao Tse-tung Thought is in sight. If that doctrine declines, as eventually it no doubt will, neither the timing of that decline nor the outlines of an alternative doctrine can at present be predicted. Any nationally-accepted system of thought must for the foreseeable future have a Maoist cast.

This is not to say that the Cultural Revolution has succeeded in creating the new Chinese man of Mao's vision. Rather the contrary. Nor is it to suggest that, even if Chinese internal and external policies continue to be partly guided by an evolving Maoism, this must make for intellectually coherent policies or administrative clarity or even for anything that, judged by American or European standards, need look like "success." What it indicates is that Maoist thought, or an immediate derivative of it, will continue to be an essential ingredient of the Chinese attitude toward public affairs. The phasing out of the Cultural Revolution may, in fact, represent the beginnings of a compromise in the search for a new integrative principle for China. But one doubts whether, in that compromise, ideology and bureaucratic pragmatism can do without each other, or whether either of them can wholly escape from traditional Chinese attitudes and cultural patterns.

Mao Tse-tung Thought is usually expressed in generalized form which not only allows a number of different applications but invites dispute as to its meaning on points of detail. The canon includes pronouncements of a variety that makes possible the underpinning of widely varying practical policies by selective quotation. Mao himself has stressed the uselessness of rigid dogmatism, and on a range of matters, especially in the economic and technical spheres, the general guidelines of his thought are not particularly relevant one way or the other. Yet it remains that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideology is no mere symbol, but an instrument of power. It helps to shape the perception of reality by which the leadership structures its policies. It is part of the essential base for the exercise of political and social influence. It also encourages some attitudes and forbids others. It is hard to believe that as long as Mao Tse-tung Thought remains an important factor in China's view of the world, the struggle against revisionism at home and capitalism abroad can be abandoned, even under the most generous interpretation of Leninist flexibility. The fact that particular policies are not solely or even principally guided by ideology does not make the ideology unimportant. It may merely indicate fresh complexities in the relationships within Peking's policy-making elite, an increased range of fluctuations in policy and, for outsiders, greater unpredictability.

This balance will also be reflected in the CPR's approach to foreign relations. For the moment, at least, many of China's broad aims remain unaffected. She intends to secure recognition as one of the world's great powers. The discrepancy between her actual and potential influence is to be eliminated. Strategic arms are being developed, and arms control is unacceptable until she has achieved some measure of equality with the two superpowers. Western influence must be removed from East and Southeast Asia, where she intends to exercise a general dominance. A united front will be formed with "progressive" Asians from North Korea to Indochina.

China will also maintain her unceasing struggle against capitalism and the United States. She will encourage the development of what she regards as genuine Marxist-Leninist-Maoist parties and movements everywhere. She will continue her leadership of, and support for, revolutionary forces in the world and promote the success of revolutionary wars by means of the protracted struggle technique. At the same time she will insist, where necessary, on the distinction between formal interstate relations and ideological or other forms of accommodation, for her pursuit of wider aims is not to prevent her from taking advantage, for such purposes as propaganda, trade or access to technology, of limited agreements with any other nation.

These are not defensive or limited aims. For all their ethnocentric aspects they amount to a declared intention to reshape the entire international system. They indicate that the CPR is a power which cannot be satisfied or appeased by specific concessions or the removal of particular grievances. In pursuing them, Peking

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has scored important successes, as well as some failures. Many of the constraints imposed by U.S. and Soviet power persist. Insofar as America is withdrawing from East or Southeast Asia, the CPR faces the no less worrying possibility of confrontation with Japan. People's war has not been as successful as was hoped. Peking's authority among communist and revolutionary movements outside China is not always great.

On the other hand, the unity and integrity of China have been safeguarded as they were not in the century before 1949. The principle has been established that with the exception of the northern borders no foreign army can even approach Chinese territory without risking Chinese intervention.[14] China has been able to exploit some Asian quarrels, such as those between India and Pakistan, and tensions in, for example, the Middle East. She has supported revolution elsewhere while persuading many that she is a nonexpansionist power. She claims to be the stronghold of true Marxist-Leninism and to lead the wave of the future, but is widely regarded as the injured party in her relations with America and the Soviet Union. She is developing nuclear arms and has denounced most of the arms control arrangements of recent years, but has convinced powerful groups abroad that her violence is merely verbal. She has maintained the internal advantages of isolation, and the freedom of action stemming from a rejection of international responsibilities, yet many accept that this isolation is not China's fault and that, if it is to be remedied, others should take the initiative. Often abrupt and intransigent, she has nevertheless persuaded others that the CPR cannot be coerced and that an accommodation will have to be sought largely through concessions to China's wishes. These are remarkable achievements.

Nor is this set of aims denied by Chinese foreign policy moves over the past year. There have evidently been decisions at the highest level about ending China's diplomatic isolation from most of the world. Formal relations are being established or resumed with a variety of countries, from Canada to Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Ambassadors have been exchanged with Moscow. There is a renewed interest in joining the United Nations. At the same time the alliance with North

[14]There are precedents in Korea (1950), India (1962) and Viet Nam (1966-1968). In Viet Nam it was largely fear of CPR intervention that is believed to have prevented a South Vietnamese-American invasion of the North. In effect, therefore, China was able to guarantee North Viet Nam against invasion by the United States. The implications of that lesson have been, and will be, far-reaching.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Korea has been restored and unity with the peoples of Indochina confirmed. There have even been minimal gestures in the direction of the United States, such as Peking's abstention from criticism when some U.S. restrictions on travel and trade with China were removed in 1969, or when Washington declared that it would back neither side in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Much of what has happened restores merely the machinery of international intercourse. Of itself, it says nothing about the political purposes for which that machinery will be used. Certainly one would expect continued CPR caution in the face of physical threats to national security, an unwillingness to take high risks or engage in forward military action rather than politically more ambiguous enterprises. One would expect more attention to effective propaganda, and to the benefits available in exchange for insubstantial gestures. Yet none of China's major claims in the world has been qualified or abandoned. There is no suggestion that she would fail to take advantage of the removal of past constraints. Peking undoubtedly continues to regard diplomatic relations as entirely compatible with the encouragement of revolution and subversion, as in the cases of Burma and India.[15] In the general tenor of Peking's statements, the United States remains the prime and irreconcilable national enemy, the major devil-figure of the outside world.

True, the multiplication of China's formal relationships will also multiply choices of a kind whose exercise involves real costs and therefore responsibilities. This may mean greater difficulty in reconciling different aspects of policy, greater institutional pressures in Peking making for compromise between them, and, in sum, greater constraints on Chinese policymaking. But the other side of the problem is the continuing need to design China's foreign policies in accordance with her domestic pressures and needs. This may indicate caution in the face of nuclear threats, but a welcome for the domestic benefits of limited foreign dangers. There will be Leninist flexibility in dealing with powers with different—and irreconcilable—social systems and vigilant maintenance of revolutionary discipline to guard against doctrinal dangers or subversion from abroad. There will be emphasis on the need for national unity, patriotic fervor and revolutionary en-

[15]See, for example, the *New York Times,* August 31, 1970, pp. 1, 5. That the strategy and tactics of people's war will outlast Mao and become a permanent feature of Chinese policy and international politics has been argued by George D. Damien, "The Dialectical Structure of the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," ORBIS, Spring 1970, pp. 192-217.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thusiasm, all of them likely to be undermined by any premature discounting of foreign threats.[16] Indeed, all its foreign dealings are likely to reflect, in some degree, Peking's persistent fear of domestic difficulties or corruption.[17]

Altogether one must question the thesis that Maoism will inevitably give way to greater moderation and pragmatism, that such developments will be to the advantage of the outside world in general and the United States in particular, and that U.S. policies in Asia should be amended to prepare for the welcome day when more moderate men come to power in Peking. For one thing, it is far from clear what "pragmatism" implies. In the sense of more emphasis on technical and economic rationality, this has in many places been shown to be compatible with various forms of radicalism. So far, there is little evidence for supposing that pragmatism need mean anything more than the pursuit of the same aims in rhetorically less colorful ways and perhaps by somewhat less offensive means. In that event, presumably pragmatism should be welcomed only by those who believe that the achievement of China's aims is desirable. Nor can we be sure who in Peking is a pragmatist on what kind of issue, or that pragmatists are invariably, or even usually, moderates. As Uri Ra'anan has written:

> The "pragmatism" of Mao's opponents . . . is a very questionable proposition altogether. The most "practical" leader in China is probably Premier Chou En-lai, who appears to be with Mao and not against him. Among Mao's more important opponents, Liu Shao-chi, at any rate, has given many indications throughout his life of being anything but a moderate. But of far greater significance is the fact that, as the 1965-66 debate shows, even if one were to equate pragmatism with plans for modernization, Mao's opponents always linked such proposals to calls for a limited reconciliation with Moscow.

[16]Mao has recognized the usefulness of enemies. See his 1939 article, "It is a good thing and not a bad thing to be opposed by the enemy," *Selected Readings from Mao Tse-tung's Works* (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1964).

[17]Back in 1964 it was argued that "imperialism headed by the United States has placed its hope of realizing 'peaceful evolution' in China on the corruption of our third and fourth generation. Who can say that this way of thinking of theirs is not without a certain foundation?" (Editorial in *Red Flag*, No. 14, 1964, p. 34.) Five years later on the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the CPR, in October 1969, a joint editorial in *People's Daily, Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily* was still arguing that "U.S. imperialism, social imperialism and their lackeys have had countless dreams of subverting the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . You vainly attempt to instigate the remnant counter-revolutionary forces to restore capitalism and hope that Liu Shao-chi and his gang of counter-revolutionaries will come to power again; this is simply day-dreaming and madness." The warnings against remnants of class enemies persist. See, for example, the Communiqué of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee, *op. cit.*, p. 3, and the joint editorial of August 1, 1970 in *People's Daily, Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily, op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A rapprochement with the USSR also was consistently advocated by Mao's foes as part of a militant "Unity of Action" in Vietnam, which would have involved both Peking and Moscow in considerable risks of confrontation with the United States. So it would seem that it was the pragmatists and not the fanatics who were the larger menace to peace and to the West. And there is no reason to assume that precisely the same policy motivation would be ignored now if Mao's opponents were able to defeat him.[18]

II

The Sino-Soviet relationship is one of Peking's primary problems and a major parameter for the design of U.S. China policies. Inevitably, it is the subject of continuing debate in Peking. If Mao's opponents favored a limited reconciliation with Moscow during 1965-1966, the Maoist reaction was both violently anti-Soviet and, in an operational sense, isolationist. The struggle against revisionism at home and abroad was central to the Cultural Revolution. Most of the speeches as well as the practical military preparations of 1968-1969 were directed as much against ideological and military dangers from the Soviet Union as they were against the United States. But even at the height of the Cultural Revolution there were probably groups, temporarily silenced, which favored Lo Jui-ching's old line about cooperation with the Russians.

The Ussuri River clashes of March 1969, for instance, may have various explanations. The second, at least, was probably begun by the Soviets.[19] But the first, on March 2, was probably triggered by the Chinese. This might have been partly due to poor command and communications locally, a wish by a local Chinese commander to make a name for himself, or a decision for limited pre-emption in the face of a growing Soviet buildup. But it also seems possible that the incident was begun in order to make the Soviet danger to China more visible and real. A war scare may have been thought necessary to strengthen domestic discipline and deflate opposition to Maoist policies, to make it impossible for soldiers in particular to argue for accommodation with an enemy whom

[18]"Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate', 1965-1966," in Ho and Tsou, *China in Crisis, op. cit., Volume 2: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives*, p. 68. See also Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle, Moscow, Peking, Hanoi* (New York: Pegasus Books, 1967), Chapter 3.

[19]For an excellent analysis, see Thomas W. Robinson, *The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, RM-6171-PR, August 1970). See also David Mozingo, *China's Foreign Policy and the Cultural Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University, International Relations of East Asia Project, Interim Report No. 1, March 1970), especially pp. 34-37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they were fighting in the field, and to reinforce the Maoist and anti-Soviet position generally for the impending Ninth Party Congress. Certainly the presentation of the incident within China as an unprovoked Soviet attack helped to arouse popular feelings not only against Moscow but against Chinese revisionism. It went far toward justifying the entire Cultural Revolution. And if this sketch is accurate, it illustrates not merely the lengths to which the Maoist leadership was prepared to go and the risks it was willing to assume, but the strength of the domestic opposition with which it had to deal.[20]

During 1970 there were fresh signs of debate on these matters in Peking. The reconciliation with North Korea, confirmed by Premier Chou's visit to Pyongyang in April,[21] must have been based on debate and decision at the highest level; in view of the Soviet-North Korean relationship it had clear implications as a Chinese gesture toward Moscow. Chou's visit was followed by increasingly fervent declarations of Chinese-North Korean friendship and mutual support.[22] By mid-year there were fragmentary indications that a number of Maoists, including Lin Piao and possibly Mao himself, might be making concessions to the kind of argument Liu Shao-chi and Lo Jui-ching had put forward five years earlier. The radical line, coupling Soviet revisionism with U.S. imperialism and declaring undeviating hostility to both, was still to be found. Vigilance in the face of military threats (by implication Soviet threats) was still urged. The PLA was still instructed not to ignore or play down the nation's dangers.[23] But the main emphasis in foreign policy pronouncements was more and more clearly on hostility to the United States.[24] Distinctions were offered between revisionism at home and abroad. Speakers, including the Army Chief of Staff, Huang Yung-sheng

[20]It would also supply a plausible domestic motive for apparent Chinese hesitations and delays in the subsequent Sino-Soviet border talks in Peking.

[21]For the documents, see *Premier Chou En-lai Visits the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970).

[22]See the speeches celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the start of the Korean war and the anniversary of China's entry into that conflict, *Peking Review*, July 3 and October 30, 1970.

[23]The joint editorial in *People's Daily*, *Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily* on August 1, 1970, for the PLA's forty-third anniversary, asserted that "Social Imperialism greedily eyes Chinese territory. It has not for a single day relaxed its preparations to attack China. . . . Why does it frenziedly undertake military deployments to direct its spearhead against China?"

[24]This includes Mao's own statement of May 20, text in *Mao Tsetung: People of the World, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs!* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970). In the debates of the mid-1960's, Mao does not seem to have become finally committed to resisting "Unity of Action" with Moscow until the turn of 1965-1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and even Lin, reduced the invective against the Soviets to a few comparatively perfunctory references.[25] While the signs are not conclusive, it would appear that the ground is being prepared for some limited accommodation with Moscow. Such moves would accord with Soviet hints that, even if ideological accommodation is impossible, the two states could cooperate against capitalism and the United States.[26]

The situation is far from unambiguous. The Chinese nuclear arms program presents a gradually increasing threat to the Soviet Union as well as to other countries. China has launched a satellite,[27] probably as part of a program to develop surveillance and communications systems and to test launching facilities and guidance equipment, as well as for propaganda reasons. Plans for the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems seem to be roughly on schedule. Some recent statements have again emphasized the importance of scientific effort.[28] These developments are almost certain to narrow the span of security risks Moscow will feel able to accept with respect to Peking.[29] In addition, the Sino-Soviet border problem remains unsettled. Chinese and Soviet interests are in conflict in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. The CPR has even indulged in anti-Soviet propaganda and diplomatic maneuver-

[25]See especially Huang's speech of August 1, on the PLA's forty-third anniversary (*Peking Review,* August 7, 1970, pp. 9-10) and the emphasis in Lin Piao's address on October 1 (*Peking Review,* October 9, 1970, pp. 14-15); also the joint editorial of *People's Daily, Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily* on October 1 and Huang's speech of October 25 (*Peking Review,* October 30, 1970, pp. 9-11). With a few exceptions (such as the ones mentioned in footnotes 17 and 23) the appellation "social imperialism" seems almost to have disappeared, at least for the moment. When Li Hsien-nien criticized the Soviets in an address on June 25, he merely referred to "some people" who fear war and are forced to capitulate to reaction, and who fraternize with Japanese reactionaries (*Peking Review,* July 3, 1970, pp. 19-21). The same phrase was used in the joint *People's Daily, Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily* editorial of June 25.

[26]On September 30 the Soviet Union sent greetings to Peking on the occasion of China's national day. The greetings were from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers (not, be it noted, the *party* leadership) and spoke of the USSR's wish for a normalization of state relations with China, friendship between the two peoples and the "pooling" of efforts in the struggle against imperialism, reaction and war. TASS dispatch, Moscow, September 30, 1970.

[27]Communiqué, Hsinhua news agency, April 25, 1970, and *Peking Review,* April 30, 1970.

[28]See, for example, Lin Piao's reference to "the three great revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment" in his speech of October 1 (*Peking Review,* October 9, 1970, p. 15).

[29]They are likely, for instance, to lead to Soviet insistence on maintaining the lead-time necessary to install an effective ABM system before a Chinese ICBM force becomes operational. For a general discussion, see H. G. Gelber: "Strategic Arms and the Sino-Soviet Relationship," *Asian Survey,* April 1970, pp. 265-289, and "China and SALT," *Survival,* April 1970, pp. 122-126.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing in the Soviet preserve of Eastern Europe.[30] The ideologies of the two countries are not in harmony. It is not easy to see on what terms any far-reaching accommodation would be based.

The Chinese leadership cannot, for instance, consider terms implying a restoration of Soviet dominance. They will be equally wary about the possibility of renewed Soviet encouragement of "healthy forces" in Peking. In fact, given the CPR's need for foreign enemies, Sino-Soviet reconciliation and political stability within China may, for the near future, not be compatible. What China can be expected to look for is less a restoration of complete friendship with Moscow than a way of playing off the Soviet and American barbarians against each other, as China has done with barbarians ever since the days of the Mongols. Peking may look for particular agreements with Moscow, and even with Washington,[31] as a way of strengthening China's hand against one or the other superpower, or of securing various advantages of trade or technology. But a relationship with either which is both stable and amicable does not, for the time being, seem attainable.

From the American point of view, the Soviet-American side of this triangular relationship is primary. It determines the central strategic balance that has given international society whatever stability it may now possess. The United States must maintain itself not merely against Soviet strategic weapons systems, but against Soviet alliances and the general expansion of Soviet influence in the world. In large part, this is the context in which Washington is likely to judge its relationship with Peking. Three possibilities are open: the United States could (1) try to side with the Soviet Union against China; (2) attempt, by some accommodation with China, to put pressure upon the Soviet Union; or (3) behave with maximum impartiality and therefore flexibility.

The first option does not survive analysis. American moves in this direction would free Moscow's hand for more radical action against China—and elsewhere—and at the same time persuade the

[30]See the acid comments on the Soviet-West German treaty in *People's Daily*, September 13, 1970, and *Peking Review*, September 18, 1970, pp. 10-12. The general tenor is that the Soviet Union has betrayed the interests of the East European countries, and of East Germany in particular. The Soviets are charged with selling out to capitalism just as Chamberlain once sold out to Hitler. Obviously this argument is calculated to have special appeal to Czechoslovakia and its neighbors.

[31]As *People's Daily* said on May 9, 1965, provided that "the basic interests of the people are not violated, it is perfectly permissible and even necessary to conduct negotiations with the imperialists and to reach certain agreements with them on certain occasions."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet leadership to be more, not less, intransigent for fear of justified charges of collusion with imperialists. By increasing Moscow's ability to contemplate armed attack upon China, they would increase the pressures on Peking to meet Soviet terms for a settlement, or they could pave the way for a Chinese defeat by the USSR, which would, in some ways, be even more undesirable.

The second possibility seems in many ways attractive. On the face of it, American diplomacy should certainly be able to make capital out of the Sino-Soviet dispute, at least to the point of preventing effective cooperation between Moscow and Peking. But here, too, there are serious objections. The first one is that such an attempt may do more harm than good to Soviet-American relations. The Soviets, it is argued, have begun to perceive the advantages of limited cooperation with the United States in Europe, the Middle East and on arms control. They also have some interest in cooperation regarding Southeast Asia, since they have little wish for this area to fall under Chinese domination. They may want to prevent the kind of U.S. defeat there which would encourage forward ambitions in Hanoi or Peking or a tough reaction in the United States. Any substantial Sino-American accommodation would be regarded as a direct and immediate threat to the Soviet Union. It would therefore seriously damage the prospects for cooperation in all fields and constitute a major danger to peace.

This argument is not beyond challenge. The Soviet Union has usually been more responsive to changes in the balance of international forces than to mere soft words. The unsentimental Soviets will accord the United States cooperation when they think they have something to lose by refusing, not otherwise. If an accommodation with China moved the balance of forces in America's favor, the Soviets would react to this much more surely than to other inducements. Yet it remains true that if Washington does have hopes for collaboration with Moscow, these would probably be dashed by a Sino-American rapprochement.

The decisive objection, however, is that such a rapprochement, desirable or not, is not available. If Peking's wish to play off the barbarians against each other militates against a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, it does so no less against a Sino-American one. In any case, nothing the CPR's leaders have done in recent years can support the view that China regards her place and ambitions in the world as compatible with the wishes and interests of the United States in anything like their present form. There is no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

evidence for supposing that Peking would be willing to accept the internal or external consequences of visible collusion with Washington. These would include a greatly increased danger of Soviet reprisals, against which the United States would be quite unable or unwilling to guarantee China. No foreseeable CPR government would assume such risks in exchange for questionable benefits. In Chinese internal affairs, too, any attempt to promote such a policy would be highly disruptive.

The situation in Peking offers various possibilities, but among the most probable are two, equally unpleasant for the United States. Peking may move toward the kind of pragmatism which favors some reconciliation with Moscow; or the ruling faction may adhere to something like Maoism, in which case any effective rapprochement with Moscow is more unlikely, but hostility to the United States will also remain acute. There is consequently much to be said for the present position of the U.S. administration: that it will not interfere in the Sino-Soviet dispute or favor one side against the other. Neither side should be able to take the U.S. attitude or future American actions for granted, or be able to use the threat of U.S. intervention or support against the other. At the same time Washington has said mildly conciliatory things to Peking, so as to deny the argument of U.S. intransigence to those sections of China's elite who may look to accommodation with Moscow, while imposing the pressure of at least some additional uncertainties on the Soviets.

III

There is also the problem of Japan. Both for China and the United States, this is the key problem in the Pacific. Here is the third industrial power in the world, enjoying an unsurpassed rate of economic growth and considerable technical and scientific eminence. The ties between Japan and the United States are strong. The Japanese political system was created under American auspices. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party, in particular, has a vested interest not only in that system but in the economic and security links with the United States which underpin it. Japan's economic upsurge has relied to a significant extent upon economic relations with the United States. Her trade is equivalent to about one-fifth of her GNP. Roughly one-third of it is with the United States. In 1969, her trading surplus with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States was $1.5 billion; her global trading surplus was only about one-third more. American markets are of especial importance to firms at the growth points of Japanese industry, American research remains important for Japanese access to high technology, and Japan relies substantially upon American funds for such things as trading finance.

In security terms, Japan is protected by the U.S. nuclear deterrent; the provisions of the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States, extended in mid-1970; U.S. bases in Japan; and a U.S. presence in forward areas, notably in South Korea and the waters between Japan and the Chinese mainland. Farther afield, the security of Japan's sealanes, and especially of the 90 per cent of her oil supplies that comes from the Middle East through the Malacca Straits, cannot be divorced from the operations of the U.S. Navy or the general American position in and off Southeast Asia.

The fact of U.S. protection has permitted, and therefore also encouraged, maintenance of the pacific trend in Japanese politics since the end of the war. Nevertheless, there are question marks about the future of Japan's foreign and defense policies. The Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese nuclear arms program, the delicacy of the balance in Korea, doubts about the future American presence in East and Southeast Asia, the growth of Japanese economic power and trading and investment ties, a revived sense of self-reliance and national pride—all these are compelling reassessments in Tokyo. Japan has declared herself to have an "essential" interest in South Korea and an important one in Taiwan.[32] Japanese ministers have discussed the assistance that might be offered to South Korea. Political control over Okinawa is to return to Japan in 1972. Japanese interests in Southeast Asia are multiplying. Defense expenditure is rising. The new five-year defense plan for 1972-1977, announced in October 1970, proposes expenditures of some $16 billion. Though still only about one per cent of Japan's GNP, this figure is over twice the expenditure under the previous plan, and it covers important force increases, especially in naval and air power.[33] Though Japan has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, she has not rati-

[32]Notably in the Nixon-Sato communiqué of November 21, 1969. For the text see the *New York Times,* November 22, 1969, p. 14.

[33]There have been reports that the Japanese Cabinet at the last minute deleted from the plan a pledge that Japan would not adopt national service.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fied it. Indeed, it seems likely that she is refining her nuclear option, perhaps with a view to an initially defensive capability.[34]

But the cultural and traditional links with, and admiration of, China remain. Few Japanese believe that China is expansionist or that, if she is, she will try to expand in ways relevant to Japan's practical interests. They do not believe in the possibility of a Chinese attack or perceive any credible threat to themselves.[35] They do not think a crisis is likely in such areas as Korea and there is no consensus about what to do if there were. They have made it clear that they do not intend to engage in forward military action or send troops overseas.[36] They have not been, and probably will not be, party to regional security arrangements designed to contain China. These hesitations are linked to important constitutional and domestic political problems. The government must try to avoid China's becoming an issue in Japanese politics, where it has traditionally proved disruptive. Moreover, the pacifist, anti-military and anti-nuclear forces in Japanese life remain strong. Any attempt to amend Article 9 of the constitution, which embodies Japan's renunciation of the use of force, would almost certainly meet with considerable resistance.

From Peking's point of view, developments in Japan are alarming. The declaration of Japanese interest in South Korea and Taiwan, with its overtones of interference in what the Chinese consider their internal affairs, has been taken as a warning signal. One would expect China to regard it as a long-term interest vis-à-vis Japan to wean Tokyo away from alliance with Washington and establish a working cooperation, including Chinese

[34]The defense White Paper says that "Japan will follow the policy of not acquiring nuclear weapons." But it is also made clear that the government regards tactical nuclear weapons as "defensive" and therefore not proscribed under the constitution. Japan has declared that she intends to rely on the United States for protection against strategic threats, but qualified this by the phrase "provided there are no major changes in the international situation." (*International Herald Tribune,* October 21, 1970, pp. 1, 2.) There has also been some discussion of Japanese cooperation with the United States, and perhaps Australia, in uranium enrichment. If Tokyo does decide to acquire some defensive nuclear weaponry, an initial ABM deployment, perhaps under a two-key system with the United States, might be one option.

[35]For a good discussion, see Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., "Japanese Opinion on Key Foreign Policy Issues," *Asian Survey,* August 1969, pp. 625-639.

[36]Since the regulation governing the Japanese self-defense forces prohibits their employment overseas, any proposal to send troops, even in defense of a vital interest such as Korea, would require approval by the Diet. It is not clear whether, and under what circumstances, such approval would be given. There have been suggestions in Tokyo that, since Japan has signed the UN Charter, she would be entitled to contribute to a UN force in South Korea if called upon to do so. Presumably the realism of such speculations would be affected by Peking's entry into the UN.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

access to Japanese industry and technology. But for the moment at least, Chinese pronouncements treat the Japanese government (though not the "people") as being firmly committed with the United States to an active anti-Chinese alliance in Asia.[37] The upgrading of the Japanese self-defense forces and the ambiguities surrounding Japan's abstention from nuclear weapons have merely confirmed China in her views.

It may be partly in response to this that the CPR has restored relations with North Korea and done so on a basis directed to confrontation with the United States and Japan.[38] On the other hand, China must be acutely conscious of the poverty of her leverage against Japan. So far, she has neither the navy nor the air force to pose a threat to Japan or the latter's sealanes.[39] In any case, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan still enjoy a U.S. strategic guarantee. It is not clear that China could or would use her strategic weapons program to secure political concessions from Tokyo. Nor is Sino-Japanese trade a useful instrument for pressure.[40] Yet the CPR expects—and probably rightly—that her efforts to gain control of Taiwan, to encourage Korean unification under the rule of Pyongyang, and in general to establish a dominant position in East and Southeast Asia, will all place her in conflict with Japanese diplomacy and economic power.

In the American view, the internal and external security of

[37]See, for example, the joint *People's Daily* and *Liberation Army Daily* editorial of September 3, 1970; the *Peking Review* commentary, September 4, 1970, pp. 29, 32; Chairman Mao's message to Kim Il-sung on September 8, *Peking Review,* September 11, 1970, p. 8; the *Peking Review* article on Japan's military and police buildup, September 18, 1970, p. 27; and the message of October 9 from the CCP Central Committee to the North Korean Party Central Committee, *Peking Review,* October 16, 1970, p. 3.

[38]Cf. Chou En-lai's speech of April 7, 1970 in Pyongyang, *Premier Chou En-lai Visits the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, op. cit.*, pp. 71-97, and the CCP message to the Korean party, *Peking Review,* October 16, 1970.

[39]The Chinese navy is, for the most part, a coast defense force. Its submarine flotilla, though sizeable, is largely out of date. Moreover, Peking must be aware that Japan could outbuild China in anti-submarine warfare capabilities or general naval power at any time.

[40]Sino-Japanese trade in 1969 totaled $625 million, or somewhat less than Japanese trade with Taiwan. Though it has increased in recent years in absolute terms, it has declined as a proportion of Japan's total trade: from 3.2 per cent in 1965 to 2 per cent in 1969. In 1966, China was Japan's fourth most important trading partner; in 1969 she was thirteenth, while Japan was by far China's most important single trading partner. (See *Current Scene,* May 1 and October 7, 1970; also the annual *Foreign Trade of Japan* [Tokyo: Japan External Trade Organization]. For a good brief review of Japan's position as a trading power, see Leon Hollerman, "Liberalization and Japanese Trade in the 1970's," *Asian Survey,* May 1970, pp. 427-437.) It seems likely, on the whole, that Japan's acceptance of comparatively humiliating political conditions for the renewal of the "memorandum trade" at the end of 1969 should be seen as a politically conciliatory gesture, not as a sign that Japan needs the China trade.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japan and the maintenance of a friendly and cooperative relationship between Washington and Tokyo are primary interests. That relationship cannot be taken for granted. On the contrary, given increased Japanese self-assertion, the growing complexity and interdependence of the relationship seems bound to mean more, though not necessarily more important, difficulties. The 1970 textile row is an obvious example.[41] It will all require considerable finesse. Japan's essential security interests must be safeguarded, but if U.S. protection is to be maintained, it must be without offending the developing Japanese desire for greater independence.

A large increase in Japan's arms buildup could be most undesirable. It would probably accentuate the divisions between pro- and anti-military forces in Japanese politics, with a consequent strain on the consensus which supports the entire parliamentary system. It could prove internationally destabilizing. If it appeared to be caused by the otherwise desirable draw-down of American power in Japan and Korea, it might deflect Japanese nationalism into anti-American paths. Yet the United States is in no position to prevent a large arms buildup once Japan wants it. American policy must see to it that no one can credibly argue in Tokyo that Japan must increase her armaments because she or her interests are being abandoned by Washington. Yet no U.S. administration could accept an automatic involvement to support the actions of a rearmed Japan. If the rearmament issue leads to serious disputes in the Diet or in the streets, if it does impose major strains on the entire political system, it is important that the protagonists shall not be able to blame the United States.

Consequently the relationship could be endangered equally by U.S. resistance to Japanese assertions of self-confidence and power, or by an apparent U.S. willingness to bargain away Japanese interests, whether from indifference, insufficient attention to Japanese needs, or for reasons of domestic American politics. A withdrawal of the U.S. guarantee from Taiwan, for example, or of too many U.S. troops too quickly from South Korea,[42] could

[41]For a brief comment on this important issue, see Chalmers Johnson, "The Alliance that Hangs by a Thread," *Interplay*, August 1970, pp. 11-15. But in October President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato agreed to resume discussions on the matter (*International Herald Tribune*, October 26, 1970, pp. 1, 2).

[42]This is a delicate matter. The Koreans firmly resist the idea of a renewed Japanese presence, while the Japanese think South Korea is in little danger. It is not clear what the basis for an understanding could be. Quite apart from Sato's declarations, however, and on broad historical and strategic grounds, it seems most doubtful whether any Japanese government could permit South Korea to be dominated by an unfriendly power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arouse needless Japanese fears and might at some point create the suspicion in Tokyo that Washington would like to play China and Japan off against each other. Yet if Japan ever came to consider her political and strategic interests to be widely at variance with those of the United States she could have an adverse impact on American interests much greater than that of any trans-Pacific nation except the Soviet Union. Even the replacement of active Japanese cooperation by an attitude of exclusive and frigid self-interest could cause major difficulties.

These problems seem bound to place important limitations on the American freedom of movement vis-à-vis China. They do not imply immobility, or a policy tailored exclusively to Japanese convenience. They do suggest a policy that takes account not merely of Japan's present public mood, but of her government's future interpretation of her essential interests.

IV

There are, also, the related matters of Taiwan and China's admission into the United Nations. The arguments in favor of Peking's assumption of the "China" seat are briefly as follows. The Chinese communists have been in effective control of China for more than twenty years. They are entitled to acceptance by the international community. Such acceptance implies, among other things, that the government of nearly one-quarter of the human race shall be admitted to the councils of the greatest interstate organization; the more so since the higher purposes of the UN are associated with its approximation to universality. It is not even the case that China is just a nonmember. It is rather that her place is taken up—in her view usurped—by a body whose entitlement to membership rests on its increasingly absurd claim to be the legitimate government of the whole of China. On the grounds both of equity and common sense, if China is to be a member at all, it should be represented by its real and effective government. Refusal to acknowledge this can only embitter the CPR's relations with the outside world. Yet Peking's eventual consent is a necessary ingredient in the establishment of a stable security system in Asia or the world.

For the United States, however, one of the major issues of the China debate is the security of Taiwan. To this America remains committed by the history of the last twenty years, by her promises to Chiang Kai-shek, by her own and Japan's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strategic interests, and no doubt also by a consideration of the interests of the Taiwanese. A policy of removing U.S. military installations from the island, decreasing naval patrol activity in the Taiwan Straits, and restraining the nationalists from raids as well as major assaults on the mainland, is obviously not inconsistent with a U.S. guarantee of Taiwan against overt mainland attack. The relationship between Peking and Taipeh in the longer term must presumably be settled by the parties themselves. For the time being, each claims to be the proper government of one China, including Taiwan. Each objects vigorously to the notion of two Chinas, or of one China and one Taiwan. On the other hand, their objections cannot bind third parties. It would be possible, for example, for the United States simultaneously to announce its dissociation from Taipeh's claims to be the legitimate government of mainland China, and its repudiation of the U.S. acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, made in the Cairo and Potsdam declarations of 1943 and 1945 respectively.[43] No doubt such statements would be strongly denounced in both Taipeh and Peking. It is also possible that they would encourage large, and in detail unpredictable, political changes in Taiwan. But they would produce a U.S. diplomatic posture according more closely with reality. To this extent, they would increase American freedom of maneuver.

In any case events are tending to undermine the Taiwanese claims, since an increasing number of governments around the world are extending recognition to Peking. One of the most significant of these moves was the Sino-Canadian agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations. The joint communiqué[44] said, in part:

> The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Canadian Government takes note of this position of the Chinese Government. The Canadian Government recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

This clearly implies that while the Canadian government has not succeeded in registering reservations about Peking's claim that Taiwan is part of China, it has not accepted that claim; yet Peking was willing to establish diplomatic relations in spite of this Canadian refusal. Both the communiqué and later Chinese comments

[43]For argument on this issue, see Richard A. Falk's comments on Robert A. Scalapino, "The Question of 'Two Chinas'," in Ho and Tsou, *China in Crisis, Volume 2, op. cit.*, pp. 127-134.

[44]The text is printed in *Peking Review*, October 16, 1970, p. 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also stress the five principles of peaceful coexistence,[45] further indicating the construction China wishes to place on the establishment of such relations at the interstate level.

Taipeh responded to the Peking-Ottawa agreement by breaking off relations with Canada. It has behaved similarly toward other states which have extended recognition to Peking. But it seems evident that, if more states recognize Peking without also recognizing Peking's authority over the territory Taipeh actually governs on the island of Taiwan, Taipeh cannot break off relations with all of them without isolating itself from the international community and sacrificing support that it may need later in securing international acceptance as an independent state of Taiwan. The Chinese-Canadian bargain therefore offers advantages to both sides. It implies a potentially important Chinese concession to outside pressures for a "one China, one Taiwan" situation. Its consequences may induce Taipeh to move in the same direction. It may prove a small step toward defusing the tensions in the Taiwan Straits and easing Peking's entry into the United Nations.

This raises the problem of the precise method or machinery by which the CPR should be brought into the UN, including the question of how the entry of the new state of Taiwan into the organization could be arranged without the interposition of a CPR veto. A solution to this has not emerged. For the United States, there is a balance to be struck between the costs of admitting China and the continuing diplomatic and strategic costs of being responsible, or thought to be responsible, for her exclusion. Whatever the answer, however, there are few grounds for enthusiasm about the results of China's entry.

The CPR will not, to be sure, obtain satisfaction for its more extreme demands as the price of acceptance of membership.[46] But even so, it seems most unlikely that Peking's membership will contribute to the smooth conduct of UN business. A variety of activities, including peacekeeping, will become much more diffi-

[45]See the *People's Daily* editorial of October 15, 1970.

[46]These demands, never formally retracted, were stated by then Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi as follows in 1965: "The United Nations must rectify its mistakes and undergo a thorough reorganization and reform. It must admit and correct all its past mistakes. Among other things, it should cancel its resolution condemning China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as aggressors and adopt a resolution condemning the United States as the aggressor; the UN Charter must be reviewed and revised jointly by all countries, big and small; all independent states should be included in the United Nations; and all imperialist puppets should be expelled." News conference of September 29, 1965, *Peking Review,* October 8, 1965, p. 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cult once Peking occupies the China seat on the Security Council —yet it may be that Chinese membership will make little difference in that these activities have already become relatively ineffective. Neither are there grounds for optimism about the possibility that UN membership will help to change or "educate" China. It is much more likely that China, like other powers, will use the UN as a propaganda platform and a means to further her own particular views and interests. There is no reason to believe that the CPR's entry into the UN will solve any of the major problems of China's relations with the world.

V

American China policies therefore face important difficulties. Chinese attitudes are likely to retain their confusing mixture of ideology and other kinds of national interest. Primarily, the CPR will be inner-directed. Its policies will result from pressures and arguments in Peking which are imperfectly perceived and understood abroad. Among them will be the problems of governing so vast a country and maintaining its unity. There will be the constant lure of some accommodation with Moscow, strengthened by the penalties of sustained hostility. The CPR will probably abandon neither its Marxist-Leninist rhetoric nor its vision of a Sinocentric order in Asia. Nor, probably, will its view of the United States change so long as the idea of an American capitalist devil remains essential to its picture of the world. Some movement on the level of interstate relations is both possible and ideologically acceptable.[47] But it will remain limited by Peking's wish to balance the United States and the Soviet Union against each other and by periods of renewed hostility resulting from Chinese suspicions that particular American moves are designed merely to encourage revisionism within China. In any event, China will be guided only fitfully, and in part, by her perceptions of the facts about U.S. policies or, for that matter, specific U.S. moves.

The United States may have to undertake a reappraisal of all her perspectives in the Pacific. Since the days of John Hay's Open Door Policy, China has been central to the American strategic and political picture of the area, but she is central no longer. The postwar alliance systems may have declined in importance, but the strategic balance between the United States

[47]Hints about peaceful coexistence with states of different social systems keep cropping up. See, for example, the CPR government statement of October 7, 1969, *Peking Review,* October 10, 1969, pp. 3-4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the Soviet Union is still the framework within which other powers operate.[48] In many ways technological developments seem to be increasing rather than decreasing the gap between the superpowers and other nations. The general consequences, vis-à-vis Japan and a host of other countries, of a revision of U.S. China policies must also be considered. In a period when the United States is reducing its presence in Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asia, when the Viet Nam affair and the Guam Doctrine have produced much questioning of American intentions and American will, Washington's ability to make concessions to China may well decline. The general style and temper of American policy should not be such as to invite miscalculation, least of all in Moscow or Peking.

This is not a prescription for inactivity. It suggests, rather, a cautious and pragmatic approach, the maintenance of even-handedness as between Moscow and Peking, and an unwillingness to mistake the machinery of policy, or its style, for substance. It is reasonable to seek increased elegance of diplomatic posture, the shedding of unnecessary costs, and acknowledgment of the facts established in Asia by the last twenty years. Washington has pursued such aims in loosening its trade and travel restrictions with the CPR, adopting comparatively conciliatory rhetoric, arguing for a resumption of the Warsaw talks, and gradually decreasing U.S. forces in Southeast Asia and around Taiwan. But so far, the limitations are clear.

President Nixon has explained that it is U.S. policy to "provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole." He has also declared that America regards "the principles underlying our relations with Communist China [as] similar to those governing our policies towards the USSR."[49]

Still, the notion of a relationship with China akin to the Soviet-American one, while it may include diplomatic relations, acquies-

[48]It is sometimes argued that those conflicts which have actually been fought, as distinct from threatened, in recent years prove the unusability and therefore the ineffectiveness of nuclear weapons. But the fact that these have not been used in, for example, the Middle East or Viet Nam says nothing about what their effect would have been if they *had* been employed. The fact that the United States was not willing to employ them in one situation in one theater does not prove that the United States, or another power, would necessarily abstain in another conflict.

[49]President Richard M. Nixon, *A New Strategy for Peace*, Washington, Office of the White House Press Secretary, February 18, 1970, pp. 40-41, 105.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cence at some point in Chinese membership in the UN, and a variety of contacts at various levels, scarcely goes beyond wary coexistence. It concedes that the United States will be unable to predict, let alone guide, Peking's reaction to U.S. approaches or the removal of outside constraints. It recognizes, by implication, that China's hints about improved relations remain noncommittal and that her emphasis on coexistence is compatible with full encouragement for people's war and the removal of U.S. influence from Asia.[50] At the same time it gives no necessary support to the specious piece of historical determinism which says that China, by her size, history, cultural standing, innate capacity and persistence will inevitably extend her sphere of influence over most of East and Southeast Asia.[51] Accommodation is a two-way affair. Neither Washington nor Peking is likely to obtain maximum terms from the other, and neither should be encouraged to expect them. The limitations on the design of American China policies deserve more attention than they have sometimes had.

[50]In June, for example, Huang Yung-sheng, speaking in Pyongyang, plainly implied that the U.S. position in and around Taiwan was the most important, perhaps the only, obstacle to a relaxation in Sino-U.S. relations. But a joint editorial in *People's Daily, Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily* two days earlier repeated the usual call for the peoples of Asia to drive out the United States. For the speech of June 27 and the editorial of June 25, see *Peking Review,* July 3, 1970, pp. 12-13, 46, 54-55. It is the anti-American line which has reappeared in virtually every major pronouncement since then. Even theoretically, of course, coexistence between states is entirely compatible with the continuing duty to encourage revolution.

[51]It does not need to be stressed that to regard something as inevitable is to make it so. Proponents of this argument, moreover, frequently suggest that what is inevitable is also, in some fashion, right.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOR AN END TO THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR

by René Albrecht-Carrié

THE recent termination of the Nigerian civil war had among its effects the understandable condemnation by the successful Lagos regime of those who had, or were supposed to have, given aid to the Biafran rebellion. Among those thus chastised France stood high on the list, and various reasons have been advanced for the position taken by that country in the conflict. In contrast, the British government, maintaining its support of the central Nigerian government, finds itself in a better position to preserve some influence in the largest of African states.

This contrast suggests certain reflections on the score of an issue that many had thought resolved. We are referring to the century-old record of Anglo-French differences and competition, particularly in the imperial domain, but more generally for place in the world.

The Older Past

The initial seed of the cross-Channel clash of interests is to be found in the Norman conquest of England, a French conquest in more senses than one: the Duke of Normandy was after all a vassal of the French king. The legacy of that adventure became a tangled skein, woven out of feudal relationships and intermarriages, until the heir to the Norman appanage, having become the English king and having extended his French possessions, could put forward a claim to the French crown itself. Some of the Plantagenet rulers of England were as much French as English and gave much of their time and attention to their Continental holdings. Simon de Montfort played a role in the history of both countries.

Out of these personal rivalries enmeshed with legal claims came the Hundred Years War. The significance of that conflict was the failure of the English bid for a Continental position, even if the final footnote, the loss of Calais, did not take place until 1556. Well before that time the English had rejected as a foreign element the French cultural influence. England would be English as France would be French.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The geographical circumstance of an island position—allowing for the Scottish situation to be settled only in the seventeenth century by a constitutional accident—made the English case clearer than the French. France struggled, but she never quite succeeded in re-establishing the boundaries of Gaul. England found herself cast as an island off the European mainland, not playing a major role in Continental affairs in which France was always deeply involved. It is of interest to note that seaborne England did not discover the sea and its possibilities until quite late, certainly late by comparison with such maritime peoples as the Italians and the Arabs. At the close of the Middle Ages the great European sea power was Venice.

As much as any factor justifying the label "modern" in the categorization of history is the fact that Europeans took to the broad seas of the world. The Spanish and the Portuguese, and the Dutch, led the way, while the Italians, wrapped up in their petty internecine and outdated quarrels, missed their chance. Neither the English nor the French were leaders in the movement, the former if anything participating in it even later than the latter; Cabot's voyage had no morrow, not at least until more than a hundred years had passed, though in the interval, largely by means of trading and piratical activities, England indeed had discovered the sea and sea power. The episode of the Armada, even if the gods and the elements helped, properly rates in English annals.

Once the discovery was made the islanders put it to excellent use, the clearest manifestation of this being the pursuit of empire. The French, having come through the trial of the Wars of Religion and successfully withstood the threat of the Holy Roman Empire, also went out in the wide world across the oceans. The Anglo-Scottish union and the emergence of France as the foremost Continental power, sanctioned at Westphalia, both took place in the first half of the seventeenth century.

Here lies the background of the second Hundred Years War. When the just-mentioned events took place, French numbers and resources roughly bore a relation of three to one to those of England. But in the imperial contest England enjoyed the advantage of her island position and also became the locale of a more advanced economy; the industrial revolution served to enhance what was already a large and prosperous trade. France, in contrast, was inescapably of the land, to which she could not help but give first priority.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Of the long imperial contest marking the second Hundred Years War no more than the outcome will be retained; it is best summed up in two dates, 1763 and 1815. The first signaled the essential eviction of France from the North American and Asian continents. The second, in some respects a footnote, confirmed the first. Napoleon himself had sold Louisiana, and where England was concerned her acquisition of the Cape, Ceylon and Malta at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars was wholly in keeping with a by that time well established imperial tradition. Another incident of that period is worth mentioning. The French expedition to Egypt, which Talleyrand advised, inserted itself well into a long-standing French interest in the Levant; at the same time it served to give England a greater awareness of the importance of the Mediterranean, hence Malta and the Ionian Protectorate.

The close of the Napoleonic epic confirmed England's arbitral position vis-à-vis the Continent, a position that corresponded to objective reality and that was to be maintained for another century. On the French side the Napoleonic episode represented in a sense a distortion. If France, either in 1792 or in 1815, was properly rated the first state of the Continent in terms of power, her military performance was in part the result of adventitious circumstances, Napoleon's military and organizing genius, and the injection of such revolutionary principles as the nation in arms and the career open to merit.

Moreover, after 1815 the paths of English and French power followed divergent courses. The former grew while the latter relatively declined, although it took another half-century for this last fact to be registered, this time in somewhat reverse exaggerated fashion, in the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871.

The More Recent Past, 1815-1914

The American War of Independence and the early development of industry had had for England the effect of subduing the imperial urge; Napoleon's defeat had a similar consequence for France. Yet the traditions in either case were not dead. The French went to Algeria, though without any conquering plan, and the two countries could at times even cooperate, as in their joint action in China. The continuation of combined rivalry and deficient enthusiasm for imperial activity is shown by such episodes as the British occupation of Aden and New Zealand—lest the French get there first—and the squabble over missionary activity in Tahiti.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The relative decline of French power after Napoleon found expression in the increasingly restricted horizon of France's imperial ambitions. The French presence asserted itself in the Far East and the Pacific, but the real focus of it was nearer home; Bismarck threw out to Napoleon III the bait of the Mediterranean as a French lake.

The prospect did not seem altogether improbable. From the time of the first Napoleon, French influence in the Levant, more particularly in Egypt, was pre-eminent. Mehemet Ali used it and it culminated in the great achievement that was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Though England missed an opportunity in that particular case, she had watched jealously the growth of French influence. Already in 1839 Palmerston had pointed out to Guizot:

> You have the regency of Algiers; between you and your Egyptian ally what would be left? Almost nothing, only those poor states of Tunis and Tripoli. The whole African coast and part of the Asiatic coast on the Mediterranean, from Morocco to the Gulf of Alexandretta, would thus be in your power or under your influence. This we cannot accept.[1]

Even the Suez mistake was soon to be retrieved, however. In 1882 France in turn missed an opportunity when she declined to join England in intervening in Egypt. That was a crucial turning point and the mistake proved irretrievable.

The recrudescence of imperial activity in the closing decades of the nineteenth century led Britain to assert the position that she would tolerate no influence other than her own on the Nile. When the Third Republic embarked on the path of empire, in part as substitute and compensation for the unpromising prospect of *revanche,* and proceeded to challenge the exclusive British claim to the Nile, the result was a sharp confrontation which recalls that of the eighteenth century. Wisely, France yielded without pushing the issue to the test of actual force; but Fashoda was no less a defeat than that suffered on the Plains of Abraham.

Delcassé, who was in charge of French affairs at the time, had ambitious, yet relatively moderate, aims. Egypt was lost and the prospect of the Mediterranean as a French lake was no longer realistic. He envisaged, across the western half of that sea, an empire that would be an extension of metropolitan France, reaching through the Maghreb, across the Sahara, to the Congo. Even the Indochinese possession and Madagascar he was inclined

[1]François Guizot, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps,* Volume V (1862), pp. 42-43.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to look upon as in the nature of bargaining counters. The English imperial outlook knew no such bounds.

But after the Fashoda confrontation the Anglo-French relationship took an unexpected turn. England still thought of herself, and was still acknowledged by others, as the foremost power in the world, but the margin of her advantage had become markedly reduced and her position of primacy was seriously challenged, tacitly and on the whole amicably by the United States, more boisterously by a fast rising Germany.

Following the failure to reach an Anglo-German accommodation, and having lightened the burden of her Far Eastern commitments with the Japanese alliance of 1902, England came to terms with her hereditary enemy. This is the real significance of the 1904 Entente agreement, though the judgment is easier to make in retrospect than it was at the time. After all, England and France had worked together before, in the Crimea and in China for example, but these had been passing deviations in the longer and steadier record of rivalry.

Nevertheless, things were now different and were to remain so. Even allowing for the differential in power standing and rates of relative decline, England and France found themselves in an increasingly similar defensive position vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The central point of the present discussion is that the weight of tradition has hindered implementation of the consequences of that fact. We must therefore consider the subsequent record.

Two World Wars, 1914-1945

The decade preceding the outbreak of the First World War introduced no change in the drift of European relationships. Germany lies at the center of the story which her inept diplomacy helped to maintain on a steady course. Anglo-German accommodation, still striven for, continued to elude all efforts. Instead, the Anglo-French Entente became ever closer and expanded into the Triple combination that included Russia, already connected with France through the bond of an alliance; Germany reacted with the fear of encirclement, a condition largely of her own making.

Seen against this background the Anglo-French alliance of the First World War was but the logical outcome of the preceding circumstances. At much greater cost than expected, and thanks to much additional assistance, the allies won the war. But for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Britain and France the effect of victory was separation, in which the weight of tradition played an important part.

The French reading of the common experience was sounder than the British. For the French the elation of victory was short-lived and soon gave way to obsession with security, an obsession that took on pathological overtones in the eyes of many outsiders, not least the British. For the latter the war formed part of a well established and familiar record. With equal catholicity Britain had fought Spain, then France, now Germany, whichever threatened to establish Continental unity and dominance. The British interest consisted in preserving the divisions of the Continent and thereby maintaining Britain's arbitral position. Seen in a different light, this also made Britain the most dependable defender of the liberties of Europe.

But precisely in this traditional interpretation lay the British misreading of the situation. At Vienna in 1814 Castlereagh had been France's defender, on the basis of the twin assumptions that France was a necessary element in the equilibrium of Europe and that in the last resort British power was adequate to redress that equilibrium if it were threatened.

Did not the same apply to defeated Germany in 1919? The British returned to the familiar stance during the peace discussions in Paris, and more markedly after the peace was made, particularly where economic and financial matters were concerned. Thus the Anglo-French relationship reverted from concordance to rivalry.

Even during the war the competition had not wholly ceased, as the arrangements for the Ottoman succession bore witness. It had been a logical division of labor that military activity in the Near East should be mainly a British operation. The French, uneasily aware of the importance of physical possession, were constrained by their own limited resources. They emerged with the Syrian and Lebanese mandates, but also feeling, in part correctly, in part with exaggerated suspicion, that local opposition to their presence was encouraged by Britain—certainly it was by some British individuals. Negotiations with the Arabs had been exclusively in British hands, Palestine had been severed from Syria, and Clemenceau, even if for a price, relinquished Mosul. In the Near Eastern quarter Britain could look upon the outcome with the complacent feeling that she was treading the imperial road. Had she not essentially closed the gap of her influence between Suez and the Persian Gulf?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The fundamental British mistake after the First World War lay in not realizing that the pre-1914 state of power relationships—declining British and French power—which had brought the two countries together, was not a passing condition but had instead greater validity than ever. Both countries have been for some time, as they still are, in the same boat.

The foreign policy of both after the war may fairly be described as muddled ineffectual confusion. Taking that of the French over the two interwar decades, one is struck by its inner contradictions. The attempt to organize Europe on the basis of a coalition of the beneficiaries of the war, while not an irrational policy, could not be sustained in purely defensive terms. Quite properly, France's East European allies did not see in the Maginot Line a contribution to their own security but rather the opposite. The simple fact is that French power was not equal to the task of maintaining the order of Europe, though it is not amiss to point out that the vital if imponderable factor of will was lacking. There is little question that the prevalent mood of the French people was defensive.

Britain was of slight help, to herself, France or the general order. In the days when France was seemingly all-powerful in face of a nonexistent opposition—Germany and Soviet Russia needing time to recover—some critical noises issued from Britain, but rarely more than that. There was even a passing euphoria. There was nothing wrong per se with Locarno and the spirit of Locarno, but it could only have real value if that policy were taken as a starting point. The view that the quarrels of Eastern Europe could be ignored was not Chamberlain's invention. A decade later the proposal for an eastern Locarno failed and the substitute Franco-Soviet connection was looked at askance in Britain.

France to a point, though only to a point, acted rationally when she subordinated the operation of the Franco-Soviet Pact to her previous commitments, meaning Locarno and the League—meaning therefore in the last analysis a possible British veto. To take the position that, should it come to the worst, France must have Britain in her camp was sound; how to reconcile this with Soviet doubts was a dilemma leading to another inner contradiction of French policy. The Franco-Soviet Pact did not receive the logical complement of a military convention.

As a group the leaders of Britain and France between the wars were neither especially stupid nor especially wicked men, though

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they were not a distinguished lot. A resurgent Germany gradually brought the two countries together again, but increasingly close agreement between them was purchased at the price of a French surrender to British leadership.

Thus we come to the much debated issue of appeasement, a term unjustifiably saddled with pejorative connotations. It is worth mentioning, without entering into details, a few incidents. Britain and France, or at least Hoare and Laval, could agree on a scheme for dealing with the nuisance that they considered Italy's Abyssinian adventure to be. But the result was a falling out, aroused opinions, futile and on the whole unwarranted recriminations between London and Paris. There were more such, from the French side in the main, over that inept and unimportant piece of diplomacy, the 1935 Anglo-German naval agreement. For the farce of nonintervention in Spain and the famous Munich Agreement there could be one justification alone: unpreparedness, which the purchase of time could be used to remedy. Again, in the last days of peace, French policy under the guidance of such men as Georges Bonnet may have been a shade more realistic than British: at least, it was more ready to recognize that the Munich surrender granted a free hand to Germany in mid-Europe, though whether the consequences of that acceptance had been properly faced is another question.

Britain, with France in tow, declared war on Germany in September 1939. Faced with a common threat, they embarked on a common purpose which might overcome whatever differences and rivalries persisted.

The quick collapse of France created a new situation. Churchill's eleventh-hour proposal of union was an imaginative gesture, but there was no preparation for it and France did not rise to the occasion. The leaders of defeated France thought in French terms, and in their bitterness and humiliation suspicion of the ally still standing revived. Might not either ally seek salvation, or at least alleviation of its burden, in a compromise with the enemy, possibly at the expense of the other? The suspicion was mutual, and the fate of the French navy was its immediate focus. The French meant what they said when they asserted that they would not divest themselves of that valuable bargaining counter, or of that other, the empire, but British distrust persisted.

Although the French were torn among many tendencies, Vichy's policy may fairly be described as *attentisme* (wait and see). British

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doubts found expression in the Mers-el-Kebir episode, and later the Near Eastern mandates were lost to Vichy control. While neither event resulted in a formal breach, it is not surprising that some in France saw such occurrences as a continuation of the past rivalry—in the Near East in particular—and that the anti-British emotion was especially strong in the French naval establishment. One may recall Admiral Darlan.

Meanwhile, one man in France, but at first little more than one man, rose above the parochial French view of the war. Thus, alike in England and France, the war brought out two men of stature: the common merit of Churchill and de Gaulle lies in the breadth of their views, their common shortcoming in the outdated quality of some of their thinking. It was the former who declared in 1942 that he had not become his country's Prime Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. De Gaulle held precisely the same view in regard to the French; he accepted Mers-el-Kebir but was full of suspicion of Britain's Near Eastern activities.

Churchill understood de Gaulle and on the whole bore with equanimity and humor the burden of the Cross of Lorraine in the form of de Gaulle's colossal gall and deliberate cantankerousness. But with no detraction from the merit of his generosity, the fact remains that his position fitted the traditional British stance: when it came to the reconstruction of Europe France would be needed.

The Present

Where empire is concerned the Second World War had the effect of accelerating the evolution of a trend it did not create. If we think of the imperial process as the manner in which a more advanced—if only technologically more advanced—culture transfers its ways to one less advanced, then the seeds of eventual dissolution are contained in the initial steps. The idea that colonies, like children, are fated to maturity, hence to leave the paternal hearth, long antedates the twentieth century. The imperial powers exported in their baggage the ideas that were common lore in Europe, nationalism and the rights of man among them. Two suicidal wars and rivalries among their masters had upon the dependent peoples the twin effects of diminishing fear and respect and of accentuating the demand for self-government.

Some observations about the impact of this trend on the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reactions of the British and the French are relevant. Mention has already been made of the Near East, whence France was definitely evicted after the war; the suspicion, fed by the acts and attitudes of certain British personalities, dies hard among Frenchmen that this was not a continuation of what had happened in Egypt after 1882.

More broadly in the Arab world Britain and France faced different situations. What was the British promotion of the Arab League but an attempt to maintain influence in the Arab world? Israel's birth to nationhood in 1947 was in part the consequence of a British initiative followed by an abandonment of responsibilities become too heavy; though it shifted the focus of Arab resentment, the earlier British role was not forgotten by the Arabs.

The French eventually found themselves involved in the North African rebellion—of which more presently. Since that rebellion had the sympathy and support of other Arab states, relations between France and Egypt in particular deteriorated. This strain between Paris and Cairo, combined with Anglo-Egyptian difficulties and Israeli fears, produced the conjunction of Britain, France and Israel against Egypt in the war and Suez episode of 1956. The Anglo-French action was a resounding fiasco and the cooperation was not lasting.

Still France, annoyed at Arab support of the Algerian rebellion, pursued an inimical policy toward the Arabs in the form of military assistance to Israel. In the 1967 Six-Day War French Mirages played a large role. Later, when the North African war had been settled, she turned again to a policy of courting the Arabs. Airplanes for Israel were embargoed and are instead to find their way to Libya. This abrupt about-face has earned France much reproval, especially in the United States, partly because of misunderstanding.

However one may judge the French assessment of the French interest, France is not pursuing a pro-Soviet, hence anti-American —anti-British by extension—policy in the Near East. She is endeavoring to stake her own claim and to that extent striving not to leave the field free to exclusive Soviet influence. The Arabs welcome this, preferring not to be beholden exclusively to any one power. But it would be an unwarranted illusion to expect as a consequence their long-term gratitude. That is the valid criticism of French policy: it is a short-term policy and France lacks sufficient weight of her own to enter into effective competition with either the Soviet Union or the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Other reasons have been adduced for the sudden French interest in Libya, coincident with the change of regime in that country. Oil looms large among these, but so does the rebellion against the French-supported regime in neighboring Chad. This leads to another set of considerations. In the case of the Biafran rebellion France took a pro-Biafran stand, in contrast with the British—and Soviet—position of support of the central Nigerian government. An interest in Biafran oil has been suggested, but there is a broader explanation; it has to do with the different positions of Britain and France in dealing with empire since the war.

Britain initially put her hopes in the possibility that a liberal attitude might serve to transform, yet preserve, her imperial domain. India was quietly let go in 1947, after which in a fairly short time most of the rest of her colonial possessions were granted independence. This procedure was an unusual example of sanity and reasonableness, yet British hopes have not proved justified.

The French behavior was different, though in it too there was continuity. Apart from the psychological fact that it was harder for defeated France to acknowledge retreat from her colonies than for Britain, the assimilationist tendency of French imperialism was taken up by the Fourth Republic. Of the constitutional attempt at imperial reorganization which was the French Union, the outcome was failure. If harsh suppression succeeded for a while in Madagascar, in Indochina there was war, ending in France's eviction and eventual replacement, to a point, by the United States. The Indochinese affair was barely settled before rebellion raised its head in much closer Algeria. Moreover, Algeria was constitutionally an integral part of France.

Inability to resolve the Algerian situation eventually had repercussions in metropolitan France. The threat of civil war brought General de Gaulle back to power, and the Fifth Republic was established shortly thereafter. De Gaulle had not inappropriately been characterized as living in the eighteenth and twenty-first centuries. The forces that brought him to power were precisely those that would not acknowledge an independent Algeria. In all likelihood he shared their feeling in 1958, but he was still possessed of the largeness of views and the coldness of judgment that had been his in 1940. Once he had come to the conclusion that coercion would not serve he made an about-face and granted independence, though it took some time—until 1962—to effect the operation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not only was the Algerian problem settled, but virtually all the rest of the empire was given its choice. Thus some fifteen countries were born, all of them now members of the United Nations. But France had not renounced her influence though her methods had changed. One notable aspect of the French operation was the creation of a large number of separate entities, in marked contrast to the British federative tendency encompassing larger units. Whether this was sound judgment, or Machiavellian, or both, we shall leave to others to debate.

France's effort to retain leverage in her former territories has taken various forms. The economic influence—some would say stranglehold—has remained strong. Most of her ex-African domain is associated with the Common Market. Economic aid has been on a large scale (in proportionate terms France has led all in this respect), but assistance is diminishing. Some French forces, though small, have stayed on, and the presence of a handful of organized and trained men can have considerable influence on the fate of an African regime. Finally, great stress has been put on the cultural factor. The French state maintains a large number of teachers in the former French holdings, and one may see some significance in the fact that Timbuctoo is the seat of a *lycée franco-arabe*.

Here we rejoin Nigeria as an illustration. Apart from the possibility of greater French influence had the Biafran bid for independence succeeded, the larger question concerns the merit of the French way as opposed to the British. The British federative attempts have met with little success, even disregarding the South African Republic and rebellious Rhodesia. What the fate of the French policy will be, time will tell; the passing of de Gaulle, widely admired in the African francophone world, has robbed it of one of its assets.

Britain, France and Europe

The state of relations in Europe, where differences have been sharpest, is in some respects an odd tale, yet perhaps not so odd in the context of this discussion.

Among the many effects of the Second World War was the clearing up of certain ambiguities left unresolved by the First. In 1919 it was thought possible to reconstruct the pre-1914 European state system; such an illusion could not be sustained after 1945. With the emergence of the United States and the Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Union as the dominant powers in global as well as European affairs, the European Age had passed.

At the end of the war Britain was one of the Big Three, but only briefly so; her strength and place were more comparable to those of France after the First World War than truly in the rank of the superpowers. Yet in comparison with the shambles that were the Continental states Britain stood out apart. Some realization of her changed circumstances may be seen in Churchill's espousal of the concept of unity in Europe. As events turned out, however, these were mere words. The British people, whether in their mass or through their leaders, failed to rise to the occasion, with the consequence that the opportunity for British leadership in making Europe was lost.

More traditional tendencies prevailed. Britain was generous to fallen—if also in the end technically victorious—France, as shown in her defense of the French interest at Yalta and in her advocacy of France having a voice in German arrangements. France is indeed a necessary part of Europe, but this was also thinking along classical lines.

The impact of the war on France was in some ways unexpected and may best be described as that of a spur to revival—whether surprisingly in the demographic domain or in the form of entering the modern world. Among advanced industrial states she had been lagging toward the bottom of the list. Unquestionably France was even less a world power than Britain. The war had justified her worst fears expressed after the earlier conflict. The German threat and security thus loomed large on the French horizon and she favored the fragmentation of Germany. This, too, was classical thinking, but the failure of the post-World War I policy of keeping Germany in impotence could also not be denied.

The answer to the dilemma was an imaginative one. Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman showed themselves capable of fresh thinking, of which their proposal of a European Coal and Steel Community was the earliest manifestation. To "scramble" Europe could solve several problems at once: French security, general peace, and a European role in the world commensurate with that of the Great Two. Still of limited scope, the ECSC became reality in 1952. The Treaty of Rome five years later, launching the European Economic Community in 1958, was a logical next step in a long-range, far-reaching scheme. Such leadership accorded well with the French universalistic tradition, one persistent line of French thought.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ECSC or EEC, however, this was still little Europe; while it might be a kernel of attraction for others, the significant point is that Britain declined to join in either combination. In the 1950's and 1960's British and French thinking were out of phase. By the time Britain had second thoughts and applied for membership in the Common Market, the Fifth Republic governed France. Its leader and personification, General de Gaulle, did not believe in the dilution of the national identity; though he concurred in the progress of the Common Market, all of whose members benefited at the economic level, he staunchly opposed any move toward the next, political, step that would curtail national sovereignty. It was he who interposed a French veto on the British request for membership in 1963, and once more in 1968.

Devoid of aggressive intent, de Gaulle was nevertheless bent on restoring French prestige and standing in the world and at least a primacy of sorts in Europe. This was the antiquated facet of his thinking. But here we come to a strange situation. That Britain's entry into Europe presents many problems, economic in considerable part, is true; but for France this has also been a pretext. It is likewise true that, despite the official position taken by all three political parties in Britain, the idea of Europe has failed to capture the imagination of the British people in the way it has that of the continentals.

Thus we come to a seeming paradox, yet one quite understandable in the light of the past. The reason for the stalemate is that the heart of the difficulty has not been economic but political. Given the disabilities and the cloud under which Germany has been laboring, and is likely to remain for some time, who in Europe but France could be a candidate for leadership? Britain is the only possible answer, and there is little reason to believe that such a position would be displeasing to her. Put another way, the reasons for Britain's desire to join Europe and for France objecting are essentially the same, which is why the problem has proved so intractable. Seen in this light, many French actions mentioned before, in the imperial domain for example, easily fit into place. If there seems to have been sharper point and clearer consciousness of rivalry on the French side, that is in part because of the sharper French wartime demotion, leading to greater touchiness. Regrettably, certain American attitudes, especially during the war, have fed this French sensitivity and given unwarranted body to what is largely the myth of Anglo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Saxondom, or alternatively, of Britain being the wedge of American penetration and domination.

But this is outmoded thinking, and so is the prospect that Britain's entry into Europe would revive a three-cornered Anglo-Franco-German competition, with the everlasting possibility of dual combinations within the group of three. Of course this could happen. It is also conceivable that Europe may fail to rise to the occasion and that her component parts will sink to what in world terms would be the equivalent of Balkan politics in pre-1914 Europe.

The passing of de Gaulle and French economic difficulties, especially in contrast with the German performance, have suggested to some the possibility that the active center of leadership in Europe may shift from Paris to Bonn. Germany, even West Germany alone, is a greater economic power than France, but for the reasons indicated German leadership remains too suspect. Among continentals freed from impatience with Gaullist overbearingness, one is already beginning to hear observations reminiscent of the quip made at the time of the displacement of France by Germany in 1871—that Europe had gained a master at the cost of losing a mistress.

To repeat, such rivalries represent out-of-date thinking. In this respect it is no exaggeration to say that the peoples of Europe are in advance of their governments and foreign offices in their readiness to reject the weight of tradition. The Franco-German rapprochement, more significant at the grass roots level than at that of foreign policy, bears witness to this change. Many in Europe, not excluding those in the East, would welcome unitary leadership either from Paris or London, the centers best qualified to provide it. There is no future in a continuation of the Hundred Years War, even in attenuated form; it is high time it should be ended, to the advantage of its principals and all others.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FALL OF DE GAULLE*

by William G. Andrews

IN the referendum of April 27, 1969, French voters ousted their chief executive and replaced him with the leader of the opposition. Never before in French history had a similar event occurred. In 1849 they had placed a chief executive in office. In 1965 they had kept one there. In numerous elections in the interim, they had shifted the balance of power in Parliament in such a way as to help one group of prospective premiers and hurt others. But at no time had they transferred the highest political office in the land directly from one man to another. This article will analyze that momentous event in the development of French democracy and its causes and consequences so far as they concerned long-term trends in French politics. The referendum was the immediate cause of President de Gaulle's resignation. Presidential elections were its immediate consequence.

The Referendum of April 27, 1969

Origins. The roots of the 1969 referendum lay partly in de Gaulle's constitutional concepts, which combined elements from both parliamentarism and presidentialism. In parliamentary regimes, such as the Fourth French Republic, the chief executive is elected by Parliament and resigns if his proposals are rejected, interpreting this as a loss of his constituents' confidence. In presidential regimes, such as in the United States, the chief executive is elected by universal suffrage and remains in office for his prescribed term without interim expressions of confidence. De Gaulle's chief executive was presidential in being popularly elected, but parliamentary in appealing for interim expressions of confidence and resigning on evidence of rejection.

During de Gaulle's eleven years in office, he held five referenda and four parliamentary elections. Each time he treated the result as an indication of popular confidence in him. In 1968, when student-instigated disorders called into question the level of

*Information on which this article is based was obtained during the author's trips to France in 1968 and 1969, except where footnotes indicate otherwise. The 1968 trip was financed by the State University College at Brockport, New York. The 1969 trip was financed by the SUNY Research Foundation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

popular confidence in his performance, he tried to hold a referendum. When he was unable to get the ballots printed, he accepted Prime Minister Georges Pompidou's suggestion that he call parliamentary elections instead. They resulted in the Gaullists winning the greatest parliamentary victory in French republican history. Because Pompidou had played so important a role in the elections, however, de Gaulle did not feel that he personally had won a clear vote of confidence. Therefore, he discharged Pompidou and set about to hold a referendum in which confidence in himself would be the overriding issue.

Also among de Gaulle's constitutional concepts that gave rise to the 1969 referendum was the value of interest-community representation in the governance of men. One manifestation of this concept was his view that workers and students should "participate" in the management of the enterprises in which they work. Another, expressed as early as his Bayeux speech of 1946, was that parliamentary representation of territorial communities is not enough, that the upper chamber of Parliament should represent economic and social communities. He shelved the latter project when he returned to power in 1958 in order to reduce opposition to his new constitution. Apparently, however, the unrest of 1968 led him to revive it as a step toward reducing the tensions in French society. Since the Senate was certain to withhold its necessary consent to such self-reform via parliamentary process, de Gaulle could implement his idea only by holding a referendum.

A third constitutional motivation for the 1969 referendum was de Gaulle's dissatisfaction with the Senate's role in the political system of the Fifth Republic. In a monumental miscalculation, he and Michel Debré had designed the Senate to protect the executive against a National Assembly that they feared would continue the power-greedy ways of the Third and Fourth Republics. Instead, the Assembly became a docile Gaullist tool (except for one suicidal jab in 1962 when it censured the Pompidou Government and was dissolved by de Gaulle), while the Senate, its partisan composition unchanged from pre-Gaullist days, was the only institution of the Republic that remained impervious to his will. Although it could neither overthrow his government nor kill his legislation, it made life difficult for the former and birth slow for the latter. His frustration was whipped to fury when, during the 1962 referendum campaign, the Senate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

distributed for obligatory display on all municipal bulletin boards a large poster presenting the text of a speech by its President, Gaston Monnerville, denouncing de Gaulle in scurrilous terms. De Gaulle's anger was scarcely abated by the knowledge that the constitution provided that the Senate President succeed to the Presidency of the Republic if it were to fall vacant. He ostracized the Senate socially, forbade his ministers to appear before it, and sought to curb its power and influence. The 1969 referendum was necessary, therefore, to clip the Senate's wings and to block its President from assuming de Gaulle's office.

Issues. The issues of the referendum were even more complex than its origins. They involved regionalization, the power of the Senate, the introduction of corporative principles into the French constitution, and de Gaulle's retention of office.

The constitutional proposition submitted to the voters for approval was absurdly long and complicated. It filled nine large double-column pages of the *Journal Officiel* with over 9,500 words,[1] and proposed to amend twenty-three articles of the constitution, about one-third of the document. It referred to 124 provisions of laws and decrees, all of which would have had to be consulted to grasp the full significance of the proposed alterations. Even so, many of its provisions were skeletal. Phrases such as "decrees . . . will set the dates and the conditions for the transfers provided for by this article" occurred so frequently and concerned such crucial matters that the proposition raised as many questions as it sought to settle.

This fog of complexity and obscurity would have irritated voters less had it concealed an object worth discovering. However, the average Frenchman could see little likelihood that regionalization or Senate reform would improve his lot. Regions and the Senate were vague and distant and the proposed changes were of such imperceptible and incomprehensible consequence as to dampen the interest of even the most alert citizen.

Yet de Gaulle's proposal would have transformed the Senate from a chamber of Parliament into a council advisory to a unicameral legislature. No longer would the government have been responsible to it. Its question period would have been abolished. It would have ceased to be an integral part of the legislative process and would merely have advised the National Assembly on proposed laws. In its diminished status it could not have initiated bills, delayed their passage, or prevented the National As-

[1] *Journal Officiel: lois et decrêts,* April 3, 1969, pp. 3315-3324.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sembly from amending the constitution at will. The Prime Minister would have replaced the Senate President as successor to the Presidency of the Republic in cases of vacancy. In short, it would have been reduced from a weak parliamentary chamber to an impotent debating society, with less power and much less prestige than the British House of Lords.

Although the apparent motives for the referendum focused on the Senate, the proposition also included provisions to strengthen regional administrative structures. These reforms, continuing a line of policy at least fifteen years old, concerned transferring certain activities from Paris to twenty-two regional centers. In addition to the planning and coordinating functions they already performed, de Gaulle proposed to give them general responsibility and authority for the construction, maintenance and operation of twenty categories of public works (e.g., school buildings, roads, airports, parks, water systems, sewers), to endow them with councils having largely advisory functions under the direction of a "super-prefect" appointed by the national government, and to grant them limited power to raise revenue. He reserved for the national government all the functions of political interest, but nevertheless included numerous safeguards in his referendum bill to ensure that the actions of the regions would not conflict with governmental policies.

Both the regional and Senate reforms included provision for representation by interest communities. The Senate was to contain two major categories of members. One category of 160 senators was to be elected, as before, by "colleges" composed of the deputies, general councillors and delegates of the municipal councils in the *départements* and was to represent the territorial units of the nation. The other group of 146 senators was to be designated by national interest groups representing various economic and social categories (wage earners, farmers, businesses, families, teaching and research, other professions, and "social and cultural activities"). The remaining seventeen senators were to represent the overseas French possessions or Frenchmen living abroad.

Each regional council was to contain: (1) the deputies representing that region's constituencies in the National Assembly, (2) delegates of the municipal and departmental councils in the region, and (3) representatives of the same "socio-professional" activities as would designate senators. The third group was to be two-thirds as numerous as the first two combined. For instance, the Loire Region was to have had twenty-six deputies, thirty

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"territorial" delegates, and thirty-seven "socio-professional" representatives. The distribution of the "socio-professional" seats among the various categories was to vary from region to region depending upon the relative importance of the categories in each region.

As usual in referenda, however, President de Gaulle did not allow the decision to rest solely on the merits of the proposal. He made his own incumbency an issue by threatening to resign if his proposal were defeated, even though his term had three and a half years to run.

The Campaign. Despite the general lack of interest in the formal issues presented to the electorate, the campaign was quite heated, especially after public opinion surveys indicated that de Gaulle was likely to lose. All the traditional political forces lined up against de Gaulle and the Gaullists were split. The largest Gaullist party, the Union of Democrats for the Republic (UDR) supported the General, but former Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and many of his Gaullist Independent Republicans joined the opposition.

By television, radio, the printed word, and a surprisingly large number of campaign meetings, the loyal Gaullists defended the regional and Senate reforms. They played on the traditional provincial resentment against centralization in Paris and contended that Senate reform was a "necessary complement" to regionalization. They glossed over the loss of power by the Senate. For instance, a typical Gaullist tract devoted 145 pages to regionalization and ten pages to the Senate.[2] They even argued that the "renovated" Senate would "see the effectiveness of its action increased."[3] Mainly, however, they emphasized the importance of an affirmative response to keep de Gaulle in office.

The opposition, led by Senate President Alain Poher, stressed the danger to French democracy of the concentration of power that they said would result from weakening the Senate. They objected that this would permit de Gaulle and the Gaullist-dominated Assembly to wield unchecked tyrannical power. The regional reforms, which received relatively little attention, were considered to be ineffectual and insignificant. Warnings against de Gaulle's departure were countered by denying that he would or should resign, and by reminding the voters that other able

[2]Club nouvelle frontière, *Le dossier du 27 Avril* (Paris: Grasset, 1969).
[3]*L'enjeu du référendum: Votre Information No. 3* (Paris: Centre d'étude et de documentation pour l'information privée, April 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

men were available to succeed him; voices from the Left claimed that a change would be a good thing.

The Outcome. On polling day, 23,093,296 (80.6 per cent) of the registered voters cast ballots. They rejected de Gaulle's proposals 11,945,149 (53.2 per cent) to 10,512,469 (46.8 per cent), with 635,678 invalid ballots.[4] De Gaulle resigned at once, effective at noon on April 28.

Probably the most important single reason for de Gaulle's defeat was the relative unpopularity of his propositions, in contrast to those presented in previous referenda. In 1958 the French people had wanted a new regime. In 1961 and 1962 they had wanted an end to the Algerian war, even at the cost of granting independence. In 1962 they had wanted to elect the President directly. When de Gaulle's referenda gave them a chance to approve of those measures, they were predisposed to do so. In 1969 few voters really wanted the regions strengthened or the Senate weakened. One week before the referendum, 32 per cent of them still had no opinion on the regional reforms and 44 per cent had none on the Senate reforms.[5]

If the electorate had little stake or interest in the referendum proposition, however, the same cannot be said for the country's *notables,* the proverbial big fish in the little ponds that dot the French demographic landscape. The Senate is the last bastion in French national government for these leading citizens. They serve in it and they, not the people at large, elect its members. Through three republics, the Senate traditionally has represented reward for the mayor who has worked smoothly and effectively with his neighboring counterparts in advancing their common interests and solving their common problems, retreat for the deputy who wants to escape the hubbub of the National Assembly without retiring from Parliament, and refuge for the deputy who has been dislodged temporarily from the Assembly by the vagaries of fickle universal suffrage. Such political figures as François Mitterrand, Gaston Defferre, Edgar Faure and Jacques Duclos found sanctuary there when driven from the Assembly by the 1958 Gaullist tidal wave. Other men of ability like Jean Lecanuet and Michel Debré were made welcome in the Senate although they had never been able to win honest election to the Assembly.

[4] *Le Monde,* May 4-5, 1969. Overseas returns were omitted.
[5] SOFRES in *Figaro,* April 24, 1969. The respondents favored the regional reforms 43 to 25 per cent and opposed the Senate reforms 33 to 23 per cent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To become a senator, one need not confront the rigors of a public campaign and a temperamental mass electorate; he requires merely the esteem of a few hundred of his peers. Furthermore, once elected, the senator has nine comfortable years to enjoy his good fortune before facing re-election, compared with a three-year average term for the National Assembly deputy during the Fifth Republic.[6] Small wonder that the *notables* arose in mass to protect so pleasant a fortress!

A second major reason for de Gaulle's defeat was the availability, for the first time, of viable and visible alternatives. At the time of the earlier referenda, no French political leader had established a public image as a potential successor to de Gaulle. Since then, at least five men had done so. The earliest was Gaston Defferre, Socialist mayor of Marseilles, whose campaign for the 1965 presidential election aborted when he failed to bring the Socialists and the Christian democratic MRP together in a coalition. The second was François Mitterrand, who picked up the pieces dropped by Defferre and created general surprise by forcing de Gaulle into a runoff election in 1965. The leaders of the two principal Gaullist parties, Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing, had become avowed candidates for the succession since the last previous referendum. Pompidou, especially, on the strength of his leadership in the 1968 crisis, had established himself as a major independent political figure. The fifth prospective successor, Poher, emerged in this role during the referendum campaign, in which he played a leading part.

A third major reason for the vote of opposition was the declining personal popularity of President de Gaulle. In 1962, at the time of the last previous referendum, 63 per cent of the respondents in a survey had expressed "satisfaction" with him as President of the Republic,[7] and in 1958 80.8 per cent had given the same response to a similar question.[8] An unpublished SOFRES poll for April 1969, however, tallied only 54 per cent of the respondents expressing like satisfaction. In eleven years of forceful executive leadership, de Gaulle had stepped on too

[6]De Gaulle's reform would have reduced senatorial terms to six years and introduced a ban on re-election more than once.

[7]Guy Michelat, "Attitudes et comportements politiques à l'automne 1962," in François Goguel, *Le référendum d'octobre et les élections de novembre 1962* (Paris: A. Colin, 1965), p. 245.

[8]Georges Dupeux, Alain Girard and Jean Stoetzel, "Une enquête par sondage auprès des électeurs," in Association française de science politique, *Le référendum de septembre et les élections de novembre 1958* (Paris: A. Colin, 1960), p. 142.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many toes. He had offended the army and the *rapatriés* by his Algerian policies, the workingman by his preference for prestige expenditures over improvement of living conditions, the intellectual community by his vacillations on educational reform, the farmers by his failure to halt the agricultural decline. A prevailing impression of national well-being restrained that dissatisfaction until the 1968 disorders. Then the dam broke. Three pillars of Gaullist strength, in particular, were undermined: (1) those who had turned to de Gaulle as a defense against "chaos" and had found him inadequate at a crucial moment; (2) housewives and people with fixed incomes who were hit hardest by the decline in real income in the six months preceding the referendum;[9] and (3) the business-industrial community that resented his sudden attempt to revive his scheme for worker participation in management decisions.[10] These specific losses probably were compounded by a general decline in popular political energy. During de Gaulle's eleven years, French voters had been called to the polls for national balloting fifteen times.[11] In the previous eleven years this had happened only twice.[12] Enough was enough, especially for such a useless purpose as the 1969 referendum. Would the old man never tire of asking them, yet again, if they *really* loved him?

Finally, the general electoral ennui, the indifference or hostility to the referendum issues, the awareness of available alternatives to de Gaulle, and the declining level of satisfaction with his governance were crystallized by the *notables*. For more than a decade a hallmark of Gaullism had been the President's unremitting efforts to bypass the *notables* by making direct contact with the people-at-large through referenda, public tours, television and other media, and by snubbing the Senate. He had succeeded remarkably well. Now, however, they rallied with unwonted unity to ward off a direct attack on their bastion. Al-

[9]*Le Monde,* May 30, 1969.

[10]A close analysis of public opinion survey data and occupational statistics indicates that de Gaulle's support suffered a net loss of about 500,000 among those employed in the professions and management, about 400,000 among businessmen, and about 90,000 among white-collar workers between 1965 and 1969. *Le Monde,* May 27, 1969; IFOP in *Express,* April 28, 1969; *Bulletin hebdomadaire de Statistique,* April 4, 1964, as reported in Georges Dupeux, *La Société française, 1789-1960* (Paris: A. Colin, 1964), p. 268. This alone would account for his defeat.

[11]There were referenda in 1958, 1961, 1962 (2) and 1969; and two rounds each of the 1965 presidential and the 1958, 1962, 1967 and 1968 parliamentary elections.

[12]For single-round parliamentary elections in 1951 and 1956.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though they had been deprived of real governmental power at the national level since 1958, they still had substantial influence with their neighbors. They used it to mobilize the previously undirected, amorphous discontents—and thus slew Goliath.

The Presidential Elections

Timing. The constitution required, in case the Presidency fell vacant, that the Constitutional Council call a special presidential election not less than twenty nor more than thirty-five days after the vacancy occurred. If no candidate were to win a majority of the valid votes in this election, a second balloting would be required two weeks later. The Council scheduled the first round for June 1 and the second, if necessary, for June 15.

The Candidates. Seven candidates submitted valid nomination papers endorsed by the requisite 100 elected officials from at least ten *départements*. Pompidou headed off an expected challenge from Giscard d'Estaing by winning endorsement by both the UDR and the Independent Republicans immediately after de Gaulle's resignation. Poher was nominated by the Radical Socialist Party, the Christian democratic Center of Jean Lecanuet, and the conservative National Center of Independents. The Socialists designated Defferre despite the bitter opposition of retiring party boss, Guy Mollet, who wanted the nomination for someone acceptable to the Communists. (Mitterrand would have been the logical choice, but he had just alienated the Socialists by refusing, at the last moment, to bring his *Convention des institutions républicaines* into the long-planned merger with them.) The Communists considered Defferre unworthy of their support and nominated long-time party leader Jacques Duclos to bear their colors. The left-wing socialists (PSU) nominated Michel Rocard. Alain Krivine, a Trotskyite leader of the 1968 student disorders, and Louis Ducatel, a self-made businessman, entered without significant organizational backing.

The Campaign. As in 1965, television dominated the campaigning before both ballotings. For the first-round campaign each candidate was allocated an hour and forty minutes on the state radio and the state television networks alike.[13] In addition, the "peripheral" commercial radio stations broadcast several lively debates among candidates and their supporters. Few town or ward public meetings were held. For instance, one typical

[13] *Le Monde,* May 17, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

département (Eure), with 220,000 registered voters, had a combined total of only four meetings during the first-round campaign. The general decline of interest in the traditional meetings was blamed on the unwillingness of most Frenchmen to leave their television sets long enough to attend them. With its usual resourcefulness, the Communist Party organized living-room meetings to which party members invited a few neighbors to have a cup of coffee or glass of wine while watching a Duclos speech on television and talking politics. These intimate meetings were used more widely, and apparently more successfully, in this election than ever before. The only campaign meetings to attract much attendance or attention were some of those addressed by the four principal candidates personally.

Otherwise, the campaign devices differed little from those used traditionally for French elections. The candidates' election appeals were sent postage-free to all voters and their official posters were displayed on all municipal billboards. Printed brochures and "newspapers" were distributed at meetings or stuffed in mailboxes. "Unofficial" posters decorated many walls, trees and bumpers. Virtually all the materials were produced by the national campaign organizations. Only the Communists canvassed door-to-door and no one canvassed by telephone, although Pompidou recorded a campaign statement that could be heard by dialing certain numbers in many cities.

Pompidou's campaign was the best organized and most intense. He traveled 10,000 miles in fifteen days of the first round, delivering several speeches a day. He stressed the theme "continuity in change" and relied on his image of personal competence. No mention of de Gaulle nor any Gaullist symbols appeared on his posters, and his speeches played down his association with the former President. He indicated clearly that he would alter some of de Gaulle's major policies such as the *politique de grandeur* and the opposition to British entry into the Common Market. His principal defense against Poher was the warning that a victory by the centrist candidate would initiate a return to the confusion and impotence of the Fourth Republic.

Poher's restraint during the first round was dictated partly by his position as the interim President who had criticized his predecessor during the referendum campaign for degrading his office by tendentious and divisive behavior, and partly by his hope to attract substantial support from anti-Pompidou Gaullists. Furthermore, Poher had neither Pompidou's experience nor ora-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

torical talent (nor, probably, his general competence). More exposure might have hurt rather than helped him. He did not travel during the first-round campaign and gave only one press conference. His themes were similar to Pompidou's although he was more "European" and "Atlanticist," and his ten-point program was almost a caricature of evenhanded, platitudinous campaign largesse. The Pompidou-Poher rivalry was a model of the conflict between claims of better pragmatic solutions and greater personal competence that dominates "end of ideology" politics.

Even the Communists waged an ideology-free campaign. They had two purposes: to prove to the noncommunist Left that no government of the Left was possible without Communist approval, and to demonstrate their increased reasonableness and respectability. Marxism and revolution were absent from their appeals which stressed, instead, their fidelity to the little man in French society and their efforts to improve his lot. They argued that both Pompidou and Poher would merely perpetuate the mistakes of the past and that Defferre's refusal to work with the Communists would lead to the same result.

Defferre sought to show that the noncommunist Left could outdraw the Communists. When his plan to assimilate center-Left votes to the Socialists' traditional 15 per cent of the electorate was set back by the Radical Socialist Party's endorsement of Poher, he countered by persuading former Radical Socialist Premier Pierre Mendès-France to join his ticket as prospective Prime Minister. Their campaign criticized the allegedly meager social and economic achievements of the Gaullist years and warned of the danger that would result from Communist dominance of the Left. Both Duclos and the Defferre-Mendès team made nationwide personal tours.

Krivine was the campaign's pyromaniac, casting verbal cherry bombs at all his adversaries and calling for a resumption of the 1968 "revolution." Rocard recanted his party's support for that uprising by condemning "those who confuse revolution with armed insurrection," yet billed himself as "the socialist candidate." Ducatel attacked "technocracy" and applauded the free enterprise system that had made his own material success possible.

First-Round Results.[14] The official first-round results were:

Registered voters	28,775,876	
Ballots cast	22,500,644	(78.2%)

[14] *Ibid.*, June 5, 1969. Overseas possessions have been omitted.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Blank and void ballots	289,922	
Pompidou	9,763,428	(44.0%)
Poher	5,202,271	(23.4%)
Duclos	4,781,838	(21.5%)
Defferre	1,128,049	(5.1%)
Rocard	814,053	(3.7%)
Ducatel	284,820	(1.3%)
Krivine	236,263	(1.1%)

No candidate having received a majority of the valid ballots, a second balloting was required. Pompidou and Poher, the two leading candidates, were eligible for it. However, the constitution permitted either to withdraw. Some of Poher's first-round supporters strongly urged him to step down and pave the way for a direct confrontation between Gaullism and the Left, as had happened in 1965. He refused.

Second-Round Campaign. The second-round campaign was anticlimactic. Pompidou's lead was so great that virtually no one conceded Poher any realistic chance of winning. The decision by the Communist Party to urge its well-disciplined voters to abstain on the second ballot rather than vote for Poher, as the opponent of "personal power," spelled his certain doom. Rocard and Krivine issued similar recommendations. Defferre backed Poher on the second round and Ducatel endorsed Pompidou. Even if Poher had kept all his first-ballot support and attracted all of Defferre's voters, however, he would have fallen more than three million votes short of Pompidou's first-round total.

Poher himself implicitly acknowledged the hopelessness of his candidacy by announcing that his main purpose for remaining in the race was to demonstrate the viability of the Center as an alternative between Gaullism and communism. His best hope to improve his first-round showing was to arouse support from among the 6.3 million voters who had not gone to the polls on June 1. To this end, he conducted a more vigorous personal campaign for the June 15 balloting. He scheduled rallies in eleven large cities, including Paris, and waged a more hard-hitting attack than his restrained first effort. In contrast, Pompidou eased up. Pompidou's best chance to pick up additional support was to win votes from Poher's first-round voters who felt he should have withdrawn after his disappointing showing. To woo them he needed a velvet glove. He spoke in only six medium-sized cities and adopted an even more conciliatory tone than before June 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Second-Round Results.[15] Pompidou won easily on the second ballot. The official results were:

Registered voters	28,747,988	
Ballots cast	19,851,728	(69.1%)
Blank and void ballots	1,294,629	(4.4%)
Pompidou	10,686,498	(57.6%)
Poher	7,870,601	(42.4%)

Conclusions

For more than a decade, observers had speculated endlessly on the course French politics would take after de Gaulle's departure. The great unanswered question had been the extent to which the changes wrought by the Fifth Republic would survive de Gaulle. The 1969 elections provided a preliminary indication that his departure had not undermined those changes seriously.[16]

The Dominance of Pragmatism. De Gaulle's distaste for ideology was well known. Organized Gaullism was nonideological or even anti-ideological. Pompidou's stance was, if anything, even more pragmatic than his predecessor's. Poher represented a similarly pragmatic movement and showed no trace of ideology in the campaign he waged. Although centrism was an outgrowth of the Christian democratic MRP, in the process of transformation it had abandoned any ideology that remained from its early postwar years. Only its clericalism survived, and even that was attenuated by its absorption of such former Radicals as its parliamentary leader, Jacques Duhamel.

Therefore the two leading candidates were pragmatists, and both of them did better than their partisan predecessors in the 1965 presidential elections. Pompidou's 44.0 and 57.6 percentages bettered de Gaulle's 43.7 and 54.5. Poher's first-round 23.4 per cent was nearly half again as large as Jean Lecanuet's 15.9 per cent in 1965. Lecanuet, of course, was eliminated before the second round.

The candidates of the traditional ideological parties were slightly weaker. Defferre, Duclos, Rocard and Krivine polled a combined total of 31.4 per cent compared with 32.2 per cent for Mitterrand in the 1965 first round. Furthermore, Defferre represented the less doctrinaire wing of the Socialist Party; in 1965

[15] *L'Année politique 1969* (Paris: P.U.F., 1970), p. 52. Returns from overseas possessions are not included.

[16] This refers to domestic political and constitutional developments, not foreign or domestic policies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he had been rejected in favor of Mitterrand as the candidate of the Left because Mitterrand was more acceptable ideologically to the doctrinaire Socialists and the Communists. Also, the French Communist Party had become less doctrinaire since 1965. Thus, ideology was at least as weak a factor in French politics without de Gaulle as it had been while he was still in the saddle.

Bipartism. The trend toward bipartism that had been widely noted after 1958 was no longer evident, at least in the same form. The Gaullists and an increasingly unified Left had been emerging as the two principal political movements in France, much as the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats had squeezed out most minor parties in Germany after 1949. The collapse of the Federation of the Left in the last few months of de Gaulle's presidency, the refusal of the Socialists to nominate a presidential candidate acceptable to the Communists, and the disastrous showing of Defferre and Mendès-France combined to destroy one leg of that biped. Bipartism along the traditional Left-Right axis suffered a devastating setback. However, the strong surge of the Centrists opened the possibility of the development of a non-ideological bipartism, more on the American than the British or German model, modified only by the seemingly irreducible hard-core Communist following representing 20 to 25 per cent of the vote. Eleven years of Gaullism had failed to make a dent in the Communist record: Duclos polled 2.6 percentage points more of the vote in 1969 than the party had won in the parliamentary elections of 1958. So long as communism retains its appeal, any bipartism based on a Left-Right dichotomy, but which did not incorporate the PCF, would be crippled. Given the strong wave of pragmatism, no such form of bipartism seems likely.

Presidentialism. De Gaulle's concept of an independent president may be the heartiest of his legacies. None of the candidates, except Krivine, advocated renunciation of the Fifth Republic or its independent president. Both Pompidou and Poher professed the intention to conduct the office with vigor and independence unlike the presidents of the Third and Fourth Republics, though both also made it clear that they would behave with less arrogance and isolation than had de Gaulle. Pompidou, especially, seemed to be endowed with the executive ability and will necessary to maintain the strength and independence of the office.

De Gaulle's parliamentary-presidential crossbreed concept of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his office gave it a transitional appearance. He was able to exploit its anomalous combination of popular election and votes of confidence to enhance its prestige and power as long as Parliament was dominated by a disciplined Gaullist majority, no viable alternative to him was visible, and the referendal issues were popular. When presidential-caliber rivals emerged and an unpopular referendum was posed, the inherent weakness of the concept was revealed. "Responsible" presidentialism proved to be a two-edged weapon. Later presidents, lacking de Gaulle's "providential" image, may discover that its sharpest edge cuts toward them. They might be well advised to cast aside so treacherous a weapon and complete the transition to orthodox presidentialism rather than risk a gradual, or not-so-gradual, slide back to the executive weakness of the Third and Fourth Republics. This could be accomplished by refusing to regard policy defeats as expressions of lack of confidence requiring their resignation. For the president to remain in office in such a situation and use his powers to attain his objectives—even though he might not always be successful—could go far toward endowing the presidency with the independence in practice that de Gaulle's constitution gives it in theory.[17]

[17]Pompidou's restraint in this respect is palpable. In nearly two years as President, he has not once hinted at calling a referendum or even a parliamentary vote of confidence in him.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GAULLISM AFTER DE GAULLE*

by Charles A. Micaud

GAULLISM can be interpreted as a political mythology that legitimizes a set of institutions. Emphasis is put on the power of the state, seen not as the instrument of a man or party but "as the energy of the entire nation." This power is incarnated in the Chief of State, who belongs to the whole community and represents France. Thanks to his identification with France, the Chief of State has complete authority to lead the destiny of the nation and to make the decisive choices, leaving it to the government to carry out his policies and to Parliament to handle the daily conflicts of parties and interests.[1] De Gaulle made it clear that his concept of state power delegated to the President of the Republic stood in contrast to the dangerous *système des partis* and should remain the keystone of the regime, thus ensuring the continuity of the institutions he had created.

Part of the mythology was the role France was called upon to play in the world—which also served to legitimize the regime. De Gaulle's grand design—independence, world prestige, leadership in Europe—was necessary to unite the French and raise them above their petty quarrels. It also demanded a prestigious and durable Chief of State, armed with special powers and able to appeal directly to the people over the heads of the politicians. Until 1962 at least, his legitimacy was essentially based on his unique competence to carry out France's mission. The constitutional reform that established the election of the President by universal suffrage did not entirely erase the earlier basis of legitimacy through charismatic gifts.

"Grandeur" abroad and order at home were complementary. The basis of both was the art of *faire illusion;* abroad, by pursuing a great-power policy well beyond the country's means, and at home by identifying Gaullism with order and its opponents with chaos at each election and referendum.

*This article, first read as a paper at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association in Sacramento, April 2-4, 1970, has been updated with references to the June 1970 election in Nancy and the September election in Bordeaux.

[1]Jean-Louis Guermonne, "La seconde présidence de la V[e] République," *Projet,* September-October 1969, pp. 912-925.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The problem of succession was thus complicated by the fact that the successor could no longer *faire illusion* and pretend to incarnate France and be "above the parties." Legitimacy by charisma had to be replaced by a legal-rational legitimacy that no longer depended on the marriage of heroics and order. Many observers even believed that the institutions of the Fifth Republic could not survive de Gaulle's unique claims to leadership.

Yet the transition from one type of legitimacy to another was smooth. The machinery for the transfer of power proved adequate, the institutional framework acceptable, the successor convincing. The confrontation of rational arguments, programs and promises, in an election that remained within the bounds of fair play, paved the way for a new style of leadership and a new strategy combining "continuity" and "change" in proper dosage.

Luck was an important ingredient in the smooth transfer of power. De Gaulle's defeat at the April 27, 1969 referendum, most observers agreed, meant that the French condemned not the institutions of the Fifth Republic but merely a style of leadership that had become objectionable and superfluous. For the first time since 1958 the threat of chaos following the departure of the great man had lost credibility.

De Gaulle made a dignified and silent exit. Georges Pompidou, who as early as January 1969 had made public his eventual candidacy, offered an acceptable alternative that seemed to have the implicit blessing of the General. He had amply proved his competence, especially during the crisis of May-June 1968, was unopposed by any rival within the ranks of the Gaullists (UDR), and quickly gained the support of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's Independents and a sizable fraction of the Center behind Jacques Duhamel. He could count on a four-fifths majority of deputies at the National Assembly, a distinct advantage over Alain Poher, his opponent at the second ballot. The opposition was fragmented; the Leftists, hopelessly divided, had presented four candidates at the first ballot and, at the second, had to leave to a Centrist the task of representing them. By recommending abstention to its followers, the Communist Party was ensuring a Gaullist victory.

Poher was hardly convincing when he stressed the dangers to individual and public liberties inherent in the victory of the Gaullist candidate, though his supporters painted a gloomy picture of Gaullism after de Gaulle. "The colonization of France will continue," they warned; abuses are to be feared when there is no real institutional counterweight to the excessive concentration of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power.[2] In *Le Monde* (June 3, 1969) Beuve-Méry was even more pessimistic in his editorial entitled "Charybde ou Scylla." He talked of the degradation of traditional liberties and the taking over of the state by a party, and predicted that "the slow shift for half a century toward a French version of fascism or totalitarian socialism may well keep getting worse." The unlikelihood of a "third way" depressed him. The next day *Le Monde* again emphasized the urgent need to defend democracy and end the authoritarian trend that had been worsening during eleven years of personal power.

Yet Pompidou's clear-cut victory was readily accepted by the opposition. Poher sent a telegram of congratulations. François Mitterrand declared that "the elections of the new chief of state had been legally acquired" and that "the permanent coup d'état" of de Gaulle had ended.[3] "France is entering democracy," wrote J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, though he confessed that it was "not natural" for the Right to be in power in an industrial society.[4] Others proclaimed "the passage from monarchy to republic."

II

The second President of the Fifth Republic had to translate into facts the three main themes of the campaign: continuity, change and "opening." Above all he had to strengthen his republican self-image by creating a new style of leadership. This he succeeded in doing from the first days. It was noted that "The General was remote, royal, solitary in his palace and in his grandeur. His successor appears simple, familiar, anxious to remain accessible. . . . The ministers talk more in the council . . . the deputies come to the Elysée for work sessions."[5] No autocrat and no hero, the new President appeared modest, open and businesslike, anxious not to cut himself off from public opinion and to keep on good terms with Parliament, a man believing in the eminent dignity of compromise and the virtue of negotiated contracts. Yet there remained skeptics who saw him as Janus-faced, equally capable of authoritarian or liberal rule.[6]

His problem was in fact to combine both aspects of leadership, in order to reassure Gaullists who were convinced of the need for

[2]Jacques Julliard, "L'après-Gaullisme," *Esprit*, July-August 1969, p. 148.
[3]*L'Express*, June 23-29, 1969.
[4]*Ibid.*, June 16-22, 1969.
[5]Pierre Viansson-Ponté, *Le Monde*, October 4, 1969.
[6]*Idem*, June 3, 1969. For a good sketch of Pompidou, see his book *Après de Gaulle, Qui?* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a strong man in full use of his constitutional powers and Centrists who thought the new President should do away with all vestiges of arbitrary and personal power, with governmental control of mass media and *polices parallèles,* with disrespect of the constitution, Parliament and parties. He had to reconcile the two Frances: the one that wanted a presidential system *à l'Americaine,* the other that upheld the importance of Parliament as controller, critic and protector of individual and collective rights and interests. Public-opinion polls showed that a majority of the French understood the institutions of the Fifth Republic to combine effective authority of the Executive with meaningful parliamentary representation.

Pompidou made it clear that he was the real chief of the Executive and took seriously the *domaine réservé* carved out by de Gaulle: i.e., essentially foreign policy and the defense of the state. At the same time his new style of leadership was reflected in his press conferences, his constant communication with the ministers, and the powers delegated to the Prime Minister. The three themes of continuity, change and opening were first translated into the selection of the new governmental team. Jacques Chaban-Delmas personified the three themes. He had been a hero of the Resistance and a trusted companion of de Gaulle. He was also a former Radical and a former minister of the Fourth Republic. As President of the National Assembly and as Mayor of Bordeaux, he had acquired the reputation of a man with liberal instincts and a talent for public relations. Quite typically, his first public gesture as Prime Minister was a visit of courtesy to the President of the Senate, Alain Poher. His appointment evoked the appraisal that "Under his ministry, Gaullism without de Gaulle and Poherism without Poher are going to coexist."[7]

Of the eighteen ministers of the preceding cabinet, only four remained. Of the sixteen new secretaries of state, twelve had never belonged to a government of the Fifth Republic. Next to Michel Debré, representing continuity, were Giscard d'Estaing, Duhamel, René Pléven and Joseph Fontanet representing change, the open-

[7] *L'Express,* June 30-July 6, 1969. This diagnosis held true a year later. In fact Chaban-Delmas' policy of opening and change has irritated many Gaullist deputies who object to his plans for reforms and feel closer to Pompidou's cautious approach to change. The President made it plain at his July 1970 press conference that the role of his Prime Minister is merely to execute decisions made at the Elysée. In this sense Pompidou leaves less margin to his Prime Minister than de Gaulle did, preoccupied as the latter was with the *domaine réservé* of foreign affairs. The important power of arbitration concerning budgetary appropriations has, however, been left to Chaban-Delmas.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing to the Center and, together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Schumann, the opening to Europe.

III

Underlying the theme of change was the new situation that altered the concept of legitimacy and the role of the President which had prevailed under de Gaulle. The successor could no longer claim to be above parties and to owe his legitimacy to some mystical quality combined with unique services rendered the country in a time of peril.

Although Pompidou presented himself as the President of all Frenchmen, it was difficult for him not to appear as the leader of the UDR and its allies. Whereas de Gaulle's prestige had allowed him to incarnate the general interest and, almost incidentally, to rally a parliamentary majority behind him, Pompidou owed his election to the coalition that supported him.

But once elected, the President is expected to use his newly acquired prestige on behalf of party and coalition and to lead them to victory at the next legislative elections. He becomes the architect of a majority that can conceivably change.

The two phenomena—a strong President elected by universal suffrage and what Duverger calls "le parlementarisme majoritaire"—have thus become complementary and mutually sustaining since 1962.[8] The President is the architect of the majority just as the majority is the architect of the President's victory. This is in the logic of the institutions, since a parliamentary majority is an essential feature of a system in which the government is responsible to the Assembly. Faced with a hostile majority in the Assembly, the President has the choice of imposing his own rule or yielding to the Assembly. In either case the system would break down. This was probably understood in a dim way by the electors and explicitly by political commentators. As a candidate for the presidency, Pompidou had a major advantage in the *Chambre introuvable*. A major drawback for Poher was the fact that he could not rely on a parliamentary majority and would have to call for new legislative elections, an unpredictable and disturbing prospect for many.

One commentator probed to the heart of the issue: "The Gaullist adventure has ended and with it the anti-Gaullist farce. . . . For seven years the largest part of the French political elite

[8] *Le Monde,* June 11 and November 27, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has refused to face the evidence: Gaullism . . . has become a permanent political force."[9] Over the years the UDR has become the dominant party of France, with only the Communist Party (PC) as a serious rival. From 20.4 per cent of the votes in 1958, the Gaullist party passed to 31.9 per cent in the elections of November 1962, to 37.7 per cent in 1967 and to 43.65 per cent in 1968. Similarly Pompidou received about the same number of votes in 1969 as de Gaulle had received against Mitterrand in 1965, independently of the personality of the candidates and the character of the opposition. A united Left in the 1969 run-off may in fact have given Pompidou a more sizable majority, for Poher was a more attractive candidate to the Centrists than a genuine Leftist supported by the PC would have been.

Poher's defeat only illustrates the quasi-impossibility of a Centrist solution advocated by those who dread the division of France into two antagonistic blocs. For the Centrists are not only too weak to constitute a majority, they are divided into two tendencies—those who followed Jean Lecanuet in his denunciation of the two blocs and those who agreed with Duhamel that the *phénomène majoritaire* was here to stay and that the French now expected a majority to come out of elections; in other words, that France was moving toward bipolarization.[10] Whereas all Centrists agreed that communism was the main enemy, they were far from agreeing on the second peril; for some it was Gaullism, for others the Federation of the Left. It is significant that Duhamel, representing the second tendency, became the leader of the Center forces in the legislative elections of 1968 and avoided as much as possible opposition to the UDR at the second ballot, while Lecanuet and his Democratic Center persevered in an opposite tactic.

Lecanuet's followers continue to resist bipolarization and hope for a return to the Third Force or the "Great Federation" that Gaston Defferre tried to build in 1964 and 1965. Their rationale is that any President is bound to be the leader of a coalition, which should give the Center the advantage of the *bascule,* enabling it to offer an *alternative de progrès;* between the conservatives and the Marxists they would be the core of the alliance of the reformists. Their hope is that splits within the majority and dissensions within the opposition will give the Center forces their

[9] Julliard, *op. cit.,* pp. 146-154.
[10] "Unité ou pluralité du Centrisme," *Revue française de science politique,* February 1969, pp. 171-182.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chance to unite again, as they did under Poher, and to open the *alternative de progrès*. This hope is not altogether wishful thinking, but it seems unlikely to be fulfilled so long as part of the Center continues to be attracted by the present coalition in power and so long as the parties of the noncommunist Left continue to turn their backs on a Third Force solution.[11]

The consolidation of the institutions of the Fifth Republic seems, therefore, to depend on the ability of the political system to develop and maintain bipolarization, which implies a relative cohesion of the present majority and a relative unity of the forces of the Left. But bipolarization without a minimum of consensus would be dysfunctional and would only reinforce political extremism, thus making the semi-presidential system unworkable; it would lead either to some form of dictatorship or to a rebirth of the Third Force, keeping the extremes at bay under conditions and institutions similar to those of the Fourth Republic.[12]

Consensus is both a condition and a consequence of bipolarization. This is to say, once majority and opposition have agreed on the rules of the game and are not too far apart in their socio-economic programs, a consensual situation tends to perpetuate itself, as the experience of the two-party system seems to demonstrate, the main reason for the continuation of consensus being competition for the uncommitted votes at the Center.

IV

There are consequently two sets of questions to be answered concerning the future of the Fifth Republic: What are the prospects for a continued cohesion of the majority and for an eventual unity of the Left? And what are the prospects for a consensual situation regarding both political institutions and socio-economic programs? The two problems are somewhat interdependent, since Right and Left need to compete for Centrist votes and so must "objectively" pave the way for a consensual situation if they are either to hold or conquer power.

[11] *L'Express*, January 19-25, 1970, and Joseph Fontanet, "Régime majoritaire et Centre," *Le Monde*, June 14, 1969.

[12] A Gaullist alternative to bipolarization is suggested by Léo Hamon in *Le Monde*, June 11, 1969: Gaullism has become the dominant party; its only rival is the PC, which prevents a *solution de rechange*. Social change and the protection of public liberties must therefore be guaranteed by the dominant party or coalition through "juridical innovations." See also Hamon's article, "Fait majoritaire et Gaullisme de Gauche," in *Le Monde*, May 17-18, 1970, in which he stresses the dilemma of the reformists, who must either ally themselves with the PC or join the majority.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This optimistic premise stems partly from the logic of the bipolar situation; it is also reinforced by an examination of the evolution of French social structures. The number of independent producers and middlemen is shrinking in proportion to the number of wage- and salary-earners, which now includes 75 per cent of the working population. In the latter category, white-collar workers, technicians and cadres of industry are growing in number much faster than industrial workers, particularly semi-skilled and unskilled ones.[13] Social structures are thus inclining toward the salaried middle class, that is, toward social forces favoring a middle-of-the-road policy of gradual improvement of social conditions.

On the other hand, the revolt of May and June 1968 dramatically exposed the consequences of ten years of *pouvoir personnel* and partly explains the strategy of change of the new government. The resentment of the young generation was directed at the whole system and its inner contradictions. Gaullism had not solved the problems of French society, such as lack of communication and participation, social distances and social injustices, bureaucratic red tape, police rule, objectionable styles of command, controls and regulations. "The price of Gaullism has been, as its heirs admit, the accentuation of social rigidities and of economic underdevelopment," not to mention "intellectual and political underdevelopment through the state control of the television network," wrote Servan-Schreiber.[14]

The French economy is an uneven mix of costly *secteurs de pointe* and uneconomic enterprises. Heavy subsidies have to be paid to declining sectors. Real wages went up only half as much as in Germany during the Gaullist decade; the same index was true of exports in key industries, such as machinery. Spectacular accomplishments have meant inadequate investments in basic industrial sectors. Thus the *force de frappe,* the space program, and atomic plants of French design have saddled the nation with high-priced electricity, antiquated telephone and road systems and inadequate housing. France is a heavy importer of machine tools, though she exports Mirages, builds the Concorde, and has the largest radio-telescope in the world and a gigantic solar oven in the Pyrenees. Agricultural subsidies cost her 18 billion francs a

[13]For the evolution of socio-professional groups from 1962 onward, see *Le Monde,* June 1-2, 1969.

[14]*L'Express,* September 22-28, 1969. See also the two articles by Stanley Hoffmann in *The New Republic,* July 12 and July 26, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

year, but the support of prices helps the rich rather than the poor farmers. The per capita income is at the same level as the German, yet French wages are substantially lower, which indicates a severe imbalance in the distribution of the national income.

These are the conditions that explain why, as early as September 1969, Chaban-Delmas proposed a diagnosis of ills and a program of reforms that was to lead to the "New Society." The diagnosis was severe, and though it did not apply directly to the eleven years of Gaullist rule, it was broadly interpreted as an indirect criticism, as "the Khrushchev report of the regime."[15]

"We are still a country of castes," said Chaban-Delmas. "Excessive differences of income and insufficient social mobility maintain anachronistic walls between social groups. The conservatism of social structures feeds the extremism of ideologies. We too often prefer to fight for words, even if they cover dramatic failures, rather than for realities. This is why we succeed in accomplishing reforms only by pretending they are revolutions." He went on condemning the *société bloquée,* the tentacular and inefficient state, the underindustrialization, the lack of organization of socio-professional groups. "The State," he said, "will have to grant or restore real autonomy and thus effective responsibility to local communities, universities and nationalized enterprises."[16]

He then suggested a number of remedies. A new statute will be given to French radio and television so that they will no longer be the mouthpiece of the government. An "institute of industrial development" will be created with private and public capital to lend money for industrial expansion and mergers. The guaranteed minimum wage will be automatically adjusted to indexes of economic growth. Family allowances will take into account the income of the beneficiaries. Trade unions and business will be called upon to discuss the problem of monthly wages. Collective bargaining methods will be improved and workers enabled to participate in the profits of enterprises. The lowest wages will be raised, as well as the incomes of handicapped and old people. The income-tax system will be revised.

Chaban-Delmas obtained massive support at the Assembly for his program (369 votes against 85), and most editorials were favorable. But grave doubts were expressed as to the possibility of carrying out such a program with the support of a conservative majority. The government declaration, wrote *Le Monde* (Sep-

[15]Viansson-Ponté in *Le Monde,* October 5-6, 1969.
[16]*Le Monde,* September 17, 1969 and *L'Express,* September 22-28, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tember 18, 1969), implies a profound transformation of economic and mental structures for which many deputies of the majority have no sympathy. Yet *Le Monde* registered approval of diagnosis and remedies. The Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail congratulated the government on a late conversion to its ideas. The Club Jean Moulin, consistently anti-Gaullist, voiced its approval, saying that "A latent civil war is not the right climate for democracy. It is not because an idea is expressed by the government that it should become suspect. . . . Must the intellectuals help turn France into a strange country where the fiction of the perfect society precludes any attempts at limited progress?" Though the members of the club had doubts about the practicability of the program, they agreed that the government was attempting "a breakthrough against the conservatism of Right and of Left."[17]

It is too early to pass judgment on the government's efforts to create conditions for a successful neocapitalism that would combine efficiency with greater social justice. Some significant successes have been attained, especially in the economic field. Efforts have been made at developing contractual relations with the trade unions, and labor-management relations have improved as the workers gained tangible advantages, including a 10 per cent raise in wages. The program will have to be carried out against formidable odds. But at least a broad agreement in principle is beginning to develop concerning diagnosis of ills and even remedies at both the right and the left ends of the political spectrum. Emphasis is put at last on domestic problems, on industrialization, housing and urban problems, the liberalization and modernization of institutions, the vision of a better society.

V

In the field of foreign policy, which the President keeps as his *domaine réservé,* continuity seems to be the rule. Independence is still the key word. Improved relations with the United States follow the trend de Gaulle started in April 1968 and the visit of Nixon in January 1969 confirmed. Pompidou's visit to Washington was balanced by a visit to Moscow a few months later.

But continuity does not apply to the essence of the Gaullist dream: France's prestige in the world and leadership in Europe. The emphasis has shifted from the "monumental vision," stretch-

[17] *L'Express,* November 3-9, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, to prosaic problems of trade and technical cooperation.[18] With Willy Brandt as the leader of the Federal Republic, the French impact on East-West relations was bound to diminish, Bonn having more to offer than Paris. Maurice Schumann recognized in the National Assembly that the most obvious limitation to continuity was the absence of the man whose personality and prestige had lent greater weight to his actions than France's strength would normally have permitted. France, he said, can no longer play a world role and must be content with playing an important role in Europe.

Pompidou's character leads him away from Gaullist histrionics. With him at the helm, "It is no longer a question of challenging the world, or of remodeling its map, but only of finding one's place in it."[19] Patience, caution and hard bargaining are his style. Economics takes precedence over politics; realism over visionary dreams. According to Fontaine, Pompidou sees the EEC as an economic enterprise, not a political one. He does not believe in a federal Europe and sees in the negotiations with Great Britain and in the extension of the powers of the Assembly of Strasbourg only bargaining points to obtain economic advantages for France. Nor is he interested in building, with Germany as a privileged ally, a Europe independent of the two superpowers. This is why, Fontaine explains, the problem of British entry into the Common Market has lost its dramatic character. It no longer matters that Britain is more or less "Atlantic," since her candidacy is now based on criteria of efficiency: the British industrial potential is considered useful in the technological and commercial competition with the United States. So long as the interests of the French farmers are protected, there is no major objection to accepting her as a partner. One advantage is that the new partner may back France in preventing the creation of supranational institutions. Another advantage is that Britain will help to balance the greater weight of Germany, particularly if the reunification of the two Germanys should some day take place.

Hence Pompidou thinks first of France's national interest, interpreted more realistically than by de Gaulle and given a lower profile. It means good relations with all, détente with the East but not at the expense of U.S. protection; defense against U.S. technological superiority, hence the construction of a larger Com-

[18] *Le Monde Weekly*, January 7, 1970.
[19] André Fontaine, "La Politique étrangère de M. Pompidou," *Le Monde*, February 3, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mon Market, but not at the sacrifice of France's independence; friendship with Germany, but not excluding proper counterweights.

Though Pompidou has been much praised for his constructive approach toward Europe at the Hague conference, and given credit for *l'Europe débloquée,* his policy is far from clear according to Alfred Grosser, who sees in it a dilatory attitude: let us wait for the entry of new members before we discuss the question of institutions.[20] Some observers are encouraged by the French initiative to create a European budget controlled by the European Parliament and detect in it the element of supranationality that de Gaulle had opposed in 1965. But is this an "historical event," the beginning of "political Europe"?

Much the same policy is apparently being pursued toward the Middle East as that inaugurated by de Gaulle, who viewed a pro-Arab policy as profitable to France in the long run. French policy in the Mediterranean is probably the result of a chain reaction of events rather than a well-thought-out strategy, as Jean Lacouture suggests.[21] Imports of Arab oil, exports of equipment, and concern for the balance of payments no doubt have carried considerable weight. Also important may be the fact that France is seeking compensations in North Africa for her declining role in Europe. Even more important may be a growing concern about the Soviet role in the Mediterranean; Michel Debré's advocacy of a strategy of containment probably goes far in explaining the Mirage deal with the Libyan government. New dangers as well as new opportunities have thus led France to take a more active role in an area where she had traditionally held a major interest.

Continuity in foreign policy is important for domestic reasons. Due respect must be paid to sacred symbols if secessions are to be avoided in the UDR. Yet continuity can be interpreted broadly, since the General himself was the greatest practitioner of "change in continuity." Who is then to decide what is the correct interpretation of his grand strategy?

Accordingly, a clever balance has been kept between continuity and change, especially in foreign policy. The policy of opening to the Center is a calculated risk, since the theme of *fidélité* can be, and has been, used to oppose the present leadership. But the government seems willing to accept these risks. The center of gravity of the coalition has moved away from the un-

[20] *Le Monde,* December 9, 1969.
[21] *Le Monde Diplomatique,* February 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conditional admirers of the great man to the conditional supporters of a program; in other words, from Right to Center. The assumption is that the "ultras" will have no other choice but to follow at the next elections.

Inevitably the absence of the prestigious presidential monarch has increased personal and group antagonisms within the UDR. The case of Louis Vallon, excluded from the party for a book accusing Pompidou and his friends of having engineered de Gaulle's departure, is an indication of the ever-present danger of schism. "The General alone can exclude me from Gaullism," answered Vallon. "Pompidou, the usurper, is not competent." René Capitant went even further: "By excluding Vallon, the UDR excludes itself from Gaullism."[22] Whereas the rebellion of a handful of pure Gaullists may be a tempest in a teapot, the danger exists that some prominent figure may take over the leadership of the present association, "Présence et Action du Gaullisme," and transform it into a national movement that could make moderates appear as renegades.

The ambiguities of Gaullism are more obvious since the departure of the great man. Old cleavages—nationalism vs. international cooperation, authoritarian vs. liberal rule, conservatism vs. reforms, state centralization vs. decentralization—can no longer be reconciled by regal pronouncements or silences. A rational and consistent doctrine and program may not succeed in creating consensus in a vast, heterogeneous coalition that can maintain its unity only through the fear of electoral defeat. Although harmony is stressed in public proclamations, some leaders admit privately the existence of divisions concerning such issues as foreign policy, reforms and the role of the state.[23]

VI

Perhaps the main incentive for cohesion—not to mention the implementation of the "New Society"—is the presence of an acceptable and credible left-wing alternative. The absence of a strong competitor at the Left may well encourage disunity in the ranks of the majority and revive the hopes of Centrists who dream of an end of bipolarization and a return to the institutions and

[22] *L'Express,* November 3-9, 1969.

[23] *L'Express,* October 27 and November 2, 1969, and *Le Monde,* November 1, 1969. For a good study of the UDR, see John S. Ambler, "The Democratic Union for the Republic: To Survive de Gaulle," in *Rice University Studies,* Summer 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mores of the Fourth Republic. The existence of a credible left-wing alternative is thus a condition for the cohesion of the majority and even for the survival of the Gaullist institutions. For they could not survive indefinitely a monopoly of power by the Right and the absence of hope by the supporters of the Left. This would lead to a dangerous sense of frustration and to alienation on the part of those who consider themselves subjects of rather than participants in the Fifth Republic.

What are the chances of unity among the forces of the Left? The problem is less one of rivalry over programs—although each party uses its own rhetoric and wants to maintain its ideological identity—than of the strategy to be followed by the noncommunist Left toward the powerful Communist Party. For example, the reactions of the Socialist Party and its left-outgrowth, the PSU, to the manifesto of the new Radical Party under the leadership of Servan-Schreiber indicate that they approve most of its specific reforms, even if they disapprove the underlying ideology of "neo-capitalism." Significantly, the reaction of Lecanuet was the reverse: approval of the ideology and dissent over such reforms as heavy inheritance taxes.[24]

The main stumbling block to unity is the attitude to take and the tactics to adopt toward the Communists, what Viansson-Ponté called "the traditional cleavages between opponents and partisans of an agreement with the PC." In theory most Leftists agree on the need to reach some agreement, if only of a tactical nature, for the absence of the Communists would spell the electoral defeat of the noncommunist Left, as the presidential election amply demonstrated. In practice, however, each party has its own strategy with respect to the PC. Mitterrand advocates a reconstruction of the Left Federation of 1965. The Socialist Party under the new leadership of Alain Savary has been launching an ideological dialogue with the PC in order to find the basis for an alliance. Michel Rocard, leader of the PSU, rejects this approach, as he sees the smaller Socialist Party putting itself in a dependent position vis-à-vis the much stronger PC. He also rejects the notion of an agreement among the general staffs of the parties and favors common action by militants *à la base*. The Radicals are the most cautious in their answer to the Communist invitation.[25]

Viansson-Ponté, writing in *Le Monde* about the problem of Leftist unity, refers to the "Communist enigma," the fact that

[24] *L'Express*, February 2-8, 1970.
[25] *Ibid.*, October 6-12, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the party accused of subversion by the Right seems to prefer order and to concentrate on vote-getting, yet can be a force for the conquest of power.[26] The French PC is still largely Stalinist in its intellectual complacency, its refusal to tolerate criticism or even to face facts and adjust to the evolution of society. The "dialectics of power and opposition" seems to profit its leaders, who can afford to wait for the Left parties to accept their conditions for an electoral alliance.

Perhaps the PC is not even interested in an electoral victory of a Leftist coalition. Since it "renders millions of votes useless by the mere fact of receiving them,"[27] it can continue to prove that a reformist alternative is impossible, keep alive the illusion of revolution, and monopolize the protest votes at the Left. Its present leadership may be equally uninterested in reforms or revolution, the latter being most improbable and the former threatening both the identity of the party and the rule of a Communist elite that is objectively the ally of the conservatives. The deposing of Roger Garaudy makes it appear dubious that the party leadership is willing to adjust goals and methods to new realities and new opportunities.[28]

The spectacular June 1970 victory of Radical Servan-Schreiber in Nancy, where he obtained 45 per cent of the votes in the first ballot and 55 per cent in the second, seems to demonstrate the possibility of a successful reformist alternative. His appeal springs in large part from his concrete approach to socio-economic problems as well as his advocacy of regional autonomy, an engaging remedy for what Jacques Fauvet calls the "exaspération chronique" caused by excessive centralization. About half of the Gaullist electorate and two-thirds of the noncommunist Left followed him in his plea for a union of the reformists and for local and regional participation of citizens in the key decisions affecting the future of their region. Only the Communists maintained their strength, with some 20 per cent of the expressed votes.

Shortly after his victory, Servan-Schreiber launched the idea of a "municipal manifesto": to unite Socialists, Radicals and "democrats" at the 1971 municipal elections. Should this coalition be relatively successful, the ground would be laid for a union of

[26]Viansson-Ponté, "Les grandes vacances de l'opposition," *Le Monde,* October 8, 1969; also October 12-13, October 15, December 9, 1969.

[27]Alfred Grosser in *Le Monde Weekly,* January 7, 1970.

[28]Roger Priouret, "Le P/C et la Réalité," *L'Express,* January 26-February 1, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reformists at the legislative elections of 1973, which could offer a convincing alternative to the dominant party.

In September, Servan-Schreiber challenged Chaban-Delmas at Bordeaux and was thoroughly defeated. Perhaps Nancy and Bordeaux can be written off as special cases from which no lesson can be learned concerning either the forthcoming elections or the long-term evolution of French politics. Perhaps, also, the victory of two men who are not far apart in their political outlooks and approaches to socio-economic problems, including the need for regional autonomy, indicates that France is moving toward the alternance of moderate Right and moderate Left which seems to be a precondition for stable and effective democracy.

VII

In conclusion, the prospects for bipolarization with a consensual situation, and thus for the survival of the Fifth Republic, appear relatively bright, at least in the long run. Much will depend on the ability of the Left to unite and, ideally, of the Communist Party to adapt itself to the realities of post-industrial society. Much will depend also on the ability of the present leaders of the majority to effect a synthesis of authority and democracy, and of managerial efficiency and social justice. Both Right and Left seem now to be facing the key problems of modernization, and are not far apart in their diagnosis of past and present ills. This is most encouraging. The fact that the right questions are being asked does not mean that the right answers will follow, but it is easier to "agree to disagree" on concrete problems than on articles of faith, including faith in the Gaullist mythology.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCING AND THE SUMMIT: MACRO-ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL PARTICIPATION

by Elmer Plischke

EVERYONE presumes to know what an international conference is, yet few have rationalized its fundamental nature and utility as a primary ingredient of modern diplomacy.[1] When the U.S. President meets face to face with the Soviet Premier, we call it a "summit conference" or "summit meeting," but few are aware of the frequency with which world leaders convene in summit gatherings of various types, or of the precise role "summit conferencing" plays in contemporary diplomatic relations.[2] To ex-

[1]The principal literature on the international conference as a diplomatic institution, much of it fairly old, includes (in chronological order): Sir Ernest Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (London: Longmans, Green, 1917), Chapters XXV and XXVI, also fourth edition, edited by Sir Nevile Bland (London: Longmans, Green, 1957), Chapter XXII; Sir Maurice Hankey, *Diplomacy by Conference* (London: W. H. Smith, 1920); Sir Ernest Satow, *International Congresses* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1920); Frederick S. Dunn, *The Practice and Procedure of International Conferences* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929); Norman L. Hill, *The Public International Conference: Its Function, Organization and Procedure* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1929); Mildred Moulton, *A Structural View of the Conference as an Organ of International Cooperation* (Highland Park, N. J.: New York University Dissertation, 1930); William O'Davoran, *Post-War Reconstruction Conferences: The Technical Organisation of International Conferences* (London: P. S. King and Staples, 1943); Vladimir D. Pastuhov, *A Guide to the Practice of International Conferences* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1945); Sir Maurice Hankey, *Diplomacy by Conference: Studies in Public Affairs, 1920-1946* (New York: Putnam, 1946); Elmer Plischke, *Conduct of American Diplomacy* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1950), Chapters 13-14, and third edition (1967), Chapters 15-16; Plischke, *International Relations: Basic Documents* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1953), and second edition (1962), Chapter 4.

[2]The following deal specifically with summit conferencing: Dean G. Acheson, "Meetings at the Summit: A Study in Diplomatic Method," lecture at University of New Hampshire (May 8, 1958, processed); Keith Eubank, *The Summit Conferences, 1919-1960* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966); Johan Galtung, "Summit Meetings and International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research,* No. 1, 1964, pp. 36-54; Arthur Kemp, "Summit Conferences During World War II," in George L. Anderson, *Issues and Conflicts: Studies in Twentieth Century American Diplomacy* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1959), pp. 256-283; Stephen D. Kertesz, "Summit and Personal Diplomacy," Chapter 5 in *The Quest for Peace Through Diplomacy* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Hans J. Morgenthau, "Dilemma of the Summit," *New York Times Magazine,* November 11, 1962, pp. 25, 117-122; Elmer Plischke, *Summit Diplomacy: Personal Diplomacy of the President of the United States* (College Park: Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland, 1958); Douglas Waples, "Publicity versus Diplomacy: Notes on the Reporting of the 'Summit' Conferences," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Spring 1956, pp. 308-314; Richard L. Worsnop, "Heads-of-State Diplomacy," *Editorial Research Reports,* December 1962, pp. 873-892.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plain these diplomatic techniques systematically requires putting the summit conference in functional perspective, and presenting, as a minimum, a macro-synthesis of its use by the President of the United States.

Summit Conferences and the "New Diplomacy"

For half a century analysts have addressed themselves to defining and assessing the "new diplomacy."[3] At the close of the First World War, on the basis of allied wartime experiences in the Supreme War Council and its thirty-five supporting committees and subcommittees, as well as in the intricate and changing organization of the Paris Peace Conference,[4] British diplomatist Lord Maurice Hankey — who personally attended nearly five hundred international meetings in an official capacity — delivered a lecture at the Royal (then British) Institute of International Affairs, in which he equated "conference diplomacy" with the "new diplomacy." He regarded diplomacy by conference as a technique enabling leaders responsible for framing policy to conduct negotiations. He concluded that "diplomacy by conference has come to stay."[5] With the establishment of the League of Nations and later the United Nations, and many other "permanent" international institutions serving as a type of forum for diplomacy by conference, this development came to be termed "parliamentary diplomacy."[6]

Sir Harold Nicolson, British diplomat and a leading authority

[3]For general background, see Arno J. Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).

[4]For a chart depicting the principal elements of the "Inter-Allied War Organization," see Hankey, *Diplomacy by Conference . . . 1920-1946,* p. 10. The organization of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 is described in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference, 1919,* Vol. III (1943), pp. 1-157. For comparative purposes, organizational structuring of the San Francisco Conference of 1945 is given in Plischke, *International Relations: Basic Documents,* p. 41, and a generic conference procedure flow chart is presented on p. 45. Conference organization also is described in varying detail in the published and unpublished individual conference reports and other documents of the Department of State. For a guide to the records of selected conferences participated in by the United States to the early 1950's, see National Archives, *Preliminary Inventory of the Records of United States Participation in International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions,* compiled by H. Stephen Helton (1955), and supplement compiled by Marion M. Johnson and Mabel D. Brock (1965).

[5]Original lecture, "Diplomacy by Conference," published in *The Round Table,* March 1921, pp. 287-311. Later, as revised, it was incorporated as Chapter 1 of *Diplomacy by Conference . . . 1920-1946,* pp. 11-39; quotation is at p. 38. Also see references in Sir Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London: Butterworth, 1939), pp. 155, 157. Prior to World War I, according to Lord Hankey, "the method of conducting international business by direct conference between the principal Ministers concerned was the exception rather than the rule." *Diplomacy by Conference . . . 1920-1946,* p. 12.

[6]Plischke, *Conduct of American Diplomacy,* third edition, Chapters 17-18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on his profession, viewed the new diplomacy rather as "democratic diplomacy," characterized by increased responsiveness to the people, less secrecy, a higher level of popular control, less emphasis on formal protocol and procedure, and greater reliance on conference diplomacy.[7] Following the meetings of the principal European leaders during the 1930's and the World War II conclaves of President Franklin D. Roosevelt with Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and Premier Joseph V. Stalin, other writers emphasized "personal diplomacy" and "summit diplomacy" in the evolvement of the concept.[8] The introduction of nuclear weapons and the launching of the Cold War produced still other refinements, variously called "total diplomacy,"[9] "Cold War diplomacy,"[10] or "nuclear diplomacy."[11] In general, however, these are less valid as forms of diplomatic method than as characterizations of the times, of geopolitical power relationships, or of the subjects of negotiation.

Current perception of the "new diplomacy" is quite different from that of 1920, when the expression first came into use. Its

[7]Nicolson, *op. cit.,* especially Chapter IV. Fifteen years later he developed a different analysis to identify the principal characteristics of the old diplomacy: world affairs centered in Europe so that European chancelleries determined issues of peace and war; it was taken for granted that "the Great Powers were greater than the Small Powers," and the latter's interests, opinions and votes scarcely affected agreed policy of the concert of the Greats; "the Great Powers possessed a common responsibility for the conduct of the Small Powers"; diplomacy was handled by national corps of professional diplomats; and "sound negotiation must be continuous and confidential." See *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 73-79. Also see his "Diplomacy Then and Now," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1961, pp. 39-49.

[8]Plischke, *Summit Diplomacy* and *Conduct of American Diplomacy,* third edition, pp. 43-55, 68-70, 92-96, 292-293, 481-482, 519. Also cf. footnote 2 above.

[9]Dean G. Acheson, "Total Diplomacy," address of February 16, 1950, in Department of State, *Strengthening the Forces of Freedom* (Washington: GPO, 1950), pp. 15-19. Secretary Acheson was concerned with the totality of U.S. government involvement in foreign relations with the communist orbit, rather than with the international aspects of diplomatic conduct. Nevertheless, the expression "total diplomacy" has been used by editorialists from time to time as meaning a broad-scale diplomatic concern or initiative, or a massive diplomatic thrust in considerable depth, both of which appear to be more meaningful applications of the concept.

[10]Norman A. Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy: American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962) and Young Hum Kim, editor, *Twenty Years of Crises: The Cold War Era* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968) which, together with an expanding literature on the Cold War, are less concerned with diplomatic system and practice than with policy substance and purpose in the post-World War II years.

[11]Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age,* second edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1957); and Lester B. Pearson, *Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age* (Toronto: Saunders, 1959). These and similar volumes devoted to world affairs are more concerned with diplomatic relations in the nuclear period, or with the impact of nuclear power on diplomacy or nuclear strategic relations, however, than they are with a special type of diplomatic method.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

most obvious distinguishment is from traditional or classical diplomacy, which consists of direct representation and largely bilateral negotiation by professional diplomats or appointees commissioned to serve specifically in a diplomatic capacity.[12] The fundamental variants of the new diplomacy need to be differentiated, however, even though they may be highly interrelated and rarely are mutually exclusive. "Democratic diplomacy," generally regarded as the broadest of these concepts, is sometimes called "popular diplomacy." It is distinguished by such factors as an increase in the influence of representative bodies, greater openness, multipartite negotiations, utilization of representatives of the people as negotiators, public appeals for direct and immediate support of policy positions and negotiations, and insistence in the name of the people on not only a "right to know," but also a "right to participate."[13]

"Conference diplomacy" and "parliamentary diplomacy" jointly comprise "multilateral diplomacy"— differentiated from bilateral on the basis of the number of participants. In essence, "conference diplomacy" is simply that form of negotiation which takes place around the conference table, with the parties collectively negotiating in a common forum of *ad hoc* gatherings, occasional or regularized meetings, or sessions of deliberative agencies of international organizations. American diplomat and publicist Charles W. Thayer, distinguishing conference diplomacy from traditional diplomacy, defines it as "the procedure whereby special delegations, usually headed by special chief delegates, foregather to settle special problems."[14]

"Parliamentary diplomacy," one of its mutations, which may be described as institutionalized conferencing, is conducted within permanent mechanisms founded on agreed constitutive acts, like the United Nations. Within such forums, their sessions generally being public or at least in the limelight, forensic ability sometimes is believed to be of influence, and decision-making ostensibly is reduced to a formalized voting process.[15]

[12]E. L. Woodward, "The Old and the New Diplomacy," *Yale Review*, March 1947, pp. 405-422; and Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Permanent Values in the Old Diplomacy," Chapter 2 of Stephen D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons, editors, *Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959). In *Conduct of the New Diplomacy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), James L. McCamy devotes his attention to how the U.S. government is organized to carry out contemporary foreign relations, rather than to the essence and techniques of diplomacy.

[13]Plischke, *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, third edition, p. 39.

[14]Charles W. Thayer, *Diplomat* (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 105.

[15]Some writers have denounced it as being neither genuine parliamentarianism nor authentic diplomacy, and Professor Hans Morgenthau has decried what he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Personal diplomacy" involves the direct participation of political principals, especially chiefs of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, and other officials of cabinet or higher rank. When this is of the highest order — that is, when it transcends the cabinet (or ministerial) level — it is called "diplomacy at the summit."[16] This, in turn, consists of several functionally distinguishable elements, including policymaking and enunciation at the summit, personal communications with other chiefs of state and heads of government, the use of personal representatives or special diplomatic agents, summit visits and tours, and summit conferences and meetings, as depicted in Diagram A. The "summit conference," therefore, is but one of the principal manifestations of "summit diplomacy";[17] the latter is only one aspect of "personal diplomacy," and this, in turn, is merely one form of the "new diplomacy." At the same time, the "summit conference" is only one of the many types of "conference diplomacy," which is an ingredient of the "new diplomacy." The relationships of some of these elements are indicated in Diagram B.

All of these basic components — democratic diplomacy, conference diplomacy, parliamentary diplomacy, personal diplomacy and summit diplomacy — contribute to the new diplomacy.[18]

calls "the vice of majority decision" as a diplomatic technique. See *Politics Among Nations,* fourth edition (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 535-537; also pp. 528-529. Charles Thayer, though he deplores "diplomacy by ballot" and regards it as lacking "the quality of reality," nevertheless concludes that "it is a form of diplomacy no matter how odd." (See *Diplomat,* p. 12.) John W. Gange raises another reservation, questioning whether "international parliamentary diplomacy" has not produced "an unmanageable Frankenstein" which injects into foreign relations "too many international bodies composed of too many members among whom there is an incredibly disproportionate involvement of means, risks, and commitments." *American Foreign Relations* (New York: Ronald, 1959), p. 145.

[16]For distinguishment and definition, see Plischke, *Summit Diplomacy,* pp. 3-5. Galtung, *op. cit.,* on the other hand, defines the summit as superior to the diplomatic level, therefore embracing the chief of state, head of government, and ministerial levels.

[17]Plischke, *Summit Diplomacy,* Chapters 2-6, deals respectively with these principal elements.

[18]Another conceptualization of the new diplomacy is provided by Stephen Kertesz, who says: "Conditions in the twentieth century have created, necessarily, a diplomacy different from that of the nineteenth century." He proceeds to identify thirteen categories of "contemporary diplomacy," including: contact and negotiation through bilateral diplomatic channels, *ad hoc* international conferences, consultative diplomacy of permanent collective bodies, diplomacy of the international specialized agencies, parliamentary diplomacy, diplomacy of parliamentarians (as in the European Parliament), cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, diplomacy through technical assistance, military diplomacy, diplomacy of disarmament and limitation of armaments, intelligence diplomacy, and activities of private groups and individuals. See *The Quest for Peace Through Diplomacy,* pp. 5, 6-7. These categories are not mutually exclusive, however, and they tend to be more descriptive than distinguishing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Diagram A

ANATOMY OF SUMMIT DIPLOMACY



While Nicolson may question Hankey's prophecy of 1920[19] — with some justification in terms of the latter's definition, and with the benefit of hindsight — nevertheless it can scarcely be denied that conference diplomacy, in the broader sense of multilateral diplomacy, is here to stay. Personal diplomatic relations at the

[19]Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, p. 159.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Diagram B

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCING AND THE "OLD" AND "NEW" DIPLOMACY



Notes:

[1]Such as Western Foreign Ministers Conferences after World War II.
[2]Such as Big Four Council of Foreign Ministers.
[3]Also called "parliamentary diplomacy."
[4]United Nations.
[5]Such as International Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Labor Organization, UNESCO.
[6]Such as Organization of American States, Council of Europe, Arab League, Organization of African Unity.
[7]Such as NATO, SEATO, European Communities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

summit — including the summit conference — also have become a regular aspect of modern diplomacy.[20]

Summit Conferences as Multilateral Diplomacy: General Relationships

A great deal of diplomatic business is conducted *among* as well as *between* governments. "In the conduct of foreign relations," reports the Department of State, "perhaps no greater change has occurred in the past half-century than the increased emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and the employment of the international conference as a medium for cooperative action among governments."[21]

This is evidenced by the fact that, while the United States attended only one hundred international conferences to 1900 — averaging less than one per year — by the 1960's the rate of attendance reached an annual average of well over three hundred, and in some years it exceeded twice that number. Between 1776 and 1914, the American government joined in only six of the forty-two most important international assemblages (and none of these six took place prior to the 1880's). Since World War II the United States has been attending virtually all major conferences in which it has a conceivable interest of consequence and from which it is not logically excluded by the participants (such as restricted British Commonwealth, communist orbit, Arab, Asian or African conferences).[22]

The "international conference" may simply be regarded as a gathering of the representatives of two or more governments to

[20]Plischke, *Summit Diplomacy,* especially p. 101. The old diplomacy, in the guise of direct representation and negotiation through accredited resident emissaries, has not been displaced, but rather has been supplemented in the relations of states in diplomatic affairs. However, there is a school of thought which decries the "decline of diplomacy," represented by such writers as George F. Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Sir Harold Nicolson and others; see, for example, Quincy Wright, "The Decline of Classic Diplomacy," *Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. XVII, No. 1 (1963), pp. 18-28. For another point of view, assessing the myth of the "Golden Age" of diplomacy as coterminous with classical diplomacy, see Charles Burton Marshall, "Golden Age in Perspective," *ibid.,* pp. 9-17.

[21]Department of State, *Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, July 1, 1959-June 30, 1960* (Washington: GPO, 1961), p. vii.

[22]See *ibid.,* annual volumes published for years 1932 to 1960. For analysis, see Plischke, *Conduct of American Diplomacy,* third edition, Chapter 15, with tables of overall U.S. conference participation on p. 474, participation according to conference subjects, p. 480, and participation in major international conferences, Appendix IV, pp. 595-599. Older lists of international conferences are provided in Simeon E. Baldwin, "The International Congresses and Conferences of the Last Century as Forces Working Toward the Solidarity of the World," *American Journal of International Law,* July 1907, Appendix, pp. 808-829; Hill, *op. cit.,* Appendix A, pp. 229-231; and Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (1917), Vol. II, pp. 4, 95-96.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confer or negotiate on matters of mutual concern. Stated another way, "international conferencing" takes place when the emissaries of two or more countries convene to exchange policy views, to discuss a common problem or to work out an agreement. As a diplomatic technique, however, the fullest significance of the international conference is not reached until the gathering is arranged for in advance, the questions for consideration are previously identified and circumscribed, the sessions are serviced by an international or conference secretariat, the representatives are specially delegated for the purpose and conduct their affairs in an organized fashion, and the governments they represent strive for overt results in the nature of treaties, agreements or other forms of understanding and commitment. At the summit level international conferring assumes special qualities and prominence.

For descriptive or taxonomical purposes, international conferences and meetings may be grouped into various categories in accordance with their composition, subject matter, objectives, and other differentiating factors.[23] Thus, major groupings of categories are readily identifiable on the basis of the primary type of forum, the participants, the substantive matters under consideration, procedural factors, and the effects of the conferencing. Each of these five major groupings consists of a number of primary conference categories, and each of these, in turn, is composed of a series of specific subcategories and subsidiary types, as depicted in Table I. The total projection of the conference macrocosm embraces approximately seventy-five distinct international conference subcategories, and all but six of these are applicable to summit conferencing.[24]

[23]A fourfold distinction of conference types is provided by Dunn, *op. cit.*, Chapter III; he segregates them into political and nonpolitical, bargaining and legislative, diplomatic and technical, and League and non-League categories. Some publicists strain the conceptualization by distinguishing "the summit conference by correspondence"—or "written communication conferencing"—as a separate category of summit conferencing. For example, Worsnop, *op. cit.*, pp. 875-877, regards the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchanges at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 as illustrating this diplomatic technique. However, such presidential involvement is more appropriately "summit conferring" than "summit conferencing." Other historic examples include the extensive correspondence between President Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister and Soviet Premier during World War II, and the protracted and public exchange between Eisenhower and the Kremlin, 1955 to 1960. See Elmer Plischke, "Eisenhower's 'Correspondence Diplomacy' with the Kremlin—Case Study in Summit Diplomatics," *Journal of Politics*, February 1968, pp. 137-159.

[24]The exceptions embrace the ministerial, diplomatic and technical subtypes under category C (level of principal participants) and the semi-public and private conference subtypes under category D (official character of the participants), as well as the international congress (category B—basic nature of forum) which has become obsolete as a conference type. In addition, certain conference functional topics (category J) are of questionable relevance to summit conferencing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CATEGORIES

I. PRIMARY TYPE OF FORUM

A

Basic Method of Conferencing

*Face-to-face conferencing
*Correspondence conferencing
*Telephone conferencing
*"Telecon" conferencing
*"Hot line" conferencing

B

Basic Nature of Forum

Congress[1]
*Conference
*Meeting[2]
Meeting
Informal meeting
Discussion
Informal discussion
"Talks"
Informal "talks"
Conversations

II. PARTICIPANTS

C

Level of Principal Participants

*Summit
Ministerial
Diplomatic
Technical

D

Official Character of Participants

*Public or inter-governmental
Semi-public
Private

E

Number of Participants

*Bilateral
*Multilateral
Trilateral
Quadrilateral
Others

F

Primary Role of Principal Participants

*Ceremonial
*Discussion
*Negotiation

G

Primary Objective of Participants

*Propaganda
*Sizing-up
*Intention-revealing
*Decision-making

H

Relations of Governments of Participants

*Friends
Allies
Others
Combination
*Adversaries
*Combination

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III. SUBJECT MATTER

I — *Timing*

- *Wartime
- *Peacemaking
- *Peacetime

J — *Functional Topic*[3]

- General
- Agriculture
- Aviation
- Commodity
- Communications
- Disarmament
- Economic
- Education
- Finance
- Health
- Labor
- Legal
- Political
- Resources
- Scientific
- Security (Defense)
- Trade
- Transportation
- Welfare

K — *End Product*

- *Written
  - Treaty
  - Agreement
  - Communiqué
  - Other
- *Unwritten
  - Understanding
  - Commitment

IV. PROCEDURE

L — *Periodicity*

- **Ad hoc*
- *Occasional
- *Recurrent
- *Periodic
  - Agency of international organization
  - Other forums

M — *Location*

- *United States
- *Country of other participant
- *"Neutral" location
- *Other (allied country)

N — *Degree of Formality and Sophistication*

- *Personalized
- *Informal
- *Formal
- *Highly structured

V. CONSEQUENCES

O — *Primary Nature of Results*

- *Image and prestige building
- *Mutual goal promoting
- *Issue resolving
- *Crisis settling
- *Law creating

P — *Degree of Pragmatic Significance*

- *Trivial
- *Useful
- *Important
- *Decisive

Q — *Historicity*

- *Minor
- *Major
- *Classic

*Denotes applicability to summit conferencing.

[1]Has become obsolete except for limited, special purposes.

[2]Subcategories based on Department of State designations.

[3]Based upon categories used by Department of State in its earlier annual reports entitled *Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A single international conference — whether at the summit or not — may usually be defined as falling into each of the primary categories (A to Q in the Table), as well as into one or more of each set of subcategories. For example, an international gathering may be classified as follows: a public/multilateral/wartime/occasional/informal/summit/conference/among friends (allies)/held at a location within one of the participating countries/for negotiations/and decision-making/respecting political/security/and other matters/with its results consummated in both written/and unwritten end products/the gathering serving as a vehicle for promoting mutual goals/and resolving issues/in a decisive fashion/and being of major historical significance. Each of the items, separated by virgules, signifies a special subcategory identification of the conference, thus involving some twenty conference characteristics. Actually, this particular depiction represents the anatomy of the Yalta Conference of 1945. Although not every international gathering reflects elements contained in all of the seventeen primary categories, even a minor, informal, bilateral summit meeting, largely for ceremonial purposes (such as a joint dedication of a border monument or communications facility), fits aspects of virtually all of them.

As already implied, the seventeen basic international conference categories are not mutually exclusive. This matter is less clear, however, with respect to the subcategories. By way of illustration, whereas a conference is either at the summit or some lower level — convened either within the United States or abroad, bilateral or multilateral — it may produce both written and unwritten understandings and agreements and it may deal with a whole series of different though definable functional topics. In some cases the analyst finds it difficult if not impossible to ascribe a given conference to a particular subcategory. For instance, is the gathering primarily for propaganda, sizing-up, or other purposes, or does it serve all of them? Does it lend itself principally to mutual goal-promoting or to issue-resolving, or equally to both? Can it be said to be recurring, or is it merely occasional?

Inability to apply all elements of a logically-determined taxonomy of international conferencing to actual practice with precision means that knowledge is insufficient, descriptive terminology is inadequately refined, or distinguishment criteria are too imprecise to render such allocation easy. Nevertheless, these weaknesses are remediable, and sufficient information and conceptualistic precision are at hand to warrant undertaking some

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

systematic analysis of summit conferencing participated in by the President of the United States.

In determining a priori the scope of analysis, the international conference may be analyzed from any one of many predetermined perspectives. The analyst may apprehend the international conference cosmos in its entirety, encompassing the total complex. Even so, he may give it a particular slant — historical, institutional, functional, conceptual or theoretical. Or he may prefer to look at it from the point of view of one of the major groupings, emphasizing either the nature of the conference forum, the participants, the subject matter, procedure or ultimate consequences; again, he may confine his attention solely to one of these.

On the other hand, further restricting his approach, the analyst may be concerned with the subject from the perspective of one of the seventeen primary categories, stressing, for example, the number of participants, the primary objective, the conference end products, the nature of the forum, or some comparable factor. Becoming even more precise in his outlook, he may align the projection of his consideration with one of the seventy-five subcategories, such as summit conferences and meetings. He may restrict his focus even more, concentrating on one of the precise sub-subcategories or electing, for particular reasons, to combine several of these elements in designing his perspective.[25] Finally, as is most commonly the case, he may confine himself to an individual gathering or series of conferences.[26]

The most general diagnosis of international conferencing results in rather obvious distinguishment based on such criteria as the fundamental nature of the forum, the level and official

[25]Dunn, *op. cit.;* Hill, *op. cit.;* Moulton, *op. cit.;* O'Davoran, *op. cit.;* Pastuhov, *op. cit.;* and others.

[26]This focus has been most widely used in the past. In addition to the many volumes published on the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the references given in footnote 41 below, such studies include: Keith Eubank, *Munich* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963); Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Richard F. Fenno, Jr., editor, *The Yalta Conference* (Boston: Heath, 1955); Kemp, *op. cit.;* William L. Neumann, *After Victory: Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and the Making of the Peace* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); John L. Snell, editor, *The Meaning of Yalta* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956); William H. Vatcher, Jr., *Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations* (New York: Praeger, 1958); Sir Charles Webster, *The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966). However, such expositions are more generally concerned with reporting biography or diplomatic history than with conference method and analysis. An exception is Keith Eubank, *The Summit Conferences, 1919-1960, op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

character of the participants, the number of countries involved, the general timing of international gatherings and their periodicity – categories B, C, D, E, I and L of Table I.

Today there appears to be little material difference between international "congresses" and "conferences" respecting either their purposes or their effects.[27] Both are gatherings of plenipotentiaries to consider mutual problems and arrive at common agreements or programs of action. From the middle of the seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the difference between them was held to be significant, and to some extent this belief continued throughout the nineteenth century. The supposition was that an international congress carried more weight and was more dignified than a conference – it was an assembly for the purpose of negotiating a major peace treaty and implied an especially important occasion, it involved a greater number of powers than a conference, or the plenipotentiaries were of more impressive political stature in their home countries.[28] The historic assemblages of Westphalia (1644-1648), Utrecht (1712-1713), Vienna (1814-1815), Paris (1856) and Berlin (1878) were called congresses. They were attended by emperors, kings, princes, prime ministers, chancellors and other chiefs of state and heads of government, as well as by foreign ministers.[29]

[27]On the international congress as a diplomatic forum, see Satow, *International Congresses, op. cit.* The distinction between international "conferences" and "meetings" is discussed below.

[28]Plischke, *Conduct of American Diplomacy,* third edition, pp. 471-472. For additional discussion, see Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (1917), Vol. II, Chapters XXV and XXVI, or *ibid.* (1957), Chapter XXII, especially pp. 303-305. Satow applies the term congress to "assemblies of plenipotentiaries for the conclusion of peace and the redistribution of territory"; in earlier times, he adds, they ordinarily were further characterized by being held at a neutral spot or some place expressly neutralized for the purpose of the gathering, and sometimes by being presided over by third-party mediators. Also see Pastuhov, *op. cit.,* pp. 9-11.

[29]The Congress of Vienna is particularly noteworthy for the high degree of summit participation. Ranking participants included the Austrian Emperor, the Czar of Russia, King Frederick William III of Prussia, the Kings of Bavaria, Denmark and Württemberg, the Princes of the Netherlands and Sardinia, the Chancellor of Prussia, and the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France and Russia, as well as Prince Metternich, the head of the Austrian government. At Berlin in 1878, Britain, Germany and Russia were represented by their heads of government, whereas Austria, Hungary, France and Italy were represented by their foreign ministers, Turkey left its negotiations to its Minister of Public Works and its ambassador to the German capital, and the Balkan states only sent observers.

Irrespective of the political or personal rank or the diplomatic designation of the participants, however, seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth century conclaves functioned at the summit in that they generally were concerned with dynastic matters, with the settlement of "kings' wars" and the adjustment of the territorial possessions of autocratic rulers. Inasmuch as it was the rulers who had relations with each other, and not the peoples over whom they ruled, public policy was determined, and negotiations were personally controlled, by such rulers, thereby elevating the conference process to the summit. See, for example, Dunn, *op. cit.,* pp. 52, 55, 64-65.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However, with the conferences on Greece (1827-1832) and Belgium (1830-1833) the designation "international conference" came to be employed, and in the latter part of the nineteenth century it was ascribed to most of the more important formal and general gatherings. Since then "international congress" has virtually disappeared from international usage except, perhaps, for semi-public and private gatherings or the technical or administrative meeting concerned with scientific, legal or other non-political matters, particularly in inter-American affairs. The trend has been to accept "conference" as the common expression for international assemblages,[30] leaving "congress" to be applied rather to national legislative bodies.[31] The United States attended none of the fifteen important international congresses convened between 1776 and 1878, and no summit gathering involving the President has borne this special title.[32]

One of the most obvious conference classifications, which has assumed greater significance since the 1930's, is founded on the status of the principal participants – category C of Table I. In this respect, the highest stratum of international gatherings is the summit conclave; other levels, in descending order, embrace ministerial, diplomatic and technical conferences and meetings. At

[30]See list of major international conferences since 1776 in Plischke, *Conduct of American Diplomacy,* third edition, Appendix IV, in which international congresses are specifically identified.

[31]It is interesting to note that the federal legislature of the United States, called the "Congress," derived its title from the early expression "the United States in Congress assembled." At the time of the American Revolution, intercolonial diplomacy/governance was handled by the "Continental Congress"—essentially an interstate conferencing mechanism—which, among other matters, negotiated a "treaty" called the "Articles of Confederation" in 1777. When this was ratified by the states in 1781, it established the "Congress of the Confederation" as the agency of diplomacy/governance. With the negotiation of the Constitution at the intergovernmental conference at Philadelphia in 1787, and its ratification by the states, the new government of the United States of America simply continued the term "Congress" for its national legislature. Thus, the latter derives its title from an institution assimilable to the interstate conference of the late eighteenth century, when the term congress was the common expression for such gatherings.

Most countries now have the parliamentary or cabinet form of government, rather than the separation-of-powers or presidential system, and their legislatures generally are called parliaments, national assemblies, constituent assemblies, or diets. Nevertheless, a few countries have modeled their political systems on that of the United States, with legislatures bearing the title "Congress." This has been the case with Liberia, the Philippine Republic, and a number of Latin American states, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru. In Latin America, however, this usage appears to be declining. As a consequence, the term "Congress" has become exceptional for national legislatures as well as for international gatherings.

[32]The U.S. government was invited to attend the Panama Congress of American States, called by Simon Bolivar and convened in 1826. Following a four-month debate, Congress, which feared foreign entanglements, belatedly decided to authorize U.S. participation. Two representatives eventually were dispatched, but one died on the way and the other, having started so late, failed to reach Panama in time for the sessions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

times diplomatic gatherings are called "political" to distinguish them from the technical. Between the Congress of Vienna and World War I, resort to the first and second of these categories was exceptional in international practice, and, while the United States rarely participated at either level prior to 1940, since World War II they have come to be widely employed by both the White House and the State Department.[33]

On the basis of the official character of the participants — category D of Table I — three main classes of international gatherings may be distinguished, namely, public, quasi-public, and non-public or private conferences and meetings. Intergovernmental or public conferences are attended by officially accredited government delegations to deal with public matters and usually result in formal instruments such as an international treaty, agreement, protocol or communiqué, or in such informal arrangements as intergovernmental understandings.[34] When the President personally joins other heads of state and government in a summit-level gathering, it is *ipso facto* official and intergovernmental in nature.

On the other hand, semi-public meetings, which may or may not be called by governments, are composed primarily of the delegates of quasi-official agencies and are restricted to semi-official purposes. Although resolutions and recommendations of an advisory nature may be agreed upon, the final results are not

[33]The upsurge of the Secretary of State's involvement in ministerial conferencing began with World War II, and has since become routine. Earlier participation was occasional, beginning with James G. Blaine's presiding at the first International Conference of American States in Washington (1889-1890) and Robert Lansing's appointment as a member of President Wilson's Peace Commission to Paris; later it was limited to such occasions as Charles Evans Hughes' appearance at the Washington Naval Arms Conference and Cordell Hull's attendance at several inter-American conferences. During the war, Hull also participated in three inter-American foreign ministers conferences (the precursor of the Organ of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States) and the Moscow Big Three Foreign Ministers Conference, which paved the way for the Tehran summit conference. Edward R. Stettinius led the American delegations to the Mexico City and San Francisco conferences in 1945, at which the Act of Chapultepec and the United Nations Charter were signed.

Nevertheless, such participation merely prefaced the wave of ministerial conferencing that was to follow. James F. Byrnes spent 350 of his 562 days as Secretary of State engaged in international conferences. Dean Acheson attended approximately 25 conferences and similar negotiations in four years, and John Foster Dulles attended about 50 in little more than six years. In addition to *ad hoc* conferences, the Secretary of State represents the U.S. government in such regularized conferencing systems as the Council of Foreign Ministers, Western foreign ministers meetings, the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States, sessions of the councils of regional security organizations including the North Atlantic Alliance, and, at times, the principal organs of the United Nations.

[34]Periodic lists of intergovernmental conferences and meetings participated in by the United States are given in *Schedule of International Conferences,* published by the Office of International Conferences of the Department of State; also see references to individual conference reports and the annual reports entitled *Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences,* cited above.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formalized in instruments that bind governments unless the latter subsequently approve them officially. Private international gatherings are convened by nongovernmental or private agencies concerned with common problems and are not intended for governmental participation or public policy determination. They have little to do with official affairs, representation often is based on professional, functional or other similar criteria rather than on nationality, and the achievements of such meetings have no official relevance unless governmental sanction is overtly provided. Delegates may be artists, businessmen, churchmen, doctors, social workers, teachers, youth, and the like.[35]

The nature of the subject matter considered — category I of Table I — points up fundamental distinctions among wartime, peacemaking and peacetime conferences. The President has attended international gatherings in each of these categories. For example, the conferences Roosevelt and Truman held with the British Prime Minister and the Soviet Premier at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam illustrate the first type, and Woodrow Wilson's participation in the negotiation of the World War I peace treaties at Paris represents the second category. However, it should not be surprising that most presidential summit conferencing — actually 70 per cent (or as much as 90 per cent since World War II) — is of the third type.

Studies of diplomacy also differentiate conferences and meetings on the basis of the number of participants (bilateral, multilateral) — category E — or their periodicity (*ad hoc*, occasional, recurrent, periodic) — category L of Table I. In addition, they distinguish intergovernmental conferencing associated directly with established international organizations — such as the plenary and other sessions of the agencies and committees of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the seventy other major multipartite public international institutions with which the United States has affiliated.[36] By the mid-twentieth century, this

[35]Periodic compilations of nongovernmental conferences and meetings may be found in *World List of Future International Meetings*, prepared by the Library of Congress and published monthly by the Government Printing Office.

[36]In less than a century the United States has been affiliated with approximately 200 public international organizations of a permanent and continuing nature, and, including temporary and bilateral agencies, participated in well over 300 international organizations of various types during the decade ending with the termination of World War II. For early official lists, see Department of State, *International Agencies in Which the United States Participates* (1946) and *International Organizations in Which the United States Participates, 1949* (1950). Contemporary lists of international organizations in whose budgets the United States participates are to be found in the Secretary of State's annual reports entitled *United States Contributions to International Organizations*, published annually since 1953 by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

kind of deliberation accounted for the preponderant share of U.S. involvement in multilateral diplomacy. Whereas conference diplomacy in the international organization is primarily at the diplomatic and technical levels, since 1940 an increasing number of such forums have come to function regularly at the ministerial level. These, however, rarely constitute an instrument for summit conferencing.

Presidential conference participation has been principally, though by no means entirely, bilateral, and it has been largely *ad hoc,* although Roosevelt's convening with Churchill acquired the character of recurrence if not regularity during World War II. On rare occasions the President confers or deliberates with other heads of government at a periodically scheduled session of an international organization — illustrated by Dwight D. Eisenhower's attendance with other Western summit leaders at a North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris in December 1957, to energize Western unity and strength in the Cold War and to advance the cause of peace. Occasionally the President also meets personally outside the plenary chambers of the United Nations and the Organization of American States with foreign summit leaders who come to the United States to attend their sessions. Over a seventeen-day period in the autumn of 1960 — following the U-2 incident, the aborted Paris summit conference, and his curtailed Pacific tour — Eisenhower conferred individually with the heads of state or government of fourteen countries who assembled in New York at the time of the General Assembly's fifteenth session. In June 1967 Lyndon B. Johnson met at Glassboro, New Jersey, with Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, who came to the United States to address the United Nations, and for ten hours, according to the President, they discussed "respective goals and commitments."

During the Middle East crisis of 1958 — involving the difficulties in Lebanon and Jordan — President Eisenhower also negotiated with Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev and other leaders respecting the unique possibility of holding a session of the United Nations Security Council at the summit. For some four months, July to November, the negotiations progressed from a heads of government meeting "with the participation of the United Nations Secretary General" to a meeting of Great Power leaders as delegates to a regular session of the Security Council, to a special session of that agency functioning in extraordinary fashion under special rules so that "the goal will consist in the achievement of an agreement" rather than "the fixing of disagreement by the method of voting," and eventually back to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

original Soviet proposal of a special summit meeting. Failing to agree to any of these alternative procedures, however, the Big Four leaders decided to forgo a United Nations summit meeting and resorted rather to a special session of the General Assembly convened specifically to deal with the Middle East problem.[37]

To summarize, summit conferencing on a systematized basis, or within the agencies of established international organizations, still remains exceptional.[38] The President is likely to continue limiting his involvement largely to special occasions, associated either with some form of summit visit or presidential tour, or with a specially planned conference or meeting. On the other hand, ministerial-level diplomacy in fixed and continuing forums has been commonplace since World War II.

Anatomy of Presidential Conferencing

By and large, the discrimination of conference categories, while important to an analysis of international conferencing in general, bears only minor or tangential relevance to summit gatherings as a form of presidential diplomacy. The principal exception is the bilateral-multilateral distinguishment. Aside from this delineation, four principal criteria for differentiating types of summit conferencing involve the sophistication or formality of the gathering, the functional role played by the President, the purpose of the conference in terms of both final results and the fundamental intent of participants, and the degree of friendliness of the summit leaders and their governments — categories B, E, F, G, H and N of Table I.

Meaningful distinctions, therefore, may be drawn among the following gatherings: those which are bilateral or multilateral; which are in the nature of conferences as distinguished from meetings; in which the primary presidential role is ceremonial, discussive or negotiatory; which are oriented essentially to propaganda, sizing-up, intention-revealing or decision-making; and which involve friends as against those with adversaries. The use of some of these international conference types by the President is summarized statistically in Table II, and individually itemized in Table III (at end of article).

Presidential summit conferencing began with Theodore

[37]For analysis of these negotiations, see Elmer Plischke, "The Tortuous Road to the Summit, 1955-1960," English-Speaking Union Editorial Background Fact Sheet No. 9 (February 1961, processed). Also see Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958* (1962), pp. 993-1067.

[38]The Organization of African Unity is the first contemporary international organization to establish an "Assembly of Heads of State and Government" as a primary plenary facility scheduled to meet normally in annual session.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Roosevelt's indirect participation in the Portsmouth Conference during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Since that time, every President has become involved personally in conferences and meetings in some capacity; in the three and a half decades following the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt, the President has joined other world leaders in more than one hundred summit gatherings, currently averaging approximately four per year. In many ways the classic though exceptional example of presidential

TABLE II

PRESIDENTIAL PARTICIPATION IN SUMMIT CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS: SUMMARY BY SELECTED CATEGORIES

Years	President	Location		Number of Participants				Type of Gathering		Primary Presidential Role			Total	No. of Days
		United States[1]	Abroad	Bilateral	Trilateral[2]	Quadrilateral[3]	Multilateral	Meeting	Conference	Ceremonial	Discussion	Negotiation		
1789-1933	Pre-F. D. Roosevelt	4	2	3			3	2	4	3[4]	1	1	6	44[7]
1933-1945	Roosevelt	9[5]	12[5]	15	7		1	8	15	1	8	14	23	132
1945-1953	Truman	6	3	3	2		4	4	5	4	4	1	9	39
1953-1961	Eisenhower	20	15	28[6]	2	3	2	30	5	2	27	6	35	71
1961-1963	Kennedy	4	8	11			1	11	1		11	1	12	25
1963-1969	Johnson	6	16	19			3	20	2	6	14	2	22	44
TOTAL		49[5]	56[5]	79[6]	11	3	14	75	32	16[4]	65	25	107	355[7]

[1]Meetings held in Guam and Honolulu are regarded as being held in the United States.
[2]Includes World War II Big Three and postwar Western Big Three conferences.
[3]Includes postwar Western and East-West Big Four conferences and meetings.
[4]In addition, Theodore Roosevelt, though not a participant, played a mediatory role at Portsmouth Conference in 1905.
[5]Also two conferences and meetings held partly in the United States and partly in Canada.
[6]Includes, as separate items, President Eisenhower's 15 meetings with 14 heads of state and government at the time of the United Nations General Assembly session in 1960.
[7]This does not include the six months of negotiation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

involvement was Woodrow Wilson's attendance at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Extensive presidential conferencing emerged, however, only when the United States acquired the status of a leading world power during World War II. FDR assumed an enthusiastic role, engaging in twenty summit-level conferences and meetings in less than five years — many of which constituted what Secretary of State Acheson later called "military staff meetings at the highest levels."[39] On the other hand, Harry S. Truman, aside from exercising a ceremonial function at several international gatherings at which major commitments were negotiated, became involved in only three summit meetings and the Potsdam Conference, the latter concluding the historic World War II series of Big Three conclaves.

Eisenhower engaged extensively in summit conferencing: he varied the form of his participation, played less of a ceremonial role than his predecessor, and displayed the courage of venturing to two formal East-West four-power conferences with Kremlin leaders. This experiment was not repeated by John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, who nevertheless maintained a high level of involvement. Except for inter-American summit gatherings and the Seven-Nation Manila Conference of 1966, Kennedy and Johnson followed the practice of relying on the more personal and less formal styles of summit diplomacy. Richard M. Nixon is doing likewise and, barring a significant change in the international posture of the United States, the trend is likely to continue.

During the World War II years the President confined his conferences and meetings almost entirely to the leaders of five allies — Australia, Canada, China, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom — whereas since 1945 he has joined in conference diplomacy with the chiefs of state or government of some fifty countries. He has conferred most frequently with the British Prime Minister and, in addition to meeting with the Soviet Premier both in this country and abroad, has engaged in summit conferencing consistently with the leaders of neighboring Canada and Mexico and our European and Asian allies. Such conferences and meetings account for nearly three-fourths of the total; those involving East European, African, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, other than Mexico, are exceptional.

The President meets more frequently on an individual basis with the leader of a single country than in a multilateral conclave

[39]Acheson, "Meetings at the Summit: A Study in Diplomatic Method," *op. cit.*, p. 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

— category E of Table I. Approximately three-fourths of his participation is bilateral. Many such gatherings — nearly half of the total — flow from the visits of foreign leaders to the United States or are associated with presidential tours abroad. At times the elements of the summit visit predominate although serious discussion may also become an important accompaniment of ceremonial formalities. Usually the overriding purpose is to provide a distinct opportunity for summit-level discussion and consultation.

Examples of such bilateral meetings in the United States include the frequent visits of the President of Mexico, the Prime Ministers of Australia, Canada and Great Britain, and the Chancellor of West Germany. To these may be added the meetings with Premier Khrushchev at Camp David in 1959 and Premier Kosygin at Glassboro in 1967. On the other hand, when President Eisenhower went to Europe in the late summer of 1959, he engaged in a series of separate two-power meetings with the leaders of Great Britain, France, Italy and West Germany, and when President Johnson attended the Manila Conference in 1966, he not only participated in the multilateral deliberations at the conference table and met privately with the Philippine and Vietnamese leaders, but visited five other countries to confer bilaterally with their leaders.[40] Similarly, within three weeks of his inauguration, President Nixon decided to confer personally with our North Atlantic allies in Brussels, and also to visit Britain, France, Italy and West Germany to consult separately with their heads of government. Occasionally the President also participates in important bilateral conferences and meetings in "neutral" places, as when Roosevelt joined Churchill in Argentia Bay and at Casablanca, Quebec and Malta to discuss policy and strategy during World War II, or when Kennedy met with the British Prime Minister in the Bahamas and Bermuda to align political and strategic policy, and with Khrushchev at Vienna to exchange views on disarmament and the Berlin and Laotian questions.

Beyond this the President may engage personally in various types of multilateral gatherings. The more memorable three- and four-power conferences include the Big Three World War II conclaves at Cairo, Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam, the Western four-power gatherings with the leaders of Britain, France and West Germany since 1945, and the East-West four-power conferences. In addition, the President has joined in multilateral conferences

[40]These included Australia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand and Thailand.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in a negotiating capacity, as at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit meeting of 1957, the Seven-Nation Manila Conference of 1966, and several inter-American gatherings.[41] From time to time, also, he may attend multilateral international conferences purely in a ceremonial capacity, principally to welcome the negotiators if the conclave meets in the United States, to deliver an address at the commencement or termination of the deliberations, or to witness the signing of an important treaty.

One of the most difficult distinctions to draw respecting presidential conferencing is that based on formality, which differentiates summit "conferences" from summit "meetings"—categories B and N of Table I. Some gatherings are clearly informal, without careful advance preparations, and consist largely of discussion in an informal and unorganized forum. Others may be meticulously planned in advance, highly structured, and a good deal more formal. However, a great many lie between these extremes and, because these qualities are relative, individual conferences and meetings often are hard to classify.

Most frequently summit gatherings lack formal titles, although sometimes they are officially denominated, such as the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences of 1945, the Geneva and Paris Heads of Government Conferences of 1955 and 1960, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Meeting of Heads of Government of 1957, and the Manila Seven-Nation Conference of 1966. In its documentation the Department of State often assigns them unofficial designations — e.g., conferences, meetings, informal meetings, discussions, informal discussions,

[41]For compilations of documents pertaining to such summit conferences, see Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States,* particular volumes on *Paris Peace Conference, 1919,* 13 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1942-1947) and on the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, Malta and Yalta, and Berlin (Potsdam) (Washington: GPO, 1955, 1960, 1961); Department of State, *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955* (Washington: GPO, 1955); Department of State, *Background of Heads of Government Conference, 1960: Principal Documents, 1955-1959, With Narrative Summary* (Washington: GPO, 1960) and related documents of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1960); Department of State, *North Atlantic Treaty Organization Meeting of Heads of Government, Paris, December 1957* (Washington: GPO, 1958); U.S. Information Service, *Journey to the Pacific* (1966); Department of State, *The Promise of the New Asia: United States Policy in the Far East as Stated by President Johnson on His Pacific Journey* (Washington: GPO, 1966). Additional documents, including those on Western, inter-American and other summit conferences and meetings, may be found in *Department of State Bulletin* (weekly), *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955* (2 vols.), and *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,* volume for each calendar year since 1956 (Washington: GPO, since 1957). Also see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* since 1945 (Washington: GPO, since 1961).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

talks, informal talks, conversations. Except for those given the distinct designation "conference," by and large the rest may be classified as meetings. Over the years the President has participated in more than twice as many meetings as conferences, and since World War II the ratio is four to one.

In the postwar era, greater attention has been paid to the use of the terms conference and meeting, particularly with regard to the summit and ministerial levels of diplomacy, and certain generalizations have emerged. For example, after 1945 the term conference ceased to be used by the Department of State for gatherings or sessions of fixed or permanent diplomatic agencies, such as the organs of international institutions like the United Nations, the Organization of American States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They are uniformly called meetings.[42] In other words, the conference generally is *ad hoc* or, at most, it is occasional. Moreover, the State Department no longer uses the term conference for a bilateral conclave, as was the case with the wartime meetings of Roosevelt and Churchill; currently, to qualify as a conference, the gathering must be multilateral, involving three or more principal participants.

Distinguishment between conference and meeting also may be one of formality and sophistication of organization and procedure. The summit conference tends to be more highly planned, structured and managed. Advance preparation often includes negotiation respecting the subjects to be discussed, the compilation and sometimes the exchange of position papers and draft diplomatic instruments, and the fixing of ground rules, objectives and purposes. At the conference the delegations and the deliberation organization are highly structured, and greater attention may be given to keeping formalized conference and delegation records. Yet, summit conferences vary considerably as to each of these factors, and the Big Three conclaves during World War II intensified in certain respects as the series progressed, reaching their highest state of formality and complexity at Potsdam in 1945. Nevertheless, with few exceptions, such as the peace treaty

[42]A major exception has been the Inter-American Conference, the primary, plenary agency of the Organization of American States after 1948, which, prior to the adoption of its Charter, consisted of eight "regularized" gatherings, between 1889 and 1947, called International Conferences of American States, and a series of additional "special" inter-American conferences. Charter amendments approved at Buenos Aires in 1967 and ratified early in 1970 converted the Inter-American Conference into a General Assembly, thus eliminating the term conference from its title and bringing OAS terminology into line with general contemporary practice.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

negotiations in 1919, the summit conference rarely reaches the degree of procedural and organizational style characteristic of a major international conference at the traditional diplomatic level.[43]

When conferences at the summit are virtually indistinguishable from the more sophisticated summit meetings, the principal though by no means definitive gauge of differentiation is that, except for the bilateral Roosevelt-Churchill negotiations during World War II, the conferences usually are multilateral. Moreover, as a group they tend to be more highly organized, more hierarchically structured and more formal in procedure than are the summit meetings. A general rule is that, when the gathering is multilateral and *ad hoc,* when the President is accompanied by a negotiating team (in addition to advisers and other servicing officials), and when the principals defer matters to such delegation members for further discussion, refinement, agreement or phrasing, so that the deliberations take on the character of parallel plenary and subsidiary sessions, the gathering possesses the stature of a conference.[44]

So far as the primary presidential role is concerned – category F of Table I – occasionally the President participates in a limited

[43]For a detailed analysis of the technical problems related to the preparation for, organization of, and conduct during international conferences, undertaken to serve as the basis for codifying conference procedure, see Pastuhov, *op. cit.* Also see Dunn, *op. cit.;* Hill, *op. cit.;* Moulton, *op. cit.;* O'Davoran, *op. cit.;* Plischke, *Conduct of American Diplomacy,* third edition, Chapter 16; and Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice,* fourth edition, pp. 305-314.

[44]Another rule of thumb, perhaps more applicable to lower levels of conferencing, is that, if an independent conference secretariat (as distinct from delegation secretariats) is designated to service the gathering, it is in the nature of a conference.

Whether the principals at a summit gathering present or exchange "full powers" appears to be irrelevant to this analysis. The full power is an official document, signed by the President, authorizing the negotiation and signing of a treaty or agreement for the United States. It is not required practice to present full powers for discussions and negotiations that do not result in the consummation and signing of such formal commitments. For this purpose a "note of accreditation" (sometimes simply called "credentials") suffices. An official written communication that becomes a part of the official records, the latter may variously be signed by the President, the Secretary of State, or some other authorized official, depending on the particular circumstances.

Inasmuch as summit conferencing involves chiefs of state and government, in whom reposes ultimate responsibility for deputing authority to consult, negotiate and sign on behalf of the government, notes of accreditation would be redundant. Moreover, it is now accepted practice that no full power is submitted or exchanged, even if the end product is a formal treaty—in the sense of U.S. constitutional procedure—and is subscribed to *ad referendum,* as was the case with President Wilson's signing of the Versailles Treaty. In recent years governments also have ceased requiring the full power for foreign ministers.

The existence or absence of the full power, or note of accreditation, does not determine whether the gathering is a conference or a meeting.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ceremonial capacity at either a bilateral or a multilateral gathering, as indicated earlier. Thus Warren G. Harding welcomed the negotiators to Washington at the commencement of the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in 1921. This was the first important multilateral conference hosted by the United States, other than the initial inter-American conference, which met in Washington in 1889. Calvin Coolidge sailed for Havana to address the Inter-American Conference of 1928, undertaking the first presidential venture of the kind. Similarly, Truman personally addressed four gatherings, each of which produced a major treaty — at San Francisco (United Nations Charter, 1945), Rio de Janeiro (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947), Washington (North Atlantic Treaty, 1949) and San Francisco (Treaty of Peace with Japan, 1951). At times the President also confers with the leaders of Canada and Mexico when he meets with them primarily to engage in a joint ceremony, such as dedicating the Falcon Dam in Mexico (1953), implementing the treaty to develop the Columbia River Basin (1964), laying the cornerstone at Roosevelt-Campobello International Park (1966), and commemorating at Juarez the transfer of El Chamizal to Mexico (1967).

Official publications and the press variously describe other forms of the presidential role in summit conferencing as discussions, conversations, conferring, exchanges of views, or just plain "talks" — all of which denote face-to-face oral communication. As methods of presidential involvement in diplomacy, they entail the presentation of policy positions and views, listening to the interests of other summit leaders, a mutual endeavor to gain acceptance of such explications, and, perhaps, an attempt to achieve an adjustment or an accommodation of interests.

On the other hand, the concept of "negotiations" — which may be in writing as well as oral — connotes engagement in international intercourse with a view to coming to terms or arriving at understanding and agreement via the bargaining process. Serving as a vehicle for consummating mutual decision, it has a more precise, and often a more important, objective than the other forms of the presidential role. In practice the President is less personally concerned with formal negotiations than with discussion and conferring, because negotiation normally is not his proper function. It is time consuming and may entail haggling over minute detail, and it allows him little ultimate ratification

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flexibility. Nevertheless, at times the President approximates functioning in this capacity, as was the case with Roosevelt and Truman at the World War II conferences, Eisenhower at the four-power Western and East-West summit gatherings, and Johnson at the Manila Conference. The unparallelled experience of this nature, however, was President Wilson's protracted capacity as negotiator at Paris in 1919.[45]

The character of the summit conference or meeting may be influenced by the way in which it happens to progress or the consequences that follow — entirely aside from the original aim of the participants. As related to objective and intent, the role of the President may serve one of four basic functions — propaganda, sizing-up, intention-revealing or decision-making — category G of Table I. Because they are widely publicized, summit gatherings enjoy unusual propaganda potentialities, and all summit conferences and meetings have some propaganda effect. The very fact that the President engages personally in an international gathering, whether to negotiate, to confer, or simply to address the conferees or observe a signing ceremony, focuses widespread attention on the assemblage and, therefore, imbues it with special public appeal and importance. Roosevelt's wartime meetings with Churchill, Stalin and other anti-Axis leaders commanded considerable propaganda value among the Axis powers and the neutrals as well as the allies. In general the presidential ceremonial function at an international gathering is directed toward public relations benefits.

Attention on the summit conference or meeting may be manipulated to attain a specific propaganda advantage, such as conveying an aura of united purpose among allies or a willingness to resolve their differences. In the case of an East-West meeting, presidential participation may be portrayed as representing the desire to reduce tensions or as willingness to discuss issues at the highest level with an adversary. When it becomes apparent to the summit leaders that propaganda is a primary objective, however, mutual confidence and forthrightness are apt to suffer; genuine negotiation, to say nothing of accommodation on serious issues, is then all but impossible, so that long-range results are bound to be

[45]The Paris Peace Conference lasted approximately six months. By comparison the Peace Congress of Westphalia ran for more than three years (with nearly five years of preparatory negotiations), the Congress of Utrecht required 14 months to fulfill its task, and the Congress of Vienna similarly lasted 14 months. More recently, the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 took almost ten years to consummate, and the Korean Armistice was under deliberation for two years.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

negligible and the consequence may be merely an amorphous and short-lived "spirit."

In all probability, comparable or even greater propaganda and image-enhancing value may be achieved for all parties by the well planned and advertised summit visit. Much the same may be said of the meeting designed to afford summit leaders an opportunity to gauge one another, or, put in terms of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Vienna meeting, to "measure" each other. The summit visit often is used for these purposes, as evidenced by the large number of ranking leaders seeking to come to Washington or pressing for presidential visits to foreign lands following the inauguration of a new President. When the visit to one or the other capital is inconvenient, impolitic or impossible, the meeting may be arranged in a neutral place.[46]

More valuable to the cause of diplomatic purpose, however, are those summit meetings and conferences which serve as a vehicle for mutual intention-revelation. Gatherings designed to provide a forum for "a general exchange of views" presume the President's expectation of influencing other leaders to recognize his sincerity regarding the matters addressed, to understand his views, to accommodate to them, or to adjust differences in order to avert confrontation and conflict.

When such deliberations produce decisive determinations — in which issues are settled, differences or controversies are resolved, joint judgments are arrived at, mutually acceptable conclusions are drawn, or understandings and agreements are achieved — they enter the higher realm of decision-making. The results of this process may be written or unwritten—category K of Table I—and may vary from exchanged assurances acknowledging willingness to undertake further negotiations, to commitment regarding matters of procedure or substantive principle, and occasionally even to accepting and signing previously negotiated formal agreements.

[46]To the end of the Johnson Administration there were more than 500 summit visits to the United States, of which all but 23 postdate the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt in 1933; in the 1960's they averaged between 25 and 30 per year. On the other hand, the President has traveled abroad more than 50 times since Theodore Roosevelt first ventured to Panama in 1906. Whereas the President is received in formal state visits only rarely by foreign governments, two out of every five presidential trips abroad involve participation in international conferences and meetings; the rest, except for an occasional vacation trip, constitute tours to a series of foreign countries or individual informal visits to the capitals of other governments. For additional discussion, see Plischke, *Summit Diplomacy,* Chapter 5, and "Recent State Visits to the United States—A Technique of Summit Diplomacy," *World Affairs Quarterly,* October 1958, pp. 223-255. Also see Historical Office, Department of State, *List of Visits of Presidents of the United States to Foreign Countries* and *List of Visits of Foreign Chiefs of State and Heads of Government to the United States,* published periodically (processed).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Inasmuch as the propaganda, sizing-up, intention-revealing and decision-making roles are highly interrelated in the diplomatic process, often to the point of inseparability, it is difficult to place most summit conferences and meetings precisely within one or another of these categories. On balance, however, it may be said that the President is not apt to regard propaganda as his primary objective, and certainly not as his stated purpose, even though he would acknowledge its importance. Some presidential engagement is avowedly for sizing-up purposes, but this function is more frequently served by summit visits and tours. Many "summit meetings" are undertaken by the President with the objective of intention-revealing; the "summit conference," on the other hand, appears to lend itself more appropriately to decision-making through informal and formal negotiation.

Most presidential summit conferencing is with friends, or at least with "non-enemies"— category H of Table I. Because the international environment is competitive, it may be argued that whenever governments differ markedly on issues of substance, especially in a conflict of vital interests, they become negotiatory adversaries and, therefore, engage overwhelmingly in adversary diplomacy. Nevertheless, the term is more properly restricted to the relations of governments which are committed antagonists. In this sense, Roosevelt's wartime summit conferences with Stalin — despite serious disagreement over many important issues — involved conferring and negotiation with an anti-Axis ally; in many respects the President's task was less unpropitious and hazardous than in certain other summit negotiations although, admittedly, this is a matter of degree.

The East-West summit conferences and meetings following the commencement of the Cold War epitomized presidential involvement in adversary diplomacy. Such gatherings differ from those with more amicably-disposed powers in basic attitudes, negotiation preconditions and results. For years following World War II, the President was reluctant to meet personally with the leaders of the Kremlin. Secretary of State Acheson pointed out the irrationality of negotiating with a country seeking one's own destruction when, in 1950, he said: "The one difference which is just about impossible to negotiate is someone's desire to eliminate your existence altogether."[47] On a number of occasions the United States emphasized that the Soviet Union needed to demonstrate its willingness to improve relations, not only by words, but by acts of

[47] *Department of State Bulletin,* June 26, 1950, p. 1039.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

good faith, before the trust necessary to justify negotiations was warranted.

For some years the preconditions to meeting at the summit, specified by both the President and Soviet leaders, often were unreasonable. However, the United States also stressed three basic and reasonable preconditions, namely, that adequate diplomatic preparation be undertaken beforehand, that an acceptable agenda be agreed to, and that creditable assurance be given that the conference could be productive.

While these three conditions normally are taken for granted, and are applicable to international conferencing in general, they proved to be impediments to an East-West gathering until it became apparent that the Big Four possessed the will to regard them, as well as selected substantive issues, as negotiable. Unless governments possess sufficient mutual trust and harbor a disposition to render issues genuinely negotiable — which is always difficult to achieve in the relations of major adversary powers respecting their vital interests — serious negotiation for productive purposes is impossible.

In the end, despite the hazards, President Eisenhower succumbed to the lure of summit conferencing with Kremlin leaders in formal East-West four-power conferences in 1955 and 1960. At Geneva the heads of government devoted themselves to such broad but sensitive and important issues as the reunification of Germany, European geopolitical stability and security, disarmament, and the development of contacts between East and West. Many proposals were introduced, but few were discussed in depth and, therefore, remained unnegotiated. The much-heralded conclave produced little more than a short-lived "Geneva spirit" and a determination to turn certain matters over to the foreign ministers for further negotiation. Whether originally intended or not, the four leaders consciously galvanized global attention on their deliberations and each used the conference for propaganda purposes.[48]

[48]See Eubank, *The Summit Conferences, 1919-1960,* especially pp. 158-159. That Eisenhower was sensitive to the public relations aspects of the Geneva conference in 1955 is attested to by the fact that James C. Hagerty, his White House Press Secretary, was appointed one of the nine members of his official delegation. See Plischke, *Summit Diplomacy: Personal Diplomacy of the President of the United States,* p. 100. When Hagerty accompanied the President to the Paris North Atlantic Summit Meeting in 1957, he was designated as an "adviser," of which there were 17, not as one of the four members of the official delegation. Similarly, he was one of half a dozen "advisers" to the President at the Paris Summit Conference in 1960. While it is customary for the President to be accompanied to such gatherings by his press secretary, it is most unusual to accredit him as one of the principals on the negotiating team.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The four-power Paris Summit Conference, five years later, was more newsworthy and even less productive. Preluded by the U-2 incident — which occurred just two weeks before the Big Four convened — and the incredible way in which the matter was mishandled in Soviet-American relations, the gathering proved to be less of a conference than a Khrushchev-Eisenhower confrontation. The Soviet Premier demanded an apology from the President, as well as a guaranty that the U-2 overflights would be discontinued and a promise that those responsible for the flights would be punished. Then, holding that these demands were not fully met, he refused to take his place at the discussion table and resorted to bluster, threats and emotional propagandizing.

Khrushchev demeaned the East-West summit conference as a method of diplomacy, so that in the 1960's succeeding Presidents switched to other forums — to formal conferencing at lower levels and to less formal bilateral Soviet-American summit meetings, such as those at Vienna and Glassboro, where the objectives were more patently intention-revealing than decision-making, and the avowed primary role of the President was discussion rather than negotiation.

Conclusions

It may be concluded that within a single generation presidential involvement in summit conferencing has become a widely-used technique of diplomacy. Presidents vary the intensity and form of their participation in accordance with their personalities, the political support they command at home and the status of their image abroad, the acuteness of the international differences they need to discuss and resolve, the degree of their willingness to work out problems and adjust differences personally, and, sometimes, the pressures imposed upon them by other world leaders to deal at the highest level in particular ways.

Perhaps every summit conference and meeting may be said to accomplish something. The question is whether more may be achieved by other forms of summit diplomacy — presidential written communications, the dispatching of special emissaries, or the summit visit — or by resorting to other levels of diplomacy. Adjudgment of the importance and value of each summit gathering relates not only to the readily identifiable results, but also to the longer-range benefits, and especially to the objectives that motivate the President and other nations' leaders.

Much criticism of "summit diplomacy" is really meant for the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"summit conference"— as distinguished from other forms of diplomacy at the summit — and even more precisely for presidential face-to-face participation in adversary negotiations, particularly with the leaders of the Kremlin. Reflecting this view early in his administration, Eisenhower reportedly informed his Cabinet in July 1953 that "This idea of the President of the United States going personally abroad to negotiate — it's just damn stupid. Every time a President has gone abroad to get into the details of these things, he's lost his shirt."[49] Yet, two years later he was to meet with Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev at Geneva, and in the meantime he attended the Bermuda Conference to confer with Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Joseph Laniel of France, and met individually in Washington with the president or prime minister of more than two dozen countries.

The doubts that have arisen appear not to concern summit conferencing per se, whether in this country or abroad, but rather presidential involvement at the international conference table with powerful antagonists, to bargain in depth over important issues which concern national interests, without appropriate diplomatic preparation. Less skepticism and criticism greeted the more informal meetings of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson with the Soviet Premier at Vienna and Glassboro. Serious questioning of summit conferencing thus would seem to be directed at the President's participation as a negotiator in a formal conclave with an adversary, especially if it is played up in the mass media, so that popular expectations are high and productive consequences, at best, are uncertain.

On evidence, the summit conference or meeting has become a vital part of the diplomatic practice of the United States. Contemporary international relations, often requiring rapid and significant accommodation, appear to justify negotiation at the highest level as an occasional supplement to the administration of foreign affairs through other forms of diplomacy. Much may be accomplished if the gathering is judiciously planned and wisely employed. In view of the protracted Wilsonian negotiations at Paris and Eisenhower's disappointing and unproductive experiences at Geneva and Paris, however, it may reasonably be expected that presidential participation in a formal negotiation concerning extensive, complex and sensitive problems, or in highly-advertised conferences with avowed adversaries, will be ex-

[49]Emmet J. Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power* (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 151.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ceptional. Summit conferences and meetings are bound to be resorted to more freely among friendly powers, but even in East-West relations they could bear significant fruit if they were sagaciously handled and the participants were sincere in mutually desiring to adjust their differences and achieve better understanding respecting negotiable issues.

The summit gathering is by no means a panacea for the international problems of the contemporary world. On the other hand, history has not disproven that it may help to resolve or ameliorate some of these problems. In any case, it needs to be employed sparingly, lest it lose its impact. It cannot be permitted to become a fetish or to merit attention as an end in itself.[50]

[50]For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of summit conferencing, see Eubank, *The Summit Conferences, 1919-1960,* Chapter 15, and Plischke, *Summit Diplomacy: Personal Diplomacy of the President of the United States,* pp. 90-101 and Chapter 7. For a general evaluation of conference diplomacy, also see Kertesz, *The Quest for Peace Through Diplomacy,* Chapter 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE III

PRESIDENTIAL PARTICIPATION IN SUMMIT CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS
TABLE OF SELECTED STATISTICS

President	Date	No. of Days	Location	Major Identification	No. of Partici-pants*	Countries Participating	Type of Gathering		Presidential Role		
							Meet-ing	Confer-ence	Cere-monial	Discus-sion	Nego-tiating
T. Roosevelt	Aug. 1905	15	Portsmouth, N.H.	Russo-Japanese Peace Conf.	2	Japan-Russia		X	**		
Wilson	Dec. 1918-June 1919	6 mos.	Paris	World War I Peace Conf.	M			X			X
Harding	Nov. 1921	1	Washington	Naval Disarm-ament Conf.	M			X	X		
	Nov. 1921	18	Washington	Harding-Briand Meeting	2	U.S.-France	X		X		
Coolidge	Jan. 1928	3	Havana	Inter-American Conf.	M			X	X		
Hoover	Oct. 1929	7	Washington & Rapidan Camp, Va.	Hoover-Macdon-ald Meeting	2	U.S.-Britain	X			X	
F. D. Roosevelt	Apr. 1933	8	Washington	Roosevelt-Mac-donald-Bennett Meeting	3	U.S.-Canada-U.K.	X			X	
	Nov.-Dec. 1936	3	Buenos Aires	Inter-American Conf.	M			X	X		
	Aug. 1940	1	Washington	Roosevelt-McKenzie King Meeting[1]	2	U.S.-Canada	X				X
	Apr. 1941	3	Washington & Hyde Park	Roosevelt-McKenzie King Meeting	2	U.S.-Canada	X			X	
	May 1941	2	Washington	Roosevelt-	2	U.S.-Australia	X			X	

Aug. 19[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] (Newfoundland)	[illegible]	[illegible]					
Dec. 1941-Jan. 1942	13	Washington	Arcadia Conf. (1st Washington)	2	U.S.-U.K.		X		X
Dec. 1941	(3)	Washington	Arcadia Conf.[2]	3	U.S.-Canada-U.K.		X		X
June 1942	7	Washington & Hyde Park	2nd Washington Conf.	2	U.S.-U.K.		X		X
Jan. 1943	13	Casablanca	Casablanca Conf.	2	U.S.-U.K.		X		X
May 1943	16	Washington	Trident Conf. (3rd Washington)	2	U.S.-U.K.		X		X
May 1943	(4)	Washington	Trident Conf.[3]	3	U.S.-Canada-U.K.		X		X
Aug. 1943	4	Hyde Park	Quadrant Conf. (1st Quebec)[4]	2	U.S.-U.K.		X		X
Aug. 1943	9	Quebec & Ottawa	Quadrant Conf.[4]	2	U.S.-U.K.		X		X
Sept. 1943	12	Washington & Hyde Park	Quadrant Conf.[4]	2	U.S.-U.K.		X		X
Nov. 1943	5	Cairo	1st Cairo Conf.	3	U.S.-China-U.K.		X		X
Nov.-Dec. 1943	6	Tehran	Tehran Conf.	3	U.S.-U.K.-USSR		X		X
Nov. 1943	(1)	Tehran	Roosevelt-Shah of Iran Meeting[5]	2	U.S.-Iran	X		X	

*"M" indicates multilateral gathering of more than four participants; countries participating are not listed.

**Although President Roosevelt was not a participant, he played an important role at the Portsmouth Conference.

[1]Ogdensburg Agreement was signed August 18, 1940.

[2]Tripartite conference convened, December 26-28, during the Roosevelt-Churchill Arcadia Conference, December 22-28 and January 1-6.

[3]Tripartite conference convened, May 18-21, during the Roosevelt-Churchill Trident Conference, May 11-26.

[4]These are three segments of a single conference.

[5]This meeting, on November 30, was held during the Tehran Conference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE III (Continued)

President	Date	No. of Days	Location	Major Identification	No. of Participants*	Countries Participating	Type of Gathering		Presidential Role		
							Meeting	Conference	Ceremonial	Discussion	Negotiating
	Dec. 1943	6	Cairo	2nd Cairo Conf.	3	U.S.-Turkey-U.K.		X			X
	Sept. 1944	9	Quebec & Hyde Park	Octagon Conf. (2nd Quebec)	2	U.S.-U.K.		X			X
	Feb. 1945	1	Malta	Malta Conf.	2	U.S.-U.K.		X		X	
	Feb. 1945	9	Yalta	Yalta Conf.	3	U.S.-U.K.-USSR		X			X
	Feb. 1945	1	Cairo	Roosevelt-King Farouk Meeting[6]	2	U.S.-Egypt	X			X	
	Feb. 1945	1	Cairo	Roosevelt-Emperor Haile Selassie Meeting[6]	2	U.S.-Ethiopia	X			X	
	Feb. 1945	1	Cairo	Roosevelt-King Ibn Saud Meeting[6]	2	U.S.-Saudi Arabia	X			X	
Truman	June 1945	1	San Francisco	San Francisco Conf. (UN Charter)	M			X	X		
	July 1945	17	Potsdam	Potsdam (Berlin) Conf.	3	U.S.-U.K.-USSR		X			X
	Aug. 1945	1	Plymouth	Truman-King George VI Meeting	2	U.S.-U.K.	X			X	
	Nov. 1945	6	Washington	Atomic Energy Meeting	3	U.S.-Canada-U.K.	X			X	
	Sept. 1947	1	Rio de Janeiro	Rio Conf.	M			X	X		
	Apr. 1949	1	Washington	NATO Treaty	M			X	X		

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

				Meeting							
	Sept. 1951	1	San Francisco	Japanese Peace Conf.	M			X	X		
	May 1952	6	Washington	Truman-Menzies Meeting	2	U.S.-Australia	X			X	
Eisenhower	Dec. 1952	1	New York	Eisenhower-Menzies Meeting	2	U.S.-Australia	X			X	
	Oct. 1953	1	Mexico (Falcon Dam)	Eisenhower-Cortines Meeting	2	U.S.-Mexico	X		X		
	Dec. 1953	5	Bermuda (Tuckers Town)	Bermuda Conf.	3	U.S.-France-U.K.		X			X
	July 1955	6	Geneva	Geneva Summit Conf.	4	U.S.-France-U.K.-USSR		X			X
	Jan.-Feb. 1956	5	Washington	Eisenhower-Eden Meeting	2	U.S.-U.K.	X				X
	Mar. 1956	3	White Sulphur Springs, W. Va.	Eisenhower-Cortines-St. Laurent Meeting	3	U.S.-Canada-Mexico	X			X	
	July 1956	3	Panama	Conf. of Presidents of American Republics	M			X			X
	Mar. 1957	4	Bermuda (Tuckers Town)	Bermuda Meeting	2	U.S.-U.K.	X			X	
	Oct. 1957	3	Washington	Eisenhower-Macmillan Meeting	2	U.S.-U.K.	X			X	
	Dec. 1957	3	Paris	NATO Heads of Government Meeting	M		X			X	
	Feb. 1959	2	Acapulco	Eisenhower-Mateos Meeting	2	U.S.-Mexico	X			X	

[6]These three meetings at Great Bitter Lake, Suez Canal, were held on the same day, February 14, following the adjournment of the Yalta Conference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE III (Continued)

President	Date	No. of Days	Location	Major Identification	No. of Participants*	Countries Participating	Type of Gathering		Presidential Role		
							Meeting	Conference	Ceremonial	Discussion	Negotiating
	June 1959	1	Montreal	Eisenhower-Queen Elizabeth Meeting[7]	2	U.S.-U.K.	X		X		
	Aug. 1959	2	Bonn	Eisenhower-Adenauer Meeting	2	U.S.-Germany	X			X	
	Aug.-Sept. 1959	7	London, Balmoral, & Chequers	Eisenhower-Macmillan & Queen Elizabeth Meeting	2	U.S.-U.K.	X			X	
	Sept. 1959	3	Paris	Eisenhower-deGaulle Meeting	2	U.S.-France	X			X	
	Sept. 1959	(1)	Paris	Eisenhower-Segni Meeting[8]	2	U.S.-Italy	X			X	
	Sept. 1959	4	Washington & Camp David	Eisenhower-Khrushchev Meeting	2	U.S.-USSR	X			X	
	Dec. 1959	3	Paris	Western Four-Power Summit Conf.	4	U.S.-France-Germany-U.K.		X			X
	May 1960	5	Paris	Paris Summit Conf.	4	U.S.-France-U.K.-USSR		X			X
	Sept.-Oct. 1960	9	New York	(General Assembly 15th Session)	2	Series of 15 bilateral meetings with 14 other leaders[9]	X			X	
	Oct. 1960	1	Ciudad Acuna	Eisenhower-Mateos Meeting	2	U.S.-Mexico	X			X	

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kennedy	Mar. 1961	1	Key West, Fla.	Kennedy-Macmillan Meeting	2	U.S.-U.K.	X			X	
	June 1961	2	Vienna	Kennedy-Khrushchev Meeting [10]	2	U.S.-USSR	X			X	
	June 1961	2	London	Kennedy-Macmillan Meeting	2	U.S.-U.K.	X			X	
	Sept. 1961	1	New York	Kennedy-Sihanouk Meeting	2	U.S.-Cambodia	X			X	
	Dec. 1961	2	Bermuda (Hamilton)	Kennedy-Macmillan Meeting	2	U.S.-U.K.	X			X	
	Dec. 1961	1	Palm Beach, Fla.	Kennedy-Frondizi Meeting	2	U.S.-Argentina	X			X	
	Sept. 1962	1	Newport, R. I.	Kennedy-Ayub Khan Meeting	2	U.S.-Pakistan	X			X	
	Dec. 1962	4	Bahamas (Nassau)	Kennedy-Macmillan Meeting	2	U.S.-U.K.	X			X	
	Mar. 1963	3	San Jose, Costa Rica	Central American Presidents Conf. [11]	M			X			X
	June 1963	4	Bonn (Berlin, etc.)	Kennedy-Adenauer Meeting	2	U.S.-Germany	X			X	
	June 1963	2	Birch Grove (Britain)	Kennedy-Macmillan Meeting	2	U.S.-U.K.	X			X	

[7]Ceremony to open St. Lawrence Seaway.
[8]This separate bilateral meeting was held during the period of Eisenhower's meeting with de Gaulle.
[9]Eisenhower met separately with the following heads of government: Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Nepal, Nigeria, Togo, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. He met twice with the British Prime Minister. Although they were also present, he did not meet with the leaders of Albania, Cuba, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.
[10]Kennedy also was received in a four-day state visit in Paris during which he met and conferred with de Gaulle.
[11]The six Central American republics and the United States were represented.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE III (Continued)

President	Date	No. of Days	Location	Major Identification	No. of Participants*	Countries Participating	Type of Gathering		Presidential Role		
							Meeting	Conference	Ceremonial	Discussion	Negotiating
	July 1963	2	Rome & Naples	Kennedy-Segni Meeting[12]	2	U.S.-Italy	X			X	
Johnson	Sept. 1964	1	Vancouver	Johnson-Pearson Meeting[13]	2	U.S.-Canada	X		X		
	Feb. 1966	3	Honolulu	Johnson-Vietnamese Leaders Meeting	2	U.S.-Viet Nam	X			X	
	Apr. 1966	2	Mexico City	Johnson-Diaz Ordaz Meeting[14]	2	U.S.-Mexico	X		X		
	Aug. 1966	2	Campobello Island	Johnson-Pearson Meeting[15]	2	U.S.-Canada	X		X		
	Oct. 1966	2	Wellington	Johnson-Holyoake Meeting[16]	2	U.S.-New Zealand	X			X	
	Oct. 1966	4	Canberra & other cities	Johnson-Holt Meeting[16]	2	U.S.-Australia	X			X	
	Oct. 1966	3	Manila	Seven-Nation Manila Conf.[16]	M			X			X
	Oct. 1966	4	Bangkok	Johnson-King & Premier Meeting[16]	2	U.S.-Thailand	X			X	
	Oct. 1966	2	Kuala Lumpur	Johnson-Monarch & Prime Minister Meeting[16]	2	U.S.-Malaysia	X			X	
	Oct.-Nov. 1966	3	Seoul	Johnson-Park Meeting[16]	2	U.S.-Korea	X			X	
	Dec. 1966	1	Ciudad Acuna	Johnson-Diaz Ordaz Meeting[17]	2	U.S.-Mexico	X		X		
	Mar. 1967	2	Guam	Johnson-Thieu & K. Meeting	2	U.S.-Viet N	X			X	

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Apr. 1967	3	Punta del Este	Summit Conf. of American Presidents	M			X		X
May 1967	1	Ottawa & Montreal	Johnson-Pearson Meeting[18]	2	U.S.-Canada	X		X	
June 1967	2	Glassboro, N. J.	Johnson-Kosygin Meeting	2	U.S.-USSR	X		X	
Oct. 1967	1	Ciudad Juarez	Johnson-Diaz Ordaz Meeting	2	U.S.-Mexico	X	X		
Dec. 1967	1	Pakistan	Johnson-Ayub Khan Meeting[19]	2	U.S.-Pakistan	X		X	
Dec. 1967	1	Rome	Johnson-President and Premier Meeting[19]	2	U.S.-Italy	X		X	
Apr. 1968	2	Honolulu	Johnson-Park Meeting	2	U.S.-Korea	X		X	
July 1968	1	El Salvador	Central American Presidents Meeting	M		X		X	
July 1968	2	Honolulu	Johnson-Thieu Meeting	2	U.S.-Viet Nam	X		X	
Dec. 1968	1	El Paso, Tex.	Johnson-Diaz Ordaz Meeting[20]	2	U.S.-Mexico	X	X		

[12]Kennedy also met with Pope Paul and with NATO officials.
[13]Ceremonies related to Columbia River Treaty.
[14]Ceremony involved dedication of Lincoln statue.
[15]Ceremony to lay cornerstone at Roosevelt-Campobello International Park.
[16]On his journey to the Pacific to attend the Manila Conference, Johnson was en route 17 days, 14 of which were spent in the countries listed as entries in this table. The total of days indicated in the table, numbering 18, represents the full and partial days spent in each place, and therefore it is inconsistent with the actual total. The latter is reflected accurately in Table II. While on this tour, Johnson also stopped off at Hawaii, Samoa and Alaska, and from Manila he made a side trip to Viet Nam to visit with American forces. Although the President's main objectives were to attend the Manila Conference and confer bilaterally with the leaders of our Asian allies, his reception in New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Korea also possessed much of the character of a summit visit.
[17]Included visit to Almstead Dam site.
[18]Also attended EXPO 67.
[19]These meetings were held at stopover points on the President's return from attending the funeral of Prime Minister Holt of Australia. Johnson also met with Pope Paul in Rome.
[20]To celebrate opening of President Adolfo Lopez Mateo Channel of the Rio Grande River.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE IRAQI REVOLUTION: A CASE STUDY OF ARMY RULE

by Phebe Ann Marr

THE 1967 war and the escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict have temporarily eclipsed a more fundamental conflict in the Middle East which is dividing the area as profoundly as the rift between Arabs and Jews. This is the conflict between divergent models of modernization and, at a deeper level, between the systems of values with which they are associated. Opposed are the evolutionary "capitalist-oriented" model, usually with its accompanying values of liberal democracy and a relatively open political society, and the revolutionary "socialist" model, in which the army serves as the vehicle of rapid change and the ideal is centralized state control over society. While neither model exists in pure form, both exhibit distinctive tendencies. The outcome of the conflict between them, far more than the Arab-Israeli struggle, will determine the political future of the countries of the Middle East.

For the past decade and a half the trend in the Middle East has been toward revolutionary regimes. A succession of governments in the Arab world has been toppled by military coup: those of Egypt in 1952, Iraq in 1958, Syria between 1958 and 1963,[1] Yemen in 1962, the Sudan in 1958 and again in 1969, and Libya in 1969. The success of these military regimes in establishing viable political structures and the degree to which they are able to legitimatize their authority and fulfill a moderate measure of the social and economic aspirations of their people, will determine the pace as well as the direction of this trend in the future.

Iraq is a key country in this process. Since its establishment in 1920, it has exercised a powerful influence over the rest of the Arab world, partly because of its strategic position as the only Arab state bordering on two powerful non-Arab neighbors, Turkey and Iran, and on a major sea artery, the Persian Gulf, and partly because of its oil resources, which give it economic independence and a voice in international councils. Under strong leadership,

[1]Syria actually had its first military coup in 1949, but later returned to civilian rule. Between 1958 and 1961 it was united with Egypt under a military regime. In 1963, after another civilian period, it returned to military rule by way of a Ba'thist coup.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iraq, along with Egypt, its major rival and competitor, has been a center of power and a chief determiner of policy for the Middle East. More than this, since the military coup in 1958, Iraq has become a case study for governments in the area regarding what can and cannot be accomplished by revolutionary means.

The Iraqi experience has particular relevance in this respect.[2] Despite its social and political difficulties, which most other Arab countries share, Iraq has a number of assets. Considerable economic resources free it from many pressures facing its less fortunate neighbors. Its oil revenues provide steady income for investment in long-range projects as well as critical foreign exchange for imports. Its river systems, when properly harnessed, can support agricultural production sufficient both to feed the populace and to allow for the export of cash crops. Moreover, it is underpopulated and does not yet suffer from problems of acute unemployment or underemployment. If any country should be able to make a success of its revolution, it would seem to be Iraq.

Thus far this has not been the case. Today, almost thirteen years after a small group of army officers swept into office on a wave of popular sentiment and with good intentions, Iraq is afflicted with chronic political instability, deepening economic stagnation and growing despair among wide segments of the population. Not only has the revolutionary government failed to implement a number of its announced reforms, but it appears to be losing the power and administrative capacity to do so. Relations between the two major Muslim religious communities, the Sunnis and the Shi'ah, have deteriorated, while the large Kurdish minority was, until recently, in rebellion. The Development Board, which under the monarchy allocated 70 per cent of oil revenues to long-range projects, has been dismantled; few new projects have been initiated since 1958. The land reform program, allegedly a major accomplishment of the revolution, removed the landed classes from power and expropriated vast areas of land, but it has not succeeded in redistributing most of the land and in replacing the landowners with cooperatives. Agricultural production and business activities have declined. Worst of all, in the past thirteen years there have been four distinct changes of regime, each led by a new coterie of army officers and each

[2]It is unfortunate that revolutionary Egypt has monopolized the attention of scholars writing on this subject, for much of the success Egypt has achieved has resulted from its unique historical and social conditions. It has a homogeneous population, a sense of nationhood rooted in antiquity, and a long tradition of central government. It is easy to govern. These conditions apply to no other Arab country.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

embodying a different political orientation, besides nine coups or attempted coups and at least fourteen cabinets with an average longevity of less than a year.

What has gone wrong? Although Iraq is admittedly not easy to govern, divided as it is among various religious and ethnic groups, and although the old regime did little to create a firm political and social base for governing a modern nation-state, it is becoming increasingly clear that much of the present difficulty lies with the revolutionary leaders and the nature of the many "new" regimes they have established. To appreciate why this is so, it is necessary to go back to the origins of the revolution and trace it through some of its critical phases. The purpose is not merely to recount the course of events since 1958, but to indicate reasons why the revolutionary regime has failed to stabilize itself and pinpoint some of the consequences of this failure for Iraq's evolving social and political structure. If, as claimed, Iraq's experience is shared by other revolutionary Middle Eastern regimes, such an analysis should shed light on their future prospects as well.

The Free Officers' Movement and the 1958 Coup

The seeds of difficulty were sown in the original coup. The "revolution" of 1958 grew out of the Free Officers' movement, which was inspired by the Egyptian revolution of 1952. But from the outset the Iraqi movement, unlike that in Egypt, lacked internal cohesion and clearly recognized leadership, essential for the later transition from revolution to responsible government. Moreover, its gestation period was too short to develop these attributes. While according to some sources the movement began to take shape as early as 1954,[3] it is unlikely that it was much more at this stage than informal groups of like-minded officers who met in their barracks to discuss their ideas and perhaps to conspire. It did not begin to achieve a degree of organization until 1956, when a number of independent cells under several different leaders had come into existence. At the end of 1956, only a year and a half before the revolution, these cells coalesced.

[3]Little has, as yet, been published on the Iraqi Free Officers' movement, and details must be subject to modification. The best work to date is Majid Khadduri, *Republican Iraq* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). The following information has been taken from this work, as well as from *Majzarat Qasr ar-Rihab* (*Massacre at the Rihab Palace*) (Beirut, 1960), *The Proceedings of the People's Court,* Volume 5 (Baghdad, 1960), and, most important, the author's interviews with politicians and army officers in contact with the participants in Baghdad.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Higher Coordinating Committee of some twelve officers was elected, and Abd al-Karim Qasim, who was not the founder of the movement, was made its head, largely because of his seniority.[4]

Even then, however, leadership was not clearly defined and there was disagreement over the introduction of certain members, especially Abd as-Salam Arif, into the Higher Committee. Nor does there seem to have been a tradition of collective decision-making. As time passed, serious differences developed among members of the committee regarding the timing and strategy of the coup and what should be done afterward. As a result, the movement began to drift into the hands of one or two men. This was hastened by a remarkable decision taken some time in 1957. Several attempted coups having failed,[5] it was decided to leave execution of the next to any leading Free Officer who might be presented with the opportunity and the proper combination of circumstances to assure success. Thus the ground was laid for the capture of the movement by Qasim and Arif.

In addition to lack of organization and poor cohesion, the Free Officers had no clear aims and no specific program. According to their own reports, they were moved to action mainly by the example and later by the intense propaganda of the Egyptian revolution. Their major goal was the destruction of the old regime through the liquidation of its three main pillars, Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah, King Faisal II and Premier Nuri as-Sa'id. Dislike of the regime's foreign policy was the major motivating factor. The monarchy's reliance on the West and adherence to the Baghdad Pact in 1955 were felt to be not only a humiliation but the cause of Iraq's alienation from other Arab countries in favor of the northern tier countries—Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. With respect to internal policy, the Free Officers were stirred by strong but vaguely formulated feelings of social injustice, directed mainly at the "clique" of politicians and "feudal" landowners whom they felt had ruled Iraq as a closed corporation. These sentiments, however, found no expression prior to the revolution in a concrete program for land reform, economic or social devel-

[4]Testimony of Naji Talib, *Proceedings of the People's Court, op. cit.*, p. 2086.
[5]The first attempt was at the H2 pipeline station in December 1957, during army maneuvers attended by Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah and the young King Faisal. Both narrowly missed being killed by artillery fire. An investigatory report by a Free Officer attributed the incident to a defective cannon. A second attempt was to have been made in 1958 during graduation exercises at the Royal Military Academy, but it was canceled because the main target, Premier Nuri as-Sa'id, did not arrive.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opment, or even in a constitution which would specify how power was to be redistributed under the new regime.

Whatever plans had been laid beforehand for the coup, when the moment arrived it was the work of Qasim and Arif. Qasim was in charge of a brigade; Arif headed a battalion in another brigade. Both were stationed northeast of Baghdad. Several days before the uprising, Arif's unit received orders for a march to Jordan, sparked by the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon. The two officers, alerted to the opportunity, proceeded to lay their plans. Only a few Free Officers, mainly those essential to the coup's operations, were informed. Although much of the planning must have been the work of Qasim, it was Arif who took the risks and who carried out the takeover. Units of his forces surrounded the royal palace and Nuri as-Sa'id's house, assassinated the royal family, and captured the radio station and the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, it was Arif who first announced the coup over the radio at about six o'clock in the morning on July 14. Qasim held back, ostensibly to make certain of success, and did not arrive in Baghdad until almost noon. Hence, regardless of who planned the operation, Arif could with much justification claim leadership of the movement at the critical juncture.

The fact that the coup was the work of two men, rather than a cooperative and coordinated effort of the Free Officers' Higher Committee, was to have a critical effect on subsequent events. According to a previous committee decision, the major governing body of the new regime was to be a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), composed mainly of members of the Higher Committee and modeled after the Egyptian RCC. No such council was established. The Sovereignty Council of three men formed instead was a mere figurehead. Real power was concentrated in the hands of Qasim, who assumed the overlapping positions of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, and Arif, who became Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. Only one other of the Free Officers was given a place in the cabinet.[6] Most cabinet posts were distributed among former opposition politicians representing a wide range of political views.[7] A few of these had known of the coup beforehand, but none had played a

[6]However, Free Officers were assigned the chief security and military posts, ranking as Commanders of the four Divisions, Military Governor, and Directors of Security and Intelligence.

[7]These included members of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, the National Democratic Party, the Ba'th Party, and one pseudo-communist.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

role in its planning or execution. The failure to establish a Revolutionary Command Council and the rapid concentration of power in the hands of Qasim and Arif alienated the rest of the Free Officers on whom the regime should have been able to depend. There was no forum for discussion of differences among the Free Officers or a majority vote on decisions which might have prevented later splits in the movement and subsequent coups.

These defects in the planning of the coup and the organization of the new regime contributed to the chaos which began on the first day when Arif called upon citizens to rise up and liquidate traitors. It is not surprising that mob violence ensued and that martial law became necessary. Arbitrary arrests, both of innocents and of potential enemies, gave rise to widespread insecurity. The purge continued for months. One hundred twelve army officers were arrested, retired or transferred to civilian positions, many merely because they were senior to Qasim, while forty-five officials of the security and other services were dismissed.[8]

Moreover, the center of authority in the new regime was difficult to locate. Although a temporary constitution, published on July 27, specified that the cabinet would be the legislative and executive authority, most of the ministers had little real power. Authority lay with Qasim and Arif, but even here it was not clear who had the upper hand. Behind the scenes, Arif appears to have had greater power, particularly on questions of arrests and the licensing of the press. He toured the country, making speeches in which he and Nasser figured prominently but in which Qasim was scarcely mentioned.

Yet Qasim won the first decisive round in the power struggle between them and this factor determined the course of the revolution for the next four and a half years. Differences between the two men were political as well as personal. Publicly and privately, Arif advocated a close and immediate union with the UAR, a policy to which neither Qasim nor the majority of the officer corps could subscribe. In addition, Arif's rash speeches and ill-considered behavior alienated the more cautious among the new leaders, many of whom were of higher army rank and resented taking orders from a colonel. Qasim, a shrewd manipulator, waited until he had secured support among his army colleagues to oust Arif, and then demanded his exile in the form of a diplomatic mission abroad. Although Arif acquiesced, his absence (as Ambassador to West Germany) was temporary.

[8]Uriel Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Three weeks later, he returned to Baghdad. This time Qasim lost patience and Arif was put under arrest and tried for plotting against the regime. He was found guilty of an obscure attempt on Qasim's life but was not executed.

The Political Struggle

While the struggle between Qasim and Arif was in large part of a personal nature, those that followed were mainly political. The revolutionary euphoria of the first weeks and the slogans of liberation, brotherhood and unity could not long conceal the real differences in outlook and policy that existed among the Free Officers. It was here that lack of prior agreement on general policy guidelines and procedures for decision-making, exclusion of most Free Officers from the high councils of government, and absence of consultation and discussion on important matters, were critical. Basing their action on the precedent of the coup itself, the Free Officers resorted to force and counterforce to achieve their aims. The violence and the personal rivalries involved have tended to obscure the fact that these conflicts have taken place between men and groups espousing alternative policies and forms of government. Since these alternatives continue to sway the course of Iraqi politics, it is essential to understand *what they are, who their spokesmen are, and the foci of their* support within the country. Some are represented by well-organized political parties; others are merely ill-defined movements. None is so clear-cut that it does not overlap with others on issues and on membership. Nevertheless, the following groups can be identified.

Chief among them are the Arab Nationalists, a broad, rather amorphous group favoring the ideal of pan-Arabism. Pan-Arab sentiments are hardly new in Iraq. They had been harbored from the participation of Iraqi officers in Faisal's army in World War I (although the ideas of Faisal I and the group around him were vague and susceptible of various interpretations), through the pan-Arab designs of Nuri as-Sa'id and the Regent. After World War II, pan-Arab schemes were also put forth by the right-wing nationalist Istiqlal (Independence) Party in opposition to the government. But the impetus for the current Arab Nationalist movement owes less to Iraqi antecedents than to the inspiration of the Egyptian revolution. The movement might better be termed Nasserist than nationalist. Although its members run the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gamut from those advocating outright union to those desirous merely of a close Arab alliance on economic, military and political matters, the focus of their aspirations is Egypt. They have, until recently, been weak on specific social and economic content, as well as organization of the political entity they hope to see emerge; to the extent that such practical details have been introduced, the model has been Nasser's brand of Arab socialism.

The movement draws its support largely from the Sunni elements in Iraq, and has a considerable following in the educated middle class and the army. Under Arif's leadership, it tended in the beginning to be strongly anti-communist as well as socially conservative, with a strong mixture of Islamic fundamentalism. An attempt was made in 1964 to organize a party, the Arab Socialist Movement, but this had no more success than its Egyptian counterpart. It collapsed shortly thereafter, and the movement split into many groups.

Closely related to the Arab Nationalists, and drawing on much of the same support, is the Ba'th Party, a latecomer to Iraqi politics. Established early in the 1950's, the Iraqi Ba'th was relatively unimportant before the revolution, although it did join the United National Front against the monarchy in 1957. Its major impetus came after the 1958 coup when it utilized a surge of Arab nationalist sentiment to marshal its forces, solidify its organization and gain adherents. During the early postrevolutionary months it was aided by Arif. While Arab unity is a goal it shares with the Arab Nationalists, Nasser is not its hero. Rather, its orientation is toward Syria, where the party originated and where it has its firmest base. This is so despite the split in the parent party in 1966 and the recent emergence in Syria of a moderate pro-Egyptian faction of the party.

In contrast to the Arab Nationalists, the Ba'thists have a tightly knit party organization and an ideology that, even if not adhered to, includes a philosophy of Arab nationalism as well as social and economic goals.[9] Support is drawn mainly from the Sunnis, particularly in the provincial towns of the northern Tigris and Euphrates. A previously strong following among university and secondary school teachers and students appears to have dwindled since the party came to power in 1968. After the revolution of

[9]The Arab nationalist philosophy, as expressed by Michel Aflaq, party founder, is vague and mystical. The party's aims and goals are expressed in the Ba'th Party Constitution (1951), although they have since undergone modification. See Sylvia Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1958, the Ba'thists succeeded in winning over a hard core of army officers, although party leadership has generally been held by civilians. It is difficult to say which is more dominant today, civilian or military leadership.

The leading group on the Left is clearly the Communist Party, established in Iraq in the early 1930's. Originally dominated by minorities—Christians, Jews, Shi'ah and Kurds—it gradually gained strength among the Muslims. Its growth was stimulated during Britain's occupation of Iraq in the Second World War, when British cooperation with the Soviet Union and the arrest of anti-British nationalist supporters of Rashid Ali enabled the Leftists to enter positions in government and in the schools and to spread propaganda. In the liberal trend after the war the Communists worked for several years with relative lack of harassment. They managed to build a solid party organization able to survive the repression of the postwar Nuri as-Sa'id era, and after the 1958 revolution they emerged as the country's most cohesive and best organized party.

In true Marxist tradition, the Communists have a consistent ideology, a well-ordered explanation of Iraq's problems, and a panacea for its ills, together with potentially wide appeal for the poor and downtrodden, who are not interested in pan-Arab schemes. They have been able to make inroads among the Kurds as well as the Shi'ah in the south, where they retain considerable support. Intellectually, the Communist leadership has been among the most impressive in Iraq. At present, however, the party is split among a number of factions, and its membership has never been large. Support rests in a portion of the intelligentsia—mainly teachers, writers and journalists—and a following among the trade unions. Nevertheless, its ability to call out the "street," and the hard work and party discipline that enable it to infiltrate and capture other organizations, have made it a formidable opponent.

Another Leftist alternative is represented by the members of the former National Democratic Party (NDP), a noncommunist group that combines a program for radical social and economic reform with a belief in liberal, parliamentary democracy. Its closest parallel is the British Labour Party, from which several members have taken inspiration. The NDP originated in the 1930's as a social group with a newspaper. After World War II it recruited a number of Western-educated Iraqis concerned with radical change through democratic means and became a political organization. Both before and after the war, its newspaper,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

al-Ahali, played an outstanding role in educating a generation of Iraqis to the need for reform and the virtues of liberalism. Its leadership has traditionally been dominated by lawyers, many of them from wealthy families. A major weakness, however, is its lack of party organization and discipline. Largely for this reason, the NDP has exercised little or no influence since 1961.

Another group of narrow appeal, but with a definite political position, is the Kurdish national movement. Kurdish aspirations have found their most coherent articulation in the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), which represents the nonassimilated Kurds of Iraq. The KDP originated in 1946 under the aegis of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who has more recently led the Kurdish rebellion in the north. During Mulla Mustafa's long exile in the Soviet Union after World War II, his party fell under the influence of the young educated Kurdish intelligentsia of Sulaimaniya, many of whom had Marxist leanings. KDP ties with the Left, including the Communist Party, were therefore strong, not only for ideological reasons, but also because both groups looked askance at the pan-Arab schemes of the Arab Nationalists. The party's aims, which have changed with the times and in direct relation to the policy of the central government, have ranged from greater privileges and benefits for Kurds, especially in Kurdish territory, to Kurdish autonomy and independence. There are strong elements of social reform and democracy in the program and since 1961 the party has aligned itself with other factions calling for a return to representative government. The Kurdish break with the central authorities in 1961, and the Kurdish war—recently settled through negotiation—enabled the movement to marshal support among a wide variety of Kurds, both tribal and educated. Its leadership has again gravitated to Mulla Mustafa, a traditional militant leader with strong tribal and religious support in the north.

Yet another group, which we may label the "Iraq Firsters," is difficult to categorize mainly because it comprises most of the political moderates in Iraq. As with moderates everywhere, its political aspirations are vague and its stand lies chiefly in the limits placed on policies of the extremist groups, whether Kurdish, Arab Nationalist or Communist. It is, however, leaderless and has no particular organization or specific program. Nevertheless, though it overlaps with other groups it is characterized by a certain identifiable outlook and can count on broad support from the populace at all levels. It probably represents the views of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

largest number of Iraqis, and could it achieve a degree of organization and leadership it would constitute the best hope for Iraq's progress out of the present dilemma.

The moderates hold clear views on foreign policy. They would put strict limits on aspirations for Arab union though they would undoubtedly promote cooperation with other Arab countries. They would also improve relations with Iraq's non-Arab neighbors, especially Iran. Most important, they would direct their political efforts to creating a more viable nation-state within Iraq's present frontiers, primarily by dealing more flexibly with the Kurds and the discontented Shi'ah. In internal affairs, they have no real consensus on policy except for a desire to return to civilian rule and economic progress. This can probably be translated as less state control over the economy, a return to some form of parliamentary democracy, better relations with the West, and an end to arbitrary rule.

The composition of this moderate group is difficult to identify; it draws support from various sources including elements left over from the old regime, the more conservative army officers, certain of the bureaucracy and the professions, a growing number of intellectuals, and those with property, whether rural or urban. The fact that its aims seem much like those of the prerevolutionary era has not been lost on the more radical groups which have since tasted power, and hence its chances of gaining control are almost nonexistent. The moderates, however, are too significant a group to ignore. They may not be able to capture the government, but they hold the balance between extreme groups, especially in times of conflict; as instability increases, their strength grows. Although leaderless and unorganized, the moderate middle is not without its spokesmen. Among them must be counted Abd ar-Rahman Bazzaz, former Prime Minister, recently released from prison, where he had been serving a sentence for treason, and Colonel Abd ar-Razzaq Na'if, former Prime Minister and recently exiled leader of the 1968 coup.

The Many "New" Regimes

The struggle for power among these groups, led by army officers acting in their name, has dominated Iraqi history for the past thirteen years. Although none has had sufficient support from other groups or among the moderates to maintain itself in power long enough to accomplish its aims, several have had time to reorient policy and even to change government structure. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opposition, however, has always had the strength to disrupt their work, undermine their prestige, and eventually bring about their downfall. With each turn of events, the coups have engendered deeper feelings of bitterness and less willingness to share power with former opponents. Iraq's history since the revolution can be divided into four periods of rule, each of which represents a victory for one or another of these groups: the Qasim era, lasting from 1958 to February 1963; the Ba'th government of 1963; the era of the two Arif brothers, from November 1963 to July 1968; and the current Ba'th government.

The Qasim Era

The Qasim era began following the "two-man" revolution when Qasim was able to maneuver Arif out of office. In the contest for supremacy between them, Qasim was supported by the Communists and the Left, Arif by the Arab Nationalists, the Ba'thists and the United Arab Republic—which meant that Qasim could rely also on the "Iraq Firsters," the Kurds and the Shi'ah, all of whom feared a close union with Egypt. With the fall of Arif from power, the Arab Nationalist effort foundered. Its chief attempt to overthrow Qasim, the Mosul rebellion of 1959, failed. Instituted in the midst of a rising tide of Communist influence, the rebellion was led by several members of the original Free Officers movement whose army units were stationed in Mosul. They were supported by money, arms and propaganda from the UAR, but their effort collapsed when at the last moment help was not forthcoming as planned from the commander in Kirkuk, and the Arab Nationalists were left in disarray and disfavor.[10] The Ba'thists, who had gone underground, were tightening their organization and preparing for future battle.

During the remainder of 1959 and 1960, with the Arab Nationalists seemingly in eclipse, the Communists and Qasim maneuvered for the dominant position in the new regime. While never wavering in their support of Qasim, the Communists sought sufficient power to exert a decisive influence on government policy, both in foreign affairs and internally. To this end, the party infiltrated many professional organizations or created new ones, took over key press and radio posts, and formed a militia, the Popular Resistance Forces. It then demanded open recognition as a legitimate political party and the appointment of card-carry-

[10]The distance of Mosul from the capital, inadequate air support, poor planning, lack of widespread support and poor timing also contributed to their failure.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing members to the cabinet. Qasim outwitted the Communists, however, in a subtle series of maneuvers, acceding to the least troublesome of their demands while undermining their influence elsewhere. Gradually the Popular Resistance Forces were curbed. Communists were removed from critical posts, and there was a crackdown on the Communist press. Nevertheless, although the political challenge was turned away, Communist influence remained strong, particularly in the area of social legislation, throughout the Qasim era.

The remainder of Qasim's regime took the form of a scarcely disguised dictatorship. The promising beginning made by including in the cabinet a wide range of opposition politicians, representing different shades of opinion and a considerable body of experience and political acumen, had evaporated by the end of 1960 because of successive resignations and dismissals of dissatisfied ministers.[11]

In their place Qasim, who retained the post of Prime Minister to the end, appointed his own army cronies or colorless civil servants. The political parties which had earlier been licensed were either banned or went out of existence. Governing without consultation became established procedure. According to close observers, Qasim made all the important decisions. For example, he himself conducted the complex and difficult Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) negotiations, and he made his inept claim to Kuwait in 1962 without consulting his competent Foreign Minister, Hashim Jawad. His exclusivity, inability to share power, and increasing tendency to regard himself as the personal embodiment of national aims, progressively alienated even his previous adherents. His most serious mistake, the rupture with the Kurds in 1961, was due partly to these qualities. By the time of his overthrow in 1963, only the Communists, who had no better prospect anyway, still supported him.

If any of the political groups mentioned above can be said to have dominated the Qasim regime, especially during the critical first year and a half, it was the Communists and, to a lesser extent, the National Democrats. This helps to account for the fact that the major revolutionary social measures introduced after the 1958 coup were adopted while Qasim held power. The most

[11]The first major resignations came in February 1959, when six ministers, including Baba Ali (a leading Kurd), Sadiq Shanshal (an Istiqlal leader), and Fu'ad ar-Rikabi (a Ba'thist), gave up their posts. In January and May 1960 the leading NDP members resigned, and in November 1960 the Communists and crypto-communists left.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

important of these were the Agrarian Reform Law and the Personal Status Law. The former, subsequently modified over fifty times, provided for the expropriation of large areas of land and their redistribution to the peasants, together with the establishment of cooperatives in the countryside. The latter ruling liberalized the laws governing marriage, divorce and inheritance so as to give greater status to women. These statutes, however, were never consistently applied, and after the Qasim era they were largely forgotten.

Qasim also took a number of steps to alleviate conditions among the urban poor and to improve the residential situation in Baghdad. Slums were cleared, houses were built for former slum dwellers, and in an effort to raise their standard of living prices on certain commodities, especially bread, were fixed. But the well-intentioned aid to the poor—which did not outlast his regime—did little to sustain his political position in the face of mounting opposition. His increased ineptitude and aloofness, the festering Kurdish problem, his failure to implement any of the vaunted revolutionary reforms, and above all the rift created with other Arab states over Kuwait, finally brought about his downfall. In February 1963 the Arab Nationalists and the Ba'thists successfully conspired to overthrow him.

The Ba'th Government of 1963

The short-lived Ba'th regime of 1963 conceived an entirely different political solution for Iraq as well as a different political structure.[12] The coup, initially carried out in alliance with moderate army officers and Arab Nationalists, was accomplished only after a two-day attack on Qasim's forces in the Ministry of Defense and the murder of Qasim and his close associates. This was followed by vicious street fighting between Ba'thists and the Communist militia, which left a high death toll and a bitter legacy of unsettled scores between the two groups. Shortly afterward, the Ba'th outmaneuvered other army officer factions and managed to capture control. The main outlines of their government soon became evident. Qasim's one-man rule was not repeated. The Sovereignty Council was abolished and while Abd as-Salam Arif, a bona fide Arab Nationalist, was made President, he was only a figurehead. Real power lay with the Ba'th Party.

Secrecy has always been characteristic of the Ba'th High Command in Iraq. Little is known of the composition of the party

[12]For an excellent article on the Ba'th government of 1963, see E. F. Penrose, "Essai sur l'Irak," *Orient*, No. 35, 1965.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

executive except that it was dominated by civilians and played the instrumental role in policymaking. Nevertheless, the army could not be neglected, and for the first time the long-awaited Revolutionary Command Council was established, also with a secret membership, although it was reputed to be mainly military.[13] In any event, membership in the Ba'th Party and support for it was the touchstone to high office, whether among civilians or the military, and there was considerable overlap of personnel in all posts. Ba'thist leaders figured prominently in the cabinet and among these the civilians, at this stage, predominated. Party discipline was relied on to keep the military under control, and in case that failed the Ba'th National Guard was to be built up into an effective party counterbalance. Ties with the parent Ba'th Party, which soon thereafter came to power in Syria, were close —so close that they gave rise to Syrian interference in Iraqi affairs.

Despite their short stay in office, the Ba'thists gave every indication of attempting to establish a one-party state. Key army officers and civil servants were dismissed and replaced by Ba'th Party members or their supporters. Yet the party's control over the organs of government, and particularly the army, was tenuous. In order to maintain themselves in power the Ba'thists needed the cooperation of other elements, primarily the moderates and the Arab Nationalists. These they proceeded to alienate by attempts to monopolize power, an increasingly militant and doctrinaire attitude toward their opponents, and, above all, the development of the militia. It was not long before a split occurred in the party between advocates of a moderate policy and the militants.[14] Basically, however, the increasing activity of the National Guard and its unpopular night searches in Baghdad, together with interference by the Syrians in Iraqi affairs, impelled the moderates in the army—Ba'thists and non-Ba'thists alike—to act. Led by Arif, they overthrew the Ba'thists in November 1963.

The Era of the Two Arif Brothers

It was now the turn of the Arab Nationalists, who set themselves to undo the work of both the Ba'th and Qasim and to institute their own form of government and revise its policies.

[13]It reportedly contained thirteen members, of which nine were military and four civilian. See Ahmad Fawzi, *Arba'tash Ramadhan* (*The Fourteenth of Ramadhan*) (Cairo, n.d.).

[14]To these misfortunes were added the failure of the unity talks between Nasser and the Ba'th (Iraqis and Syrians) in Cairo in March and April 1963, after which Nasser began to encourage the Arab Nationalists in Iraq against the Ba'thists.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In this they had a greater measure of success than their predecessors. The regime of Abd as-Salam Arif and his brother, Abd ar-Rahman Arif, ushered in a period of relative stability and normalization lasting five years.[15] Not surprisingly, given its pro-Egyptian orientation, there was a conscious effort to pattern Iraq's political and economic structure after Egypt's. An Arab Socialist Union on the Egyptian model was created in July 1964, and a Ministry of Arab Union Affairs was established to coordinate Iraqi-Egyptian cooperation and presumably to further a more integrated union. These moves were followed in October 1964 by the institution of a twenty-five-member Unified Political Command, including the Presidents, Prime Ministers and other ministers of both countries, with headquarters in Cairo. None of these arrangements came to have any significance.

Nevertheless the Egyptians had great influence over a number of pro-Egyptian ministers who were not unmindful that some 5,000 Egyptian troops were stationed north of Baghdad. To correct the disparity in the structure of the Egyptian and Iraqi economies, the Arif government in 1964 passed a series of nationalization laws. All banks and insurance companies were nationalized, as well as cement and cigarette firms. A government monopoly was imposed on the importation of cars, tea and other commodities. Finally, a State Economic Establishment was created to oversee the nationalized sector. During its last years the pro-Nasser orientation of the regime became even more pronounced, and this factor undoubtedly contributed to its downfall.

Two parallel trends characterized the Arif period. One was the increasing intrusion of army officers—for the most part Free Officers—into many high state posts, particularly in the cabinet, the diplomatic service and the new economic offices.[16] Thus, as in Egypt, a military bureaucracy began to develop. At the same time, paradoxically, the regime became increasingly civilianized. As its tenure lengthened and government processes attained some normality, civilians, and especially technical experts, gained influence over their military counterparts, and the military themselves

[15]Little published material, aside from Khadduri's *Republican Iraq, op. cit.*, exists on the Arif era. The following material has been taken from newspaper reports and interviews with Iraqi politicians.

[16]Under the Arif regime, army officers held a third of all cabinet posts, and with respect to top officials—President, Prime Minister, and the Ministers of Defense, Interior and Finance—the proportion was over two-thirds, almost all of them Free Officers. Those in the diplomatic service included the Ambassadors in London, Amman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Among those in economic posts were the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry, head of the Industrial Establishment and head of the large government-owned textile company.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

underwent a degree of "civilianization." Direct intervention by the army in politics was curtailed. The Revolutionary Command Council established by the Ba'th gradually fell into oblivion and a National Defense Council, consisting of the President, the chief ministers, and the armed forces commanders, was created with purely security and defense functions. More power came to be exercised by the cabinet and particularly by the Prime Minister.

More important than these changes of structure was the first attempt to appoint a civilian Prime Minister. In 1965 Abd ar-Rahman Bazzaz headed a cabinet. He had great success, perhaps too much, in gathering the support of moderates for the regime.[17] But the experiment with a civilian Prime Minister did not last. In April 1966 President Abd as-Salam Arif was killed in a helicopter crash. In accordance with the new constitution, published in 1964, the cabinet and the National Defense Council met to elect a new President. When they chose Abd ar-Rahman, brother of Abd as-Salam, the military used this occasion to reassert its authority. Shortly afterward Bazzaz was forced out of office; his place was taken by Naji Talib, who was, most conveniently, both a Free Officer and a Shi'ah.

Abd ar-Rahman was a much weaker personality than his brother, and power began to slip from his grasp. The authority of his military Prime Ministers increased, notably so in the case of Tahir Yahya, as did the influence of certain technocrats. Chief among these latter were Khair ad-Din Hasib, a pro-Nasser, University of London educated economist, and Adib al-Jadir, a relative of his, who was head of the National Iraqi Oil Company. Despite the regime's attempts to normalize political processes and to emphasize collective leadership, it was still a personalized system of government. Major decisions were made by "cliques," mainly alliances of army officers and technocrats, without public discussion and without institutionalized checks on their authority. It was not long before there were accusations of corruption, misuse of government power, and complicity in a suspicious increase of wealth among alleged "socialists."[18]

[17]While maintaining good relations with other Arab countries, Bazzaz mended Iraq's fences with Iran. In June 1966 he concluded a settlement with the Kurds which would have put an end to the war, and he won the favor of the Shi'ah by putting many of them in his cabinet.

[18]Although it is difficult to gauge the accuracy of these charges, almost all the previous cabinet ministers were placed under arrest by the Ba'thist regime of 1968. (They have recently been released without any trial.) A Military Intelligence report on corruption had reportedly been placed in President Arif's hands and his reluctance to act on it was critical in the decision of the officers, especially the younger ones, to overthrow his government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Outside the formal organs of cabinet government, meanwhile, the influence of major army units—the Republican Guard, the Baghdad Garrison and Military Intelligence—had increased and those Free Officers who had been excluded from power too long and who were annoyed over corruption had grown restive. A few months before the fall of Arif, a number of officers met and drew up a list of demands which they presented to him. Included were calls for the formation of a consultative council and an end to the transitional period. When Arif refused to act on them and prepared to reshuffle the cabinet to strengthen the position of his own supporting clique, this was the signal for his removal. In July 1968, ten years after the first revolution, the government was overthrown for the fourth time, and still another "new regime" was inaugurated.

The Current Ba'th Government

The coup of 1968, although it brought the present Ba'th government to power, was not a Ba'th coup. Like its predecessor in 1963, it was engineered by moderates in alliance with Ba'thists. This time the prime movers were several younger officers who had not been part of the Free Officers' movement but who had held strategic military commands in the Republican Guard and Military Intelligence. They collaborated with Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, a Ba'thist former Prime Minister and by now a veteran political manipulator. What the young officers wanted is not entirely clear. According to close observers, they belonged to the "Iraq First" group, which resented increasing Egyptian influence, and had been instrumental in bringing the charges of corruption to President Arif's attention. There are also indications that they favored a return to some form of representative government and a more open economic system. If they had hoped to maintain themselves in power, however, they were wrong. Despite the fact that they occupied the posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, they were outmaneuvered by Bakr and the Ba'thists and two weeks after the coup they were ousted from the cabinet along with several civilians. Thereafter, the Ba'th dominated the government, cutting a wide swath through the military and the civil service to appoint their followers.

The locus of power in this government is still not firmly established, nor does the regime have a wide base of support in the country. Legally, and to a considerable degree in fact, the highest authority rests in the recreated Revolutionary Command

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Council. This body, as newly constituted, originally consisted of five men: the President and Prime Minister, the two Deputy Prime Ministers, the Chief of Staff, and a man who combined in his purview the functions of Commander of the Republican Guard, Commander of the Baghdad Garrison, and Director of Military Intelligence. All were army officers and at least three were Ba'thists. At the same time, however, substantial power lay within the Executive Committee of the Ba'th Party (headed by a civilian, Sadam at-Tikriti, the party's Executive Secretary. In the fall of 1969 this arrangement underwent a revision. The RCC was enlarged to fifteen members, mainly civilian party members loyal to Tikriti. The President of the Republic, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (a Free Officer and a Ba'thist) was made Chairman of the RCC and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Tikriti was elevated to second ranking position as a Vice President of the RCC, while still retaining his party leadership. The new RCC is overwhelmingly, if not entirely, Ba-thist, although some of the military men may be Ba'thist in name only.

Clearly this move enabled the Ba'th—and not least the civilian element within it—to assert its authority over the RCC and once again to attempt to establish a one-party state. It also strengthened the hand of Sadam at-Tikriti, now considered the strongest figure in the regime. The non-Ba'thists in the council, reduced to an insignificant minority, may have disappeared entirely by becoming appointed to party membership. The military element on the RCC has been neutralized by the addition of a number of civilian Ba'thists. But while this new arrangement has temporarily stabilized the situation, it has not solved several crucial dilemmas. First is the relationship between civilians and military, both in government and in the party. The highest official post is held by a military man but second to him, and in fact more powerful, is the civilian head of the party. Military officers retain considerable power within the Party Executive, however, in the RCC and over critical military units. It is not inconceivable that one of them, Ba'thist or otherwise, may decide to assert the supremacy of the military and, in conjunction with like-minded officers, oust the Ba'th in a "palace" coup such as that engineered by Abd as-Salam Arif in 1963. Ba'th Party fears of such a move help to account for the expulsion from the RCC and the party of Hardan at-Tikriti, former Vice President and an independent-minded party member who collaborated with Arif in overthrowing the Ba'th regime in 1963.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Another dilemma inheres in the question of where authority lies and who has responsibility for making decisions—the party, the ministers or the Revolutionary Command Council. The cabinet, although it contains a number of important Ba'thists and military men, has been reduced to a subordinate role and no longer meets as a single body. Ministers, mainly technocrats, have responsibility for the execution but not the making of policy. More authoritative are the Party Executive, which includes some high-ranking ministers, and the RCC, which is comprised of leading figures of the party and the cabinet as well as commanders of key military units. There is thus so much overlap of function and personnel in these three units that the question of where power lies structurally may be academic. It lies with the men who have the following in the party and the army to make their demands effective. Chief among these at the moment is party boss Tikriti, although President Bakr also has a substantial personal following. The new regime has still not succeeded in depersonalizing its rule through institutions. Much of the basis of its power lies in a close web of personal relations based on common origin in the same locale (mainly Tikrit, a small town on the Tigris north of Baghdad) and in some cases on ties of blood and marriage.

So far the Ba'thists have insisted on rigid control over all organs of government—the army, the bureaucracy and even the university. In all important posts previous appointees have been removed and Ba'thists have replaced them, while recruitment of new party members and procedures for their indoctrination have been expanded, nowhere more assiduously than among the new cadets of the military academy. Meanwhile, in the inner councils of government the Ba'thists have refused to share real power with other political groups. Although one Communist and several Kurds are ministers, none of these positions bears much weight since they do not include membership in the RCC or the Party Executive.

Not unnaturally, their exclusion from power has alienated almost all other political forces in the country, and herein lies the greatest problem facing the regime. In an effort to alleviate some of its difficulties, the government took the bold step of proffering the Kurds a generous settlement, including a large measure of local autonomy, release of Kurdish prisoners and appointment of Kurdish cabinet ministers. Fighting has since

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ceased, but it is notable that Kurds have not yet been taken into the RCC.

The Shi'ah are resentful because the upper governing echelons are dominated in traditional fashion by Arab Sunni army officers,[19] and because of the regime's continual struggles with Shi'ah Iran. Relations between the Shi'ah community and the government reached their lowest point in many years when the son of the former chief *mujtahid* was charged with conspiracy *in absentia* during recent spy trials. The pro-Nasser Arab Nationalists, who were largely represented in the previous government, are alienated by the deterioration of relations between Egypt and Iraq. And the moderates, both within and outside the army, are thoroughly disillusioned.

Nor has the foreign policy of this regime improved Iraq's standing. Relations with Egypt worsened in the wake of Nasser's acceptance of the Rogers peace plan. In Syria, where a rival Ba'th regime was recently overthrown, a more moderate government has aligned itself with the proposed Egyptian-Libyan-Sudanese Federation, leaving Iraq even more isolated politically. Although relations with Iran have recently improved, they are likely to be further impaired in the coming struggle for influence over the Persian Gulf. Under these circumstances, it need scarcely be asked what the regime has accomplished in the way of social or economic reform.

The Causes and Effects of Failure

Enough has been said to show that the various revolutionary regimes which have come to power in Iraq since 1958 have failed to bring about much revolutionary change or even to implement a modest program of reform. The reasons for this failure, as indicated, lie almost wholly in political ineptitude and in the inability of the Free Officers to stabilize their rule.

The Free Officers' coalition, prior to 1958, knew what it was opposed to, but not what it wished to create. A major weakness from the start was the absence of a broad consensus on aims, policy directions and the kind of political structure that should be established. This deficiency proved disastrous in the absence of clearly recognized and accepted leadership. Qasim, unlike

[19]Only about a fifth of the present cabinet members are Shi'ah, while Arab Sunnis hold about 80 per cent of the top posts. Although no census on religion has ever been taken, the Shi'ah probably constitute a little over half of the population.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nasser, his prototype, was not the founder of the movement, and owed his paramount position mainly to rank. He always had a number of potential rivals within the officers' group; his usurpation of power, between 1958 and 1960, was accomplished only by eliminating rivals and at the high cost of factionalism. Qasim's failure to establish a recognized government body, such as the Revolutionary Command Council, through which disagreements could be channeled and resolved, or even to rely on ordinary consultation procedures, alienated the original body of Free Officers and eroded what legitimacy the regime could initially command. Had these mistakes and weaknesses been avoided, the new government might have found its footing sooner, and been able to mobilize support from influential elements among civilians and military alike.

Beneath these tactical differences, however, lay more profound divergences of strategy, political orientation and ideology. The Free Officers, it is now clear, had unrealistic conceptions of the nature of Iraq's internal problems and the degree of unity existing in the country. Iraq suffers from political and social fragmentation. The prime thrust of any government must be to draw together its many ethnic and religious groups so as to give them a common focus of national identity, and to reduce social and economic disparities between various strata of the population. To accomplish this takes a strong central government, based on as wide a consensus as possible. Instead of working toward these ends, the Free Officers plunged themselves and the country into factionalism and a continuing debate over the goals of domestic and foreign policy. On the external level they revived and intensified the issue of pan-Arab unity and allowed themselves to be drawn into the power orbit of other Arab states, especially Egypt, thus losing much of their independence of action and initiative. Internally they were rent by disputes, in which the Communists figured prominently, over the pace, form and direction of modernization and which classes and groups were to benefit from it. Above all, they quarreled among themselves about which groups and factions should control these processes. The results have been calamitous.

The most obvious effect of the changes of regime is that they have made consistent and continuing application of any particular policy impossible. No particular group has remained in power long enough to create a strong power base to sustain its rule or sufficiently wide support among the populace to enhance its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legitimacy. Hence the revolution has been unable to implement any broad programs of reform.

But the changes of regime have meant more than inconsistency; they have also generated a high degree of insecurity among ministers and upper-level officials, who must keep a constant look over their shoulders for fear of intrigue or removal. This has shortened the time (and incentive) available to them to undertake constructive work on long-range problems. In this atmosphere the decision-making process has been pushed further to the top and concentrated in the hands of a few men. Decisions that might previously have been taken with confidence by the director-general must now be referred to the minister; and those previously taken by the minister must now be referred to the powers-that-be in the military or the Ba'th Party. Even here, there is no clear-cut delineation of who may make decisions or at what point they may be countermanded. Responsibility can seldom be fixed, and many decisions are put off or simply never made.

More fundamental, in terms of Iraq's long-range development, is the fact that chronic political instability is depleting the country of one of its scarcest resources, men skilled and experienced in public affairs. From its inception as a state in 1920 Iraq has had only a small pool of educated and professionally trained talent upon which to draw for political leadership. It was not until the mid-1920's that the first Iraqi students were sent to Europe or the United States to study at government expense, and by 1956, two years before the revolution, those who had returned with degrees numbered only slightly over a thousand.[20] During the interwar period, and especially after World War II when the country enjoyed unprecedented stability, a group of younger men with experience in administration and politics was gradually built up. Many, if not most, of these have been lost to the new regimes through coups and purges. At the same time, continuous insecurity has precluded any of the new regimes from creating a substitute supply of talent. Initially, under Qasim, considerable experience was marshaled through the former opposition politicians, most of whom had long and close contact with political realities in Iraq. In the Ba'th cabinet which followed, almost all ministers were replacements and there was also a purge of top-

[20]Government of Iraq, Ministry of Education, *Statistics* (Baghdad, 1957). Those who had studied abroad on their own arrangements would augment this number.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

level bureaucrats and military men. Only four ministers with previous experience survived. During the regime of the Arifs, only fifteen of eighty ministers had been ministers before. In the present cabinet, about a third have had some experience in office, but this has little meaning since most of them held posts for only a short time in 1963. Up to (but not including) the cabinet change of 1969, there had been some 162 ministers; of these, nineteen had survived two regimes, while only six had survived three.

The turnover has not been limited to the upper levels of the political ladder. It has cut deeply into the bureaucracy, the officer corps and even the university, all of which have become thoroughly politicized. According to an unpublished U.S. government survey,[21] about two-fifths of the top level of the bureaucracy had been sacrificed by 1965; undoubtedly the percentage is even higher now. Few published figures are available on the military, but large numbers of retirements and rapid promotions have followed each coup. According to the Iraqi Defense Minister in 1968, between 2,000 and 3,000 officers had been put on retirement in the decade since the revolution.[22] Baghdad University has become a major source of recruitment for civilian cabinet members, especially those needed for technical positions. Given the vicissitudes of Iraqi politics, it is often not easy for these professors to return to the university once they have served their turn in the cabinet or some semi-official post, the more so since the university is government-controlled. At least three university presidents have been arrested and tried or have chosen self-imposed exile since 1958. The risks of entering a political career are so great that they are discouraging the bright but ambitious civilians needed to staff a modern government. This loss of talent, felt particularly in the more mundane fields of practical administration, accounts for much of the government's inability to implement its programs.

Still another effect may be even more critical than those already mentioned. The emergence of new and unknown political leaders, and their rapid turnover, has succeeded in breaking the linkages between the top men who make the policies and those who must carry them out, both in the capital and in the countryside. At the top, there is too much change for continuing personal contact

[21]Department of State, Intelligence and Research Division, "Survey on Iraqi Elites, 1950-1965" (1968).

[22]*Al-Hayat* (Beirut), July 24, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and interaction between the minister and the director-general and too little continuity to allow for long-range planning. Traditionally, there has been a strong connection between cabinet members and the uppermost bureaucrats. Many cabinet ministers reached their posts through the bureaucracy and frequently simply moved across the hall, from the director-general's office to that of the minister. After a cabinet fell, they often returned to their former post. This practice not only assured the continuity of policies but provided a major training ground for ministers. The emergence of military men in the top posts, together with an excessive turnover in the upper ranks of the bureaucracy, has severed, or at least weakened, this administrative link.

The same situation is true in the countryside, where ties with the central government appear to have diminished considerably. The new regime eliminated the political influence of the landlord class at the national level by expropriating much of their land and doing away with parliamentary institutions in which they were represented. But many landlords were tribal leaders who retained close ties with their tribal cultivators and who, for better or worse, performed numerous governmental functions in the countryside. Often they acted as mediators between the peasantry and the government. Many had outlived their usefulness or were greedy and rapacious, but if the regime has removed their influence in national affairs it has not entirely succeeded in replacing them in the rural areas. While stripped of much of their land, many still hold sizeable plots where the peasants continue under their authority. Tribal ties and loyalties may be weaker, but they still persist. To implement land reform, a large staff of competent agriculturalists is needed to run the cooperatives and assume the management functions of the landlords. These specialists are not available in nearly sufficient numbers, although the present government has pledged itself to concentrate on agriculture. Hence, much of the countryside has been depleted by rural migration to the cities or remains effectively outside government control.

If these links are weak and discontinuous, those between the government and the populace are virtually nonexistent. No effective organizations exist to channel disagreements to the regime, or to explain its policies to the general public. Under the monarchy, parliament and political parties, ineffectual and suppressed though they may have been, kept the lines of communication open. Even in Egypt, the Arab Socialist Union and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

National Assembly have exercised a limited function in this respect. There are no such institutions in Iraq. Despite numerous promises to hold elections, establish a Consultative Council or some other legislative body, and end the "transitional period," no steps have been taken in this direction. The present President of the Republic, Bakr, has admitted publicly that a free election would mean a return to the old regime.

In the meantime, among the urban intelligentsia professional societies have proliferated since 1958. These are the closest approximation to the old political parties. A number of them, particularly the older Lawyers' Association, and the newer Students' and Teachers' Unions, have at times functioned as indicators of public sentiment through their elections of officers. On occasion they have also acted as mediators between their members and the government. But these societies represent only a small fraction of the populace, and with the exception of the students speak only for those within limited professional and technical fields. More important, they are weak politically and do not act as a unified force. Unlike the older politicians, even former opposition politicians, they have roots in no large or powerful constituency and control no key sectors that might have an influence on policy. Successive governments have been careful to prevent the rise of any independent organizations with a power base, and thus the new professional societies have been kept under thumb. They show little signs of developing into genuine representative institutions.

In short, Iraq's new rulers, military or civilian, show little intention and less capacity to develop the linkages with the populace, the continuity of government administration, the organs of consultation, the consistency of policy, and, generally, the wider base of support needed to stabilize if not legitimize their regime. The pattern of recent years, especially the fragmentation of power among Iraq's leadership groups, suggests that even if those presently in authority were inclined to make an attempt at constructive action they would probably not be granted the time necessary for it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CUBA AND THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICS OF A COMMUNIST INDEPENDENT, 1967-1969*

by Daniel Tretiak

SINCE the end of the Vietnamese war against the French (1954), only one nation has joined the international communist system. In the early days of 1961, Cuba and the United States terminated diplomatic relations and Cuba quickly became a member of the "socialist camp." However, Cuba's presence in the communist system has been an unsettling one not only for the small Caribbean nation itself, but also for the Soviet Union, the East European party-states and the Chinese People's Republic.

Soviet-Cuban uneasiness is rooted in disparate basic world views and the economic requirements of each country. Sino-Cuban tensions derive from strongly-felt differences over revolutionary tactics. Moscow, Peking and Havana have divergent perceptions of what role Cuba should play in the communist system and in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The Soviet leadership has frequently seemed more committed than the Cubans to preserving the international status quo and maintaining "normal" relations with the United States. Although Moscow may entertain a lingering commitment to system expansion, during the Cuban missile crisis it demonstrated that there were definite limits to the degree the Soviet Union would support Cuba if the latter were directly threatened by the United States. After the crisis, the Cubans publicly criticized Moscow for a seeming betrayal of Cuban interests. While there have been times since the crisis when Soviet-Cuban relations were reasonably calm, mutual trust had suffered. The Cubans, committed to weakening *now* the international power position of the United States, emphasize less than the Soviets the possibility of large-scale war developing if the communist system aids Third World guerrilla movements. A source of continuing tension between Moscow and

*The author would like to extend thanks to his colleagues at the Advanced Studies Group, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, P. Mayer and J. F. McGarry, as well as to L. D. Tretiak, for their extensive and helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this condensed version of ASG Monograph No. 4. The views expressed are not necessarily those of either the Advanced Studies Group-Westinghouse or its contracting agencies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Havana during the 1960's was the Cubans' desire to extend greater support than the Soviets thought appropriate to combatants in armed struggle in Latin America and elsewhere.[1]

Chinese-Cuban amity of the early 1960's foundered on the rocks of ideological and political disagreements and a dispute over trade terms. Both the Chinese and the Cubans emphasize that revolutionaries must take the "violent struggle" route if they are to gain power successfully, but they have had serious disagreements over tactics. The Chinese also expected that Cuba would at minimum adopt an independent position toward the Sino-Soviet rift, which might have been interpreted as support for China. But for the Cubans such a posture was neither possible nor desirable.

This article will examine key areas of Soviet-Cuban political relations, the current state of Sino-Cuban relations, and Cuba's rather harmonious relations with two Asian communist party-states.

Conflict and Consensus in Soviet-Cuban Relations

During the past several years, Soviet-Cuban relations have often been severely strained. Yet Moscow has continued to provide the Cubans with a great deal of economic, military and political support, and Cuba still considers herself a member of the international communist system. Areas of recent discord have included (a) allegations by the Cubans that Soviet diplomats and pro-Soviet Cuban communists were improperly trying to influence Cuban policies; (b) Cuba's disagreement with the Soviet Union on policies for ordering relations within the communist system and on policies followed by that system's members toward non-communist nations; and (c) Soviet disinclination to support Cuban desires to aid and encourage guerrilla warfare movements in Latin America.

Soviet Interference in Internal Cuban Affairs

Soviet involvement in Cuban affairs via pro-Soviet Cuban comrades has been a feature of the island's politics both before and

[1]In this article the essential concern is with Cuban foreign policy output, not the decision-making process by which that output is determined. Nevertheless, it should be noted that some Cubans (possibly even Premier Castro himself) may have been less willing than others to support actively armed struggle in various Latin American countries. Che Guevara's Bolivian adventure may not have been supported by all elements of the Cuban elite; some gave it lukewarm support and others may actually have sabotaged it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

after Castro's rise to power. Before 1959, the *Partido Socialista Popular* (PSP; the Cuban communist organization), with strong ties to Moscow, gave belated but important support to Castro's movement. After Batista's fall on January 1, 1959, collaboration between the PSP and Castro's July 26th Movement increased rapidly but was often uneasy. Doubts about the loyalty of PSP members (the "old" communists) on several occasions resulted in their being purged by Castro. The most recent serious purge occurred in early 1968.

In that incident "old" communist Aníbal Escalante was the target, along with nearly three dozen other once-PSP members.[2] Escalante was accused of trying to organize within the Cuban Communist Party a "microfaction" opposed to the leadership of Fidel Castro and his followers. The microfaction allegedly differed over the use of material vs. moral incentives in the Cuban economy and Cuba's position on the Sino-Soviet rift. Escalante and his cohorts were also charged with attempting, not without some success, to obtain support for their anti-Castro activities from Soviet, East German and Czech communists. The charges levied against the microfaction resulted in heavy prison sentences and the removal of two members of the Central Committee.[3]

Intra-Communist System Policies

World Communist Conference. Within the communist system, the Soviets have tried since 1964 to convene a world communist meeting that would ratify a number of Soviet-espoused policies. Although goals for the conference varied, by 1969 these included denunciation (or even expulsion) of the Chinese Communist Party; ratification of the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in the affairs of other communist party-states and/or nonruling parties; and commendation of the Soviet line on the ways for communists and noncommunist radicals to attain power, mainly in underdeveloped areas. Cuba—like China, North Korea, North Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Rumania—has long been apprehensive of Moscow's success in imposing its will on a world communist

[2]In 1962 Escalante was removed from his position in the *Organización Revolucionaria Integrada* (a precursor of the present Cuban Communist Party) and exiled to Eastern Europe. He returned to Cuba in 1964. From then on, according to the 1968 charges, he plotted against the party leadership.

[3]The Soviets were clearly unhappy with the decision to jail Escalante and purge his aides. See the lukewarm Soviet report of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party in *Pravda,* January 30, 1968, p. 5; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter cited as *CDSP*), February 21, 1968, p. 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

meeting; hence, the Cubans consistently refused to send delegates to several preparatory conferences held from 1965 to 1968.

Nevertheless, they maintained a continuing interest in the conference and were under pressure from the Soviets to send a delegation when the June 1969 World Communist Conference took place in Moscow, even though China, North Korea, North Viet Nam and Yugoslavia did not attend. The Cubans resolved their dilemma by sending *observers* instead of a delegation. The observers had the right to attend sessions, make speeches, and sign (or not sign) the conference document.

The behavior of the Cuban observers, headed by the pro-Castro "old" communist Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, demonstrated the limits of Cuban cooperation with the Soviet Union. Although numerous delegations attacked the leadership of the Communist Party of China and supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet position on the Sino-Soviet border, Rodríguez' speech omitted mention of those core issues. Immediately following the staunchly pro-Soviet Polish communist leader, Gomulka, who had suggested that armed struggle was far from the universal way for nonruling parties to take power, Rodríguez defended the necessity of using armed struggle, particularly in Latin America. He affirmed a Cuban commitment to peaceful coexistence, but submitted that the section of the conference's document dealing with this question should be amended to read: "The policy of peaceful coexistence does not limit the right of oppressed peoples to apply all roads, including that of armed struggle, in the fight for their liberation, nor does it signify in any way support for reactionary regimes."[4] Near the end of his speech, Rodríguez expressed gratitude for Soviet aid and at the same time called attention to differences in Soviet-Cuban relations:

> In the defense of the advance of Socialism in the Western Hemisphere we have had the support of the Soviet Union, of the socialist camp and the revolutionary movement. . . . we would like to point out . . . all that the military aid, economic assistance and the political and moral solidarity of the Soviet Union . . . has meant to us in this battle as was stated by Comrade Fidel Castro . . . on January 2 [1969]. In the development of this friendship and collaboration *there have been inevitable differences which on some occasions became acute.* . . . (Emphasis added.)

As the conference developed, Rodríguez was willing to join in

[4]Havana, Prensa Latina in English, June 12, 1969; *Granma* (English weekly), June 15, 1969, p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some of its extracurricular activities.[5] At the end, however, the Cubans, along with the observers from the Communist Party of Sweden and Communist Party delegations from Britain, Norway and the Dominican Republic, did not sign the final document.[6] Thus, the Cubans bowed to the Soviets to the extent of attending the conference, but once there acted more independently than any of the other ruling parties, including Rumania's.

Criticism of China. Although Sino-Cuban relations were poor during the 1966-1968 period, the Cubans, as far as can be determined, did not publicly criticize the Chinese leadership for launching the Cultural Revolution or for following policies the CPSU and many East European and Latin American communists denounced as being anti-Soviet or un-Marxist. Nor during 1967 and 1968 did they in any way praise the Chinese leadership for the Cultural Revolution or support publicly any Chinese attacks against the Soviets.

This independent Cuban attitude on the China question has annoyed Moscow. As the 1968 Escalante case showed, the Soviets may have tried to use the "microfaction" either to remove Fidel and his followers, or, just as likely, to build a position of strength within the Cuban Communist Party to modify Cuba's position on the Sino-Soviet conflict. Cuban behavior at the 1969 World Communist Conference indicated that this goal had failed.

Extra-Communist System Policies

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Although the Soviet Union, the European party-states and Outer Mongolia have been consistent supporters of a variety of international treaties and United Nations resolutions on nuclear weapons proliferation, the Cubans have just as consistently refused to join such activity.[7] Cuba refrained from signing the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and a subsequent treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons in outer space; nor, despite initial Soviet pressure, did she sign a proposed treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons in Latin America. In line with this policy, her signature is missing from the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), again

[5]See *Neues Deutschland,* June 9, 1969, p. 1, for report of him taking a boat trip in Moscow with key representatives from East Germany, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. I am grateful to my colleague, Richard W. Munkelwitz, for pointing out this reference to me.

[6]*New York Times,* June 18, 1969, p. 3.

[7]For a good summary of Cuba's positions, see Eloy G. Merino Brito, "Disarmament and Denuclearization," *Politica Internacional* (Havana), No. 21 (1968, 1st trimester), pp. 27-42.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to Moscow's displeasure.[8] The Cuban leadership has felt that, however desirable are peaceful conditions in which to develop the nation, small nations like Cuba and her allies, North Viet Nam and North Korea, cannot devote themselves solely to economic development as long as the United States continues to threaten them and to conduct hostile policies toward them. Foreign Minister Raúl Roa, in a major UN speech announcing his country's unwillingness to sign the NPT, proclaimed Cuba's "inalienable right to defend herself with weapons of any kind, whatever their nature. . . ."[9]

Policies Toward Noncommunist Regimes in Latin America. Soviet-Cuban disagreement over the strategy for taking power in Latin America is fundamental and pronounced. The CPSU allows that communist parties may have to turn to armed struggle in some cases, but it admonishes them not to overlook the possibilities for increasing their power by nonviolent means—even to the point of participating in elections. One Soviet Latin American specialist summed up the Soviet aversion to communist parties relying solely on armed struggle (which the Cubans would advocate) in this way:

> The Communist Parties of the Latin American countries, ardently supporting any anti-imperialist revolutionary actions on the part of the popular masses, at the same time are exerting substantial efforts aimed at preventing the stereotyping of revolutionary tactics and the elevation of any one form of struggle to the status of an absolute, and at the correct combination at any given moment of armed struggle with the development of all other forms of struggle.[10]

Cuban leaders maintain that, in the end, the only way revolutionary change will occur in Latin America is through armed struggle against noncommunist regimes; they are generally contemptuous of those Latins (particularly pro-Soviet communist parties) who feel that power can be obtained by nonmilitary, even peaceful, means. The Cubans[11] doubt whether urban-based com-

[8]China, North Korea and North Viet Nam have likewise not signed either the 1963 or 1968 treaty, and the Chinese particularly have vigorously attacked both.

[9]Roa's speech is in *Granma,* May 19, 1968, pp. 2-3.

[10]V. Volskiy, "Latin America: New Stage of the People's Struggle," *Pravda,* March 19, 1968, p. 4; translated in *CDSP,* April 10, 1968, pp. 19-20. Volskiy is Director of the Latin American Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

[11]Once again, it should be pointed out that some Cubans in all probability have not shared the seemingly official view indicated here; others, while subscribing to it, may have felt that in the late 1960's Cuba could ill afford the risks of supporting Guevara-like adventures. And others fully approve of the government's stand and of Guevara's activity in Bolivia. As for Premier Castro, it is my opinion that his complete theoretical and practical views on these matters are not fully known.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munist parties are the proper vehicle for revolutionaries to use in their effort to seize power; in many countries (e.g., Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia) the communist parties have frequently been antagonistic to guerrilla movements begun by young radicals supported by Cuba. Hence, throughout the 1960's Cuban relations with orthodox Latin American communist parties were generally poor, while relations with the more radical armed struggle movements were on the whole satisfactory.

In conjunction with the Soviet policy of downgrading violent struggle as the sole instrument for Latin American communists' seizure of power, Moscow in the past few years has worked to improve interstate relations with a number of Latin American countries; diplomatic and trade relations have been established and developed with Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Chile and, most recently, Peru. The Soviets may see this undertaking as a marginal aid in reducing U.S. influence in Latin America and in gaining new trade partners. The Kremlin has undoubtedly also felt that a positive Soviet image would enhance the position of the communist party in a given country.

This Soviet policy has been at odds with Cuban policy toward Latin America, and has been interpreted by Havana as support of the noncommunist governments against which Cuban-backed guerrilla movements are struggling. The Cubans (and their Latin American compañeros) have voiced their disapproval of Soviet behavior from time to time. In August 1967—after Premier Kosygin visited Cuba to try unsuccessfully to resolve the aid-to-guerrillas vs. trade-with-Latin American-nations question—Castro sarcastically approved Soviet trade policies but questioned the propriety of the USSR making loans to Latin American nations: ". . . we asked ourselves: how can this be? This is absurd! [Soviet] Dollar loans to an oligarchic government that is repressing the guerrillas, that is persecuting and assassinating the guerrillas! . . . That we condemn!"[12]

Soviet and Cuban views of the Peruvian situation are, however, converging, and Cuban support for guerrilla movements may necessarily wane during the current period of tactical Soviet-Cuban amity. But support of Latin American armed struggle is a fundamental part of Cuban foreign policy; disagreement on policy toward guerrilla movements and noncommunist governments can be expected to continue at the least as a latent aspect of Soviet-Cuban relations.

[12]Speech of August 10, in *Granma,* August 20, 1967, p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Areas of Agreement

The grudging Cuban endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and similar Soviet-Cuban attitudes toward Peru in 1969 are two major developments that have led to a strengthening of accord between Moscow and Havana in 1969-1970.

When Soviet and East European troops invaded Czechoslovakia on August 22, the Cuban regime did not immediately support or criticize Soviet behavior. Then, on August 24, Castro indicated that Cuba was critical of recent internal and external policy trends in Czechoslovakia (e.g., alleged closer ties between that country and the United States and West Germany, and evidence that Czechoslovakia was "moving toward capitalism") and felt that it was "unavoidable to prevent this [Czechoslovakia's changes] from happening—at any cost, in one way or another. . . . From our viewpoint . . . the socialist bloc has a right to prevent it in one way or another."[13] But he fully admitted that the invasion violated Czech sovereignty and had "absolutely no legality."

The Soviet Union and Cuba reacted similarly to one of the most important political developments in the southern hemisphere in 1969: the emergence in Peru of a highly nationalistic military junta pursuing policies detrimental to U.S. economic interests in Latin America. Neither communist state immediately perceived that the new Peruvian regime would be so nationalistic; hence, when the Velasco Alvarado government began to confiscate property owned by U.S. firms in Peru, they were both cautious in responding. Finally, after East European nations began to develop economic and diplomatic relations with Peru, the USSR followed suit. Cuba has not yet done so, largely because the military junta has seemed wary of taking that step.

During most of 1970, Soviet-Cuban convergence on policy toward Latin America became more evident. The USSR was friendlier than Cuba toward the Ovando regime in Bolivia when it came to power in 1969, and toward the successor Torres government of late 1970, but both showed pleasure at the results of the Chilean electoral campaign which brought Salvador Allende to power as Chile's President. Further, Soviet-Cuban military cooperation began to increase: in July 1969 Soviet naval vessels visited Cuba; and in the fall of 1970 the United States perceived

[13]Havana, Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. It might be noted that neither *Pravda* nor *Izvestiia* reprinted even excerpts from this speech.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a new military threat to its security when the Soviets attempted to establish, and then quickly denied they were attempting to establish, a submarine base in southern Cuba.

Some Quantitative Measures of Cuban Noncooperation with the Soviet Union

Despite the foregoing examples of cooperation, a great deal of mutual hedging still pervades Soviet-Cuban and East European-Cuban relations. Quantitative evidence of this uneasiness is obtained from an examination of Cuban behavior toward CEMA and international communist front organizations and the degree of attention paid to Cuba in *World Marxist Review Information Bulletin,* a key publication of the international communist system.

Cuba's Relations with CEMA

In an earlier study, this writer and a colleague explored the range of Cuban participation in such communist-system functional organizations as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA or COMECON). We concluded that Cuba's "overall integration into the Soviet-led ruling party system has proceeded with hesitation and difficulty, although it has considerably increased since late 1962," and that the "Cuban political elite has maintained a rather ambivalent attitude toward participation in the organization [CEMA]."[14]

More recent data corroborate this conclusion. Using attendance at CEMA meetings during 1967-1969 as an indication of her willingness to integrate economically with the more developed communist party-states, Table I reveals that Cuba attended 14.6 per cent (seven) of all meetings examined—considerably less than the 37 per cent she had attended in the 1963-1966 period. Most of the 1967-1969 meetings she joined were Commission meetings; only one was of the more important Executive Committee. The North Viet Nam attendance record was also 14.6 per cent, while North Korea's was only 6.3 per cent. In contrast, CEMA associate member Yugoslavia attended nearly 65 per cent of the meetings (including those of the Executive Committee).

Cuba's ignoring of CEMA has been reciprocated. This can be seen in the lack of attention paid to Cuban economic develop-

[14]David Ronfeldt and Daniel Tretiak, "Cuba's Integration into the Communist System, 1962-1966: A Preliminary Assessment," in J. F. Triska, editor, *The World Communist System—International and Comparative Studies* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I

CUBAN ATTENDANCE AT CEMA MEETINGS, 1967, 1968 AND 1969[1]

	January-August 1967	*January-June 1968*	*July-December 1968*	*January-June 1969*
Total Meetings Examined	15	19	22	23
Total Meetings with Reports of Attendees Made (or strongly implied)	10	13	12	13
Total Cuban Attendance	1 (10%)	2 (15.4%)	3[2] (25%)	1[3] (7.7%)
Total Yugoslav Attendance	8 (80%)	10 (77%)	6 (50%)	7 (54%)
Total Mongolian Attendance	6 (60%)	7 (54%)	9 (75%)	10 (77%)
Total North Viet Nam Attendance	6 (60%)	1 (7.7%)	0 (—)	0[4] (—)
Total North Korean Attendance	2 (20%)	0 (—)	1 (8.3%)	0[4] (—)

1. Derived from reports of Executive Committee, Standing Committee and Commission meetings indexed in *CDSP*, 1967 and 1968, and checked against actual stories in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, 1967-1968.
2. Cuba also attended a meeting at which ministers from socialist countries discussed higher education questions. *Izvestiia*, October 18, 1968, p. 2.
3. Although Cuba attended *no* Commission meetings during the January-June period, a Cuban observer attended a meeting of the CEMA Executive Council in January 1969.
4. North Vietnamese, North Korean and Cuban representatives attended a gathering of scientists from socialist countries in Poland (*Izvestiia*, March 21, 1969, p. 2) and a meeting of the Organization for Cooperation in Wire and Postal Communications (*Izvestiia*, May 14, 1969, p. 1).

ments in articles about the economies of CEMA nations; North Viet Nam and North Korea have come off little better. Although a *Pravda* article in May 1966 made a passing reference to Cuba's rate of industrial growth, many other articles dealing with CEMA in the Soviet daily press made no mention of Cuban economic gains.[15]

[15]I. Oleinik, "Stages of Growth," *Pravda*, May 6, 1966, p. 4; translated in *CDSP*, May 25, 1966, p. 25. See also N. Faddeyev, "The Commonwealth Comes of Age," *Izvestiia*, November 3, 1966, p. 2 (*CDSP*, November 23, 1966, pp. 20-21); "Our Strength Lies in Unity and Friendship," *Pravda*, March 28, 1967, p. 1 (*CDSP*, April 19, 1967, pp. 28-29); A. Alekseyev and Yu. Shiryayev, "The Economy of World Socialism Gains Strength," *Pravda*, September 5, 1967, p. 4 (*CDSP*, September 27, 1967, p. 19).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The low degree of Cuban participation in COMECON activities, which has persisted for several years, coupled with the slight attention paid by CEMA members (especially the Soviet Union) to Cuba as an observer, suggest an unwillingness on both sides to change the existing order. As observers the Cubans could attend (and indeed have attended) a number of CEMA meetings—but they seem disinclined to permit the supranational body to attain an increased measure of control over the Cuban economy. For CEMA members, Cuban reluctance to participate is not entirely unwelcome: it would be exceedingly difficult to try to assimilate Cuba into an organization that has trouble integrating the more developed economies of Eastern Europe.

An examination of revelant Cuban journals shows that the Cubans have been even less enthusiastic about COMECON than the Soviets have been about Cuban participation in the organization. The available issues of four Cuban publications[16] contain not one article by a Cuban dealing with economic developments in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, let alone CEMA; and only one of the articles in these journals written by East Europeans had even limited reference to Cuba's role in COMECON or described any activities of that organization.[17]

Cuban Participation in Communist Front Organizations

From 1963 to 1966, when the Sino-Soviet conflict pervaded the activities of international communist front organizations, Cuba tended to support the USSR more than the Chinese, but her support was weak and selective.[18] Since the beginning of 1967, the Chinese have failed completely to attend meetings of these organizations. The Cubans could be expected infrequently at gatherings of such organizations as the World Federation of Trade Unions, World Peace Council and Women's Democratic International Federation, but would be apt in their participation to refrain from strong support of Soviet positions.

Reports of thirty-six meetings of various levels of several leading international communist front organizations (including some with specific Latin American orientation) held from September 1967 through June 1969 show that Cuba attended only four (11

[16] *Cuba Socialista,* January 1966-February 1967, excluding November-December 1966; *Pensamiento Crítico,* January-May 1968; *Comercio Exterior,* January-March, April-June 1966; and *Nuestra Industria,* June-August 1967.

[17] See Imre Vajda, "Hungary's Participation in World Trade," *Comercio Exterior,* January-March 1966, pp. 69-78.

[18] Ronfeldt and Tretiak, *op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

per cent), one of which was held in Havana.[19] The North Koreans and Vietnamese were present far more often. Given their low attendance, it is difficult to ascertain the degree of pro-Soviet feelings demonstrated by the Cubans; two delegates' speeches are available for the four meetings, and these suggest little, if any, affinity for such mid-1969 Soviet positions as condemnation of China or cautious support of armed struggle in Latin America.[20]

Attention Paid to Cuba in World Marxist Review and Its Information Bulletin

Although the international communist system lacks a specific organization for routinely ordering the system's affairs, theoretical journals are published which in essence are system-wide in their scope; the *World Marxist Review* (*WMR*) and the *WMR Information Bulletin* are two of these. The *WMR,* consisting of articles written expressly for the journal, has been published monthly since 1958; the *WMR/IB* reprints articles selected by the editors from organs of the parties or speeches of leaders. Articles by leaders of ruling and nonruling communist parties appear regularly in the two magazines; hence, the number of articles from a given party's representatives is an indication of the degree of agreement between that party and the CPSU and of the willingness of its leadership to write for the system's theoretical publications. Since the Cubans are reluctant to integrate politically or economically into the Soviet-led international system, which in turn is not enthusiastic about active Cuban participation, we would expect to find that, in comparison with other ruling parties, Cuban articles appear infrequently in both the *WMR* and *WMR/IB;* articles by representatives from more orthodox nonruling Latin American communist parties might appear more often, on the whole, than those by Cuban communists.

The year 1965 was one of relative Soviet-Cuban amity, and, as expected, the percentage of Cuban articles was highest in 1965 (3.2 per cent, or six articles, 64 pages), second highest in 1966 (2.6 per cent, four articles, 37 pages)—but down to nearly zero in 1964 and 1967 (one article each year) and to zero in 1968, years

[19]As reported in *International Communist Front Organizations* (*ICFO*). The meetings were an International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) seminar held with the Cuban Union of Journalists in Havana, September 9-11, 1967; a General Council meeting of the WFTU, held in East Berlin, December 16-19, 1968; the World Congress of Women, held in Helsinki in mid-June 1969; and a WPC meeting held in East Germany in June 1969.

[20]The speech of Vilma Espín de Castro (Raúl Castro's wife) at the World Congress of Women may be found in *Granma,* June 22, 1969, p. 12; that of the old PSP leader, Juan Marinello, at the WPC meeting is in *ibid.,* June 29, 1969, p. 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in which Soviet-Cuban relations were only fair. Over the 1964-1968 period, Cuban materials were cited far less often in the pages of the *WMR/IB* than were those from members of the Soviet subsystem within the world communist system, as Table II shows. Materials from all the ruling parties normally considered pro-Soviet were reprinted with greater frequency. Rumania, whose foreign policy posture during these years was in many ways similar to Cuba's, was on a par with Cuba in the number of citations, and only North Korea—which during most of the period was considered pro-Chinese—had less. On the other hand, materials from North Viet Nam—which maintained high levels of all-round interaction with China and the Soviet Union during 1964-1968—were reprinted more often than those of all other party-states except Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.

WMR/IB published more articles from the pro-Soviet French and Italian communist parties than from Cuba during the 1964-1968 period; likewise, the data show that *WMR/IB* editors found the views of two major Latin American communist parties—the Argentine and Chilean (eighteen and thirteen articles respectively)—more important than those of the area's only ruling party.

Sino-Cuban Relations, 1967-1968

Shortly after a near-break in Sino-Cuban relations, in early 1966,[21] Chinese foreign policy entered a period of prolonged stagnation, punctuated, particularly in 1967, by xenophobic outbursts against many foreign countries. Yet, however vitriolic the 1966 Sino-Cuban exchange, Cuba was not a target of "Cultural Revolution diplomacy." By the same token, neither Chinese nor Cuban officials took major steps toward improving relations. Both countries basically ignored each other's existence, although there were minor exceptions.

Cuban Perceptions of China

In the months immediately after the near-rupture of relations, the Cuban press was extremely critical of the Chinese leadership; but as the Cultural Revolution developed, Cuban criticism of China sharply declined. In October 1966 the Soviets, always eager to add voices to an "anti-China" chorus, found one anti-Chinese article from Cuba to reprint in *WMR/IB* (an August

[21]Cuba claimed that China had promised to increase its shipment of rice to Cuba indefinitely; the Chinese said they had promised to increase rice exports for only one year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE II

ARTICLE MATERIALS PUBLISHED BY THE PARTY-STATES

Party-State	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*	*1968*	*Total*	*Annual Average*
Soviet Union	13	19	32	14	10	88	17.6
Nominally pro-Soviet:							
East Germany	5	7	9	6	2	29	5.8
Hungary	4	6	6	6	2	24	4.8
Bulgaria	2	6	4	3	3	18	3.6
Czechoslovakia	4	6	7	6	8	31	6.2
Poland	0	8	7	4	5	24	4.8
Mongolia	2	2	6	4	0	14	2.8
Independent with varying pro-Chinese tendencies:							
Rumania	0	3	6	2	1	12	2.4
North Korea	0	3	4	0	1	8	1.6
North Viet Nam	1	8	12	2	2	25	5.0
Cuba	1	6	4	1	0	12	2.4

Source: WMR/IB, 1964-1968; 1964: five issues missing.
Albania, China and Yugoslavia are omitted from consideration.

31 *Granma* editorial), but from then on no Cuban articles censuring the Cultural Revolution or Mao appeared in the Soviet-directed journal. While the Cubans were quite willing to carry on a hostile bilateral dialogue with Peking over *internation* differences, they were unwilling to join in system-wide attacks on the Chinese.

In 1967 the Cubans, along with the Rumanian, Yugoslav, Albanian, North Korean and North Vietnamese ruling parties, refrained from anti-Chinese pronouncements, whereas all the Latin American nonruling parties, all the ruling parties in Eastern Europe and the Mongolians made at least one attack on Mao, as reprinted in *WMR/IB*. From the Kremlin's viewpoint, Cuba was not leading the Latin American communist parties in support of Soviet systemic goals; rather, the Latin American parties were outdistancing the Cubans in supporting the CPSU in its anti-Mao campaign. As might have been expected, the long-time pro-Soviet Chilean and Argentine parties were among the leaders.

A similar pattern emerged when response to a Soviet call in 1967 for a world communist (anti-Chinese) meeting was tabulated. The Hungarian, Czechoslovak, East German, Polish and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bulgarian parties, plus Mongolia, dutifully fell into line; many Latin American communist parties did so as well, but five ruling parties—the same ones from which no attacks on the Chinese leadership in 1967 were reprinted in *WMR/IB*—joined the Cubans in not issuing calls for an international meeting.

Chinese Perceptions of Cuba

During the Cultural Revolution, Chinese mass media have often cited statements in praise of Chairman Mao which were allegedly made by anonymous citizens of communist and non-communist countries. The Chinese used such statements from the Soviet Union, for example, to show that the Soviet *people* were opposed to the "revisionist" *leadership* of the CPSU—clearly an act viewed negatively in the USSR. On the other hand, if the Chinese did not wish to antagonize the leadership of a given country, they did not carry such claims of support by that nation's citizens in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*) or the foreign-language *Peking Review*. Thus, extensive use of claimed Cuban praise for Mao was an implicit indication that Sino-Cuban relations were not good, but a decline in the use of such quotations suggested that Peking was less interested in proclaiming a breach between Cuban citizens and their leaders. During the seven-month period, November 1966-May 1967, *Jen-min Jih-pao* averaged more than a claim a month that unidentified Cubans were praising Mao, thus failing to reciprocate the Cuban government policy of ignoring Mao and the Cultural Revolution. However, after May 1967, with one exception (one article in October), *no* articles claimed Cuban praise for Mao. This suggests that in the last seven months of 1967 the Chinese attitude toward Cuba had shifted from relatively high hostility (which had prevailed since January 1966) to at least studied inattention to the Caribbean nation.[22]

Just as the CPSU tended to pay little attention to the Cubans in the *WMR/IB* compared with the attention given to pro-Soviet Latin American communist parties, the Chinese in *Jen-min Jih-pao* paid far more attention to pro-Chinese splinter communist parties in Latin America than to Cuba, completely ignoring the Cuban Communist Party's existence in the years 1966-1967. The activities of the Chilean party received the highest number of

[22]As is noted further below, the Chinese in official media did not hesitate to criticize implicitly the strategy and tactics of the Cuban guerrilla leader, Che Guevara, in Bolivia; and in unofficial Red Guard materials attacks were made on Guevara and Fidel Castro.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mentions (thirteen), followed by nine references each to the Bolivian, Peruvian and Argentine parties. Even so, Chinese references to pro-Chinese Latin American party factions as well as to the number of pro-Chinese statements from them, although in great contrast to the total absence of references to Cuba, declined from 1966 to 1967.

Robert Williams and Sino-Cuban Relations

Sino-Cuban relations during 1966 and 1967 may have been further damaged by the charges levied against the Cuban government from Peking by Robert Williams, the exiled American black leader.[23] In Peking, Williams continued to publish *The Crusader,* amplifying the theme of his disappointment in Cuba after five years in that sanctuary. During 1967 he lamented that the Cuban revolution had ceased to develop, having been taken over by the petty-bourgeoisie, that racism against blacks in Cuba was returning, and that Cuban intelligence had been infiltrated by the CIA. He also alleged that the Cuban press was slandering the Cultural Revolution.[24] In the May issue of *The Crusader,* he dealt exclusively with the case of Ernesto ("Che") Guevara, whose fate he had discussed in his August 1966 letter to Premier Castro: ". . . I wonder if 'Che' did not meet with foul play in the interior [of Cuba?] and that maybe the same people who contrived his disappearance may be planning to do away with you in the same manner."

Had Williams' charges against the Cuban government been made from a noncommunist country, the Cubans could easily have dismissed them. But as it was, the Chinese government provided the facilities for Williams to publish *The Crusader* and periodically utilized his claimed stature within the black movement in the United States to legitimize its support for that movement. Although Williams maintained that *The Crusader* was "a

[23]Robert Williams, an NAACP leader from North Carolina, fled from the United States in 1961 facing federal charges of kidnapping. He went first to Cuba, where he resided until mid-1966. While in Cuba he broadcast programs to the United States from "Radio Free Dixie" and encouraged blacks to prepare for armed struggle in the United States in his magazine, *The Crusader.* In mid-1966, he fled from Cuba to China, claiming that his plans were "frustrated by officials and functionaries of the Cuban government, especially those in the Foreign Ministry . . . ." According to Williams, only Che Guevara "showed any genuine interest in our struggle and . . . really promised to help . . . ." (Williams' letter to Fidel Castro, from Peking, dated August 28, 1966.) Williams returned to the United States in September 1969.

[24]Robert Williams, "Cuba: The Tragedy of No Proletarian Cultural Revolution," *The Crusader,* March 1967, pp. 6-9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

personal journal," the 1966 state of Sino-Cuban relations would have provided little reason for the Chinese to restrain him from his diatribes. However, as the end of 1967 neared, Williams' *Crusader* ceased its anti-Cuban remarks.

Chinese Attitudes Toward Guevara's Guerrilla Movement

The Chinese, who in the 1959-1963 period had evinced much interest in Guevara's speeches and writings, turned a cold shoulder to the Cuban leader during and after his visit to China in early 1965.[25] Some time after his return to Cuba in March of that year, the Argentine-born revolutionary left his adopted land for Europe and Africa, only to reappear in Bolivia to lead a guerrilla movement in that country against the Barrientos government. As is well known, Guevara's efforts were wholly unsuccessful, resulting in his own death as well as that of many, but not all, of his Bolivian and Cuban comrades-in-arms.

For the Chinese, the formula for making revolution in Latin America is not a simple one. Prospective revolutionaries are urged to establish a functioning political party to provide the ideological guidance and leadership for the guerrilla movement which must be developed in the rural areas; thus, political work in the urban areas must not be neglected. The Chinese, despite their emphasis on armed struggle, argue that it is incorrect for revolutionaries, without prior preparation and organization, to go out into the countryside and establish guerrilla bases. Underpinning the Chinese line for guerrilla warfare is the necessity for Latins to pay heed to Mao's thought and its applicability in Latin America.

Guevara and Regis Debray, a young French communist (now in Chile) with close ties to the Cuban government, have stressed that it is not really necessary to establish a Marxist-Leninist party, that one must go out into the countryside and make armed revolution regardless of objective conditions, and, implicitly, that Mao's thought is irrelevant.

Although the Chinese in the early 1960's viewed favorably many actions and speeches of such Cuban political leaders as Castro and Guevara, it is a striking fact that *Jen-min Jih-pao* carried *no* articles acclaiming guerrilla activity in Bolivia during the eleven months (November 7, 1966-October 7, 1967) when Guevara was struggling to launch his movement in South

[25]Daniel Tretiak, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: The Growing Accommodation, 1964-1965," ORBIS, Summer 1967, pp. 450-451.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America.[26] A few general stories about Bolivian events and periodic references to the activities of the Bolivian Communist Party (with which Guevara's relations were increasingly bad) were not critical of Guevara; however, certain more general Chinese articles about Latin America either downgraded Guevara's efforts in Bolivia or were, by implication, critical of them. Thus, Chinese surveys of developing guerrilla movements in Latin America praised activities in numerous specific countries, but omitted any reference to guerrilla activity in Bolivia.[27] At the end of September the Chinese unmistakably attacked Guevara's movement (which insiders must have known was clearly failing) and perhaps Castro as well:

> In Latin America, some *pseudo-revolutionaries are in partnership with revisionism,* [albeit] under the guise of Marxism-Leninism; [but] *their plots to lead the Latin American armed struggle down the wrong path are right now being revealed. True revolutionaries* are taking the revolutionary road of depending on the peasants, establishing rural bases and using the countryside to surround the cities.[28]

While Guevara, by no stretch of even the Chinese imagination, could have been in "partnership with revisionism," Castro may have been seen in this light. It might have been Guevara's imminent failure to which the Chinese were referring in the rest of the quotation.

Unofficial statements made during the Cultural Revolution by some of the Chinese political elite probably reflected the viewpoint of only one segment of the foreign policy bureaucracy, but they too suggested a degree of disenchantment with Guevara and Fidel Castro. For example, Yao Wen-yuan, an important Cultural Revolution figure and now a member of the new Chinese Communist Party Politburo, claimed in a late 1967 analysis of the international situation that "there are contradictions between Cuba and the Soviet revisionists but the former can in no way free itself from the latter's economic control."[29] A lower functionary, Feng Piao (reportedly associated with *Jen-*

[26]This statement is based on a reading of all issues of *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*JMJP*) during this period.

[27]See *JMJP,* "The Deepening Struggle of the Latin American People's Anti-American Struggle," December 29, 1966, p. 6; March 5, 1967, p. 5; "The Struggle of the Latin American People Cannot Be Stopped," March 16, 1967, p. 5; October 23, 1967 and December 23, 1967.

[28]"The Deepening Development of the Latin American People's Revolutionary Struggle," *ibid.,* September 30, 1967, p. 7. (Emphasis added.)

[29]Yao Wen-yuan, "Report on the International Situation," *Kung-chiao Hung-ch'i* (*Industry and Communications Red Flag,* Canton); translated in *Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press* (*SCMP*), March 5, 1968, p. 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

min Jih-pao), expressed hostility to Cuba's two leading political figures: Castro had "boasted that he had set an example in successfully taking big cities with small forces," but "this success also reflected to some extent the feebleness of imperialism"; "Guevara's line is an adventurist line, but there is a contradiction between him and Castro. In any case, this man [Guevara] cannot be called a Marxist-Leninist."[30]

Under such circumstances, there was no need for the Chinese to shed crocodile tears when Guevara's death was announced in mid-October 1967; *People's Daily* took no notice of it.

China's disagreement with the theories and practice of Che Guevara was of more than ideological significance: Peking successfully urged that the pro-Chinese faction of the Bolivian Communist Party (BCP) refuse to cooperate with Guevara. Although some pro-Chinese BCP members joined Guevara, the group's leader, Oscar Zamora, did not. Like Mario Monje, head of the pro-Soviet Bolivian communists, Zamora was attacked by Castro in his introduction to the Guevara *Diary*.[31]

Cuba's Relations with the Third World: Viet Nam, Korea and the Cuban Fronts

While Cuban relations with both China and the Soviet Union during the past several years have been unpleasant and often tense, the Cuban government has sought to develop meaningful relationships with two other party-state neutrals, North Korea and North Viet Nam, as well as with the South Viet Nam National Liberation Front (SVNNFL; i.e., the Viet Cong).

Cuba's empathy with distant Asian comrades stems from the similarity of their current positions within the world communist system. None of the three countries is particularly satisfied with the kind of leadership offered by either the USSR or China; both major powers are too interested in influencing the policy output of smaller communist countries to suit the latter's liking. Furthermore, in varying degrees, Cuba, North Viet Nam and North Korea are more willing to take higher risks to expand the boundaries of the communist system than the USSR or even China. By supporting one another, they hope to dissuade the major powers from excessive interference in the affairs of the smaller party-states and to manipulate from them more aid and assistance. The Cubans, for example, desire systemic support for their internal economic

[30]Cited in "The International Situation Is Excellent," *Hung-se Hai-yuan* (*Red Seaman*, Canton), January 24, 1968; as translated in *Current Background* (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), April 3, 1968, p. 9.

[31]*The Diary of Che Guevara* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 13-15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development goals and those relating to encouraging Latin American *guerrilleros* to launch armed struggle. They want this aid and support to be provided with as little interference as possible—a rather naive expectation. In forming relationships with other party-states having similar expectations from the rest of the system, they have attempted to strengthen and legitimize their own position by exerting leadership over international organizations whose main purpose is the support of guerrilla warfare movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America—the Asia-Africa-Latin America People's Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO) and the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO).

Relations with North Viet Nam and the SVNNFL

Cuba's relations with North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong undoubtedly were among the most satisfying for the Caribbean nation during the late 1960's, as a variety of indicators suggest.

Communist party-states often show the degree of mutual attraction for each other by exchanging delegations and visitors. Thus, in 1967-1968, political, military, journalist and musical delegations from Cuba visited Hanoi, meeting with both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong representatives; the highest ranking Cuban visitor was Haydee Santamaria, a leading female member of the Cuban Communist Party and government.[32] In return, North Vietnamese economic and cultural delegations went to Havana, with Vice-Premier Le Thanh-nghi heading the list of notables; Viet Cong delegations also visited Havana.[33] Not only were important high-ranking delegations exchanged but Cuba, North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong also found themselves in agreement on many international issues facing communist party-states. Cuba and North Viet Nam (and North Korea) similarly failed to respond positively to CPSU appeals to attack the Chinese leaders during the Cultural Revolution and to attend international communist meetings. The North Vietnamese hailed Cuba's stature within the communist system:

> As members of the socialist camp, the people and armed forces of Cuba and Vietnam are comrades-in-arms closely bound by . . . Marxist-Leninist theory. . . . [Vietnam rejoices] at the great achievements [of the] Cuban people in socialist construction. . . . Cuba, the western outpost of the socialist camp is . . . confronting . . . the U.S. imperialists.[34]

[32]Hanoi, Vietnam News Agency (VNA), October 3, 1967, November 2, 1967, April 13, 1968, September 9, 1968.

[33]For North Vietnamese visitors, see VNA, August 15, 1967, September 19, 1967, January 5, 1968; for Viet Cong visitors, see *ibid.*, August 21 and 26, 1967, March 17, 1968.

[34]*Quan Doi Nhan Dan* (organ of the Vietnamese army), November 22, 1967, as reported by VNA the same day.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reciprocally, the Cubans saluted the Viet Cong on the seventh anniversary of the founding of the SVNNFL and, after the early-February 1968 TET offensive, hailed "the brilliant victories of the Vietnamese people in both the South and North."[35]

Cuba's relations with the Viet Cong were particularly good. As one North Vietnamese report noted:

> Cuba is the first country of the world to accept a permanent mission of the SVNNFL, to found a national committee of solidarity with the people of South Vietnam and raise the South Vietnamese permanent mission in Cuba to the level of an official diplomatic organ. Cuba is also the first country in the world to establish a diplomatic mission and appoint an ambassador beside the SVNNFL Central Committee.[36]

Relations with North Korea

The exchange of visitors between North Korea and Cuba was much akin to that between Cuba and Viet Nam. The main North Korean delegation was led by the country's President, Choi Yong-kun, while the most important Cuban delegation was headed by Jesus Montane, a member of the Cuban Politburo and close Castro aide.[37]

The North Koreans and Cubans also expressed support for some of each other's internal and external policies. In 1968, the Koreans praised the Cubans' nationalization of all private trade as

> showing the firm stand of the Cuban people . . . and the farsighted Marxist-Leninist leadership and principled policy of the Cuban Communist Party and Revolutionary Government. . . . All the achievements and victories scored by the Cuban people in revolution and construction clearly prove the sagacity of the leadership, and correctness of the policy . . . of the Cuban Communist Party and revolutionary Government headed by Comrade Fidel Castro.[38]

The same article cited Kim Il-sung as having hailed the right of Cuba to preserve an independent position within the world communist system and admonished other communists—undoubtedly those from Moscow and Peking—not to meddle in Cuban affairs.

The Cubans returned Pyongyang's support by strongly backing North Korea after the January 24, 1968 *Pueblo* incident. The

[35]VNA, December 17, 1967 and February 17, 1968.

[36]*Ibid.*, September 22, 1967. On March 17, 1969, Cuba announced that her first ambassador to the SVNNFL had presented his credentials to that body's head on March 4. See *New York Times,* March 18, 1969, p. 3.

[37]Pyongyang, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), November 14, 1967, April 10, 1968, July 25, 1968.

[38]*Ibid.*, March 30, 1968. Compare this staunch comment with the Soviets' rather uninspired one in *Pravda,* April 4, 1968, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cuban Communist Party's statement on January 27 made note of "profound sympathy" with the Koreans and expressed "unconditional support of the exemplary attitude of the Korean Government and Party."[39]

Cuba and Its Fronts

Undoubtedly the Cubans have chosen not to participate extensively in the Soviet-sponsored international front organizations because they question the usefulness of these bodies and their commitment to revolutionary change, and consider them so Moscow-dominated that Cuban influence therein would at best be marginal. Hence, since 1966 they have preferred to become the active leaders of two international organizations designed mainly to promote Cuban influence in Asia, Africa, and especially Latin America.[40]

The Asia-Africa-Latin America People's Solidarity Organization, founded in early 1966 in Havana, has served as an international vehicle for Cubans and guerrilla fighters to express support for one another's struggles against established governments. A main goal of the organization and its participant members is to launch successful armed struggles in various parts of the world in order to reduce the power of the United States. The Secretary-General of AALAPSO is a Cuban, Osmany Cienfuegos, as are the two Assistant Secretaries-General, Carlos Lechuga and Domingo Garcia. Through this ostensibly international medium, the Cubans claim to be mobilizing Cuban sympathy and support for the Vietnamese and North Koreans and for guerrilla movements in other Asian and African countries as well as in Latin America.[41] The organization sends Cuban officials to visit scenes of combat (e.g., South Viet Nam, Laos and Syria) and also provides opportunities for guerrilla warriors to come to Cuba for training and indoctrination.[42]

[39]Statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, January 27, 1968, in *Granma,* February 4, 1968, p. 3. For China's more restrained statements, see *JMJP,* January 28, 1968; see also the excellent summary of the Chinese and Soviet responses in China Watcher, "The World Intrudes," *South China Sunday Post-Herald* (Hong Kong), February 11, 1968.

[40]Just as Cuban attention to and participation in Soviet-dominated fronts has been low, Soviet publications have virtually ignored AALAPSO and LASO activities.

[41]See, for example, VNA, July 2, 1968 for an AALAPSO message to Ho Chi Minh; also Radio Hanoi (in English), March 14, 1968.

[42]Three schools, one for each continent represented in AALAPSO, were established in 1966-1967 for training political cadres. On this point, and for a good summary of AALAPSO's first year of activities, see "The First Anniversary of the Tricontinental," *Cuba Socialista,* February 1967, pp. 175-180.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO), formed in July 1967 as an outgrowth of AALAPSO, serves as the means by which unofficial Cuban support is given to Latin Americans engaged in armed struggle against pro-American local governments. Like AALAPSO, it caters to the requirements and needs not of local pro-Soviet communist parties but of more radical *guerrilleros*. Consequently, it receives little or no support from the Latin American communist parties and it has in turn been critical of them. During the three years of its existence LASO has been an adjunct of Cuba's revolutionary foreign policy in Latin America. As is the case with AALAPSO, the organization mainly reflects Cuban views, although some of the Latin American guerrilla movements have representatives in Havana attached to LASO.

Both AALAPSO and LASO are mainly paper organizations, yet their importance for the Cubans, and particularly for Latin America, should not be underestimated. They symbolize in concrete fashion Cuba's ongoing commitment to encourage and support armed struggle against established governments. While for many Cubans that commitment is consistently strong, some from time to time have tried to hedge their support for guerrilla movements, only to be pressured by the guerrillas and other Cubans into re-emphasizing it—as occurred from late 1964 through most of 1965. The existence of AALAPSO and LASO will make any wavering of this type more difficult in the immediate future.

The effectiveness of the Cuban effort to promote locally-developed armed struggle is a different matter from Cuba's high commitment to such activity. As the Soviets and Chinese have learned before them, the Cubans are realizing that it is no mean task to engineer rebellions in Venezuela or Bolivia from the outside. Nor is it easy even if Cubans are smuggled into a given country to establish the revolutionary foci. There are innumerable obstacles to "creating the Sierra Maestra in the Andes," as Guevara's failure in Bolivia revealed.

The Impact of Guevara's Failure on Cuban Foreign Policy in Latin America

Che Guevara's death by a Bolivian bullet on October 8, 1967 ended a major Cuban effort to operationalize guerrilla warfare in Latin America.[43] The Cubans have continued to maintain that

[43]Even if Castro and some other Cubans did not fully support them, the Cuban government on its own and via AALAPSO gave extensive verbal approval to Guevara's activities in Bolivia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they are as committed as ever to giving support and encouragement to the *guerrilleros;* but this remains to be seen. Since Guevara's death no guerrilla undertakings have come even close to being successful, although movements in Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala and Bolivia are continuing irritants to the governments in those countries.

It has been suggested by some that Castro, as in the mid-1960's, is considering modifying the level of Havana's support for armed struggle in Latin America because of (1) Soviet pressure; (2) a painful realization that Cuban support will not yield significant results; (3) the need to concentrate energies on domestic developments; and (4) renewed opportunities for diplomatic relations with increasingly radical, but noncommunist, nationalistic regimes, such as the junta in Peru. However, any reduction of support for Latin American guerrilla movements would certainly call forth criticism from the leaders of those organizations for such action—an unhappy prospect for the Cubans, who still feel that their revolution is the model for revolution in all of Latin America.

Conclusion

By late 1970, the state of Cuba's relations with the USSR was better than it had been for some time, but relations with China have not returned to their pre-1966 cordiality. Additionally, the Cubans have developed strong relations with two other party-states —the Vietnamese and Korean—which are also committed to system expansion, and have launched new international organizations dedicated to supporting national liberation movements in the Third World. By taking the latter course, they have shown more initiative than even the Chinese, who have established no new international front organizations since they in effect withdrew from those dominated by Moscow.

Cuba's disagreements with the Soviet Union over ideological and policy matters are not irrelevant or minor. Moscow is plainly keeping its profile low in Latin America by encouraging many Latin American communist parties to seek to gain power by peaceful means, even as the USSR seeks wider horizons by improving relations with noncommunist (often stridently anti-communist) governments in the area. The Soviet Union seems extremely reluctant to run the risks of having to protect "another Cuba" in Latin America. In contrast, many Cubans have a genuine and deep commitment to the encouragement of armed struggle, although that commitment may perforce be reduced because of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the failure of Che Guevara's Bolivian adventure to spark the proverbial "prairie fire" of revolution. The October Revolution Bolsheviks were forced by the pressure of events to reduce their expectations for revolutionary triumphs in Europe after 1920, even though many Soviet policymakers continued (and still continue) to believe in the necessity for such revolutions in other countries. It is one thing, however, to preserve the core belief, another to attempt quixotically to make it work. The Cubans, like the Bolsheviks, may not significantly change their belief in the necessity for armed struggle in Latin America, but they may be in the process of tactically reducing their attention to and real support of such revolutionary movements. Cuba's current posture may mean that there will be at least a short-term decline in the degree of Cuban-inspired guerrilla activity. Her attitude toward Peru, for example, may presage an accommodation not only with that country but perhaps also with Chile, which is, like Peru, enacting policies that are highly nationalistic and somewhat detrimental to U.S. interests in Latin America.

Despite the uneasy state of Cuban relations with the Soviet Union and the East European party-states, it is important to recognize that these communist countries still provide extensive economic support to Cuba, and that while Soviet military support might have its limits in an international crisis, it is unlikely that the USSR would fail to respond in some manner if the United States (or Latin American countries) attempted to attack Cuba militarily. Furthermore, although Moscow views with some trepidation Cuba's efforts to spur on Latin American guerrilla movements, it cannot easily stop these efforts unless it wants to give the Cubans an opening to excoriate the CPSU for exerting excessive pressure and betraying Marxist-Leninist ideological beliefs. The Soviet Union's best move may have been to allow Guevara and the Cubans to do "their thing" in Bolivia, only to see it fail (and perhaps even to have sabotaged it).

An adjustment in Cuban policy toward Latin America may result in limited agreement with the Soviet Union, at least on this front. Nevertheless, it is most unlikely that the Cubans will cease entirely their commitment to encouraging the development of armed revolution. Should the radical nationalist government in Peru fail to continue its policies, and Cuba's basic distrust of the Peruvian junta thus be vindicated, a renewal of the Cuban effort to spread armed revolution in Latin America could probably be expected, the views of the Soviet Union notwithstanding.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews

The Prospects for European Integration*

by Diane K. Pfaltzgraff

If the optimism of the postwar years and the early 1960's over the possibility of creating a unified Europe has vanished, there remain many catalysts within Western Europe that are likely to give new impetus to integration in the 1970's. In *Europe: An Emergent Nation?,* Professor Carl J. Friedrich examines those forces and assesses the prospects for unification.

According to Friedrich, a "European Community" has existed for many centuries. "It is the community which has been the carrier of what is called European culture or civilization." (p. 1.) The cultural community of the medieval period was challenged by the rise of nationalism and the forces unleashed by the French Revolution and, later, by the First World War. In the interwar period, in Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's plans for a federal organization of Europe, we find a renewed interest in union, based on a growing — but still limited — realization after World War I that Europe's world dominance was at an end. But it was the Second World War, and its aftermath, that produced the great impetus for European integration which is the object of Friedrich's analysis.

The great issue, according to Friedrich, is whether state and nation can be projected beyond the framework of the old and established national units. Thus the process of community formation, producing a cohesive grouping of people motivated by common values, interests and beliefs, is crucial. But he questions whether a distinctive consciousness of a common identity can be made to support common institutions and policies. Most important in his view is a "federal spirit," i.e., willingness to compromise and accommodate, and avoidance of doctrinaire inflexibility—a key ingredient as well for the success of political institutions at the national level. "Unless there is present a firm determination to maintain both diversity and unity by means of a continuous mutual adaptation, a federal order cannot last. Such determination presupposes a 'federal spirit'." (p. 26.) The process of federalization may operate toward both greater integration and greater differentiation, as we have seen in certain federal systems, such as Canada's.

Friedrich accords to nationalism an important role in the federalizing process. Prompted by circumstances, nationalism may either help to create and maintain the federal spirit or it may undermine

**Europe: An Emergent Nation?* By Carl J. Friedrich. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 269 pp. $8.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it. Thus far, nationalism has retained a stronger emotional appeal for Europeans than has the concept of federalism; an ideology based upon Europeanism has yet to emerge.

In the literature of integration, there has been considerable discussion, and disagreement, about conceptualization, definitions and indicators. Depending on the model chosen, students of European integration have come to differing, and in some cases opposite, conclusions about the current status of the unification movement. Friedrich is skeptical about whether the quantitative indicators chosen by Karl Deutsch, for example, are meaningful in proving the hypothesis that European integration reached a plateau in 1957-1958 and that further prospects for its development are limited. By focusing upon elites, Deutsch has neglected the greater influence the individual may wield in consensus formation. Moreover, the use of "transactions" as evidence of actual behavior can also prove misleading: to assert that indexes on trade, mail, travel, student exchanges, and the slowdown in the increase of organizations at the European level prove that European unification has halted since 1955-1957 is to ignore other important features of the movement. In support of Friedrich's critique, sole reliance on Deutsch's indicators takes insufficient account of the institutionalization in the European Community which occurred only *after* 1957-1958. It was not until the 1960's that the EEC forged common policies in trade and agriculture, and negotiated as a unit with the United States on the Kennedy Round and with Britain and other European countries on the question of Community membership.

In contrast to Deutsch, Friedrich examines community formation in the various sectors of European society in order to assess the presence or absence of a growing European consensus. His more "traditional" or "qualitative" approach leads him to a quite different perception of the prospects for integration. According to Friedrich, such indicators as student exchanges, *jumelages,* and growing cross-national contacts among businessmen, labor and agricultural groups provide evidence of a more *qualitative* nature than those of Deutsch and his associates and support his more optimistic assessment. Thus, he calls for a greater qualitative dimension in integration literature and especially in the selection of indicators. Given the conceptual and definitional problems inherent in much of the existing literature, the work of integration theorists in the 1970's could benefit greatly from the focus Friedrich suggests.

The author then appraises in detail those qualitative indicators which he believes illustrate a growing consensus. Pre-eminent among them, the EEC as an institution has contributed significantly to a general acceptance of European integration by such groups as business, labor and agriculture, and has led them to adapt their institutions and practices to the deliberation and resolution of issues at the Com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munity level. Friedrich's demonstration of the impact of the EEC on various domestic sectors in Europe may therefore be viewed as one effort to determine the "linkages" between subnational and, in this case, national and regional systems.

The response of business elites to European integration has been massive and sustained. Besides observing the business areas that have been especially responsive, Friedrich assesses those in which a need for greater cooperation remains. In particular, European businessmen today recognize the need for coordination in research and development if they are not to become increasingly dependent on the United States for advanced technologies. As might be expected, he finds strong business support for European corporate legislation to facilitate transnational mergers.

The series of European interest groups spawned by the European Community is also an object of study. From his examination of interest groups operating at the European level, Friedrich concludes: "All the evidence suggests that within these European organizations a definite community spirit is in the process of developing. At the same time it is equally clear that these European organizations are weak compared to the national constituent bodies." (p. 70.) They have served a useful function as channels of communication not only to their own members but in educating the general public, yet insofar as their potentiality to influence public policy is concerned, they have developed only limited capacity for effective action.

Since little is known about the decision-making processes in these groups, Friedrich points to a research need in the field of European integration which has thus far received scant attention. He believes that "Both an integrating and a differentiating potential find their reflection in such groups for the reason that such groups must adapt to the structure of the decision-making apparatus of the community they wish to influence." (p. 87.) It is not difficult to foresee the further development of transnational interest groups in Europe, as well as the intensification of their efforts to influence decision-making at both the national and European Community levels.

Of major interest in the author's treatment of agriculture in the European Community is the 1965 EEC agricultural crisis. For example, he discusses the relationship between French farming interests and the Common Market, arguing quite properly that the former played a decisive role in both the initiation and the resolution of the crisis. He contends that President de Gaulle badly miscalculated the sentiment of French farmers in favor of the Common Market, and that continued denunciations of de Gaulle's action by publications of French farm organizations, together with the opposition of industry and business, contributed to the French President's defeat at the polls. The "linkage" between de Gaulle's policy and the interests of French farming indicate an element of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continuity in French agricultural policy in the EEC that can be expected to endure in post-de Gaulle France.

In surveying the labor community, Friedrich presents an interesting comparison of the impact of the Common Market on French, German and Italian workers. With increased mobility, social security protection and other forms of equalization, workers are tending to become more Europeanized. However, the development of the European labor community at the trade union level lags behind that in business and industry. It has been primarily in the Economic and Social Committee of the EEC that labor's influence has been felt.

The study goes on to deal with a little known or commented upon aspect of the growth of a European community, namely, the role of the Council of Communes in the establishment of *jumelages*—or pairings —between communities of different European nations. These partnerships concentrate on exchanges of many kinds, including mayors, students and workers. On balance, Friedrich finds, such efforts have provided a "significant ingredient in the formation of a European community." It remains to be seen if their long-range political implications will encourage the building of a consensus: ". . . one is led to the rather paradoxical conclusion that *jumelages* are more likely to promote the political implications of a sense of community among the people involved if there is little talk about the political aspects; such *jumelages* serve European unification more if they are not understood and treated as instruments for it." (p. 164.) The possibility is omnipresent that *jumelages*, to the degree that they increase citizens' awareness of their own community, may reinforce nationalism. Somewhat inconclusively, Friedrich observes that the problem is highly complex and offers contradictory evidence.

The author is perhaps most pessimistic when assessing the efforts of the academic community to enhance cross-national cooperation. To be sure, attempts have been made to standardize degrees, coordinate curricula, and create *jumelages* between universities, but there has been little interest in the formation of a European university community despite the historic unity of European civilization, which Friedrich discusses, and the many exchanges of students and faculty that have characterized European education since World War II. Aside from a few ardent advocates of integration among academics, others have been either indifferent or hostile to its appeal.

Friedrich concludes that European integration is in a highly fluid stage: Neither the judgment that the process has ceased nor the contention that European politics will be dominated by "supranational" organizations is justified. Despite the current absence of optimism on the subject, he found a strengthening of economic ties in all the aspects of European life examined.

In his final chapter, he briefly catalogs some of the major issues likely to confront Europe in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

future. The economic implications of the creation of a customs union will necessitate monetary and currency reforms, possibly along the lines of a European Federal Reserve Board, for which he believes sentiment is growing. In addition, Europeans will have to develop a more adequate "regional policy" to deal with those areas that have not yet benefited from the general economic prosperity. Other problems relate to the creation of a European civil service—a potentially important source of support for the process of informal community formation—and complications that could result from the possible admission of Great Britain and others to the Community.

His overall view is that, if Europe is not yet an "emergent nation," it is nevertheless registering slow, but important, progress toward unification.

Communist Political Terror: A Behaviorist Interpretation*

by Lothar Metzl

Political Terror in Communist Systems, by Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, is an outgrowth of the Workshop on the Comparative Study of Communism, sponsored by the Planning Committee for Comparative Communist Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and held during the summer of 1968 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University. In constructing a broad framework for analysis rather than following the historical ebb and flow of terror in a rapidly developing communist world, the authors are mainly concerned with theoretical problems: the place of terror in communist systems and its relation to general theories of political dynamics; the functional range and equivalents of political terror; the reasons for the variations in the use of terror among different communist systems. The focus is on the functional variability of terror — which combination of factors makes it work, and which does not.

Dallin and Breslauer attack their subject with a vast array of shiny conceptual tools, but older practitioners need not yet nervously discard their antiquated equipment. The behaviorist approach to the comparative study of communism, at least as exemplified in the book at hand, is still in its prerevolutionary stage.

The authors place political terror in the general category of "coercive" power. "Coercive" power in tandem with "normative" (positive or symbolic) power and "material" (technical or utilitarian) power forms the sanction system of all social and political control. As they see it, a communist regime, like any other, normally prefers not to use the "ultimate weapon" of terror because of its counterproductive impact on socialization: the actual use as well as the threat of terror "maximizes alienation." However, communist regimes have used terror on a large scale. Why? The authors apparently do not wish to

**Political Terror in Communist Systems.* By Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970. 172 pp. $5.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resort to the old-fashioned explanation that communist regimes are usually minority operations, whether they seize power through a coup, a civil war, or are imposed by a foreign power, and that minority revolutions are by their nature bloody social experiments.

Instead, they tell us that there is a characteristic dynamic in communist systems which tends to bring about the initial use, later the escalation, and finally the abandonment of political terror in an eventual normalization favoring the more affiliative—normative and material—assets of power. Thus, communist systems can be seen as developing, and frequently underdeveloped, polities that unfold in clearly recognizable though overlapping stages: the takeover (i.e., power seizure and consolidation) stage, the mobilization (i.e., intensification of control and acceleration of socio-economic transformation) stage, and finally, the post-mobilization stage which apparently rests on the laurels of previously achieved "breakthroughs" and is qualitatively different from its predecessors.

In each stage there emerge different immediate, middle and long-range goals, available assets, and perceived priorities that combine variously under various internal and external pressures to furnish a rational explanation for the shifting functional patterns of terror. Other factors such as political culture, the personality of the dictator, the ideological base, and so forth, also represent an input of variables in each stage. Thus, there is a time and a place for everything: for the Revolution to devour its children, its parents, its midwives, its cadres and bureaucrats, its real as well as imagined enemies, its spies, and its faithful believers.

Against this background of perceived regularities, the authors develop the theme of the functional variability of terror rather than its horrors and its relationship to—pardon the expression — moral values. They determine when, why, and at what cost to the communist system many more millions of human beings were killed in the Soviet Union than in Communist China, or why the takeover in Czechoslovakia and Hungary was less bloody than in Russia. They find that revolutionaries who kill many of their enemies in a civil war which occurs before the seizure of power, need kill fewer of them afterward, and vice versa.

Seemingly, though, Dallin and Breslauer do not feel altogether comfortable with their quantitative cost-efficiency approach. In their preface they assure us somewhat apologetically that their attempt to "deal with terror as a phenomenon that can be rationally analyzed in no way implies any moral indifference or callousness towards its impact or social costs." (p. x.) In his foreword to the book Professor Chalmers Johnson compounds the moral dilemma. He calls the authors' subject "one of the most difficult and most heartbreaking of any. . . ." Yet he praises their objectivity: they avoided "culture-bound moralism" and analyzed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

both "the revolutionary goals achieved through terror and the legacy of terror." He commends them for analyzing "both the omelette and the broken eggshells." This metaphorical substitution of broken eggshells for broken lives and cracked skulls is a bit too ironic for comfort. The executors of terror know that the only protection their victims have is not so much a culture-bound moralism as a morality-bound culture, and that such protection is more often than not thin like the shell of an egg.

By neutralizing and relativizing the moral problem, the authors may have hoped to avoid questions that are pertinent to communist and noncommunist societies alike. Or did they simply drop the ballast of their "bourgeois ethics" so as to be unhampered in viewing their subject strictly from within the communist system? Their selection of the concept of "stages" seems to echo the obsession of communist theory and tactical doctrine with "stages"—none of which may be "skipped." An immanent functional analysis is of course a perfectly valid experiment. The question is only how much it adds to or subtracts from the judgments of those who have seen the system from within with their own eyes. Toward the end of the book the authors state: "Refugees from Communist countries have almost invariably cited terror and the secret police as their primary grievance against the system. Whatever allowance one may wish to make for the selectivity of the sample and *post facto* exaggeration, there remains a consistency of response—regardless of state of origin, nationality, class, age, or occupation—too overwhelming to be dismissed. This is true, for example, of the large group of refugees from the Soviet Union interviewed in 1950-52, as well as of the Hungarian refugees after 1956." (p. 130.)

This consistency of response is indeed remarkable. It is also observable in the testimony of more recent refugees, and suggests strongly that there is a continuum in the institutional structure of the system with which the authors have not dealt as incisively as with their definition of terror types. Terror victims will be glad to know, from the index, that there is agitational terror, demonstration and reverberating terror, deterrent, diffuse and intransitive terror, hermetic terror, institutional terror, pre-emptive and prophylactic terror, situational and therapeutic terror. There is even "mild" terror, whatever that may be. They will find the categories of targets and victims almost as neatly arranged as in the multicolored card files of the secret police. But they will find only a few scattered and not particularly precise references to the main instrument of terror, the secret police itself. In the absence of in-depth institutional studies of the Soviet system and the secret police since Stalin or since Khrushchev, the authors, who rely on secondary sources, are not to be blamed for this imbalance in their work. Nevertheless, Dallin and Breslauer could have been more cautious in analyzing the specific place and weight of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

secret police in the postmobilization "now" stage which, in their vision, appears as a systemic "change in kind."

The currently fashionable view of the Soviet secret police as just another interest group hemmed in by other interest groups, is not easily verifiable. The secret police, with their long experience in regime-approved deception, may not even be beyond creating and spreading such an impression. Yet, informed reports indicate that there are about 800 to 1,000 penal camps of varying degrees of severity in the Soviet Union. Estimates of the number of prisoners range from one to three million, and political prisoners are believed to number at least tens of thousands, if not one million or more. The total of persons in regular prisons, prison mental hospitals, and in exile, exceeds the total of the camp population. The recent re-establishment of the Ministry of Justice, which followed the re-establishment of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) alongside the KGB (Committee for State Security), completes the revival of the Stalinist triad of political police controls.

It is also difficult to reconcile the perspective of this study with the view of those "insiders" in the Soviet Union whose underground literature of dissent Dallin and Breslauer do not seem to treat as input-worthy. On the one hand, the authors perceive a "maturation of the system as it grows out of its 'infantile disease' of totalitarianism." (p. 89.) On the other hand, judging from the literature of dissent, the Soviet system seems to put up a stiff fight against the few intellectuals who wish to cure it of its infantile totalitarianism.

Dallin and Breslauer, nevertheless, are confident that their method has enabled them to predict scientifically that the revival of terror on a grand scale in the Soviet Union is possible but highly unlikely. Scholars less preoccupied with methodology might feel that they have only predicted what has happened so far.

On the whole, this reviewer enjoyed struggling with the vocabulary and concepts of the authors. Although they tend to be overanalytical, they shun oversimplification and the monistic interpretation of communism. Their chapter on the contrast between the Soviet and Chinese approach to social control and terror is most interesting, and a good starting point for further discussion. They state, for example, that the great party purge, the (1966) Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, started later in China than the one in the Soviet Union. If we set the beginning of Stalin's great purge at the time of the Kirov murder in 1934, both began seventeen years after the establishment of the regime, whatever regularity that may imply.

The final chapters review the benefits and costs, the positive and negative achievements of political terror as a means of making a communist society. They come to the unfortunately obvious conclusion that terror works—up to a point of diminishing returns, i.e., the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"threshold of dysfunctionality." As the authors postulate, however, that terror exits in the more settled and mature postmobilization stage anyway, the system seems to be able to transcend its own dysfunctionality.

In sum, Dallin and Breslauer blame the evils of political terror and its brutal excesses not so much on the "system" but rather on the fact that an ideological zeal for forced change (rapid modernization) releases "the basest instincts of the implementors." (Apparently, some eggs have to be broken. But, one may ask, how many broken eggs are too many?)

Their best advice to other modernizers is to avoid an "overly rapid" tempo of change, to limit the central power they require, to respect the "central values" and the desire of their people for material and normative rewards. Whether such advice will be heeded by impatient revolutionaries is questionable. Even the most rational analysis of terror is no remedy for the social ills and emotional aberrations which go into the making of a revolution.

Jerusalem and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*

by Linda Rose

If there is a single symbol of the intractability of the Arab-Israeli conflict, that symbol is the city of Jerusalem. Long a religious center of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the city was divided between Jordan and Israel during the 1948 war. It remained so, a compelling reminder of the deep-seated division in the Middle East, until the Six-Day War in 1967 when it was reunited under Israel's rule. Since that time, the Israeli policy has been that the issue of Jerusalem is not negotiable and that the city will never again be divided. The Arabs have been equally insistent that Jerusalem belongs to them. In *Jerusalem, Key to Peace,* Evan M. Wilson analyzes the nature of the impasse and proposes a solution.

He is particularly qualified to do so: he had had twenty-five years' experience with the Middle East, in Cairo, on the Palestinian Desk at the State Department and as Secretary to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, before becoming United States Minister and Consul-General at Jerusalem in 1964. From that vantage point he viewed the development of the Middle East conflict culminating in the June War. As head of the only Foreign Service post in contact with both Jordan and Israel during this period, his observations are especially pertinent.

Wilson's position was schizophrenic in the extreme: he was accredited to an entity that did not exist, the international city created by the United Nations resolution on the partition of Palestine in 1948. He was independent of the American Ambassadors to Jordan and Israel and reported directly to the Secretary of State. Officially he did not recognize (even implicitly) either Jordanian or Israeli sover-

**Jerusalem, Key to Peace.* By Evan M. Wilson. Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1970. 176 pp. $5.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eignty in the city. Consequently, as he says, "our daily existence . . . partook of an Alice in Wonderland quality." What this meant in practical terms was the maintenance of two homes, two sets of offices, two sets of friends, and contacts with two very different cultures, a situation challenging to the most experienced diplomat. It necessitated two local staffs, unable to communicate with each other by mail or telephone until this problem was eventually solved by the installation of a walkie-talkie system. And naturally, given his position midway between Jordanians and Israelis, he was looked upon with suspicion by both sides.

The focus of the book is Jerusalem itself, its history, geography and peoples, and Wilson outlines these in succinct fashion. He contrasts the relative austerity of life in the Israeli sector with the more leisurely pace in the Jordanian Old City. But throughout his discussion he emphasizes the essential oneness of the city. He deplores its partition, maintaining that this "existed not so much on the ground as in the minds of men." He points to the almost total lack of understanding of each other by Arabs and Israelis; the Palestinians he knew, for example, were unaware of Israel's achievements in land development, social welfare and industry. It should be noted that the author is describing the situation before the Six-Day War and that Israeli occupation of the West Bank has made the Arabs cognizant of developments in Israel.

The "incredible misconceptions" between Israelis and Arabs are due in large measure, according to Wilson, to the forced isolation that has existed since 1948. The Israelis tend to think of the Arabs as they knew them during the British Mandate: underdeveloped. They were astonished to hear about the progress made by the Arab states. In addition, the Israelis were convinced that the Arabs' sole thought was the destruction of Israel, an idea fed by Arab propaganda. Since 1948, Wilson notes, an entire new generation has grown up on each side in ignorance of the other, and if this situation continues it can lead only to the reinforcement of basic misconceptions.

Wilson goes into considerable detail on the subject of the Palestinians and describes the disillusionment of many of them, especially the Christians, with the Jordanian government. But, he says, he formed the distinct impression that they feared to speak out against the increasing militancy in the Arab world. If he is correct in his analysis, the prospects for a settlement are dim, since they represent perhaps the only element of moderation among the Palestinians who are more and more drawn to the ideology of the Arab commandos. These Palestinians send their children abroad to be educated, but many of them return to the Middle East, not to their former lives, but to the commando movement which contains a high proportion of college graduates and professionals. The author also notes that the Arabs who fled the West Bank in 1967 were largely the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

refugees of 1948 and the poorer people, not the more affluent citizens, most of whom were determined not to leave their homes. Consequently, many of the Palestinians living under the Israeli occupation are neither destitute nor uneducated.

The historical sections of the book, especially those dealing with the periods immediately preceding the wars in 1948 and 1967, are lucid and informative. Wilson describes the work and proposals of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946, as well as those of the United Nations Commission on Palestine leading to the adoption of the partition resolution by the UN General Assembly. He reminds the reader that in March 1948, a few months after it had voted for partition, the United States withdrew its support for this plan on the grounds that it could not be accomplished peacefully. On the issue of Jerusalem, the United Nations was similarly unsuccessful in finding a workable solution. In 1948 and again in 1949, the General Assembly passed resolutions calling for internationalization of the city under UN auspices, but these bore no fruit, and when in 1950 no plan could be agreed upon, the matter was suspended, to be left dangling for the next twenty years. Wilson also analyzes the weakness of the United Nations in keeping the peace in the Middle East: the UN Truce Supervisory Organization, for example, could work only with the cooperation of the parties and had no means of enforcing decisions. As a result, it could do little if the Arabs and Israelis were bent on hostilities.

Since Wilson was in Jerusalem at the time of the Six-Day War, his is a firsthand account of that conflict. He speaks of the feeling of confidence in the Jordanian sector of the city just before the war and blames the Arab leaders for starting it: "They had duped themselves with their own fiery rhetoric, and had become prisoners of their own propaganda." He explains the rapid collapse of the Arab armies as resulting from the weak social links among the Arabs, a problem that continues despite the force of pan-Arabism as an ideology.

Any book dealing with the Middle East must almost of necessity consider the possibilities for peace. Wilson says that after the Six-Day War many Palestinians told him they were ready to make peace with the Jews, but they grew disillusioned with Israeli policies such as the destruction of villages. Since then positions on both sides have hardened, and the somewhat hopeful atmosphere that prevailed in the summer of 1967 has given way to the resignation born of three and a half years of continued stalemate.

Wilson's proposals for peace center on Jerusalem; as his title indicates, he considers this the possible key to the solution of other issues. He says that the Christians and Muslims of the world will not acquiesce indefinitely in Israel's occupation of their Holy Places and that their anxieties will continue to grow as long as the whole

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

city remains in Israeli hands. He thinks a solution will not be easy, but he makes it clear that the present impasse cannot go on forever. Because the "unique problems" of Jerusalem are international and "transcend purely local issues," he looks to some kind of internationalization as the only possibility.

Rejecting an Israeli-Jordanian condominium as unworkable, he suggests instead the partial internationalization of an area smaller than that envisioned in the UN partition plan, with Jordan and Israel controlling the remainder of the city. The international area would include the Walled City, Mount Zion, the Mount of Olives, the sections between them, and possibly Government House and the surrounding United Nations enclave. Since some of this territory belonged to Israel and some to Jordan prior to June 1967, the concessions from each side would be balanced. The remainder of the formerly Jordanian sector would revert to Jordanian control, and Israel would retain no-man's land. Under this plan the supreme authority in the international zone would at first be in the hands of a United Nations administrator, but would gradually be turned over to a city council elected by the inhabitants. The administrator, a professional similar to an American city manager, would have an Israeli and a Jordanian assistant. The rest of the West Bank would revert to Jordan but with a greater degree of autonomy than it had previously.

The idea of internationalizing all or part of Jerusalem is an attractive one, since it introduces the possibility of removing the city from the Arab-Israeli conflict. But such a proposal ignores the failure of previous efforts to create an international Jerusalem and gives too little weight to the tenacity of both Arab and Israeli claims to the city. Neither side is willing to relinquish its claims to a third party, and in any event the United Nations has been notably unsuccessful in dealing with any aspect of the Middle East conflict. It is even doubtful that the Israelis and Jordanians could agree on an administrator for the city. Wilson admits that his proposals may be visionary, but he points to centuries of fruitful cooperation between Arabs and Jews as an example of what can be accomplished. This cooperation was, however, achieved under conditions considerably different from those which exist today. The creation of the State of Israel embittered relations between Jews and Arabs, perhaps beyond repair. Yet the bleak alternative, according to Wilson, is continued hostilities with the possibility of a nuclear conflict. His book provides a sobering warning that the Middle East remains perhaps the gravest threat to world peace.

The Course of West German-Israeli Relations*

by Nicholas Balabkins

Genocide is not a new phenome-

**Bonn and Jerusalem: The Strange Coalition.* By Inge Deutschkron. Philadelphia: Chilton Book Company, 1970. 357 pp. $13.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

non. From the dawn of history men, tribes and states have warred against each other, but their conflicts have been essentially interclan, intertribal or interstate. In this century, mass murder has taken the form of *intrastate* war. Whereas in an interstate war the objective is generally the defeat, not the extermination, of the adversary, genocide, no matter how defined, aims at complete physical destruction of the designated enemy.

Three major cases of genocide have been carried out in the twentieth century: the Turkish against the Armenians in 1915, the Nazis' against the Jews, and the Stalinists' against "socially unacceptable" elements in the Soviet Union. The Turkish Ittihad ordered the annihilation of one and a half million Armenians; the Nazis gassed or shot an estimated six million Jews; and the Stalinist "re-education" camps and outright executions took the lives of between ten and fifteen million people. What marked the mass killings committed by the government of the Third Reich was adherence to a racist creed and the use of highly sophisticated and technologically advanced methods. The Nazis put to this task industrial techniques, managerial know-how and research laboratories, with the result that factories of human destruction produced death in the same way as other factories produced articles of daily use.

Inge Deutschkron's book, *Bonn and Jerusalem: The Strange Coalition,* traces the changing relationship of Jews and Germans from 1945 to 1970. After Germany's unconditional surrender, the country was cut up into four occupation zones, in which the four victors practiced industrial disarmament, de-Nazification and demilitarization. From 1945 to 1948 the Germans, living on an official food ration of less than 1,500 calories a day, thought first of food and shelter. The animal instinct to survive dominated their daily lives (p. 2), and what had happened to Jews during the war seemed of remote importance. To the outside world all Germans were considered pariahs.

In 1949 the Cold War led to the emergence of two Germanys: the Federal Republic of Germany, firmly allied with the United States, and the German Democratic Republic, allied with the Soviet Union. The legacy of the Third Reich weighed heavily on the new government of the Federal Republic. The image of the horrid *furor teutonicus* was deeply ingrained in the world's mind. Because antagonism against Germans was the order of the day, one of the most pressing problems for the new government was how to bring about West Germany's readmittance into the family of free nations. The Israelis, for the time being, adhered to the policy of "no contact with Germans and no reconciliation, no acceptance of advances." (p. 25.) Memory of the extermination camps was still so fresh that immediate contacts were impossible.

One way Bonn could extend its hand to Israelis and Jews in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Diaspora was to settle the outstanding material claims against Germany. Jewish material claims consisted of three categories: *restitution, collective claim* and *individual compensation*. The problem of restitution, i.e., the return of identifiable property, was not difficult because there had been several precedents of restitution in modern history, going back to the Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648. The demand for collective compensation for irrecoverable Jewish property, however, was legally complex and unique. Even during World War II Jewish leaders in the United States and Palestine had demanded that all Jewish property of missing owners should revert to some central Jewish organization, such as the Jewish Agency. This call for compensation for general damages, arising out of Nazi genocide against all Jews, was a *res nova,* based on moral grounds, and not a conventional demand for reparations. After all, neither West Germany nor Israel existed *de jure* when genocide took place. In the case of an interstate war, the victor imposes a levy upon the vanquished by force, but in this case conventional concepts of legality did not apply.

In addition to restitution and the collective claim, Jews demanded individual compensation for damages for the loss of liberty, life, occupation and/or health. Miss Deutschkron deals with all these claims in chapters two and three. Her account provides some additions to the history of the difficult Wassenaar negotiations, which led to the signing of the Luxemburg Treaty of 1952. Her emphasis on the important role played by the Social Democratic Party, under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher, in supporting Adenauer's policy of "moral comeback" is particularly refreshing. (p. 73.)

Bonn's desire to settle the Jewish claims provided the initial basis for its contacts with the Israelis and Jews from Diaspora. The Arab states deeply resented this policy, however, and the author devotes chapters four and five to German-Arab relations. While both parties continually emphasized their traditional friendship, the Arab governments threatened West Germany with economic boycott, diplomatic recognition of the East German regime, and suspension of diplomatic relations with Bonn if the latter continued to fulfill the obligations it had incurred in Luxemburg, or ever recognized Israel diplomatically or provided weapons for Israel's armed forces. Despite this blackmail, and West German attempts to assuage the Arabs by giving them foreign aid and credits, West Germany stood firm against all Arab onslaughts. (p. 83.)

The abduction of Eichmann and his trial, presented in chapters seven, eight and nine, made the Nazi genocide against Jews horrifyingly real to both the average Israeli and the average German. The long trial revealed all the workings of the Nazi death factories. Genocide was no longer an abstract concept, and for the first time since the Hitler era the conscience of most Germans was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

awakened. Through this trial West Germans discovered Israel.

If Bonn's policy of settling Jewish material claims under the Luxemburg Treaty was impressive, its policy of arming Israel was dramatic. After the United States cut off its arms sales to Israel in 1956, West Germany became one of the few countries willing to make such sales. The account of the secret weapons arrangement is full of little-known details. For example, one member of the Knesset had supposedly remarked that "the Germans should add a clause to their Constitution binding them to responsibility for Israel's security." (p. 266.) The secret arms deliveries began in 1959, shipments reaching Israel via France. By 1964 $45 million worth of military equipment had been shipped; the total West German commitment was $80 million. As Shimon Peres acknowledged, "America gave us money; France, arms for money; Germany, arms without money." (p. 269.) When the secret nature of this arms agreement was discovered, it led to two Israeli governmental crises. The chapter concludes with the observation that "Strauss had done more for German-Jewish reconciliation than any other German, with the exception of Professor Böhm, who had done such vital work to see the Luxemburg Treaty through." (p. 281.)

Chapters ten and eleven and seventeen and eighteen deal with the formal establishment of diplomatic relations after they had been instituted on a semi-official basis by Dr. Felix E. Shinnar, Israel's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Head of the Israel Mission to Cologne in 1953. They reveal numerous forgotten facts recalling how Israel became a victim of the Hallstein Doctrine, and how eventually Chancellor Erhard settled the "debt of honor" to Israel and the Jewish people by deciding to establish formal diplomatic relations regardless of all obstacles. There are also chapters on the work of German scientists for Nasser's Egypt, on the heated debate about the abolishment of the statute of limitations for murder and genocide, and on East Germany's relations with Israel.

For 3,000 years the Jewish people had remembered the crimes against the early Israelites by Amalek; for centuries Jews had refused to set foot on Spanish soil. To talk to Germans in the early 1950's, five years after the holocaust, was to almost all Jews incomprehensible. Therefore, Miss Deutschkron's suggestion that the Luxemburg Treaty and West German military aid were significant elements in solving Israel's economic problems and improving the country's military posture will strike sensitive nerves in Israel and Diaspora. Her presentation of the settlement of Jewish material claims suffers because she lumps the three distinct claims—restitution, collective claim (popularly known as *Shilumim*) and individual compensation—in the restitution concept and neglects to indicate the total of all payments to Israel. Up to the present Israel has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

received more than $2 billion in payments under the Luxemburg Treaty, not including the military aid, long-term West German loans which have been running at roughly $40 million a year, or yearly grants from numerous West German foundations.

In addition, this engrossing volume has many little "bugs." For instance, the Böhm plan (p. 66) was actually drafted by the late Professor Wilhelm Röpke and Professor Fritz W. Meyer of the University of Bonn. Dr. Shinnar did not demand (p. 57) high quality consumer goods, but machinery and equipment. In East Germany there is no such city as Schwein-Rostock (p. 209). The murder of Latvian Jews by Nazis could not have taken place during 1940-1941 (p. 259), because Latvia was under Soviet occupation from June 17, 1940 to July 1941. Finally, to dub Dr. Shinnar as a mere economist forced to be diplomat (pp. 103-104) is an injustice to this able statesman.

On the whole, however, this is a revealing study of a most difficult subject, one that has thus far received little sustained attention anywhere. Historians, economists, political scientists and sociologists may have better analytic techniques at their command, but it will be hard to match Miss Deutschkron's ability to convey to the reader the "spirit of the times" she has dealt with.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Civilisation. By Kenneth Clark. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 359 pp. $15.00. An impressive survey of Western civilization from the fall of the Roman Empire to the present day, in which the author explores history and culture through the diverse creative works of Western man and underscores his text with nearly 300 beautifully reproduced color and black-and-white illustrations. Based on the scripts of the justly famous television series, *Civilisation,* this book describes the great men of the Western world and the works of genius they produced—in architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry, philosophy, science, engineering and other fields of endeavor. Kenneth Clark was formerly Director of the National Gallery in London and Chairman of the Arts Council of Great Britain; he was recently elevated to a life peerage and bears the title of Lord Clark of Saltwood.

Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations. By Mark W. Zacher. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 295 pp. $7.00. An examination of the late Secretary-General's conception of the goals and bases of power of the United Nations and his strategies and tactics for promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes, controlling the use of force, advancing the cause of arms control and disarmament, and building a more peaceful world order.

National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. By Albert O. Hirschman. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. 170 pp. $8.25. This book, first published in 1945 and reprinted now with corrections, is a pioneering study of the connection between economic and political phenomena in international relations. Using his systematic theoretical understanding of the link between economic gains from trade and the power or influence derived from trade, Hirschman predicts the way in which a power-maximizing trading country would reorient its trade. With the help of specially devised statistical tools, he tests the theory through an exhaustive investigation of world trade.

Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1970. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins and Alba Amoia. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970. 534 pp. $19.95. The 42nd edition of the Council on Foreign Relations' *Political Handbook,* totally redesigned and rewritten, covers the two-year period 1969-1970 and is larger than its annual predecessors in every way. In convenient reference form, it now records basic social and economic as well as political information about all the sovereign states and related territories of the contemporary world and contains a new section on major intergovernmental organizations. Country articles, following a general description, include data on political history, constitutional structure, foreign relations, governmental personnel, political parties and com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munications media, updated to September 1, 1969; a supplement capsulizes significant changes between that date and January 1, 1970. The accompanying atlas has also been expanded, and there are a number of line maps of areas where geographic factors have special bearing.

Religion and Political Development. By Donald Eugene Smith. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970. 298 pp. $3.95 (paper). Dr. Smith, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, explores the relationship between traditional religions and political development on a broadly comparative basis. While recognizing that "religion is in general an obstacle to modernization," he points out that "religious factors [also] have played and continue to play a positive role in certain aspects of political development." His study shows how Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Catholicism differ in their influence on the processes of cultural secularization and structural differential in the countries of South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America.

Trade Agreements for Developing Countries. By Gilbert P. Verbit. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 249 pp. $8.50. The former Legal Adviser to the Ministry of External Affairs of Tanzania examines trade agreements as one means of accelerating economic growth in less developed countries. In describing the various forms of trade agreements entered into by developing nations in recent years, the author treats such topics as most-favored-nation treatment, quantitative import restrictions, exchange controls, state trading, export subsidies and dumping, and promotion of trade. Mr. Verbit is currently Assistant Director, Resources for Development, in the International Legal Center in New York.

Yearbook of International Organizations. (Twelfth edition.) Edited by Eyvind S. Tew. Brussels, Belgium: Union of International Associations, 1969. 1,220 pp. $24.00. This 1968-1969 edition provides comprehensive information on 4,252 international and regional organizations and associations in every field of human activity. It lists organizations classified according to their field of operation; addresses of organizations arranged by continent, country and city; 600 multinational business corporations; and 105 institutes, schools and study centers of international relations. The main part of the volume is an alphabetical listing of international organizations with details on the aims, structures, officers, activities, finances and publications of each.

II. United States

America & the World: From the Truman Doctrine to Vietnam. By Robert E. Osgood and others. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 434 pp. $2.95 (paper). The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research has begun with this volume a series of studies designed to assess on a continuing basis the state of American foreign policy in the context of major trends in domestic and international politics. Seven leading scholars have contributed essays: Robert E. Osgood, in two papers, reappraises U.S. policies and examines global military issues; Robert W. Tucker and Herbert S. Dinerstein analyze American and Soviet outlooks and objectives; Francis E. Rourke writes on the American domestic scene, Isaiah Frank on economic constraints, Laurence W. Martin on Europe, and George Liska on the Third World.

The American Indian Today. Edited by Stuart Levine and Nancy O. Lurie. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970. 352 pp. $1.95 (paper). Leading anthropologists and educators explore topics of Indian thought, history and trends. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problem of the modern American Indian's search for an identity receives particular attention, as well as his relationship to the U.S. government.

Cracks in the Melting Pot: Racism and Discrimination in American History. By Melvin Steinfield. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Glencoe Press, 1970. 354 pp. $3.95 (paper). This collection of readings on racism and discrimination in the American past deals primarily with the black targets of white racism but includes considerable material on anti-Semitism, American Indians, Mexican-Americans, Chinese, Japanese and other ethnic minorities. Mr. Steinfield is Assistant Professor of History at San Diego Mesa College and is actively involved in community programs in civil rights and intergroup relations.

Development Assistance in the Seventies: Alternatives for the United States. By Robert E. Asher. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1970. 248 pp. $6.95. In this comprehensive and lucid examination of U.S. technical and financial assistance to less developed countries, the author assesses the security, economic, political and humanitarian rationales for aid; the development process and the status of poor countries at the opening of the 1970's; the special problems of debt burden, terms of aid, and overpopulation; the relative advantages of multilateral vs. bilateral aid; trade and private investment policies; balance of payments restrictions and monetary reform; the uses of seabeds and ocean floors, and the need for new U.S. authorizing legislation for a revamped aid program.

Friendship Under Stress: U.S.-Swiss Relations, 1900-1950. By H. K. Meier. Bern: Herbert Lang & Company, 1970. 423 pp. $10.60. Dr. Meier, born and raised in Switzerland and now Professor of History at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia, has written a comprehensive history of political, economic, diplomatic and cultural relations between the United States and Switzerland during the first half of the 20th century.

The Hidden Crisis in American Politics. By Samuel Lubell. New York: W. W. Norton, 1970. 306 pp. $5.95. The noted public-opinion analyst and author of *The Future of American Politics* examines the causes and consequences of the "rapid change" that "has become the prime political disturber of our time." Much of his analysis deals with four crucial conflicts which divide the nation: racial antagonisms, the youth rebellion and university crisis, the competition over how to divide the economic resources generated by a managed economy, and a growing isolationism born of the Viet Nam war.

Laws and Men: The Challenge of American Politics. By Daniel M. Berman and Louis S. Loeb. New York: Macmillan, 1970. 432 pp. $7.95. In this textbook on the American political system, the authors have organized their study into the following sections: the voter; political behavior and public opinion; the pressure of interests; political parties; the media, public relations, and the political process; money and politics; freedom of political expression; formulating policy at the national level; policymaking in the Congress; presidential policymaking and the bureaucracy; policymaking by the courts; dispersing the powers of government; and a troubled agenda for the future.

The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946-1952. By Alan D. Harper. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1969. 318 pp. $13.00. An account of the Truman Administration's attempts to establish a loyalty program for government employees that would satisfy the strident partisan demands for total security and still protect the rights of the individual. Dr. Harper is with the Department of History at Queens College, City University of New York.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III. Western Europe and the Atlantic Community

Les Chemins de Fer et l'Europe. (Two volumes.) Edited by I. B. F. Kormoss. Bruges, Belgium: De Tempel, for the College of Europe, 1969. 567 pp. n.p. A two-volume collection of lectures delivered in past years at annual seminars conducted by the College of Europe for the European Center for the Advanced Training of Railway Staff, an organization founded in 1962 to provide present and future senior railway executives with courses devoted to a study of European political and economic problems and their repercussions on transportation in general and railroads in particular. A further aim of the Center is to promote personal contacts between participants.

Denmark. By W. Glyn Jones. New York: Praeger, 1970. 256 pp. $8.00. Dr. Jones, reader in Danish at University College, London, traces the progress of Danish society and politics since 1814 and seeks to place modern Denmark into historical perspective and make it intelligible to non-Scandinavian audiences. A literary historian, he devotes considerable attention to cultural and social factors. Valuable information on social legislation, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, the Danish West Indies, and rulers of Denmark is given in the appendix of this volume in the Nations of the Modern World series.

Economic Policy and Planning in the Netherlands, 1950-1965. By James Goodear Abert. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. 282 pp. $10.00. This interpretive history of economic planning in the Netherlands is designed to examine the economic and political structure within which Dutch economic policy is framed and the main institutions and tools used in the policymaking process. There are separate chapters on the Dutch economy, government economic policy, the political process, wage policy, the technical process, coordination of economic policy, econometric models of the Central Planning Bureau, and accuracy analysis of the bureau's models.

France Since 1918. By Herbert Tint. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 210 pp. $6.95. In this account of French history from the close of the First World War to the present day, the author has not only depicted the key political, economic and social developments but has also devoted considerable attention to intellectual currents throughout the period.

The Government and Politics of Britain. By John P. Mackintosh. New York: Hillary House Publishers Ltd., 1971. 206 pp. $5.50 ($2.50, paper). Intended not as a factual guide but as an interpretive essay on how the British political system works, this book deals with the major controversies of interest to the author, an M.P. for Berwick and East Lothian.

The Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy-Making in an Authoritarian System. By Charles W. Anderson. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970. 282 pp. $12.50. In this comprehensive study of the political economy of Spain, chiefly from 1957 to 1967, the author compares the Spanish experience with that of other West European nations and the United States and concludes that the Spanish political system has been considerably more flexible—if not less authoritarian—than is commonly believed. In analyzing Spanish policy-making, he focuses on the stabilization program and liberalization policy of 1959 and the experiment in national economic planning of 1963, and reports on the thoroughgoing transformation of Spain's approach to economic affairs, "along lines more compatible with . . . neo-Keynesian economic principles. . . ." He also explains the reasons behind the "Spanish economic miracle" of the 1957-1967 period, during which the Spanish economy grew at an annual average rate of 9 per cent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Problems of Atlantic Partnership: National Perspectives. By William C. Cromwell, N. Forman and J. Joffe. Bruges, Belgium: College of Europe, 1969. 458 pp. n.p. The authors, William Cromwell, Nigel Forman and Josef Joffe, treat in their respective sections the attitudes and viewpoints toward Atlantic Partnership of the United States, Great Britain and the Federal Republic. Originally, these papers were prepared for a seminar held in 1965-1966 at the College of Europe; they have been updated to include events through 1968.

The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community: The Weak Confront the Strong. By I. William Zartman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. 243 pp. $8.50. Professor Zartman attempts in this study to examine both theoretical and practical issues concerned with the question of how the weak negotiate with the strong. By reporting and analyzing the political maneuverings in discrete but similar sets of negotiations between the EEC and several African states, he is able to compare tactics and results of the respective transactions. In particular, the negotiations treated are the two Yaoundé Conventions with the 18 Associated African States; the two Arusha Conventions with East Africa; the Lagos Convention with Nigeria; the Rabat and Tunis Conventions with Morocco and Tunis; and the transactions within the institutions established by the first Yaoundé Convention.

The Stable Crisis: Two Decades of German Foreign Policy. By Wolfram F. Hanrieder. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 221 pp. $3.50 (paper). In this analysis of West German foreign policy from 1949 to 1969, Dr. Hanrieder shows how its major goals—security, political and economic recovery, and reunification—have remained remarkably constant. Each goal is treated in a separate chapter, and the final chapter is devoted to a discussion of the domestic predispositions that have shaped the West German response to international challenges.

Trieste, 1941-1954: The Ethnic, Political, and Ideological Struggle. By Bogdan C. Novak. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970. 526 pp. $16.50. A detailed study of the Julian Region and its major city, Trieste, a strategically sensitive area between Italy and Yugoslavia. Dr. Novak, a native of Slovenia and resident of the disputed area until 1951, and currently Professor of History at the University of Toledo, views the Trieste problem primarily as a struggle of nationalism in an ethnically mixed territory: Croat and Slovenian vs. Italian nationalisms. His book deals with the wartime period and postwar dispute; the 1947 Paris peace conference when the region was divided into three sections—a small western part to Italy, a larger eastern part to Yugoslavia, and the city of Trieste and its hinterland which became a state under UN protection; and the history of the new state, the Free Territory of Trieste, which was finally partitioned between Italy and Yugoslavia in 1954.

IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Patriarch and Prophets: Persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church Today. By Michael Bourdeaux. New York: Praeger, 1970. 359 pp. $10.00. A detailed account of the massive persecution, especially severe since 1960, of the Russian Orthodox Church. The author covers all aspects of this campaign: persecution and harassment of the clergy and believers, suppression of the monasteries and seminaries, disintegration of parish life, and the legal dimensions of the Soviet state's renewed commitment to the destruction of religion. Bourdeaux, an ordained priest in the Church of England, currently a history fellow at the Center for International Studies at the London School of Economics and Political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Science, and author of two previous books on the Christian religion in the USSR, points hopefully to rising protests in the Soviet Union against religious persecution and to the growth of an Orthodox Church-oriented human-rights movement which is linking up with intellectuals, artists, national minorities and other religions, including Baptists, Jews and Muslims.

The People's Democracies After Prague: Soviet Hegemony, Nationalism, Regional Integration? Edited by Jerzy Lukaszewski. Bruges, Belgium: De Tempel, for the College of Europe, 1970. 330 pp. n.p. The papers in this volume were delivered in March 1969 at a symposium organized by the Commission of the European Communities and the Belgian Ministry of National Education and Culture. The contributors and their topics include Michel Tatu on the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the détente in Europe; Heinz Kuby on Eastern Europe in a bipolar world; John Pinder, John M. Montias and Vladislav Pavlat on COMECON and obstacles to the economic integration of Eastern Europe; Ghita Ionescu and Eugen Lemberg on East European nationalism; Werner J. Feld on the utility of the EEC experience for Eastern Europe; and Zbigniew Brzezinski on prospects for the Soviet bloc after Prague.

The Soviet Paradigm. By Roy D. Laird. New York: The Free Press, 1970. 272 pp. $7.95. According to the author, this book is intended primarily for the upper-level college student of Soviet political affairs. It is his belief that while much has changed in the Soviet Union, similarities to the Stalinist period remain. Political change is seen as a slow, relatively linear evolution toward a political model of monohierarchical character, depending upon a highly disciplined and bureaucratic apparatus.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A Handbook. Edited by George Schopflin. New York: Praeger, 1970. 614 pp. $25.00. A comprehensive reference work in which experts examine the political and economic systems of the Soviet Union and the East European countries as well as the structure of their societies and their cultural life. Basic information on the governments, economies, communications and social structures of the communist-ruled states is followed by analyses of military and strategic affairs, planning and economic policy, trade, social affairs, education, law, religion and culture.

Understanding the Russians: A Citizen's Primer. By Foy D. Kohler. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 441 pp. $10.00. A lively and important study of Soviet society, leadership, government bureaucracy, foreign policies, and the apparatus of international communism written by the former American Ambassador to the USSR (1962-1966), who is currently a Professor at the Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami. Some of the most informative chapters treat of Stalin and the making of the Soviet monolith, the Khrushchev era and de-Stalinization, the Sino-Soviet conflict, the foundations and instruments of Soviet foreign policy, Germany and Berlin, and Soviet interests in Cuba, Latin America, Viet Nam and the Middle East.

V. Middle East and Africa

The Arab World and Israel. By Ahmad El Kodsy and Eli Lobel. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970. 137 pp. $6.00 ($2.25, paper). Two essays, "Nationalism and Class Struggles in the Arab World" and "Palestine and the Jews," written from the Marxist viewpoint by an Egyptian and an Israeli living in France.

Biafra: The Making of a Nation. By Arthur A. Nwankwo and Samuel U. Ifejika. New York: Praeger, 1970. 361 pp. $8.95. Treating the major events that led

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from Nigerian independence to the secession of Biafra in 1967, this work, except for a postscript describing Biafra under war conditions, largely neglects the civil war itself. The authors, both Biafrans, present the case for Biafran independence, concentrating upon those elements which, to them, constituted the "making of a nation."

History of North Africa: Tunisia-Algeria-Morocco. By Charles-André Julien. New York: Praeger, 1970. 446 pp. $13.50. Originally published in France in 1931 (the present work translates the second edition of 1952, which was updated by Roger Le Tourneau), this classic history of the Maghreb covers in detail the period from the mid-seventh-century Arab conquest to the advent of French colonialism in 1830. It provides the background necessary to the appreciation of contemporary North Africa that has long been missing in a convenient English volume.

History of West Africa: The Revolutionary Years—1815 to Independence. By J. B. Webster and A. A. Boahen with H. O. Idowu. New York: Praeger, 1970. 333 pp. $9.00 ($3.50, paper). Writing from the African rather than a European point of view, the authors portray the revolutionary ferment in almost all West African societies as they attempted to resist the encroachment of Muslim expansion and the wave of European colonialism.

Islam in Egypt Today: Social and Political Aspects of Popular Religion. By Morroe Berger. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970. 138 pp. $6.95. A detailed analysis of contemporary religion in the United Arab Republic and its political significance. The roles of the local mosques, the *sufi* organizations and the interplay between government and religious groups are evaluated. The result, the author finds, is an increased appreciation of the continuing importance of religion despite the emphasis given to nationalism and economic development and the attendant governmental pressure toward secularism.

Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics. By Majid Khadduri. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 298 pp. $11.00. A survey of the Arab world's search for a viable political order. Traditional Islam, having for centuries provided a way of life, has seemingly been inadequate to the challenge of economic development and rising expectations of the modern technological era. The author examines experiments with nationalism and democracy, Islamic revivalism and reform, and the role of various contemporary ideologies as they may affect the Arab world's future prospects in both foreign and domestic matters.

Problems in the History of Colonial Africa, 1860-1960. Edited by Robert O. Collins. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. 389 pp. $7.95 ($4.95, paper). This volume, intended as a companion to the editor's *Problems in African History*, focuses on seven problems dealing with the partition, occupation and administration of Africa by the European powers. The author includes many useful and interesting selections that might not otherwise be readily available to the student of African politics and brings together diverse points of view on the topics under discussion.

Rhodesia: A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society. By Frank Clements. New York: Praeger, 1969. 286 pp. $6.50. A former mayor of Salisbury and 20-year resident of the country, writes intimately of the sentiments typical of most of Rhodesia's ruling white minority. He sketches the lengthy and active history of Rhodesia well before its "founding" by Cecil Rhodes in the late nineteenth century; examines the brief history and current posture of the 200,000 people—barely 5 per cent of the population—who compose white Rhodesian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society; and scrutinizes the effects of Ian Smith's independence policy on the Rhodesians, the new signs of African political self-assertion, and prospects for disruption of the white man's order.

Rwanda and Burundi. By René Lemarchand. New York: Praeger, 1970. 561 pp. $12.50. A thorough and instructive exposition of Rwanda and Burundi's social structure, political institutions and colonial heritage. Lemarchand assesses the dissimilar nature of German and Belgian colonial rule in the two countries and attempts to account for the violence experienced by Rwanda as contrasted to the relative ease of transition in government experienced in Burundi. Also included is an examination of the role of external forces—the United Nations, the Chinese communists, and the retreating Belgian colonial administration—on developments in the two states.

South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid. By Amry Vandenbosch. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970. 303 pp. $8.50. In this scholarly, comprehensive study of South Africa's foreign policy, Professor Vandenbosch briefly examines the Dutch and British colonial periods, the development of an independent policy during World War I, and the problems and uncertainties of the interwar period, culminating in the resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism during World War II. More than half of the book is devoted to "the foreign policy of Apartheid" since 1948, with separate chapters on the High Commission territories; Rhodesia; other African states; expulsion from the Commonwealth; conflict with the UN over Southwest Africa, Apartheid, and the treatment of Indians; and South Africa's attempts to counteract her increasing diplomatic and moral isolation.

VI. East Asia and the Pacific

A Century of Chinese Revolution, 1851-1949. By Wolfgang Franke. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970. 202 pp. $5.95. Professor Franke, author of *China and the West,* sets forth the stages in the development of the revolution in China from the start of the Taiping Rebellion to Mao's accession to power and examines the complex social, economic and political factors that combined to destroy the foundations of traditional Chinese society.

Communist China, 1949-1969: A Twenty-Year Appraisal. Edited by Frank N. Trager and William Henderson. New York: The New York University Press, for the American-Asian Educational Exchange, 1970. 356 pp. $7.95. Contributors and topics include Franz Michael on ideology and the cult of Mao; Jürgen Domes, party politics and the Cultural Revolution; William W. Whitson, the role of the military in the policy process; Yuan-li Wu, the economy after 20 years; E. Stuart Kirby, agrarian problems and the peasantry; Theodore Hsi-en Chen, education under communism; Vincent Y. C. Shih, the state of the intellectuals; Robert A. Rupen, the national minorities; Richard C. Thornton, China and the communist world; Richard L. Walker, China's approach to the outside world; and the editors on U.S. policy and Communist China.

Communist China's Interaction with the Arab Nationalists Since the Bandung Conference. By Joseph E. Kahlili. New York: Exposition Press, 1970. 121 pp. $7.50. A discussion of the goals of the People's Republic of China with respect to the Arab world and an assessment of some of the activities undertaken to achieve them since 1955. Peking's designs toward Arab revolutionary movements, stands on various global issues, and behavior at Third World conferences are considered as they have borne on Sino-Arab relations, and there is a country-by-country analysis of the Arab states' trade and cultural relations with China.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era. By Arthur Stein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. 310 pp. $9.50. From a brief historic backdrop, the author analyzes the areas of harmony and tension, during the Nehru era, in the most extensive relationship of an independent nation with the Soviet Union. The factors that have encouraged close ties between these two major countries are examined primarily from the Indian vantage point. A final chapter reviews the more important developments since the leadership changes of 1964.

The Jana Sangh: A Biography of an Indian Political Party. By Craig Baxter. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. 352 pp. $12.50. A U.S. Foreign Service Officer, who has been stationed in or concerned with the Indian subcontinent since 1958, assesses Jana Sangh's place within the Indian political system and its relationship to religio-political movements which are increasing in strength in several Afro-Asian countries. After surveying its political and ideological-organizational ancestors, the Hindu Mahasabha and the militant RSS, respectively, the author describes the party's position on such issues as the role of non-Hindu minorities, Hindi as a national language, Hinduism as the basis for Indian society and development, Pakistan-Indian relations, and India's role in the world. He analyzes in considerable detail the party's participation in the national elections of 1952, 1957, 1962 and 1967; its manifestoes, leadership, tactics, and increasing appeal.

Japan in Postwar Asia. By Lawrence Olson. New York: Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1970. 288 pp. $10.00. Making extensive use of Japanese sources, Dr. Olson, Professor of History at Wesleyan University, traces the evolution of Japan's relations with the rest of Asia from the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 to 1969. This is the story of the re-establishment of trust and diplomatic ties, reparation agreements, commercial relations, and—especially since 1964—of Japan's search for security, regional cooperation, and her proper role in Asia's modernization. Considerable attention is given to her relations with Peking and to a country-by-country examination of her current activities in noncommunist Asia, from India to South Korea.

Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia. Edited by Robert O. Tilman. New York: Praeger, 1969. 637 pp. $13.50. A collection of 40 articles and statements by American, European, Australian and Southeast Asian specialists on the history and culture of the area; the nature of "traditional" and "modern" values and the process of social change; the political ideologies, structures and leadership of the various states; problems of national integration and the outlook for regional integration; and the social and cultural obstacles to economic development.

Southeast Asia Today and Tomorrow: Problems of Political Development. (Second edition.) By Richard Butwell. New York: Praeger, 1969. 240 pp. $7.00. The two chief problems of Southeast Asia have been to develop viable and stable political processes and to prevent efforts, internal and external, to exploit the failure to achieve such political goals. Employing both a comparative and a topical approach, the author analyzes each nation's political, economic and social developments and its many foreign concerns, chief among the latter being the impact of the Viet Nam war.

The United States and the Future of Thailand. By David A. Wilson. New York: Praeger, 1970. 181 pp. $7.50. Dr. Wilson, Professor of Political Science at UCLA, traces the history of Thai-U.S. relations and shows how the alliance between the two countries has been based on a congruence of political interests. He also examines Thailand's economic and political affairs and the reasons

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

why Thai society is better integrated and more stable than those of her neighbors in Southeast Asia.

A View from New Delhi. By Chester Bowles. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. 268 pp. $7.50. A selection of speeches and articles by the U.S. Ambassador to India from 1963 to 1969. The author's thesis is that communication among people, in both domestic and foreign affairs, is, next to the control of population and nuclear weapons, the most important subject on earth. The topics discussed are: the workings of the American democratic system, American objectives in world affairs, and the problems of economic development.

VII. Latin America

A History of Brazil. By E. Bradford Burns. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 449 pp. $11.95. Dr. Burns, author of four previous books on Brazil, traces here the economic, social, cultural and political evolution of Latin America's largest nation from its discovery to the present. Focusing on trends and movements, he examines how the forces of nationalism, urbanization, industrialization and democratization have influenced Brazil's development since 1850.

Internal Colonialism and Structural Change in Colombia. Edited by A. Eugene Havens and William L. Flinn. New York: Praeger, 1970. 252 pp. $15.00. In this detailed and sharply critical study of Colombia's economic, political, ecclesiastical and educational institutions, seven specialists in rural sociology, agricultural sociology, and the law and the church in Colombia argue that drastic structural change is required before the country can achieve significant economic growth. Basing their findings on intensive field studies, the contributors describe the Colombian economic and social system as internal colonialism, for they conclude that decisions regarding the allocation of resources are made by a coalition of industrialists, landowners and politicians to the disadvantage of the vast majority. Both editors teach in the Department of Rural Sociology at the University of Wisconsin; Havens is Director of the University's Center for Developing Nations Programs and Flinn is associated with the Land Tenure Center.

Peru. By Sir Robert Marett. New York: Praeger, 1969. 280 pp. $7.50. In this history of Peru, a volume in the Nations of the Modern World series, the author gives brief attention to Inca society and the Spanish colony and describes in greater detail the affairs of the republic from 1821 to 1895. More than half of the book is devoted to the modern era (to 1969), with special treatment of the dictatorship of Augusto B. Leguia, the central role of APRA, the rise and fall of Fernando Belaúnde, problems of economic development, agrarian reform and urban assimilation, the Indian peasantry, and Peru's foreign policy. Sir Robert Marett is a former British diplomat who served eight years in Peru, including four years as the British Ambassador.

Politics and Social Structure in Latin America. By James Petras. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970. 382 pp. $9.50. This collection of essays attempts to survey and assess the impact of the class structure of Latin American countries on their political problems. Petras concludes with a general criticism of eight recent books on Latin America.

The Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America: A Documentary History, 1960-1968. Compiled and translated by J. Gregory Oswald. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971. 365 pp. $15.00. This compilation of 47 Soviet writings on the contemporary Latin American scene presents a cross-section of Soviet official and academic viewpoints. The selections are topically organized and center on the Cuban revolution, economic problems, labor and trade unionism, the Church, and national liberation movements.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Monographs and Reports Received

Anatomy of Political Institutionalization: The Case of Israel and Some Comparative Analyses. By Amos Perlmutter. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs No. 25, August 1970. 56 pp. $2.25.

The Cause and Effect of the "Cultural Revolution." By Yeh Hsiung-chih. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, May 1970. 111 pp. $1.20.

The Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Publications in Western Languages, 1960-1970. By Joseph-john Nevadomsky and Alice Li. Berkeley: University of California, Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, Occasional Paper No. 6, 1970. 119 pp. n.p.

Defence by Other Means: Diplomacy for the Underdog. By Arthur Andrew. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1970. 123 pp. $2.00.

Ecology and Politics in America's Environmental Crisis. Contributions by Cyril E. Black, Robert F. Goheen, Henry M. Jackson, Walter J. Hickel, Harold Sprout and others. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Policy Memorandum No. 37, August 1970. 138 pp. $3.50.

Fishy Winds and Bloody Rains: The Struggle between "Rebels" and "Power Holders" in the Chinese Communist Camp. By Yu Hen Mao. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, June 1970. 89 pp. $1.00.

Further Weapons Against Inflation: Measures to Supplement General Fiscal and Monetary Policies. A Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee, CED. New York: Committee for Economic Development, November 1970. 34 pp. $1.50.

The General Assembly: Patterns, Problems, Prospects. By Ruth B. Russell. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 1970. 77 pp. $1.00.

Issues Before the 25th General Assembly. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *International Conciliation,* No. 579, September 1970. 222 pp. $1.25.

Multi-Ethnic Politics: The Case of Malaysia. By Cynthia H. Enloe. Berkeley: University of California, Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, Research Monograph No. 2, August 1970. 172 pp. n.p.

Questions and Answers on Current Conditions on the Chinese Mainland. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, July 1970. 105 pp. $1.30.

The Shaping of Foreign Policy: The Role of the Secretary of State as Seen by Dean Acheson. By Ronald J. Stupak. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969. 132 pp. n.p.

The Soviet-American Confrontation, 1970 (Four reports: I, The Global Soviet-American Relationship. II, The East-West Confrontation in Europe, 1970—The Soviet-West German Treaty and European Security. III, The Great Powers and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Middle East in 1970. IV, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1970—The Main Trends.). By William E. Griffith. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, C/70-15, 16, 17, 18, October 1970. 14,29,46,29 pp. n.p.

Soviet Russia and the Middle East. By Aaron S. Klieman. Washington: The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Studies in International Affairs No. 14, November 1970. 107 pp. $2.45.

Statement to the European Parliament: Strasbourg, 15 September 1970. By Franco Maria Malfatti. Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities, 1970. 22 pp. n.p.

The True Facts of Chinese Communist Accelerated Aggression against Foreign Countries at the Present Stage. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, August 1970. 76 pp. 90 cents.

United Kingdom: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, November 1970. 47 pp. 80 cents.

Vietnam: Which Way to Peace? A discussion by Roger Hilsman, Harold C. Hinton, Morton A. Kaplan and Hans J. Morgenthau. Chicago: The University of Chicago, Center for Policy Study, November 12, 1970. 27 pp. $1.00.

Yugoslavia: An Economic Survey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, November 1970. 66 pp. 80 cents.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contributors to this Issue

James N. Rosenau, Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University; formerly, Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University. Author of *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (1971) and *The Adaptation of National Societies* (1970); currently preparing a book entitled *Citizenship Between Elections: An Inquiry into the Mobilizable American.*

Hammond Rolph, Research Associate, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California; Consulting Editor, *Studies in Comparative Communism.* Co-author of *Communism in Vietnam: A Documentary Study* and author of articles on revolutionary war in Asia.

Alvin J. Cottrell, Director of Research, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

Harry G. Gelber, Reader in Politics, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. Formerly, American Council of Learned Societies Fellow and Research Associate, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

René Albrecht-Carrié, Professor Emeritus of History, Barnard College and Columbia University; currently Distinguished Visiting Professor of History at Rockford College, Rockford, Illinois. Author of *Britain and France: Adaptations to a Changing Context of Power* (Doubleday, 1970).

William G. Andrews, Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Faculty of the Social Sciences, State University College, Brockport, New York. Author of numerous articles and books on French politics.

Charles A. Micaud, Professor of International Relations, The Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver. Author of *French Right and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939* (Octagon Books, 1964), *Communism and the French Left* (Praeger, 1964), and other studies on French and North African politics.

Elmer Plischke, Professor and Head, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland. Author of *Conduct of American Diplomacy* (Van Nostrand, 1967, third edition) and *Contemporary Government of Germany* (Houghton Mifflin, 1969, revised edition).

Phebe Ann Marr, Assistant Professor of History, Stanislaus State College, Turlock, California. Formerly, Research Fellow and Instructor, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, and Chairman, Near East Program, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State.

Daniel Tretiak, Senior Political Scientist, Advanced Studies Group, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Waltham, Massachusetts; specialist in the study of the international politics of the communist system.

Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Beaver College, Glenside, Pennsylvania; member, Editorial Research Staff, ORBIS; specialist in Western European Union and European Economic Community affairs.

Lothar Metzl, Research Professor of International Affairs, The George Washington University.

Linda Rose, Lecturer, Department of Oriental Studies, University of Pennsylvania; Research Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Nicholas Balabkins, Professor of Economics, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Author of *Germany Under Direct Controls: Economic Aspects of Industrial Disarmament, 1945-1948* (1964), and of the forthcoming book, *West German Reparations to Israel.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

International Organization

Announces a Special Issue for Autumn 1970

REGIONAL INTEGRATION | Theory and Research

Leading scholars explore the theoretical and empirical aspects of the study of regional integration in the most comprehensive and up-to-date work in the field.

Leon N. Lindberg — Stuart A. Scheingold

Editors

Hayward R. Alker	Ernst B. Haas
Fred M. Hayward	Ronald Inglehart
Andrzej Korbonski	Leon N. Lindberg
Joseph S. Nye	Donald J. Puchala
Stuart A. Scheingold	Philippe C. Schmitter

Contributors

Volume 24 — Number 4

Individual copies of this issue will be available in paperback or cloth edition from Harvard University Press or as part of a subscription to **International Organization.**

SUBSCRIPTION RATE: **$7.50 A YEAR** **$19.00 THREE YEARS**

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

40 MOUNT VERNON STREET

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02108

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EUROPA-ARCHIV

Zeitschrift für internationale Politik

Begründet von Wilhelm Cornides

Seit 1945 erfüllt das EUROPA-ARCHIV die Aufgabe eines aussenpolitischen Fachblattes, das anhand von Beiträgen und Berichten, Wiedergabe wichtiger Dokumente, Besprechungen von Neuerscheinungen und einer Chronologie des politischen Geschehens dem Leser die Möglichkeit bietet, sich selbständig ein Urteil über die Weltlage zu bilden.

Alle 14 Tage bietet das EUROPA-ARCHIV dokumentarische Analysen der Ereignisse, die für die Weltpolitik entwicklungsbestimmend sind.

Das EUROPA-ARCHIV ist dadurch in den 25 Jahren seines Erscheinens zu einer "Miniatur-Enzyklopädie für die wesentlichen Tagesfragen" der Politik geworden.

Jahresabonnement (24 Folgen): DM 75,—zuzüglich Porto. Probehefte auf Wunsch kostenlos

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.
EUROPA-ARCHIV, Vertrieb, 6 Frankfurt, Postfach 3685

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

An international journal for the study of China

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1970 **ISSUE NO. 44**

China and the Overseas Chinese: Perceptions and Policies — Stephen FitzGerald

Taiwanese and Mainlanders on Taiwan: A Survey of Student Attitudes — Sheldon Appleton

The Role of Law in Communist China — Victor H. Li

The Role of the Military in the Formation of Revolutionary Committees, 1967-68 — Jürgen Domes

Party Views of Science: The Record from the First Decade — Richard P. Suttmeier

Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the CCP — Parris H. Chang

COMMENT BOOK REVIEWS QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

Editorial Office: 24 Fitzroy Square, London W. 1
Subscription Agents: Research Publications Ltd., 11 Nelson Road, London S.E.10

Subscription rates: £3 or U.S. $7.50 a year
For full-time students: £2 or U.S. $5.00
Individual copies: 15s. or $2.00

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Australian Journal of Politics and History

Volume XVI August 1970 Number 2

Keith Sinclair	AUSTRALASIAN INTER-GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATIONS 1865-80: OCEAN MAILS AND TARIFFS
W. Bruce Lincoln	COUNT P. D. KISELEV: A REFORMER IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA
Robert R. Sullivan	THE ARCHITECTURE OF WESTERN SECURITY IN THE SOUTHERN TIER OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
A. Chanady	GERMANY, RUMANIA AND THE BRITISH GUARANTEES OF MARCH-APRIL 1939
J. H. Bell and J. R. von Sturmer	CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS: SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND HISTORY

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY is published three times yearly, in April, August and December. Individual copies: $2.00. Subscription rates payable in advance: Australia $5.25 a year; United Kingdom £2.10.0 stg. (including postage); U.S.A. $6.00 (including postage); Canada $6.00 (including postage).
Address orders to:

The Manager,
University of Queensland Press,
ST. LUCIA, Queensland, 4067, Australia

The Journal of Politics invites you to join its ever-increasing circle of readers

The February 1971 issue contains:

Nonviolence, Violence, and Reason
William R. Marty

Ambition and the Political Vocation: Congressional Challengers in American Politics
Jeff Fishel

The Closed Rule and the Paradox of Voting
John C. Blydenburgh

Issue Conflict and Consensus: A Comparative Study of Democratic and Republican Delegates to the 1968 National Conventions
John W. Soule and James W. Clarke

Malapportionment and Roll-Call Voting in Indiana, 1923-1963: A Computer Simulation
C. Richard Hofstetter

Economic Development, Representative Mechanisms, Administrative Professionalism and Public Policies: A Comparative Analysis of Within-State Distributions of Economic and Political Traits
Ira Sharkansky

Ideology and Politics: The Rechtsstaat Idea in West Germany
Glenn Schram

Socio-Economic Conditions and Party Politics in Japan: A Statistical Analysis of the 1969 General Election
Chao-Jin Lee

Research Notes

Military Interpretation of Federal Constitutions: A Critique
R. D. Dikshit

Political Ambitions and the Prosecutorial Office
Richard L. Engstrom

Published Quarterly by

The Southern Political Science Association

Peabody Hall, University of Florida • Gainesville, Florida 32601, U.S.A.

Subscription and Membership Fee: $8.00 U.S.A.; $8.60 Foreign; $5.00 for students registered in universities

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Politique Etrangère

la grande revue des questions internationales

SOMMAIRE

No. 4—1970

Jean CHAUVEL, ambassadeur de France	La conférence de Genève sur l'Indochine et la conjoncture actuelle
René FABRE	Les plantations de caoutchouc du Vietnam
Jean KLEIN	L'utilisation militaire des fonds marins et le désarmement
Mario LEVI et Walter SCHÜTZE	Les relations économiques de la République Fédérale avec les Pays de l'Est

SOMMAIRE

No. 5—1970

Un groupe d'études	La réduction équilibrée des forces et l'aménagement de la sécurité en Europe dans le contexte politique actuel
Raph UWECHE	La crise nigériane. Réflexions sur l'échec du Biafra et l'avenir politique du Nigeria
Claudine RODOLFO	Le Golfe Persique (II)—Situation actuelle et perspective d'avenir

Prix de l'abonnement:

France ..... 48 F

Etranger ..... 64 F

Le numéro: 9 F

Publiée tous les deux mois

Adresser les abonnements au **Centre d'études de Politique étrangère**
54, rue de Varenne—Paris 7ème—C.C.P. 1865-41 Paris

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Winter 1971 **Volume XXV, No. 1**

PEASANT MOVEMENTS AND REVOLUTIONARY WARS

EFFECTS OF PACIFICATION ON INSURGENCY IN VIET NAM
Robert W. Komer

FRENCH EXPERIENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY WAR: INDOCHINA AND ALGERIA
Jean Baechler

REACTION AND REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD
Eqbal Ahmad

ARMS SUPPLIES TO PEASANT MOVEMENTS: LATIN AMERICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
John H. Hoagland

BOOK REVIEWS: William R. Corson, Manfred Halpern, Colonel John J. McCuen, Truong Buu Lam, Eldon Kenworthy

Subscriptions: Single current issue $2.25; single back issue $2.50; one year $4.50; two years $8.50; three years $12.50. Plus 50 cents per issue for foreign postage and handling.

School of International Affairs, Columbia University

622 WEST 113th STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10025

ÖSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSSENPOLITIK

keeps you informed on Austrian foreign policy and international relations.

Recent issues contain articles by:

Alois Riklin, Modell einer schweizerischen Aussenpolitik

Gerd Kaminiski, "Luftpiraterie"

Arne Haselbach, Ein Überblick über die Vorarbeiten für die Zweite Entwicklungsdekade der Vereinten Nationen

Documents on Austrian neutrality and the problem of South Tyrol

Chronicle of Austrian foreign policy

Reviews

Annual Subscription $8.50—six copies a year.

Published by:

ÖSTERREICHISCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR AUSSENPOLITIK UND INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN

1010 VIENNA, JOSEFSPLATZ 6, AUSTRIA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE WORLD TODAY

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems.

Recent numbers include articles on:

THE NEGOTIATIONS IN BRUSSELS: AN ITALIAN VIEW *by Pietro Quaroni*

CAN URANIUM ENRICHMENT ENRICH SOUTH AFRICA? *by Aldo Cassuto*

PAKISTAN: OLD ISSUES IN A NEW CONTEXT *by William J. Barnds*

CHILE: FROM CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY TO MARXISM? *by Alan Angell*

EAST EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT AID: COMPARATIVE RECORD AND PROSPECTS *by Michael Kaser*

Annual Subscription: £3.25 post free (U.S.A. and Canada $10)
28 NP per copy

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London N.W.10.

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CHATHAM HOUSE, 10 ST. JAMES'S SQUARE, LONDON S.W.1

ISI THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW

Contributors to recent issues:

Raymond Aron
William C. Bark
General Andre Beaufre
Louis I. Bredvold
Yale Brozen
Lev E. Dobriansky
M. Stanton Evans
Lawrence Henry Gipson
Ernest van den Haag
Will Herberg
William R. Kintner
Russell Kirk
Wm. Oliver Martin
Ludwig von Mises
Gerhart Niemeyer
Stefan T. Possony
Leo Strauss
Robert Strausz-Hupe
Frank N. Trager
Eric Voegelin
Simon N. Whitney
Francis G. Wilson

A journal of scholarship and opinion publishing articles in the fields of philosophy, political science, economics, literature and social criticism. THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW is made available free of charge to faculty and students four times during the academic year by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Subscriptions are invited from those outside the academic community: one year, five dollars; two years, eight dollars; three years, eleven dollars. Subscriptions and inquiries should be addressed to: ISI, 14 South Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 19010.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

William R. Kintner, Director

Research Monograph Series:

No. 3. *Nationalism in the Atlantic Community.* By Hans Kohn. $1.25. January 1965.

No. 4. *Soviet Politics Since the Fall of Khrushchev.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $1.25. January 1965.

No. 5. *Measuring International Alignments.* By Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt. $1.00. April 1965.

No. 6. *Aggression and Self-Defense: The Legality of U.S. Action in South Vietnam.* By Stefan T. Possony. $2.50. September 1966.

No. 7. *The British Common Market Decision and Beyond.* By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. $1.50. March 1966.

No. 8. *To the Twenty-third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $2.00. October 1965.

No. 9. *New Trends in Soviet Policy and the 23rd Party Congress.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $1.25. August 1966.

No. 10. *A Scale of Events Along the Conflict-Cooperation Continuum.* By Alvin Richman. $1.75. March 1967.

No. 11. *The Political Dimensions of Foreign Aid.* By Karl von Vorys. $2.00. August 1967.

Recent Books in the Institute Series:

Peace and the Strategy Conflict. By William R. Kintner. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 264 pp. $6.95.

Constituency Labour Parties in Great Britain. By Edward G. Janosik. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 222 pp. $6.50.

The Treaty Trap. By Laurence W. Beilenson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1969. 344 pp. $7.00.

The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. 216 pp. $2.45 (paper).

Britain Faces Europe, 1957-1967. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. 228 pp. $6.00.

Copies of Institute monographs may be obtained from The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Institute books may be obtained from the publisher or from your local bookstore.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED